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The doctrine of popular sovereignty emerged as a potential solution to the crisis over 
slavery in the territories because it removed the issue from the halls of Congress.  Most 
historians have focused on its development and implementation beginning in the late 1840s and 
culminating with passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854, but have not recognized its 
significance in earlier debates over slavery.  Popular sovereignty, which took various forms and 
received different definitions, appeared as a potential solution to the problem of slavery 
extension as early as the first decade of the nineteenth century when settlers in the Louisiana 
Purchase and the Old Northwest demanded the right to govern their own domestic institutions. 
This work charts its development beginning with the earliest debates over the extension of 
slavery in the territories and traces its place in political discussions until the breakup of the 
Union. 
Focusing on the idea of popular sovereignty illustrates how Americans perceived 
democracy and democratic institutions, specifically the division of power between states and the 
federal government.  The issue of slavery in the territories became a flash point in the debate 
over the nature of the Union in the earliest years of the republic; it persisted to the coming of the 
Civil War. The expansion of slavery remained a contentious issue throughout the nation’s first 
eighty years, even though the terms of the debate changed significantly over time.  Popular 
sovereignty offered a way to avert a clash over the future of slavery by affirming the right of 
residents in the territories to determine slavery’s future within their jurisdiction.  Ultimately, the 
doctrine failed to settle the crisis over slavery in the territories because northerners and 
southerners could not agree on how the people would exercise self-government.  Placing the 
future of slavery in the hands of settlers in the territories presented a risk to both northerners and 
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southerners.  The North feared that they would permit slavery; the South believed that 




 Americans argued over the expansion of slavery into the territories of the West for much 
of the eighty-year period between independence and the Civil War.  The people had long debated 
whether the institution of slavery fell under local control or if the federal government dictated 
where slavery could exist and where it could not.  On the issue of slavery in general, from the 
jurisdiction of issues regarding slavery and the law to the collection and return of fugitive slaves, 
political leaders had cobbled together a blend of local and federal control designed to allay 
sectional fears and tension.1  Whenever the United States gained new territorial acquisitions, 
however, the dreaded issue of whether slavery would enter those new lands immediately 
surfaced.  From the establishment of the Northwest and Southwest Territories, to the Louisiana 
Purchase, the annexation of Texas, the acquisition of the Mexican Cession, and finally the debate 
over Kansas and Nebraska, the extension of slavery confounded politicians.  Each time, leaders 
crafted plans that solved the problem in their time.  In retrospect, their compromises lasted for 
only a short period and failed to settle the dispute once and for all.   
 The idea of territorial self-government, or what became known as popular sovereignty, 
played a critical role in almost every debate over slavery in the territories. In nearly every debate 
from the creation of the Northwest Territory forward, politicians contested whether the power to 
prohibit slavery rested with Congress or the people residing in the territories.  For as long as the 
United States had added territory to its national domain, leaders had discussed whether decisions 
regarding the expansion of slavery should rest with the federal government, as owner and agent 
for the territories themselves, or with those who inhabited and who would inhabit the territories.  
Closely linked with the argument over states’ rights versus nationalism that intensified during the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For a recent account of the federal government’s involvement in the institution of slavery, see Don E. 
Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Government’s Relations to Slavery, 
completed and edited by Ward M. McAfee (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
 2	  
antebellum era, the debate over slavery in the territories showed differences in how Americans 
viewed the nature and structure of the federal union. 
Different interpretations of the nature of the Union prevailed between the sections; 
northerners believed that the people themselves had created the Constitution, while southerners 
insisted that the states had created the federal government as their common agent, leaving the 
states with ultimate authority.  The argument intensified in the years before the Civil War.  
Likewise by the late 1840s Americans could not agree on the correct interpretation of popular 
sovereignty, the doctrine designed to settle the issue of slavery in the territories, for precisely the 
same reason.  In the 1850s, northerners like Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois declared that 
the people—at any time acting through their territorial legislatures—could permit or prohibit 
slavery.  Southerners insisted that territories became imbued with sovereignty only when drafting 
a constitution and seeking admission to the Union.  In keeping with their states’ rights 
interpretation of the Constitution, southerners believed, according to Don E. Fehrenbacher, “that 
the most legitimate embodiment of American sovereignty was a state convention drawn from 
and acting for the people.”2  Did popular sovereignty rest in the masses or in the states, acting on 
behalf of the people?  This was the question that northerners and southerners feuded over, just as 
they disagreed over states’ rights versus nationalism. 
 My study examines the pivotal issue of local versus federal control over the issue of 
slavery in the territories.  The debate over what Douglas would come to call popular sovereignty 
emerged in the earliest discussions of whether to permit or prohibit the expansion of slavery into 
the national domain.  Some historians have recognized this, though no scholar has yet portrayed 
the development of popular sovereignty as a process beginning with the first territorial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Don E. Fehrenbacher, Sectional Crisis and Southern Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1995), 111.  See also Austin Allen, Origins of the Dred Scott Case: Jacksonian Jurisprudence and the 
Supreme Court (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006), 178-202 and passim. 
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acquisitions of the new nation to its establishment as national policy in the 1850s, with passage 
of the Kansas-Nebraska Act and finally in the Supreme Court’s definition of popular sovereignty 
in terms favorable to the South.3   I seek to bridge the work of historians who have traditionally 
examined the doctrine of popular sovereignty as proposed beginning in the late 1840s and the 
recent writings of scholars who have focused more closely on the struggles over slavery in the 
early republic.4  Historians such as Michael A. Morrison have pointed to this approach in their 
works, suggesting that a “sectionalization of the inherited revolutionary political heritage” 
transformed American politics in the twenty years preceding the Civil War.5  In the minds of 
southerners, northerners saw their society as inferior and their peculiar institution as immoral.  
Just as colonists had chafed at imperial control over local affairs, so slaveholders resented the 
efforts of antislavery politicians to control the issue of slavery in the territories.  Beginning in the 
late 1840s, Democrats in the North and South “determined to remove this matter of local concern 
from Congress and eliminate it from national political debate.”6  
 Yet the problem had existed long before the 1840s, and so too had the proposed solution.  
Congress had implicitly established the principle of popular sovereignty when it created the 
Southwest Territory in 1790.  Slavery was prohibited north of the Ohio River, but the people 
residing to the south could determine the status of slavery for themselves.  Of course, few 
believed that the settlers would prohibit the institution, but territorial inhabitants desired, and in 
some cases demanded, a certain degree of political autonomy with respect to the issue of slavery. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For works dealing with early struggles over the issue of slavery in the territories, see Donald L. Robinson, Slavery 
and the Structure of American Politics, 1765-1820 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), 378-423; John 
Craig Hammond, Slavery, Freedom, and Expansion in the Early American West (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2007); and Matthew Mason, Slavery and Politics in the Early American Republic (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 172-216 and passim.   
4 Michael A. Morrison, Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse of Manifest Destiny and the Coming of the Civil 
War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997) is the standard work on slavery expansion and the 
debates of the 1840s and 1850s. 
5 Ibid., 7. 
6 Ibid., 8. 
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 The admission of Missouri Territory into the Union marked a watershed in the debate 
over slavery in the territories.  The antislavery amendment of the relatively unknown New York 
representative James Tallmadge to a bill for Missouri’s statehood reignited the issue of slavery’s 
expansion.  Congress debated the issue of statehood for Missouri over the course of three 
congressional sessions, sometimes using words and arguments that threatened the very stability 
of the Union.  In the course of this bitter debate, the national legislators revisited the concept of 
local control over slavery and its expansion.  Southerners and westerners vehemently asserted the 
right of local determination over the issue, while members of Congress from the Northeast 
seemed more reticent to relinquish congressional authority, for they argued that Congress did 
indeed possess the sovereign right to make the decision.7   
Ultimately Congress reaffirmed the idea of a dividing line between freedom and slavery.  
Slaves could not pass into the Louisiana Purchase north of 36˚ 30’ latitude, but to the south of 
the line citizens could permit or prohibit slavery as they wished.  The issue would arise again 
several times before the late 1840s, most notably during the debate over the Congressional gag 
rule in the second session of the Twenty-fifth Congress in 1837 and 1838, as the Senate debated 
John C. Calhoun’s resolutions on slavery and the federal Union.  Put another way, the debate 
over local control of slavery and its expansion, which had emerged in the infancy of the republic, 
never disappeared.  
My work examines the development of the concept of popular sovereignty to the coming 
of the Civil War—first, by offering a narrative of how popular sovereignty surfaced and evolved 
in the antebellum era; second, by examining the key issue of the relation of the territories to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Two works summarize the Missouri debates: Glover Moore, The Missouri Controversy, 1819-1821 (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1953) and Robert Pierce Forbes, The Missouri Compromise and Its Aftermath: 
Slavery and the Meaning of America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).  Moore’s book 
remains the standard account of the actual debates, while Forbes provides insight into the Missouri Compromise’s 
significance on the slavery debate after 1821. 
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federal government.  Tracing the evolution of the doctrine of popular sovereignty exhibits the 
continuity in the debate over slavery and local control that existed in the United States prior to 
the Civil War.  When politicians debated the terms of popular sovereignty as it pertained to 
slavery in the territories, they discussed the relation of the federal government to the states and to 
the “embryo states,” or the territories seeking admission into the Union.8  Throughout the 
antebellum era, these politicians debated the merits of allowing the people of the territories 
themselves to decide whether they would permit or prohibit slavery—the policy that came to be 
known as popular sovereignty.  Yet the solution itself created a host of seemingly insoluble 
problems.  
Popular sovereignty had an unintended consequence because neither North nor South 
could agree upon its meaning.  It effectively “constitutionalized” the debate over slavery in the 
territories by mimicking the debate over the nature of the Union.9  The issue of when or if a 
territory could ban slavery became a matter of constitutional interpretation, a process which 
culminated in the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford, when the Supreme Court affirmed the southern 
interpretation of popular sovereignty.  Antislavery northerners, however, rejected the high 
court’s pronouncement, which they considered immoral.  At the same time, many southerners 
began to believe that the federal government—acting as their common agent—would have to 
take measures to protect slave property in the territories.  The idea of popular sovereignty, and 
indeed the Union, crumbled under the ever-increasing weight of cumbersome constitutional 
rhetoric over the slavery issue.  A broader history of the popular sovereignty idea shows how the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Legal historians Francis S. Philbrick and William Wiecek both use this term in their work to describe the territories 
at them time they seek admission into the Union.  See Philbrick, ed., The Laws of Illinois Territory (Springfield: 
Illinois State Historical Library, 1950); Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism in America, 1760-
1848 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977). 
 
9 Don E. Fehrenbacher uses this term in his magisterial study of Dred Scott v. Sandford.  See The Dred Scott Case: 
Its Significance in American Law and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
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debate over slavery divided the nation into rigid sectional blocs, providing essential insight into 
how and when the Union sundered. 
 In order to chronicle accurately the evolution of the popular sovereignty doctrine and to 
analyze its significance to the debates over slavery in the antebellum era, I have taken a 
chronological approach to this study.  It begins with an overview of the debate over slavery in 
the territories from the implementation of the Northwest Ordinance to the time of the Missouri 
controversy.  To understand how the issue became so hotly contested in 1819 and 1820, one 
must investigate its origins in the first attempts to settle the vast national domain of the Old 
Northwest and the Southwest regions of the United States.  The second chapter addresses 
southern attitudes toward territorial expansion and their legal formulations regarding the peculiar 
institution and its expansion, which developed during the Missouri debates.  Federal legislation 
beginning with the Northwest and Southwest Ordinances implicitly created a dividing line 
between slave and free territory.  The Missouri Compromise expanded on this and firmly placed 
the concept of a division in American legal precedent. In the following chapter, I discuss this 
precedent in more detail by analyzing how specific territories became states and how they 
exercised local control over the institution of slavery.  I also discuss the congressional debate in 
1837 and 1838 over the relationship between the federal government and the territories, part of 
the larger debate over Senator John C. Calhoun’s resolutions on the Union.  Written in the midst 
of the well-known “gag rule” debate, Calhoun’s resolutions touched on the right of Congress to 
determine the expansion of slavery in the territories.  By addressing these basic legal and 
political issues, this debate marked another step in the evolution of popular sovereignty. 
 The acquisition of more territory from Mexico in 1848 led to the recrudescence of the 
issue of slavery in the territories in its most disruptive form since the days of the Missouri 
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Compromise.  In an effort to settle this increasingly fractious dispute, northern Democratic 
leaders like George M. Dallas of Pennsylvania, Daniel S. Dickinson of New York, and Lewis 
Cass of Michigan articulated the concept of popular sovereignty.  The doctrine would remain in 
the national spotlight for the succeeding twelve years; the debate over its application would also 
continue unabated.  The Compromise of 1850 and its settlement for the Utah and New Mexico 
territories put popular sovereignty into practice.  But the debate over the compromise measures 
and the settlement for the territories provoked contention over the idea of popular sovereignty 
itself. When the northern Democrats proposed the doctrine beginning in 1847, many moderate 
southerners had enthusiastically accepted it as a suitable compromise.  Some proponents of the 
doctrine, most notably Daniel Dickinson, explicitly stated that the citizens of a territory had the 
right to decide on the slavery issue before applying for statehood and crafting a constitution.  In 
his seminal formulation of popular sovereignty, Lewis Cass left this question unanswered, most 
likely in a purposeful effort to appease people on both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line.   
Southerners bristled at the idea of allowing the pivotal decision on the future of slavery to 
be made before the population of a territory had fully developed.  More radical southerners who 
identified with the politics and theories of John C. Calhoun threatened solid southern support for 
what the Calhounites derisively called “squatter sovereignty.”  Whigs and Calhounites in the 
South helped ensure Cass’s defeat in 1848 and raised critical questions about just how his brand 
of popular sovereignty would work—questions that Cass himself proved unwilling to answer.  
These questions had particular significance in the case of New Mexico, where southerners 
accused Mexicans of manipulating the political process in an effort to bar the introduction of 
slavery.  They argued that this course allowed the conquered to govern the conqueror.  The 
admission of California as a free state and the creation of New Mexico Territory with an openly 
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antislavery government threatened southerners, who withdrew support for popular sovereignty in 
this form—and for Cass, whom they saw as deceptive. 
 The issue would reemerge with the push for creating the Territory of Nebraska.  A pet 
project of Stephen A. Douglas, Nebraska seemed beyond debate regarding the slavery issue, as it 
lay north of the compromise line of 1820.  Southerners, however, pushed Douglas to divide the 
vast region into two territories—Kansas and Nebraska—and to include an explicit repeal of the 
Missouri Compromise line.  The Illinoisan obliged, arguing that the Compromise of 1850 had 
rendered it “inoperative” anyway.  Popular sovereignty would replace the line that had become 
odious to many southerners, a consideration that played no small part in moving many 
southerners to reconsider the doctrine they jettisoned following the 1850 debate.  Popular 
sovereignty enjoyed greater support from the southern states in 1854 than ever before.  Yet the 
old debate over the timing of a decision on the slavery issue—when a territory’s settlers could 
exercise their popular sovereignty—appeared again, and proved its ultimate undoing.  The 
proponents of popular sovereignty looked to the Supreme Court for a final determination on how 
the doctrine would operate in practice.  Southerners rejected Douglas’s interpretation of popular 
sovereignty and heaped scorn upon its chief proponent, who they believed had defined the 
doctrine against their best interests.  When the Supreme Court endorsed the southern version of 
popular sovereignty in the Dred Scott case, many northerners spurned the Court itself and 
refused to abide by its determination.  Ultimately popular sovereignty failed and even played a 
role in the destruction of the Union because neither North nor South could agree on its meaning.  
The debate between states’ rights and nationalism subsumed the popular sovereignty discourse, 
destroying the series of moderate stances on slavery that politicians had embraced in one form or 
another for eighty years. 
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 While I utilize sources from both the North and the South, I have chosen to focus more 
sharply on the South and its attitude toward popular sovereignty.  In almost every context in 
which it came up, politicians offered the idea of local control over slavery as a way to satisfy the 
South—or at least to compromise in a way that would not offend the states’ rights constitutional 
scruples of southerners.  Northern Democrats exemplified this compromise approach in the late 
1840s when they sought to unify their party across sectional lines by proposing a solution 
acceptable to southerners.  Popular sovereignty usually emerged as a means to assure the people 
of the South that their voices would be heard, that their concerns would be addressed.  Its 
proponents sought to bridge the Mason-Dixon Line, a division that in times like the Missouri 
controversy, the introduction of the Wilmot Proviso, and the congressional debates of 1849 and 
1850, seemed like a chasm. Southern support for popular sovereignty, which had emerged in the 
Missouri debates, became strongest in the late 1840s and 1850s.  Southerners rejected the 
doctrine, however, when northerners proposed a version of the doctrine that the South found 
disingenuous.  Approaching popular sovereignty from the southern perspective illustrates 
whether southerners believed that it upheld their rights to hold property in slaves, as well as its 
congruity with their beliefs about the relation of the federal government to the states and 
territories. 
 A final word on nomenclature is necessary.  What historians call popular sovereignty 
today actually went by many names in the nineteenth century.  In fact, the term popular 
sovereignty itself did not gain widespread use until the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 
May 1854.  Prior to this time, politicians, newspaper editors, and others interchangeably used the 
terms non-intervention, non-interference, territorial sovereignty, and self-government, the last 
used chiefly during the Missouri debates of 1819-1821.  Additionally, opponents of the idea that 
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a territory could make a decision regarding slavery before writing a constitution and applying for 
statehood used the epithet “squatter sovereignty.”  Few historians have attempted to set this 
straight, with Don E. Fehrenbacher being a notable exception.  He correctly noted the difference 
between non-intervention and popular sovereignty; indeed, popular sovereignty could not exist 
without an affirmation of non-intervention by Congress.10  Nevertheless, few people at the time 
looked at the matter in such precise terms and consequently used the different labels 
interchangeably.  In these pages, I attempt to use the language common at the time I am writing 
about.  This results in the use of multiple terms for the same basic idea, but it more correctly 
shows the evolution of popular sovereignty itself. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, 140-142. 
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CHAPTER 1 
SLAVERY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE EARLY AMERICAN TERRITORIES 
 
 
The United States never implemented a wholly uniform system to incorporate territory 
within the nation, in spite of attempts to do just that.  The strongest effort to create a sort of 
territorial code preceded the ratification of the Constitution of 1787.  Beginning in 1784, the 
nation’s leaders began grappling with the best way to assimilate territory previously held by 
individual states into the Union and prepare it for eventual statehood.  These early debates laid 
the groundwork for the ongoing discussion of the nature of states and territories that continued 
up to the Civil War.  Even at the earliest stages of the discussion of how to create territories and 
states, the future of slavery in the national domain assumed critical importance. 
 In 1784, even the idea of a national domain seemed foreign.  Several of the original 
thirteen states, which had held title to vast tracts of lands in the interior of the continent, ceded 
their claims to the new federal government as created under the Articles of Confederation.1  Most 
leaders agreed on the necessity of some sort of uniform code for the orderly settlement of 
western lands, but in the discussion over how to govern the West, several critical issues emerged 
that greatly complicated the process.  What role would the federal government have in governing 
these territories?  How could the government ensure a smooth transition from wilderness to 
settlement—from inchoate territory to organized state?  Who possessed the power to impose 
order on these territories—the federal government or the states themselves?  These three 
questions especially troubled national policy makers, for they touched on fundamental principles 
of the Union itself: the nature of the Union and the power of the federal government vis-à-vis the 
states.  The questions raised seem abstract on first glance, but they held great practical meaning 
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to politicians engaged in the process of securing the new nation and testing the parameters of its 
newly written Articles of Confederation. 
 The Constitution of 1787 altered the nature of the American polity by substituting a 
strong federal government for the loose confederation created by the Articles, but it did not 
substantively change the nature of territorial administration.  In the first session of the new 
Congress created by the Constitution, legislators reenacted the Northwest Ordinance, essentially 
giving approval to the action of the Confederation Congress on the subject.2  By 1790, Congress 
had passed a series of laws that addressed these issues specifically, but had largely failed to 
provide sufficient and final answers to the questions regarding establishment of territories and 
state making.  Furthermore, political leaders had difficulty establishing how much self-
government a territory should exercise versus how much control the federal government must 
assume.  Many individuals recognized that American citizens populating the territories possessed 
the same rights and privileges as citizens residing in the states.  The fragile territorial condition, 
however, seemed to necessitate a period when the federal government would have to 
circumscribe the political rights of territorial citizens to ensure the orderly political development 
of the territory itself.  No one seemed to know how to calculate the right blend of territorial self-
government and federal control.  Furthermore, the issue of federal supremacy over the territories 
raised questions among the states.  Some believed that the territorial laws gave too much power 
to the federal government at the expense of the states.  Questions of states’ rights would emerge 
from the territorial debate as well.  The lack of consensus on the entire matter proved especially 
toxic when the question of slavery in the territories arose.  Debates ensued, leaders made 
compromises, the process of creating territories began, but questions lingered. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Act of August 7, 1790, ch. VIII, 1 U.S. Statutes at Large, 50-53.  See also Peter S. Onuf, Statehood and Union: A 
History of the Northwest Ordinance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), xviii. 
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 The first effort at regulating the creation of territories came with the Ordinance of 1784, 
which most historians agree that Thomas Jefferson authored.  The legislation did not establish 
territorial governments as later envisioned by the federal government, however, because 
Jefferson made no distinction between states and territories; he called the inchoate political 
subdivisions created by the bill “states.”3  Jefferson most likely made this choice as a way to 
ensure the equality of the new states with the original thirteen.4  He nevertheless recognized the 
necessity of a maturation period, where a particular embryo state could attain sufficient 
population to support itself and become a full-fledged member of the Union.  He therefore 
sought to create different stages of government, whereby a “state” would progress in 
development over time until it reached the maturity necessary to become a full member of the 
Union.5  The embryo states—as historians have labeled them—would initially adopt a 
constitution of an existing state; they would operate under the charter until they reached the point 
where they could apply for statehood.  When they reached a population of twenty thousand, the 
citizens could organize a constitutional convention to draft their own charter.  Finally, when the 
embryo state reached the population of the least populous of the original states, it automatically 
gained statehood.  Jefferson’s plan of government imposed order on the state making process, 
just as it gave great latitude to the embryo states to conduct their own affairs.  As Arthur Bestor 
has argued, “The central feature of the Ordinance of 1784, both as Jefferson originally drafted it 
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especially pp. 27-33. See also Robert Berkhofer, Jr., “The Northwest Ordinance and the Principles of Territorial 
Evolution,” in Bloom, ed., The American Territorial System, 47-50. 
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and as Congress finally adopted it, was its unhesitating grant of self-governing institutions to 
inhabitants of new lands from the very beginning.”6 
 Jefferson’s draft ordinance contained a second provision that, if passed by Congress, 
could have fundamentally altered the debate over the territories that ensued in the nineteenth 
century.  The initial draft, read in Congress on March 1, 1784, contained the following proviso: 
“That after the year 1800 of the Christian era, there shall neither be slavery nor involuntary 
servitude in any of the said states, otherwise than in punishment of crimes, whereof the party 
shall have been duly convicted to have been personally guilty.”7  Jefferson’s proviso surely 
reflects his own ambiguity on the institution of slavery by providing for its gradual extinction in 
the newly created states of the western territories, yet it also seems incongruous with the 
document itself.  If an embryo state could select the constitution of any of the original thirteen 
states as it saw fit, and then possess the power to enact legislation in conformity with that 
document, why could it not legislate on the issue of slavery?  The record of the Continental 
Congress gives scant detail of the debates themselves, so determining Jefferson’s intentions is 
difficult.   
Viewing Jefferson’s aim for the clause as a beginning point for the gradual extinction of 
slavery in the United States does not seem implausible given his feelings toward the institution.   
This proviso, however, did not survive the debates in Congress.  On April 19, two delegates from 
North Carolina and South Carolina, representing the southern opposition to a slavery ban, moved 
to strike the proviso from the draft and a vote to sustain the wording failed.8  By the rules of the 
Confederation Congress, seven votes were required to retain the provision.  Members of seven 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid., 28. 
7 Galliard Hunt, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, 34 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1904-1937), XXVI, 119. (hereafter cited as JCC) 
8 Ibid., 247. 
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state delegations from the North voted to keep the slavery ban, but New Jersey’s delegation had 
one member absent due to illness.  Consequently, its vote did not count and the measure to retain 
failed.  Jefferson resented the outcome, noting that “the voice of a single individual” would have 
“prevented this abominable crime of spreading itself across the country.”9  
 Though the issue of slavery in the western cessions emerged unsettled from the debates 
over Jefferson’s Ordinance of 1784, the law did provide for an orderly settlement process and for 
a surprisingly broad degree of self-government for any embryo state created under its terms.  It 
also set a lasting precedent for the process of territorial policy and state making; in all future 
legislation on the matter, Congress would use Jefferson’s concept of territorial grades—or stages 
of development.  Jefferson’s ordinance also had specific implications regarding the question of 
federal jurisdiction over the territories.  The legislation of 1784 seemed to mirror the government 
at large, with its emphasis on power resting in the constituent states that made up the United 
States as a nation—essentially the foundation of states’ rights theory.  As criticism mounted 
against the Articles of Confederation, with its weak form of national government, leaders saw the 
Ordinance of 1784—with its provisions for a broad degree of territorial self-government—as 
insufficient for effective administration of a large national domain.   
Politicians who led the vanguard for a stronger federal government also argued that the 
Ordinance of 1784 provided too loose a framework for the embryo states prior to their drafting of 
a unique constitution.  Specifically, some leaders believed that the federal government needed to 
draw a sharper distinction between embryo states and states on the same footing as the original 
thirteen.  A stronger federal government would have to assume firmer control of its western 
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lands for the safety of the Union.  Some western separatists, individuals on the frontier who 
contemplated forming a separate union outside of the United States, saw the Ordinance of 1784 
as “an invitation to political action.”10  The large degree of self-government granted to settlers in 
the western lands could play into the hands of western separatists who had little or no allegiance 
to the young Union.  Forthcoming legislation would deal specifically with these issues and 
implement more rigorous control over what would become known as the territories.  Provisions 
for the orderly settlement of western lands would have to make clear the subordinate nature of 
the unincorporated districts to the federal government.  To a considerable extent, the impetus for 
stronger federal control over the territories would necessitate a retreat from the broad self-
government that Jefferson had envisioned.11  
 The efforts at revised legislation to create a territorial system began in September 1786, 
when the Continental Congress named a committee to draft legislation for territorial 
governments in the western territories.12  These initial efforts failed to gain traction, leading to 
the prompt creation of a second committee to write a new draft.  With “equal (and 
uncharacteristic) dispatch,” Congress unanimously adopted the Northwest Ordinance on July 13, 
1787.13  Historians have exhaustively studied the creation of this document, but several issues 
related to its passage merit closer examination here.  First, the new ordinance carefully 
delineated the differences between territory and state.  The committee dispensed with Jefferson’s 
plan of government—whereby territories would adopt an existing state constitution—and 
imposed a plan of government clearly subordinate to Congress.  In the first grade of territorial 
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government, Congress would appoint territorial governors, secretaries, and judges for the newly 
created territories.  Once “five thousand free male inhabitants of full age” came to reside in the 
territory, it would ascend to the second grade, thereby receiving the power to elect a legislative 
assembly.14  The third and final grade came when the territory’s population numbered at least 
60,000 citizens; at this point, it could apply for statehood.  The wording of the ordinance seemed 
to suggest that admittance to the Union did not proceed automatically at some point.  Instead, 
Congress had the discretion to confer statehood “provided the constitution and government so to 
be formed, shall be republican, and in conformity to the principles” of the ordinance itself.15   
 Second, the most well known feature of the ordinance came at the sixth and final “article 
of compact”:    
There shall be neither Slavery nor involuntary Servitude in the said territory otherwise 
than in punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted; provided 
always that any person escaping into the same, from whom labor or service is lawfully 
claimed in any one of the original States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and 
conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid.16  
 
The sixth article has an unclear provenance, as Congress inserted without debate the clause on 
the day of the ordinance’s passage.17  Most likely, Nathan Dane of Massachusetts, a leader in 
crafting the ordinance itself, appended the sixth article at the last minute.  No mention of any 
intended prohibition of slavery, however, exists in the entire record of the debate over the 
ordinance until its appearance in the final reading. 
 Just why Congress enacted such a provision in 1787, when three years earlier it had 
rejected Jefferson’s gradual prohibition of slavery remains unclear.  Why slaveholders 
acquiesced in the prohibition clause proves even more puzzling.  Even the purported author of 
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the sixth article professed surprise at its easy passage.  “When I drew the ordinance which passed 
(in a few words excepted) as I originally formed it,” Dane wrote to his friend Rufus King, who 
had attempted to reinstate Jefferson’s ban in 1785, “I had no idea the States would agree to the 
sixth Art. prohibiting Slavery---;as only Massa. of the Eastern States was present. . . but finding 
the House favourably disposed on this subject, after we had completed the other parts I moved 
the art---;which was agreed to without opposition.”18  Scholars have long debated this very point 
and have arrived at few concrete answers.  Circumstantial evidence does shed some light on the 
insertion of the sixth article.  Historian Peter Onuf notes that prohibition of slavery in the newly 
framed “neo-colonial” system of territorial government served twin purposes: first, as a tangible 
part of strengthening federal control over the territories; second, and more significantly, as a way 
to entice the emigration of New Englanders to the Northwest Territory.  By 1787, Massachusetts 
and New Hampshire had ended slavery.19  The states of Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and 
Connecticut had committed to gradual emancipation.  A number of delegates to Congress, 
especially from the northeast, surmised that settlers in the Northwest Territory would hail from 
the states that had emancipated their slaves and consequently would not desire the institution.  
Yet the southern boundary of the territory—the Ohio River—served as the northern boundary of 
a vast territory once in the possession of the states of Virginia and North Carolina.  North 
Carolina ceded its territory to the federal government in 1790; Virginia’s land would become the 
state of Kentucky two years later.  Perhaps citizens from the Atlantic slave states would care to 
settle in the region.  Politicians would soon find that emigration patterns would hardly evolve so 
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neatly, as people from both the eastern states as well as southern states would move to the newly 
created territory.  
 Interestingly, the southern states raised no objections to the sixth article.  In a letter to 
James Monroe, delegate William Grayson of Virginia wrote, “The clause respecting slavery was 
agreed to by the Southern members for the purpose of preventing Tobacco & Indigo from being 
made on the N.W. side of the Ohio, as well as for sevl. other political reasons.”20  Identifying 
those “other political reasons” is difficult, but Grayson’s comments suggest that southerners 
initially did not have a serious interest in the Northwest Territory.  Perhaps they believed that 
slaveholders would not move to the Northwest, but poorer farmers would.  Regardless, these 
suppositions were just that—mere best guesses at the makeup of the future citizens of the 
territory, making Grayson’s comments conjectural.  Alternatively, the historian Staughton Lynd 
posits that southerners acquiesced for several reasons and offers an explanation for the political 
motivation of acceding to the slavery prohibition.  In 1787, southern delegates concerned 
themselves more with the balance of sectional power in the Congress than with finding room for 
slavery’s expansion.  Precisely because the territory shared a boundary with the southern-
dominated lands south of the Ohio River, southerners believed any states formed out of the 
Northwest Territory would ally with the South.  Of course, northerners believed the exact 
opposite.  In his letter to Rufus King, Dane argued that territory that would become the state of 
Ohio would “no doubt be settled chiefly by Eastern people,” and would most likely have the 
same politics.21  Nevertheless, southerners hoped to influence politics in the Northwest Territory 
by adding to its population.  If southerners would emigrate to the territory, they could 
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undoubtedly sway the political attitudes of the three territories that would eventually be created.  
But any effort among southerners to influence the politics of the Northwest Territory would 
require a broad degree of self-government. 
 Southerners had a second reason for assenting to the ordinance as amended.  Lynd has 
produced evidence suggesting that the North and South had arrived at an implicit compromise on 
the issue of slavery that would bar its presence from the Northwest Ordinance while keeping 
silent on its status in the territory south of the Ohio River.22  In the initial version of a new 
ordinance for the creation of territorial governments, written in September 1786, the drafting 
committee made no distinction of what territory fell under its jurisdiction, instead providing for a 
general form of territorial government that the federal government could apply anywhere and at 
any time.23  In July 1787, however, the committee changed the wording to reflect its application 
to the Northwest Territory, drawing “an explicit East-West line through the Western territories 
by legislating for the Northwest alone.”24  Limiting the geographic scope of the legislation 
produced an arrangement by which the northwest would remain free territory, while the federal 
government would remain silent on the status of slavery in the territory south of the Ohio River. 
 Given the evidence, no historian can offer a definitive explanation on why southerners 
did not object to the prohibition of slavery in the Northwest Territory.  Placing the debate in its 
historical context, however, provides a reasonably solid explanation.  In 1784, nearly all the 
southern delegates in the Congress except Thomas Jefferson and one North Carolina delegate 
voted to strike the slavery prohibition from the Ordinance of 1784.25  In that case, the interdiction 
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would have applied to all western lands.  Furthermore, it provided a specific timetable for the 
ultimate end of slavery in the future western states.  Three years later, the Northwest Ordinance 
contained a slavery ban for a region that did not seem suited to large-scale plantation agriculture, 
but made no interdiction of slavery in lands south of the Ohio River.  The lands of the southwest 
seemed the most viable outlet for southern expansion.  Furthermore, the fact that the slavery ban 
in the 1787 ordinance went into effect immediately actually weakened its effect.  The ordinance 
made no statement on the status of slaves already in the territory, which politicians and courts 
alike often interpreted as an exemption; after all, how could the government deprive an existing 
slaveholder of his property without notice or compensation.26  The lack of clarity in the 
ordinance provided an entering wedge, albeit a small one, whereby slavery could possibly exist 
in the territory.  Settlers in the territory would soon exploit the lack of precision in the Northwest 
Ordinance.  Southerners most likely looked at the northwest as a secondary concern.  They fixed 
their eyes on the rich lands of the southwest, where plantation agriculture would soon boom.  By 
creating a de facto dividing line between free and slave territory, the future of slavery in the 
southwest seemed secure.  In later years, southerners would regret the decisions they made in the 
debate on the Northwest Ordinance, but from the vantage point of 1787, it may well have seemed 
like a good deal for their region. 
 In its final form, the Northwest Ordinance prohibited slavery in the territory—at least at 
first glance.  Yet constitutional scholars have noted numerous flaws in the document that not 
only reveal the haste in which the delegates added the slavery prohibition, but also cast doubt on 
the actual status of slavery in the Northwest Territory.  The sixth article interdicted slavery in the 
future, but said nothing about the status of any slaves living in the territory prior to its passage.  
Conflicting language within the ordinance itself muddled the meaning of the slavery prohibition.  
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The delegates left intact language referring to “free male inhabitants” in several parts of the 
document.27  The ordinance left considerable room for legal wrangling, if not outright evasion of 
the intended purpose of the sixth article, to prohibit slavery.  Indeed, settlers in the Northwest 
Territory would soon test the boundaries of the famous sixth article by questioning its true 
meaning and objecting to its ultimate application.  Likewise, they would challenge the broad 
authority of the federal government over the territories—or at the very least its expediency.  
Specifically, they would come to question the federal government’s authority to prohibit slavery 
in one place and not the other.  Some would question the power altogether, arguing that the 
citizens of the territories themselves could best regulate their domestic affairs. 
 Almost three years passed after the passage of the Northwest Ordinance before the 
federal government set to work on organizing the territory south of the Ohio River.  In April 
1790, the federal government accepted North Carolina’s cession of the territory that would 
become the state of Tennessee.28  Congress acted quickly to organize the cession as a territory, 
and in May 1790, they passed with little debate what has become known as the Southwest 
Ordinance.29  The law applied all the terms of the Northwest Ordinance to the new territory, 
“except so far as is otherwise provided in the conditions” of the cession of North Carolina; that 
is, it excluded the slavery prohibition of the sixth article.30  By applying the Northwest 
Ordinance—save the sixth article—Congress set a precedent in creating the Southwest Territory.  
Future territorial legislation usually replicated the terms of the Ordinance of 1787, except in 
respect to slavery.  North Carolina’s terms of cession forced the hand of Congress, as they 
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stipulated, “That no regulations made or to be made by Congress, shall tend to emancipate 
slaves.”31  Whether as part of an actual compromise, an implicit understanding, or some other 
unknown arrangement, Congress had assented to a dividing line for slavery.  In this case, 
Congress undoubtedly believed it was acting in the best interests of settlers in both the Northwest 
and the Southwest Territories by prohibiting slavery in one and remaining silent on the question 
in the other.  
Though Congress quickly dispatched with provisions for territorial government in the 
Southwest Territory, it did not act with such haste in forming a state from it.  Kentucky, which 
lay along the northern border, became a state in 1792, but the Southwest Territory remained just 
that—a territory.32  Weary of territorial government and possessing the requisite number of 
residents for statehood, the residents of Tennessee petitioned for statehood in early 1796.33  What 
might have seemed like a simple legislative process became complicated when some 
congressmen raised questions about the technical power of admitting a state.  Did the territory 
automatically become a state upon meeting the conditions stipulated in the Northwest Ordinance 
or did Congress have the jurisdiction to grant statehood at its discretion.34  In the debate over 
how a territory gained statehood, two schools of thought emerged regarding the status of the 
territory and Congress’s role in creating states.  On the one hand certain congressmen argued 
that, in the words of South Carolina Federalist William Loughton Smith, “Congress was alone 
competent to form the Territory into one or more States;” therefore it possessed solely the power 
of actually granting statehood rather than merely certifying that the requirements  
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had been met.35  Other legislators argued for a more permissive interpretation of the law.  Robert 
Goodloe Harper, another South Carolina Federalist, contended that, “in all questions relative to 
the formation of Governments, the wish of the people ought to be gratifed,” that “whenever it 
should appear to be the wish of the United States, or any considerable portion of them, to be 
governed in such or such a manner, their inclination should be attended to.”36  Because the 
Tennesseans desired statehood and had met the requirements as outlined by Congress, their 
statehood should proceed automatically.  In the case of Tennessee, Smith and Harper might have 
disagreed on the power of Congress over slavery in the territories, but most southerners sided 
with Harper. 
In one sense, the debate seems esoteric, but the ultimate decision had real implications for 
the future.  Both sides argued from a perspective beyond the immediate concern of Tennessee; 
they recognized that their actions would set precedent for the admission of subsequent states.  
Furthermore, the whole issue touched on the delicate situation of territorial government itself.  In 
reality, the old debates from 1787—where politicians argued over the power of the federal 
government—had never completely disappeared.   
Some members of the Federalist Party—with the notable exception of Harper—tended to 
look at the revised territorial government process as entirely suitable; the territories needed a 
period of gestation in which they could mature into full participation in the political life of the 
United States.  Federalists from New England especially adhered to this view.  Their opposition 
seemed uncomfortable with the status of the territories, as the new system bore more than a faint 
resemblance to a colonial system of government.  Should the nation rule its territories in such an 
aristocratic manner—much like the relation of Great Britain to the American colonies?  James 
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Madison argued that the “inhabitants of that district of country were at present in a degraded 
situation,” meaning that they had no representation in Congress and a limited power of internal 
legislation.37  The writer of the Constitution betrayed his discomfort with the process of creating 
subordinate territorial governments that limited the sovereignty of Americans who had moved 
west.  The concerns coming from both sides of the debate suggest that politicians had not yet 
settled their minds on how much power either the citizens of a territory or Congress should have 
regarding territorial government or state making.  Tennessee gained admission on June 1, 1796, 
but the issues discussed in the debate over its statehood remained largely unresolved.38 
While Congress debated statehood for Tennessee, citizens in the Northwest Territory 
began raising their own questions about the issue of slavery north of the Ohio River.  In May 
1796, a committee of four citizens in St. Clair and Randolph counties transmitted a memorial to 
Congress asking for the suspension of the slavery prohibition.  The citizens argued that the sixth 
article of the Northwest Ordinance constituted an ex post facto law, thereby depriving them of 
their property “without their consent or concurrence.”39  The political climate in the western part 
of the Northwest Territory—the remainder of the original territory after Ohio became a state in 
1803—reflected the fact that citizens from both the eastern states as well as the upper South had 
emigrated to the region, thus fulfilling the predictions of Nathan Dane and many southerners—
William Grayson excepted.  In 1787, these individuals had claimed that citizens from their 
respective sections would emigrate and dominate the politics of the territory.  As the Northwest 
Territory grew, settlers in the eastern portion tended not to support slavery. In the western 
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39 “Slavery and the Exchange of Certain Donations of Land in the Northwestern Territory,” May 12, 1796, American 
State Papers (hereafter cited as ASP): Public Lands, 1:69.  For the context of this memorial and a discussion of 
internal debate over slavery in Illinois, see Nicole Etcheson, The Emerging Midwest: Upland Southerners and the 
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portion, where upland southerners had settled, politics had a more proslavery bent.  A committee 
appointed by Congress to address the St. Clair and Randolph memorial disputed its contents, 
arguing that “an alteration of the ordinance, in the manner prayed for by the petitioners, would be 
disagreeable to many of the inhabitants of the said territory.”40  The memorial itself revealed an 
inescapable fact: slavery did exist in the Northwest Territory in spite of the prohibition.   
The slavery issue, as raised by this initial memorial, represented two distinct but 
complementary power struggles ensuing in the Northwest Territory.  First, an internal struggle 
between Ohio Valley settlers hailing from the South and those who came from the eastern states 
raised issues of who would control the three districts that would eventually become the states of 
Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio.  Some members of the Federalist Party, most notably the Northwest 
Territory’s governor, Arthur St. Clair, questioned not only the loyalty of the “multitude of 
indigent and ignorant people” who resided in the territory, but also their ability to govern 
themselves.41 On the other side, a cadre of Virginia settlers, many of whom owned slaves, 
desired the repeal of the sixth article of the Northwest Ordinance and the creation of a slave 
society, albeit on a drastically smaller scale than that of their home state.  In the middle stood a 
significant group of upland southern yeomen who believed the current territorial status smacked 
of aristocracy and arbitrary government.  They opposed the Federalist leaders, but also resented 
the introduction of slavery as a hindrance to their prosperity in the new territory.42  Still, both the 
Virginians and the southern yeomen believed that they had the upper hand in the struggle and 
would win if the issue of sustaining or repealing the slavery prohibition came to a plebiscite.  
This scenario would continue to play out in the territory for much of the next ten years.  In the 
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42 Nicole Etcheson addresses the Northwest Territory’s complex political milieu in ibid., 15-26, 63-71, and passim. 
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process of petitioning Congress for repeal of the slavery prohibition, or in some cases petitioning 
to sustain it, the settlers of the Northwest Territory showed their desire for self-government—
asserting that they could best determine their own domestic affairs. 
Nearly two years after Congress received the St. Clair and Randolph petition, legislators 
addressed the subject of territorial expansion in a vast expanse of land west of the state of 
Georgia.  That state had claimed rights to the lands making up the present-day states of Alabama 
and Mississippi for some time.  During the second session of the fifth Congress, the House of 
Representatives voted against Georgia’s claim and immediately set out to organize the large 
district into a territory.  In the course of the debate over the bill to create Mississippi Territory, a 
Federalist congressman from Massachusetts moved to strike out a clause in the bill that 
exempted the territory from the Northwest Ordinance’s ban on slavery.43  George Thatcher’s 
motion prompted a heated discussion on the issue of slavery and whether the federal government 
or settlers within the territory should determine its status.  Southerners vigorously objected to 
exclusion of slavery in this region.  Planters in the Natchez district—the extreme western portion 
of what would become Mississippi Territory— already held slaves.  Furthermore, southerners 
saw the vast territory as a natural place to escape the depleted soils of the Atlantic states and 
extend their agricultural pursuits.44  Any effort to prohibit slavery in Mississippi Territory 
constituted an attack on southern economic expansion, as a group of Natchez planters argued in a 
1797 petition to Congress.45  In September of that year, Andrew Ellicott had noted opposition to 
a ban on slavery in the Natchez district to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering.  Ellicott, a 
Pennsylvania Quaker opposed to slavery, had worked with the Spanish authorities in the district 
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on boundary issues after the ratification of Pinckney’s Treaty in 1796.  Accordingly, he 
possessed an intimate knowledge of the political situation in the region.  “Slavery though 
disagreeable to us northern people,” he wrote, “it would certainly be expedient to let it continue 
in this district, where they are numerous, upon the same footing it is at present in the southern 
States.”46  The people of the Natchez district, he noted, objected to the Northwest Ordinance 
precisely because of its ban on slavery.  So, too, did southerners. 
Southern legislators in Congress gave voice to these concerns.  Robert Goodloe Harper 
sought to place the ban on slavery in the Northwest Territory in context while proving its 
inexpediency in the case in question. “In the Northwestern Territory the regulation forbidding 
slavery was a very proper one,” he argued, “as the people inhabiting that part of the country were 
from parts where slavery did not prevail” whereas in Mississippi Territory, “that species of 
property already exists, and persons emigrating there from the Southern States would carry with 
them property of this kind.”47  Other southerners—and, curiously, at least one New England 
Federalist—concurred.  Harrison Gray Otis of Massachusetts argued that southerners would 
settle the territory; therefore, Congress should assent to the wishes of the people who would live 
there.  Furthermore, he predicted a slave insurrection among slaves in the Natchez district if 
Congress passed the amendment of his Massachusetts colleague.48  A Virginia congressman 
articulated a theory that would become a staple of the slavery-in-the-territories argument.  
Barring slavery at this point made no sense, John Nicholas argued, as the territory could make 
that determination for itself at the time it applied for statehood.49 
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Several key issues became clearer over the course of the Mississippi debate.  Thatcher 
made his motion from what at the time represented an extreme position against slavery, that the 
institution violated “the rights of man.”50  Many of his northern colleagues agreed with him, 
though few used such strong words.  Southerners like Harper and Nicholas did not address the 
moral argument itself, except in arguing that diffusion of slavery would actually prove a boon to 
the slaves.  Instead, they assumed a position that the prohibition against slavery in this region 
would hinder emigration and prevent free white property holders in exercising their right to own 
slaves.  Southerners believed that the debate had portrayed their section, according to John 
Rutledge, Jr. of South Carolina, “in an odious light.”51  Rarely in these years did congressmen 
engage in such heated criticism aimed at one section from another.  In this case, though, a 
northerner sought to prohibit slavery in a region understood as within the orbit of the South, and 
in unusually harsh terms.  Rutledge responded in kind, chastising Thatcher for “uttering 
philippics against a practice with which his and their philosophy is at war.”52  Many southerners 
at the time embraced the diffusion argument and spoke of an eventual end of slavery in America, 
but they bitterly resented the northern offensive against the peculiar institution.  Southerners 
insisted that Congress should not interfere with slavery in Mississippi Territory, but that the 
decision should rightfully be left to those who settled in the region.  This argument did not 
necessarily deny Congress of the legal right to bar slavery from the territories, but it certainly 
questioned the expediency of congressional action.  In an uncharacteristically bitter debate, the 
members of the Fifth Congress went a long way in defining the boundaries of the argument 
concerning slavery in the territories. 
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George Thatcher’s motion to prohibit slavery in a territory south of the Ohio River—the 
first instance of its kind—failed when the act creating the Mississippi Territory became law on 
April 7, 1798.53  Just days before, Timothy Pickering penned a letter to Andrew Ellicott notifying 
him that the bill had passed in the Senate and would almost certainly become law.54  Mississippi 
Territory had become the first territory created beyond the aegis of the Northwest and Southwest 
Ordinances, but the dividing line between free and slave territories implicitly created by those 
acts seemed solidified.  And southerners had made their case that only the residents of 
Mississippi Territory could make the final decision on whether to permit or prohibit slavery. 
Congress seemed to have established a pattern by which territories north of the Ohio 
River would remain free, while those south of the river would remain open to the institution.  
However, settlers in the Northwest Territory continued to argue about slavery.  Congress’s 
rejection of the 1796 memorial asking for suspension of the sixth article had not given rest to the 
desire of some settlers to introduce slavery in some form within that territory.  The Territory of 
Indiana became a flash point in this dispute.  Created in 1800 as preparation for the entry of Ohio 
into the Union, Indiana Territory encompassed a long swath of land bounded on the south by the 
Ohio River and on the west by the Mississippi.  The Ohio portion of the Northwest Territory 
never seriously countenanced slavery, but settlers in to the west had different opinions.55  
Numerous Virginia citizens and other individuals from the upper South, in addition to settlers 
from the eastern states, had migrated into what became Indiana Territory.  The mix of 
southerners and easterners made for occasionally fractious politics in the region.  In February 
1803, William Henry Harrison, the president of a proslavery convention held at Vincennes, 
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Indiana, to explore the option of suspending the slavery prohibition, communicated a memorial 
to Congress “declaring the consent of the people of Indiana” to remove the ban on slavery for a 
period of ten years.56  After the ten-year period had ended, the prohibition of slavery would 
resume, but any slaves in the territory and their issue would remain enslaved.  The Vincennes 
petition would ensure a small but perpetual slave community in Indiana, and quite possibly could 
provoke an eventual repeal of the sixth article. 
Historians have analyzed Harrison’s actions and motives in calling for a proslavery 
convention in December 1802 and have cited economic concerns as the chief goal behind 
permitting slavery in Indiana Territory.  Proslavery citizens believed the admission of slavery 
would increase emigration to the territory and provide a ready labor source for agriculture.57  The 
way in which Harrison and his allies went about seeking their goals, however, is far more 
interesting.  The governor and the delegates to the Vincennes Convention exhibited a broad 
knowledge of the ambiguity in congressional dealings with the territories.  Congress had 
continually wrestled with the competing ideas of federal control over territorial affairs versus 
local self-government.  By arguing that suspension of the sixth article had “the consent of the 
people of Indiana,” Harrison and his fellow memorialists appealed to the legislators who 
endorsed greater authority for settlers over their own internal affairs.  Yet Harrison could hardly 
prove that the Vincennes Convention represented the will of a majority of the territory’s citizens.   
The committee appointed by the House of Representatives to examine the Vincennes 
memorial viewed it with skepticism for several reasons.  It recommended that Congress deny the 
request, as “the labor of slaves is not necessary to promote the growth and settlement of colonies 
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in that region.”58  The northern makeup of the committee likely influenced this argument; only 
its chairman, John Randolph of Virginia, lived in the South.  Legal historian Paul Finkelman has 
noted a second reason why the committee may have rejected the memorial.  Indiana’s proximity 
to British territory may have provoked fear that the British would resort to their old tactics of 
offering freedom to American slaves in the case of a war, providing the committee with another 
reason to reject the memorialists’ request.59  Perhaps, too, the committee recognized that 
Harrison could hardly lay claim to represent the true will of the majority.  For reasons unclear, 
Congress deferred action on the petition and the Randolph committee’s report.  When Congress 
resumed in the next session, another committee composed solely of southern congressmen 
drafted a far more favorable report, recommending that Congress suspend the sixth article as 
requested.  However, the committee called for gradual emancipation of the descendants of any 
slaves brought to Indiana.60  For a short time, the proslavery faction held out hope based on the 
committee’s favorable report.  One Indianan wrote to a friend that “the prospect of establishing 
Slavery among us brightens daily,” and alleged that  “the [P]resident is decidedly in favor of th[e 
ar]ticle in our ordinance agt Slavery being repealed.”61  In spite of the report and the high hopes 
of the Indiana proslavery faction, Congress took no action on the Vincennes memorial. 
Undeterred, the proslavery faction in Indiana persisted in its efforts.  A steady stream of 
petitions made their way to Washington over the next few years as proslaveryites in Indiana 
sought to get their way, while antislavery settlers aimed to prevent the repeal of the sixth article.  
Both sides used the rhetoric of local government and popular will to get their way.  The 
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proslavery faction followed up their initial efforts with a subsequent series of petitions asking for 
suspension of the sixth article for ten years.  Again the petitioners asserted that they represented 
the popular will.62  And again, a committee in Congress received favorably the memorials 
written in 1805.  This time the committee noted, “The suspension of this article is an object 
almost universally desired in that Territory,” a point the antislavery faction would certainly 
debate.63  However, measuring the true level of proslavery support in Indiana is impossible.  
Regardless of whether a majority of the territory’s citizens preferred suspension, Congress again 
followed the now-familiar pattern of calling a committee to address the Indiana memorials and 
then taking no action on the committee report. 
In the meantime, the proslavery settlers in Indiana Territory devised a way of 
circumventing the prohibition of slavery by creating a system of “indentured servitude,” by 
which slave owners held their slaves to a term of service rather than in perpetual slavery.64 This 
extralegal method of permitting de facto slavery outraged the antislavery faction in the territory, 
which petitioned Congress on its own behalf in 1807.  The proslavery settlers controlled the 
territorial legislature, which had recently passed another set of resolutions calling for the repeal 
of the sixth article, this time in perhaps the strongest words used in the whole debate.65  Again, 
the memorialists asserted that the citizens of Indiana “decidedly approve of the toleration of 
slavery” and that allowing slavery to exist there would provide a safety valve for the southern 
states.  But this time they went a step further, posing a question to Congress: “Slavery is 
tolerated in the Territories of Orleans, Mississippi, and Louisiana: why should this Territory be 
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excepted?”66  The petitioners asserted that the Northwest Ordinance deprived them of rights 
equal with those of the other territories.  The latest petition from Indiana again appealed to the 
spirit of local government and congressional nonintervention with slavery by arguing that 
Congress had committed a wrong by imposing conditions on matters of local concern. 
Disgusted with the action of the territory’s Legislative Council and House of 
Representatives, the antislavery forces called for their own convention to address the issue.  They 
specifically questioned the opinion expressed in previous congressional reports that the 
proslavery faction represented the majority will of Indiana Territory.  Furthermore, the Clark 
County petitioners called for Congress to “suspend any legislative act on this subject until we 
shall, by the constitution, be admitted into the Union, and have a right to adopt such a 
constitution, in this respect, as may comport with the wishes of a majority of the citizens.”67  The 
antislavery coalition had used the strategy of their proslavery adversaries and appealed to 
Congress to let the territory decide the issue for itself when drafting a state constitution.  One 
student of Indiana history has remarked that this appeal represented the doctrine of popular 
sovereignty, “antedat[ing] by forty years the letter of General Cass in which the doctrine is 
commonly supposed to have been first enunciated.”68 
Congress had seemingly grown weary of the infighting in Indiana and the steady stream 
of petitions sent from that territory.  The committee that received the memorial of the Indiana 
territorial legislature had recommended suspending the sixth article on the terms asked for, 
noting that many of the emigrants to that territory came from southern states and citing a need 
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for increased emigration.69  Nine months later the Senate favorably received the antislavery 
resolutions from Clark County, deeming it inexpedient to repeal the sixth article.70  The political 
seesaw that the slavery issue had become began to slow after this last report.  The flow of 
petitions slowed as proslavery settlers found it easier to evade the law rather than change it, and 
as antislavery settlers mobilized and began to assume more control of territorial affairs.71 
Evasion of the law became particularly clear in Illinois Territory, where settlers actively 
practiced the “indentured servitude” ploy first devised in Indiana Territory.  The fractious 
politics in Indiana Territory had provoked settlers in Illinois to seek a second division of the 
original Northwest Territory.72  Illinois become a separate territory effective March 1, 1809, 
which “virtually killed proslavery hopes in what was to become Indiana itself.”73  After this 
point, the debate on slavery in Indiana Territory quieted considerably as Congress denied action 
on the sixth article and the antislavery movement gained popularity.  In Illinois, however, history 
seemed to repeat itself as proslavery and antislavery forces repeated the battles fought to the east.  
Proslaveryites controlled the legislature and passed a series of laws designed to circumvent the 
sixth article.  In Illinois, leaders devised a strategy similar to that of Indiana’s proslavery faction, 
but also informed by the ultimate failure of the Indianans to change policy.  Proslavery 
Illinoisans resolved to maintain their indentured servant laws until the territory achieved 
statehood.  After becoming a state, the proslavery party believed it could move for a 
constitutional amendment to permit slavery.  Of course, any such amendment would imply that 
the Northwest Ordinance had no bearing on the region once the separate territories became 
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states, an argument that some northerners considered questionable and certainly in bad faith. In 
the meantime, indentured servitude would suffice. 
Over the previous quarter century, the United States had grappled with how to organize 
and administer the regions west of the original thirteen states.  The issue of slavery had 
complicated the creation of a territorial system, especially with respect to who had the right to 
determine the status of the institution in the national domain.  The federal government ultimately 
settled on a compromise, which prohibited slavery in the northwest while implicitly permitting it 
in the southwest.  Americans south of the Ohio River could determine the status of slavery for 
themselves, though few believed that they would prohibit it.  The outright ban on slavery in the 
Ordinance of 1787 prevailed in the northwest.   Opposition to the slavery ban had surely 
emerged in the southernmost part of the Northwest Territory—and would continue for some 
time—but the system seemed to please a majority of Americans eager to settle the western 
territories. 
Issues concerning territorial self-government and slavery had held a significant place in 
the discussion over American territorial expansion into the lands east of the Mississippi River.  
These same concerns appeared during the settlement of the nation’s grandest territorial 
acquisition—the Louisiana Purchase.  The acquisition of this vast region from France seemed to 
defy comprehension; indeed, neither seller nor buyer knew its exact boundaries.  Such a 
mammoth territory promised tremendous space for national expansion, even as it presented 
numerous challenges to the federal government, which would have to organize and secure the 
land as well as try to assimilate its residents—once foreign subjects but now American citizens.74 
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Slavery had existed in Louisiana practically since the colony’s founding.  Settlers of 
French and Spanish descent held property in human chattel in a system that at one time had been 
far more permissive than its Anglo-American counterpart.  By the 1790s, slavery in Louisiana 
had become increasingly rigid.75  In its treaty negotiations with the United States, France ensured 
that any residents of Louisiana would not only gain citizenship, but also all of the rights of 
property and religion—both delicate issues—that Americans had by their constitution.  
Consequently, the federal government would have to contend with this stipulation whenever it 
began the process of creating territories in the purchase.   
Leaders initiated the process of organization promptly, desiring to establish control 
quickly over the territory and its citizens and begin the process of assimilation.  Regarding the 
citizens and their interests, a judge from Indiana Territory wrote that he desired to “promote their 
future prosperity by Granting them a Territorial Government in their own Country And Organize 
Such a System of Policy as may be Consonant with their wishes And congenial to the American 
Character.”76  According to an inhabitant of Louisiana, encouraging southern emigration 
required that the government make clear that slave property would have legal protection.  The 
citizens of Louisiana, he wrote to a Kentucky congressman, “are very much Interested in 
Obtaining a Ulimited [sic] Slavery Many of them hold a considerable part of their Estate in that 
Species of property.”77  Most settlers voiced similar concerns; they strongly desired a broad 
degree of self-government and the right to determine their own local customs.   
Congress addressed these issues in the early months of 1804 when it debated the 
organization of territories in the Louisiana Purchase.  Louisiana presented Congress with a 
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problem that it had not encountered in any previous effort to organize a territory—its citizens (at 
least those at the time of the purchase) would be naturalized Americans.  They had lived as 
colonial subjects under a monarchy; they would now live in a federal republic.  In December 
1803, a Senate committee began drafting legislation to create territorial governments for 
Louisiana.78  Some three weeks later, the full Senate received the committee’s work and began 
deliberations on the bill.  The fourth section of the Senate’s initial legislation stipulated that the 
president would select “thirteen of the most fit and discreet persons of the Territory” to serve as a 
Legislative Council, which would advise the territorial governor on internal matters.79   Senators 
approved the stiuplation, but it faced considerable opposition in the House of Representatives.  In 
February 1804, that body began a lengthy debate over the ability of the Louisianans to govern 
themselves in the American mold, an argument that would recur over forty-five years later with 
the acquisition of the Mexican Cession.  In short, the proper way to govern Louisiana 
confounded members of Congress, especially those of the popularly elected lower house.  House 
members quickly began deliberations on an act to create two territories out of the vast purchase, 
but found it difficult to agree on how to structure the legislative branch of the territorial 
governments. The clause in the Senate’s bill differed from recent practice; as many congressmen 
noted, the legislation for Mississippi Territory provided for popular election of a legislative 
council.  Some individuals, including members of Congress, questioned why this sufficed for 
Mississippi Territory and not the territories of the Louisiana Purchase. 
The representatives quickly fell into two camps.  One side demanded the striking of the 
original fourth section and its replacement with a clause permitting popular election of a council.  
The other side argued for the wisdom of the section as drafted, as it would allow the naturalized 
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citizens of the territories to mature and learn the way of American republican institutions.  As 
William Eustis of Massachusetts argued, “the principles of civil liberty cannot be suddenly 
ingrafted upon a people accustomed to a regimen of a distinctly opposite hue.”80  The people of 
Louisiana, according to Eustis and his like-minded colleagues, could not yet engage in self-
government because they had never done so before.  Giving them such a broad franchise could 
allow unscrupulous men to seize control of the territorial government.  Furthermore, such action 
could allow those not professing loyalty to the American government to attempt some sort of 
coup against American authority.  A Pennsylvania congressman cited reports that when 
American authorities in New Orleans lowered the French flag and raised the Stars and Stripes, 
the people present cried, proving that the cession “had not been received with approbation by 
them.”81  Other congressmen suggested that Congress had a duty to provide for Louisiana’s 
government, as the territory stood “in nearly the same relation to us as if they were a conquered 
territory.”82  “The object of this bill,” James Holland of North Carolina noted, “is to extend the 
laws of the United States over Louisiana, not to enable the people of Louisiana to make laws.”83  
To his mind, Congress needed to provide a system of government specifically suited to the 
unique conditions under which Louisiana became American property.  Only after American rule 
had been established and the allegiance of the territories’ citizens secured could Congress 
consider granting self-government. 
The opposition met these arguments with considerable vigor.  First, several legislators 
posited that Congress had little choice but to grant the Louisiana territories self-government, as 
the treaty between the United States and France provided for just this.  Representing the opinion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Ibid., 1058. 
81 Ibid., 1061. 
82 Ibid., 1058. 
83 Ibid., 1073. 
 41	  
of many of his western colleagues, a Tennessee congressman argued that the majority of 
Louisianans “conceive themselves entitled” to the right of self-government by the terms of the 
treaty.84  The fourth article most likely violated the purchase’s terms.  Second, several members 
of the House noted that the federal government had granted Mississippi Territory self-
government on local affairs. Congress owed it to the residents of Louisiana to integrate them 
fully within the American political system—specifically by granting them self-government as 
would normally proceed from any other act to territorial legislation.  After all, might not 
Louisiana’s citizens resent not having the same powers as their neighbor to the east?  “I cannot 
conceive,” remarked George Washington Campbell of Tennessee, “what can have rendered them 
so different from those people of the Mississippi Territory; they were once the same people and 
under the same Government, and they could not have then become unfit for self-government.”85  
Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina concurred, asking “will they not expect the same grade of 
government with the inhabitants of the Mississippi Territory, with whom they will have a 
constant intercourse?”86  
Many of the congressmen who rejected the proposed restrictions on Louisiana added a 
new dimension to the argument for self-government by attacking the notion of a pervasive 
federal presence and interference in territorial affairs.  Such misuse of federal authority 
compromised the freedom of American citizens, regardless of how they gained their citizenship 
or for how long they had held it.  These individuals cast the debate in the terms of liberty versus 
slavery, an argument that southerners in later years would use to defend the expansion of slavery 
in the territories.87  Matthew Lyon of Kentucky castigated the opposition, stating that “the most 
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ludicrous idea I have heard expressed on the subject is, that these people must be kept in slavery 
until they can be learned to think and behave like freemen.”88  Another congressman asked, “Are 
they blind to the difference between liberty and slavery?  Are they insensible to the difference of 
laws made by themselves, and of laws made by others?”89  These congressmen rejected outright 
the notion of a period of territorial tutelage, instead arguing that Congress had the obligation to 
let Louisianans govern themselves.  They did not conceive of the American territorial system as 
one of quasi-colonial control over unincorporated lands, but a system that granted as broad a 
degree of self-government as possible while providing for the orderly transition from territory to 
state.  Of course, both sides would probably have agreed to the latter statement, but they differed 
considerably on the means to achieve that goal.   
The House of Representatives voted by a sizeable majority to strike the original fourth 
section of the bill and replace it with a more suitable framework for the legislative branch.90  The 
legislation faced considerable opposition in conference negotiations with the Senate, which 
preferred its original wording.  Ultimately, the bill passed with the original section left intact, 
ostensibly because a popular election of council members could result in legislators of different 
nationalities who spoke different languages serving together, thereby confounding their work.91  
Congress exhibited considerable unease with the prospect of assimilating once-foreign subjects 
into the Union.  Nathaniel Macon stated it best when he said, “It is extremely difficult to legislate 
for a people with whose habits and customs we are unacquainted.”92   
Nevertheless, the debate had proven most interesting to those who still wrestled with 
notions of how the American territorial system should operate.  Widely differing opinions on 
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how much self-government a territory could or should exercise still existed.  Establishing a 
pattern of who supported broad self-government and who endorsed strict federal control of the 
territories proves difficult, yet certain general patterns appear.  For the most part, congressmen 
from the newer western states supported granting self-government to the territories of Louisiana.  
Many, but not all, southerners joined them.  The key support for the fourth section as originally 
proposed came from the northeastern congressmen.93  While roll call votes exhibit these general 
patterns, however, they also reveal that the stark sectional divisions on the question of slavery 
and self-government had not yet appeared. For its part, the Senate overwhelmingly supported 
presidential appointment of the council; only nine senators voted to concur with the House and 
revise the legislation.94   
The 1804 debate over the Louisiana territorial legislation had steered clear of the slavery 
issue, which also helps to explain why rigid sectional lines had not formed.  Most leaders 
understood, however, that the issues Congress addressed in the Louisiana debate would have the 
potential to impact the institution at some point.  At this moment, both houses of Congress 
seemed convinced that the ubiquity of slavery in the territory and the treaty’s provisions 
concerning property rights militated against any effort to prohibit the institution.  Slavery had a 
strong presence in the southern portion that became known as the Territory of Orleans.  
However, settlers in the northern portion of the purchase—the Louisiana Territory—exhibited 
wariness about the federal government’s intentions.  The Territory of Orleans had a far greater 
population and, therefore, the means to organize quickly a territorial government.  Conditions in 
the more sparsely settled Louisiana Territory presented challenges for creating a viable territorial 
government, leading Congress to debate whether to annex temporarily the northern territory to 
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Indiana Territory for executive and judicial purposes.  Exhibiting a keen awareness of affairs in 
the Northwest Territory, William C. Carr, a St. Louis lawyer, expressed concern with the idea.  
“Many were apprehensive that slavery would not only be prohibited,” he wrote to Kentucky 
congressman John C. Breckinridge, “but the more ignorant were fearful lest those already in their 
possession would also be manumitted.  I discern from the Law, or that part of it which relates to 
this district that Congress has been silent on the subject altho’ it has been permitted in the 
territory of Orleans under certain restrictions.”95  The issue of slavery would soon enter the 
discussion in both the Territory of Orleans and the Louisiana Territory. 
Congress created the Territory of Orleans effective October 1, 1804, dividing the 
Louisiana Purchase at the thirty-third parallel.96  The land south of this line became the Territory 
of Orleans and that north became the District (later Territory) of Louisiana.  Immediately upon 
becoming a territory, the citizens of Orleans examined the enabling legislation and found it 
wanting.  Their objections mirrored those of the congressmen who had fought to strike the fourth 
section of the bill regarding the legislative branch of the territorial government.  The settlers 
concurred with their allies in Congress, arguing that the law deprived them of self-government 
guaranteed by the treaty of cession and the American constitution.  They quickly submitted a 
memorial to Congress, objecting to the enabling legislation and arguing that it had “no one 
principle of republicanism in its composition.”97  Pierre Sauve, Pierre Derbigny, and Jean Noel 
Destrehan, who drafted the memorial, sharply criticized the actions of Congress and challenged 
its authority to enact such strict legislation.  They illustrated a clear knowledge of the principles 
written in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution and accused Congress of not 
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living up to these high standards in creating territorial governments for Louisiana.  According to 
the petitioners, the law placed Louisiana in a seemingly perpetual state of subordination, arguing 
that “no manifestation of what awaits us at the expiration of the law is yet made.”98  
Accordingly, the people of Louisiana would remain inferior to other American citizens until, “in 
the school of slavery, we have learned how to be free, our rights shall be restored.”99 
In addition to demanding the right of local legislation, the petitioners raised a most 
delicate subject—the foreign slave trade.  The territorial legislation strictly forbade the 
importation of slaves from Africa, a trade that the Constitution forbade after 1808 anyway.  The 
slave trade clause had provoked its own debate, particularly in the Senate, where members 
argued over whether to accept the amendment by James Hillhouse of Connecticut banning the 
foreign slave trade in Louisiana, or in the words of a Georgia senator, to “Let those people judge 
it for themselves—the treaty is obligatory upon us.”100 The law as passed imposed stiff penalties 
for engaging in the foreign slave trade.  Disregarding the relative unpopularity of the African 
slave trade, the petitioners objected to its ban as unfair and an inconvenience to agriculture in the 
territory.  Echoing the words of the Georgia senator, Sauve, Derbigny, and Destrehan wrote, 
“We only ask the right of deciding it for ourselves, and of being placed in this respect on an 
equal footing with other States.”101 
The House of Representatives received the memorial of the citizens of Orleans and 
referred it to a committee chaired by John Randolph of Virginia.  The committee was balanced 
along sectional lines, but five of its seven members belonged to the Republican Party, which 
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proved far more sympathetic to self-government than the Federalists.  Some in Washington 
questioned the loyalty of the three petitioners, given their French background and the way in 
which they chastised the federal government for its approach toward territorial government in 
Louisiana.102  The Randolph committee quickly answered the petition, stating that though “the 
memorialists may have appreciated too highly the rights which have been secured to them by the 
treaty of cession,” Congress should not disregard their grievances.103  Randolph, who during the 
first session of the Eighth Congress had voted in favor of expanding territorial self-
government,104 argued that revising the existing law would quiet discord in the territory and draw 
the citizens closer to the Union.  As long as Louisianans obeyed federal law, he wrote, “your 
committee are at a loss to conceive how the United States are more interested in the internal 
government of the Territory than of any other State in the Confederacy.”105  However, the 
Randolph committee rejected outright the memorialists’ objections to prohibiting the foreign 
slave trade.  The report nevertheless showed that certain members of Congress still supported 
granting the territories broader power to legislate on their own affairs. 
The Randolph committee evidently discussed their report with Sauve, Derbigny, and 
Destrehan—who presented their memorial to Congress in person—before submitting it to the full 
chamber.  At its invitation, the three delegates from the Territory of Orleans penned a rejoinder 
to the committee’s report.  Not content with letting Randolph have the last word on the subject, 
the memorialists further questioned the power of Congress to impose such strict control on the 
territories.  In the process, they raised an argument that would linger in the territorial debate for 
years to come.  Noting that some politicians had cited Article Four, Section Three of the 
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Constitution (that Congress “shall have Power to make all needful Rules and Regulations 
respecting the Territory or other property belonging to the United States”) as the basis for the 
Louisiana territorial law, Sauve, Derbigny, and Destrehan retorted that this clause “has no 
relation whatever with the situation of the inhabitants of Louisiana, and is evidently relative only 
to the disposal and management of the property of the United States.”106  Furthermore, the 
writers rejected the notion that the Northwest Ordinance applied to Louisiana, in an apparent 
effort to head off any future attack on slavery within the territory.  They noted that the citizens of 
Louisiana had received guarantees concerning their property in the treaty of cession—a 
circumstance not addressed by the Northwest Ordinance.  The treaty did not provide for 
admittance to the Union in accordance with the Northwest Ordinance, but “according to the 
principles (the elemental laws) of the constitution.”107  Accordingly, the terms of cession 
demanded that the property and rights of Louisiana’s residents receive full protection.  The 
committee of three sent by the people of the Territory of Orleans had stated their case in bold 
terms, perhaps too bold in the opinion of some Washington leaders.  Their arguments outlined 
the same fundamental disputes and complexities regarding the territorial system that had existed 
for some time.  As the United States continued to add territory to its domain, questions of self-
government would continue to arise, particularly in relation to the institution of slavery. 
Although Sauve, Derbigny, and Destrehan spoke primarily for the citizens of the 
Territory of Orleans, they also addressed the concerns of citizens north of the thirty-third parallel 
in the newly created Louisiana Territory.  These settlers, too, feared “the fetters of an endless 
territorial infancy.”108  Citizens from this territory submitted their own petitions to Congress, 
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asking for changes in the territorial system and for guarantees that their property in slaves would 
receive protection under the law.  Earlier in 1804, St. Louis lawyer William Carr had raised these 
very concerns.  In September of that year, the Louisiana territorial legislature drafted a statement 
concerning their territorial government.  It strongly opposed annexing Louisiana Territory to 
Indiana Territory for executive and judicial affairs, an arrangement that Louisiana settlers feared 
would threaten their title to slave property, as Indiana Territory prohibited slavery (at least in 
name).   “Is not the silence of Congress with respect to slavery in this district of Louisiana,” the 
memorialists wrote, “and the placing of this district under the Governor of a Territory where 
slavery is proscribed, calculated to alarm the people with respect to that kind of property, and to 
create the presumption of a disposition in congress to abolish at a further date slavery altogether 
in the district of Louisiana?”109  The citizens asked for an explicit guarantee that the federal 
government would not disturb their right to hold slave property and that they would allow for the 
importation of slaves, “under such restrictions as to Congress in their wisdom will appear 
necessary.”110  While the settlers in Louisiana Territory wanted the same provisions as their 
neighbors in Orleans, they asked in more conciliatory language. 
Congress sympathetically received the protests of citizens in both territories and sought to 
allay their fears and act on their grievances.  They refused to countenance, however, the petition 
to allow importation on slaves.  Indeed, the government would seek to strengthen the ban in the 
Ninth Congress.111  Congress quickly passed legislation granting the Orleans Territory the 
second grade of territorial government, allowing for broader local control of internal affairs.  It 
also sought to assuage any fears of an eventual ban on slavery by excluding the sixth article of 
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the Northwest Ordinance from operation in Orleans.112  An act for the government of Louisiana 
Territory ended the debate over the executive and judicial power by giving the territory its own 
governor and judicial system and essentially imposing the first grade of territorial government to 
Louisiana.113 While the law remained silent on slavery in the territory, most people assumed that 
the treaty of cession guaranteed slave property.  And because Louisiana would not be under the 
control of Indiana Territory, most settlers felt reassured.  The Louisianans remained persistent, 
however, in seeking the second grade of government and stronger assurances that the federal 
government would not legislate against slavery in their territory.  In 1810, Congress responded to 
a petition by drafting legislation that would grant the settlers’ requests, including a provision that 
exempted the territory from the Northwest Ordinance’s ban on slavery.114  Congress repeatedly 
delayed the legislation until finally passing an amended version in May 1812, which inexplicably 
omitted the exemption clause.  Nevertheless, the law granting Louisiana Territory—now known 
as Missouri Territory to avoid confusion with the new state of Louisiana—did not explicitly 
address the slavery issue, as many settlers in the territory had desired.  The language of the 
legislation, however, implicitly sanctioned slavery and admitted its presence.115 
The debate over slavery and self-government in the Louisiana Purchase reveals a 
continued lack of clarity on how Congress should or could govern its territories.  While some 
politicians insisted on strict control of territorial affairs and contended that the Constitution 
granted this power solely to Congress, other disagreed.  Opponents of the former view argued 
that placing the territories under strict federal control reduced their citizens to vassals and 
deprived them of their constitutional rights.  The Louisiana Purchase had complicated matters by 
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introducing naturalized citizens into the debate.  Some in Congress questioned whether these 
former French and Spanish subjects deserved the trust of the American government to exercise 
self-government and exhibit loyalty to the Union, yet many American citizens from the east 
would emigrate to the new western lands.  They questioned how the federal government could 
rightly treat them as subordinates.  Congress debated these questions and imposed regulations 
designed to accommodate both views, but politicians did not arrive at a concrete solution to the 
problem.  As for the slavery issue, Louisiana entered the Union as a slave state in 1812.  
Congress would not address statehood for the more sparsely populated Territory of Missouri for 
seven more years.  During that time, Congress’s silence on the slavery issue essentially allowed 
the territory to exercise self-government concerning slavery issues.  The institution thrived in 
Missouri, though not on the scale of the states and territories farther south.  With territorial 
affairs largely settled in the Louisiana Purchase, the federal government’s attention once again 
turned to the northwest, where Indiana and Illinois prepared for statehood.  In both territories, the 
issue of slavery remained unsolved. 
In January 1816, Congress received a petition for statehood from Indiana’s territorial 
legislature.  In contrast to the lengthy debates over Indiana in its territorial years, Congress 
granted the request in April with little debate.  Indiana became the nineteenth state on December 
11, 1816, after drafting a constitution that confirmed the antislavery party’s victory in the debates 
over the sixth article.  While it “temporized” on the matter of indentured servants, the new state’s 
constitution stipulated that no amendment could ever allow slavery.116  After almost a decade of 
debate, self-government in Indiana resulted in an antislavery constitution.  Two years later 
Illinois sought statehood, but the issue of slavery did not pass quietly as it had in Indiana.  
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Proslavery leaders planned to gain statehood and then after entering the Union in full standing, 
amend their constitution to permit slavery.  Recognizing the strategy of the Illinoisans, one New 
York congressman objected to the resolution to grant statehood.  James Tallmadge argued that 
the framers of the draft constitution had not “sufficiently prohibited” slavery, a clear violation of 
the sixth article of the Northwest Ordinance.  The Illinois constitution “contravened this 
stipulation, either in the letter or the spirit.”117  Once again, the Northwest Ordinance and its 
slavery prohibition entered the debate, with congressmen arguing over its true meaning and 
application.  One Kentucky congressman noted, “Still less were the people of the Northwestern 
Territory a party to the compact, as the gentleman supposed it, not being represented at all, nor 
consulted on it.”118  A prominent Ohio congressman echoed his Kentucky colleague.  Even 
though he personally opposed slavery, William Henry Harrison—the president of the Vincennes 
convention of 1803—“wished to see that State, and all that Territory, disenthralled from the 
effects of articles to which they never gave their assent, and to which they were not properly 
subject.”119  The congressmen who spoke against Tallmadge’s objection each raised the same 
critical point: they believed that the Northwest Ordinance had impaired the ability of the 
territory’s citizens to determine their own local affairs.  The debate over slavery in Illinois would 
persist into the 1820s, though until the 1830s the state continued to face questions over legal title 
to slaves held in Illinois.   
Over thirty years after passage of the Northwest Ordinance in the Confederation 
Congress, politicians still did not agree on the nature of territorial government.  In 1787, the 
Confederation Congress had passed legislation that seemed to establish a quasi-colonial system 
of government that placed authority over the territories squarely in the hands of the federal 
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government.  The new Congress reaffirmed the Northwest Ordinance in 1789.  As the nation 
faced its first efforts at creating organized territories, however, politicians and citizens alike 
seemed uncomfortable with the United States acting as a colonial power toward its western 
territories.  Slavery complicated territorial governance in ways that the founders did not wholly 
anticipate.  Slaveholders insisted on the sanctity of their property and their right to settle 
anywhere in the national domain without restriction.  Americans committed to the eventual 
extinction of slavery, however, saw the federal government’s influence over the territories as an 
agent of change.  National policy could end slavery in the western lands, whereas it could not in 
the existing states.  James Tallmadge’s objection to the 1818 Illinois constitution illustrated the 
thought of those opposed to the extension of slavery.  Just months later he would again raise an 
objection to slavery in the Territory of Missouri, one that would prove far more notable. 
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CHAPTER 2 
“SHALL THE CREATURE GOVERN THE CREATOR”?   
THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE AND TERRITORIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 
 
 
 Over the course of the Missouri controversy, southerners resisted the efforts of 
northerners to restrict the expansion of slavery into the territories by articulating the doctrine of 
self-government—that the residents of the territories themselves possessed the sole right to 
determine their own local affairs.  James Tallmadge’s amendment to prohibit slavery in 
Missouri, which he introduced on February 13, 1819, provoked an immediate response from the 
South.  Northern restrictionists like Tallmadge sought to assert federal authority over slavery in 
the territories; their opponents argued that Congress had the sole responsibility of ensuring that 
an incoming state’s constitution provided a republican form of government.  The southerners 
who composed the antirestrictionist faction used the concept of self-government to refute 
congressional intervention on the slavery issue.  The Tallmadge amendment altered the political 
calculus of territorial policy and state making by reviving the debate over federal power in the 
territories, the right of territorial self-government, and states’ rights in general. 
 Thomas Jefferson famously remarked that the Missouri question “like a fire bell in the 
night, awakened and filled me with terror.”1  Jefferson’s statement—so frequently quoted by 
historians to illustrate the gravity of the Missouri crisis—lent drama to the Missouri controversy, 
but it stretched the truth.  For over thirty-five years, Americans had wrestled with the question of 
slavery in the territories.  The debate over the Tallmadge amendment and Missouri statehood in 
Congress, the nation’s newspapers and periodicals, and in communities throughout the country 
resonated like no previous debate.  The Missouri controversy marked a pivotal moment in the 
struggle over slavery in the territories, not because it introduced the issue of slavery in the 
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territories for the first time, but because it heightened and transformed the debate into a sectional 
question heretofore unseen.  Not only did the Tallmadge amendment draw the line of contention 
for the debate over slavery in Missouri, but it also revealed deep divisions within the nation over 
the institution itself. 
  In previous debates, Congress and political leaders had equivocated on the issue of 
federal power over slavery in the territories, leaving considerable room for debate on how far 
congressional authority extended.  Tallmadge’s amendment took federal control over the 
territories as a routine matter of course by not only placing the question squarely in the domain 
of Congress, asserting that it could impose conditions on a territory seeking admission into the 
Union.  The proviso not only prohibited the “further introduction of slavery or involuntary 
servitude” but also stipulated that “all children of slaves, born within the said State, after the 
admission thereof into the Union, shall be free, but may be held to service until the age of 
twenty-five years.”2  The Tallmadge amendment imposed conditions on Missouri as a territory 
and as a state.  Southerners found both points unacceptable. 
 Slavery had existed in Missouri throughout its territorial phase, making the move to 
prohibit the institution from the point of statehood seem unfair to proslavery individuals.  
Missourians and southerners alike would question the timing of the restrictionists’ proposing a 
ban on slavery in the territories.  Why had the opponents of slavery not raised their objections 
when Congress created the Territory of Missouri in 1812, southerners asked?  Individuals with 
proslavery beliefs doubted the prudence of a ban on the institution, the right of Congress to 
impose it, and the reason why people in the North supported it.   
The Missouri debate showed how the issue of slavery in the territories could become 
sectionalized. Northerners opposed the increasingly southern-based institution, which by the 
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three-fifths rule in the Constitution that counted slaves as three-fifths of a human being for 
purposes of apportionment enhanced the slaveholding section’s power in the halls of Congress.3  
Numerous observers noted that the Missouri controversy meant as much about slavery as it did 
the sectional balance of power in the Union.  In fact, the politics of slavery assumed many 
meanings; Congress debated the future of slavery in the West, the right to restrict slavery in the 
territories, the power to impose conditions upon a territory seeking admission to statehood, and 
the sectional balance of power in the federal government. 
 Although the nature of territorial sovereignty has received little attention from students of 
the period, self-government in the territories emerged as a major component of the debate.  
Members of Congress hotly debated the expediency of leaving to the territories the right to 
legislate on slavery, a continuance of the thirty-year dispute over the unresolved issue.  Most 
stakeholders in the Missouri conflict—President James Monroe, Congress, interested observers 
in the North and South, and of course the Missourians—at some point reckoned with the 
question of local control over slavery.  The question of territorial self-government over slavery 
had divided Americans along roughly sectional lines in the past, but not always.  Northerners and 
southerners alike deviated from the pattern.  Over the course of the Missouri debates rigid 
sectional blocs formed over the issue, with northerners opposing slavery in Missouri and 
supporting federal power to legislate on the issue and southerners vigorously denying the validity 
of the northern argument.  As members of Congress debated the issue in “remorseless 
reiteration” and Americans followed the debate and formulated their own opinions, they defined 
the nature of popular sovereignty and slavery in the territories for the entire antebellum period.4 
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 Any debate over the future of slavery in Missouri would test the future northern boundary 
of the slaveholding section of the Union.  Some ten thousand slaves resided in Missouri Territory 
during the late 1810s, approximately fifteen percent of the total population.  While the territory 
seemed unlikely to become a major producer of the traditional southern agricultural staple—
cotton—planters did utilize slave labor in a significant hemp-growing market.  Regardless of the 
nature of agriculture in the region, the Missourians expressed a desire to maintain slavery as a 
labor force, as exhibited in petitions to Congress and their reaction to the slavery debates over 
the Louisiana Purchase in general.5  Many of the Missourians had emigrated to the territory from 
the southern states, bringing with them the notions of a slave society.  Indeed, a strong 
prosouthern and proslavery sentiment existed throughout the territory.  Yet the territory itself 
rested at the outer limits of the traditional slave domain, by most Americans’ definition.  
Furthermore, most of Missouri lay north of the Ohio River, suggesting to many antislavery 
partisans that the territory should become a free state.  The territory shared the Mississippi River 
border with the free state of Illinois, itself an anomaly with its free-soil northern contingent and a 
population in the southern part of the state sympathetic to slavery and southern interests.  
Missouri also counted the slave states of Kentucky and Tennessee as its neighbors.  Each of 
these states would try to exert influence in the territory’s political formation. 
 By the middle of the 1810s, Missourians desired statehood.  Four new states joined the 
Union in this decade, as Indiana gained statehood in 1816, definitively settling its own long 
dispute over slavery within its borders.  Congress admitted Illinois two years later under similar 
circumstances.  Two slave states entered the Union immediately following Indiana and Illinois.  
Mississippi became a state in December 1817, while Alabama, carved out of the eastern portion 
of the old Mississippi Territory, followed almost exactly two years later.  The future of slavery 
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was secure in both new states, as they lay south of the Ohio River, which had become the 
dividing line between free and slave territory.  Besides, Congress had defeated a motion to 
prohibit slavery in the Mississippi Territory in 1798.  Twenty years later, no one challenged its 
existence in the incoming states.  On November 21, 1818, the Missouri territorial legislature 
applied for admission to the Union, citing a population of 100,000—it was actually much less—
and asking for relief from the territorial form of government.6   
At the same time, Missouri’s proposed boundaries necessitated creation of a new territory 
to the south, the Territory of Arkansas, which greatly complicated the Missouri issue.  Now 
Congress would have to debate on the slavery question in two territories, as northerners moved 
to prohibit the institution in Arkansas’s territorial phase.  With Missouri and Arkansas both on 
the agenda, the second session of the Fifteenth Congress would address the whole gamut of 
issues concerning self-government versus federal jurisdiction over slavery in the territories. 
 Discerning James Tallmadge’s motives in presenting his amendment to the Missouri bill 
and asserting federal authority over slavery in the territories remains difficult.  Numerous 
contemporaries puzzled at the freshman congressman’s motives, and historians since have added 
little to their conjectures. Thomas Jefferson surmised that New York governor DeWitt Clinton 
had pushed Tallmadge to propose the amendment as part of a Federalist Party plot to agitate the 
slavery issue, a conjecture that historians have discredited.  Tallmadge himself provided a more 
plausible explanation; he introduced the amendment in an effort to halt the spread of slavery.7  
Regardless of his intentions, the reason why so many northern politicians “rallied to Tallmadge’s 
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side” intrigues even more.8  Northern political leaders seemingly desired to make a stand on the 
slavery issue at this time. Tallmadge’s objections to Illinois’s proposed constitution of 1818 
presaged the Missouri controversy, as he represented the wishes of certain northerners who 
desired to limit the expansion of slavery.  A New Hampshire congressman proposed what 
became the “first intimation of a Northern attempt to restrict slavery in Missouri,” but while his 
attempt at restriction, in the form of a constitutional amendment, failed to gain support, 
Tallmadge’s strategy succeeded.  9  
In “probably the most candid discussion of slavery ever held in Congress,” northerners 
promptly rallied behind the New Yorker’s effort, while southerners prepared for battle against 
what they saw as a bold usurpation of local power and states’ rights.10  The opponents of 
restriction “contended that Congress had no right to prescribe to any State the details of its 
government, any further than that it should be republican in its form.”  Besides, any territory 
once admitted to statehood possessed the “unquestioned right” to amend its constitution, 
therefore rendering the whole debate moot.  The restrictionists refuted this claim by arguing that 
“Congress had a right to annex conditions to the admission of any new State” and that slavery 
“was incompatible with republican institutions.”  Therefore, Congress had a duty to impose the 
ban on slavery in Missouri.11  
 Key northern congressmen lined up alongside Tallmadge to assert the power of Congress 
to interdict slavery in Missouri.  John W. Taylor, a prominent New York Republican and friend 
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of Tallmadge, emerged as one of the strongest defenders of the northern argument.12  Taylor 
endorsed the antislavery amendment, interpreting Article Four, Section Three of the Constitution 
as granting “unlimited” authority to Congress in the matter.  “It would be difficult,” he argued, 
“to devise a more comprehensive grant of power.”13  Politicians had debated the true meaning of 
the “needful rules and regulations” clause before, but from the Missouri debates to secession the 
provision would attract the attention of most every individual who debated the limits of 
congressional power over slavery in the territories.  In essence, Taylor had stated the argument 
that northern Republicans would use over the course of the Missouri controversy: Congress 
could and must prohibit slavery in Missouri.  Ostensibly, concern for morality and true 
republican government motivated the northern faction.  “At the heart of the Republicans’ 
reasoning,” argues historian Sean Wilentz, “was their claim that the preservation of individual 
rights, and strict construction of the Constitution, demanded slavery’s restriction.”14  Southerners 
insisted that strict construction and preservation of individual rights demanded that Congress not 
interfere with slavery.   
Speaker of the House Henry Clay of Kentucky took the lead in refuting the northern 
argument.  According to the speaker, serving his second term as the House leader, Congress had 
“no right to prescribe any condition whatever to the newly organized States, but must admit them 
by a simple act, leaving their sovereignty unrestricted.”15  Clay went further, challenging the 
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northerners who criticized the South’s institution of labor.  The Washington Daily Intelligencer 
commented on his speech, “What comparison did he make between the ‘black slaves’ of 
Kentucky and the ‘white slaves’ of the north; and how instantly did he strike a balance in favor 
of the condition of the former.”16 Southerners saw the criticisms of the restrictionists as 
unfounded. 
The northern Republicans had touched a raw nerve in the South, which intensified the 
tenor of the debate on Missouri.  The Federalists quickly joined their erstwhile opponents, 
seeking to earn much needed political capital and perhaps reinvigorate their party by forming a 
sectional bloc opposed to the power of the South.  A Massachusetts Federalist challenged the 
Clay rejoinder, stating, “the attempt to extend slavery to the new States is in direct violation of 
the clause which guaranties a republican form of government to all the states.”17  Interestingly, 
many southerners “insisted at every turn that Federalists were the principal provocateurs.”18  
Federalists certainly saw the debates as a golden opportunity to exploit the slavery issue in an 
effort to regain lost political power, though the debates revealed more of a sectional divide rather 
than a party divide on the issue of slavery in Missouri.  Northern Republicans and Federalists 
alike enthusiastically endorsed restriction; their southern counterparts forcefully opposed their 
efforts.   
 Southerners quickly rose in objection to the northern argument that “until the ceded 
territory shall have been made into States, and the new States admitted into the Union, we can do 
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what we will with it.”19  The southern delegation generally argued that the Constitution granted 
no such power, that the federal government possessed no right to fix conditions on a territory 
about to draft its constitution, except that the document embody republican principles.  Indeed, 
the southern argument implied that Congress had the duty, not the discretion, to elevate a 
territory to statehood.  Some southerners wavered on the power of Congress to prohibit slavery 
in the earlier territorial phase.  Philip P. Barbour of Virginia, for one, suggested that if Congress 
had wished to ban slavery in Missouri, it should have done so through territorial legislation.20  
He asserted, however, that Congress should consult the people of Missouri to discern their 
opinions on the issue, “because [otherwise] we should be legislating directly against the wishes 
of a people who were competent to legislate for themselves.”21 
 While some legislators broached the idea of territorial self-government with some unease, 
others more forcefully asserted the right of the Missourians to determine the status of slavery 
within their territory.  By denying congressional jurisdiction over the issue, Henry Clay had 
articulated a stronger position in his speeches, though he, too, would later moderate his remarks 
when compromise seemed within grasp. The territorial delegate from Missouri took the most 
rigid stance.  John Scott thundered against the Tallmadge amendment, accusing the restrictionists 
of reducing Missouri to a lesser among equals.  The proposed amendment created a 
“discrimination not warranted by the Constitution.”22  Congress had no right to prescribe 
conditions to admission into the Union, even according to the writer of the Constitution.  He 
quoted James Madison, who argued that Congress must only ascertain that the incoming state 
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guaranteed a republican form of government.  Beyond that, all decisions were reserved to the 
local authorities.  As Scott explained:  
In no part of the Constitution was the power proposed to be exercised, of imposing 
conditions on a new State. . . nor in any portion of the Constitution was the right 
prohibited to the respective States, to regulate their own internal police, or admitting such 
citizens as they pleased, or of introducing any description of property, that they should 
consider as essential or necessary to their prosperity.23 
 
The restrictionists proposed exactly what Madison had deemed unconstitutional, to impose 
restrictions on a territory preparing to enter the Union as a state.  Missourians could not abide 
this infringement on their rights.  The antirestrictionists, however, failed to persuade a sufficient 
number of their colleagues that Congress could not impose the Tallmadge amendment on 
Missouri.  After a closing statement by its author, the House of Representatives passed the 
amendment on a strictly sectional vote and sent the Missouri bill to the Senate for concurrence.24   
With the Missouri bill dispatched to the upper chamber, the House commenced 
deliberations on the territorial bill for Arkansas, a move that further complicated the already busy 
congressional agenda.  Almost immediately, John Taylor moved to insert a clause in the 
legislation prohibiting slavery in the new territory.25  While the Missouri issue addressed the 
right of Congress to legislate on slavery for an established territory seeking admission to the 
Union, the creation of Arkansas would test whether Congress could or should prohibit slavery in 
a territory from the outset. Consequently, the two separate issues of Missouri statehood and the 
creation of Arkansas Territory became linked in the increasingly complex debate over self-
government in the territories. 
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 Southerners quickly rallied to oppose Taylor’s effort to prohibit slavery in Arkansas, 
arguing that the people who actually lived there should make the decision for themselves.  Felix 
Walker of North Carolina contended that Congress had “no legitimate power to legislate on the 
property of the citizens.”26  The northern effort to restrict slavery in Arkansas Territory therefore 
represented an encroachment on the rights of slaveholders who might wish to settle there.  The 
right of self-government protected and defended the right to hold personal property—namely 
slaves—wherever one wished.  More important, according to Walker, the amendment deprived 
“the people of this territory the natural and Constitutional right of legislating for themselves, and 
imposing on them a condition which they may not willingly accept.”27  Walker moved toward an 
argument advanced in earlier debates over slavery in the territories, but he articulated it more 
clearly than any of his predecessors.  “In organizing a territorial government, and forming a 
constitution,” Walker contended, “they and they alone, have the right, and are the proper judges 
of that policy best adapted to their genius and interest, and it ought to be exclusively left to 
them.”28   
In deeming the people of Arkansas and the western territories “competent judges of their 
Constitutional rights” and therefore able to settle the slavery question for themselves, Walker had 
given form to the doctrine of popular sovereignty as no one else had done before.29  His 
colleagues, however, expressed some trepidation at its implications for self-government on the 
frontier.  A Massachusetts Federalist reaffirmed that “the territories are under the absolute 
control of the United States,” even as he offered a hint at compromise.30  In “an effort to do 
justice to our Southern brethren,” Congress should permit slavery in Arkansas Territory to 
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balance the effect of restriction in Missouri.31 Several congressmen, in fact, began suggesting 
some form of compromise to settle the dispute over restriction.  Louis McLane, a freshman 
representative from Delaware, attempted to steer clear of Walker’s proposal for popular 
sovereignty while offering his own version of compromise.  Though “he did not believe that 
Congress had the power to impose the restriction,” McLane endorsed the “fixing of a line west of 
the Mississippi, north of which slavery should not be tolerated.”32   
Walker’s formula for territorial self-government seemed to suggest that the settlers of 
Arkansas could legislate on the slavery issue in the earliest stages of territorial development, an 
interpretation of self-government that did not fully satisfy his colleagues.  Some politicians made 
overtures to broker a compromise similar to the establishment of the Ohio River as a line 
between free and slave territory.  In the territory south of any such line, the people could 
determine the status of slavery as they pleased without congressional intervention, but Congress 
would establish free territory north of that line.  Indeed, after the House rejected Taylor’s 
amendment to prohibit slavery in the Arkansas Territory, he offered a second amendment that 
would ban slavery north of the line of north latitude thirty-six degrees, thirty minutes.  Taylor’s 
second effort raised objections as well, especially from Virginians who feared compromising on 
the question of self-government.  His critics argued that the proposal created inequality in the 
territories “by applying a rule to one portion and a different rule to another portion of citizens 
having equal rights and placed under similar circumstances.”33  The second Taylor amendment 
also failed, but the New Yorker had advocated a compromise almost exactly like the final 
settlement that emerged from Congress. 
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The cause of self-government prevailed in the Arkansas debate—though solely for that 
territory.   Politicians quickly passed the bill creating the territory, effective July 4, 1819, 
realizing that they still had to settle the Missouri issue. The territorial legislation contained no 
mention of slavery, implicitly leaving the matter to the people of the territory itself.34  Congress 
had done little to resolve the constitutional debate over territorial sovereignty because it did not 
address the issue explicitly.  Perhaps the legislators realized that the Missouri debate still loomed 
over their proceedings, which would afford them ample opportunity to debate the issue.  From 
their vantage point, the significance of Arkansas paled in comparison to the Missouri debate. 
The restrictionist forces scored a victory when they passed the Missouri bill with the 
Tallmadge amendment, but the Senate, after “a long and animated debate,” refused to concur.35  
Thomas Ritchie, the well-known editor of the Richmond Enquirer, held out hope that the Senate 
would “strike out this obnoxious feature.  It is a struggle of Eastern prejudice against southern 
principles.”36  He had good reason to express optimism.  Even though the northern states 
outnumbered the South in the Senate, southerners could usually count on the support of Illinois’s 
senators.  The Senate divided the question and considered the two stipulations of the Tallmadge 
amendment separately.  Senators voted against the latter part, which provided for the gradual 
emancipation of slaves in Missouri, by thirty-one to seven.  A more closely divided Senate also 
voted down the motion to prohibit slavery in the state of Missouri.  The Illinois delegation, a 
Vermont senator, and the enigmatic Harrison Gray Otis of Massachusetts voted with the entire 
southern contingent to strike down this part of the Tallmadge amendment.37  Absent a consensus 
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between the two houses of Congress on the slavery issue, Missouri remained a territory at the 
end of the second session of the Fifteenth Congress.  
People across the country resumed the Missouri debate where their representatives had 
left off.  Newspapers published a voluminous correspondence that revealed just how significant 
the issue of slavery in the territories had become outside of Washington.  Missourians in 
particular argued their case with great force.  Nathaniel Beverley Tucker, writing under the 
pseudonym “Hampden,” considered the restriction an insult to the citizens of Missouri Territory 
who had proved their loyalty in the War of 1812.  Tucker, a Virginian who had emigrated to 
Missouri in 1816 and had been appointed as a judge in St. Louis, emerged as a leading voice for 
the doctrine of self-government.38  He reminded his audience that the citizens of Missouri were 
Americans, and as such they deserved the right to legislate their own local affairs.  He took 
particular aim at those who misinterpreted the needful rules and regulations clause of the 
Constitution to sanction restriction.39  That clause, according to Hampden, had nothing to do 
with congressional authority over local law; instead, it addressed federal property in the 
territories.  Southerners who sought to refute northern claims of federal supremacy over 
territorial law frequently used this argument.  Linking notions of territorial authority with the 
tenth amendment to the Constitution—the bulwark of states’ rights ideology—Hampden argued 
that self-government “is inherent in, and is moreover expressly ‘reserved to the states 
respectively, or to the people.’ The state of Missouri then, can derive none of its powers from 
Congress; all it needs from that quarter is the means of organization.”40   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See Robert J. Brugger, Beverley Tucker: Heart over Head in the Old South (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1978), 49-57. 
39 St. Louis Enquirer, April 7, 1819. 
40 Ibid. 
 67	  
Northerners earned the enmity of many southerners who objected to their efforts to assert 
federal authority over slavery in the territories.  “Is it not insulting to our common sense, to be 
told that a constitution not only permitting, but partly based on domestic slavery” would allow 
for federal interdiction of the institution, Hampden asked.  “But it is just such a doctrine as I 
should expect to hear” from those who believed that “congress have power to make laws to bind 
the territory in all cases whatsoever.”41 Local committees met and passed resolutions 
denouncing the Tallmadge amendment.  A citizens’ meeting in Montgomery County, Missouri, 
attacked the hypocrisy of Congress in admitting Alabama Territory without restriction, “while 
the people of this territory have been refused, unless they would stoop to a condition, which 
degrades them below the rank of free men, and lays the foundation of a slavery more abject than 
that which congress pretends to be so zealous to reform.”42   
Proslavery Missourians portrayed the restrictionists’ efforts as an attack on the freedom 
of American citizens residing in the territory.  “If congress can with impunity enforce a single 
restriction in direct opposition to the will of the people of this territory,” argued one 
correspondent, “they may go on to what lengths they please, fearless of our being able to 
compete with them.”43  When someone did speak out in favor of restriction as a way to protect 
farmers making their home in the territory, fellow citizens responded with more attacks on the 
actions of Congress.44   “Are the only legitimate sovereigns on earth to be told that they hold 
their liberties at the will of ‘seventy-eight’ of their servants” who voted for the Tallmadge 
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amendment, a proslavery Missourian asked.  “Shall the creature be permitted to assume an 
absolute sovereignty over his creator, and to stifle even an inquiry into his powers?”45 
The restrictionists implied that living in a territory necessitated surrender of certain rights 
enjoyed by Americans living in the states, an issue that southerners raised ceaselessly.  
Politicians and ordinary citizens alike had grappled with the issue of territorial government and 
popular sovereignty since the inception of the territorial system itself and had never arrived at 
any concrete answers.  While most leaders saw the need for some sort of oversight of territorial 
affairs, few could agree on the extent of federal interference.  Imposing conditions on territories 
seemed to contradict the idea that people could govern themselves.  Why could not Americans 
living in a territory govern their affairs with as much competence as those residing in a state?  In 
the case of Missouri, southerners questioned the right of the federal government to dictate the 
structure of their constitution.  Each territory seeking admission had a right to create its own 
organic law according to this line of reasoning, an argument that “became the centerpiece of the 
southern stand against restriction.”46  The restrictionists of the North hardly seemed concerned 
with the implications of the Tallmadge amendment on the rights of slaveholders residing in the 
territories.   
Missourians and southerners pounced on what they saw as an inconsistency in the logic 
of the antislavery contingent that pushed for the restriction of slavery in Missouri—and the West 
in general.  Beverley Tucker addressed this very point when he claimed that restriction would 
“establish a precedent that will sap the foundation of state authority and make this federal 
government a consolidated nation.”47  Ignoring the strictures of the Northwest Ordinance, he 
argued that Congress could not restrict the right of a citizen to move to any territory with his 
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personal property.  The fact that a person held slaves as property did not allow for an exception 
to the rule.  When a territory prepared itself for statehood, its inhabitants could decide in 
convention whether to permit or prohibit the institution of slavery within its bounds.  This 
authority, according to a Kentucky writer who appealed to the logic of the tenth amendment, “is 
unquestionably one of those rights which the citizens did not surrender by the federal 
constitution.”48  According to the proponents of self-government, the restrictionists proposed to 
take away the sovereign right of the people of Missouri and subject them to the will of Congress 
merely because they resided in a territory rather than a state. 
Restriction also drew criticism from individuals who noted that the third article of the 
treaty of cession between France and the United States—the Missourians’ “Magna Carta,” in the 
words of one historian—had guaranteed the property rights of the residents of the Louisiana 
Purchase.49  Ignoring the treaty’s stipulation “divested [Missourians] of the only right which 
gives value to citizenship—the right of governing themselves.”50 Because the federal 
government had made no effort to prohibit slavery in Missouri at the outset of its territorial 
period, settlers in the region considered the restriction movement in the Fifteenth Congress 
doubly impolitic.  In the period between sessions of Congress, antirestrictionist writers reminded 
the public of the treaty as yet another reason to challenge the authority that the restrictionists 
claimed for the federal government. 
Southerners suspected northerners of possessing ulterior motives in their efforts to block 
slavery’s expansion.  The “chief spur to the debate over Missouri was sectional political 
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advantage,” not the welfare of slaves or the morality of the institution itself.51  Northern 
congressmen had argued that concern for the slaves and the protection of the future of republican 
government necessitated the restriction of slavery in the territories, points that the southerners 
rejected outright.  Southerners and westerners alike resented what they perceived as the haughty 
attitude of northerners toward people of their respective regions.  Certainly a number of 
northerners (and probably some southerners, too) considered western emigrants as uneducated 
and inferior to the citizens of the older portions of the nation.  Furthermore, in the debates over 
the Louisiana Purchase, some northerners had also questioned the loyalty of the residents of the 
vast territory.  
Opponents of restriction in the South and West seized these issues to use as ammunition 
against the restrictionists, charging northerners with trying to upset the sectional balance and 
even questioning their loyalty.  Some labeled opponents of self-government in Missouri as 
supporters of the Hartford Convention, the ill-fated New England secession plot during the War 
of 1812, or members of the Essex Junto, an alleged cadre of New England sectionalists.  By 
linking the restrictionists with the idea of secession, southerners hoped to completely discredit 
their movement.  Southerners believed that northerners ignorantly impugned the character and 
honor of western settlers.  But these so-called “enlightened men” of the North would find 
themselves “wofully [sic] disappointed if they expect that the people here have degenerated, 
have forgotten the rights which they will never alienate because they inhabit a territory, or have 
not had the good luck to come from the Land of Steady Habits.”52 
In the interim period between congressional sessions, southerners and the Missourians 
laid out a comprehensive rebuttal of the argument for the restriction of slavery.  Though many 
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politicians conceded that the federal government had a role to play in organizing territories, 
southerners insisted that the slavery issue remained beyond the jurisdiction of Congress.  
Northerners, however, rejected the notion that Congress did not possess the discretionary power 
to impose conditions upon a territory asking for admission to the Union; indeed, the federal 
government had exhibited virtually unchallenged its authority to prohibit slavery in the 
Northwest Territory.  Congress could and should exercise its power to admit new states as it 
deemed fit, and to stipulate conditions for the admittance of a new state.  While the Constitution 
“admits all the original states to hold slaves as they please,” an observer wrote, the 
“discretionary power granted to admit new states into the union, by simply saying, ‘new states 
may be admitted,’ necessarily supposes a right in congress to designate the conditions of 
admission.”53  As an Illinois correspondent noted, if Congress could not impose conditions on 
admission, then the federal government had robbed Illinois of the right to establish slavery 
within its bounds.54 
While southerners utilized the tenth amendment and the concept of states’ rights to attack 
the restrictionist agenda, northerners mocked their efforts to accuse antislavery leaders of 
endorsing federal consolidation.  They also questioned the policy of territorial self-government.  
“In an extent of country capable of supporting six millions of our inhabitants,” an Illinois editor 
asked, “shall it be considered a reasonable demand for the nation to allow a few thousand the 
right of deciding a question of such vital importance, merely because the few, from pecuniary 
interest, wish for the future toleration of slavery?”55  The writer did not necessarily oppose 
submitting the decision to the will of the people, but he contended that all of the people and not 
just those in Missouri had a right to decide the issue.  Both sides argued that all of the United 
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States had purchased the territories with common treasure. Both sides used theories of 
constitutional law to support their respective arguments that slavery should or should not pass 
into the territories of the Louisiana Purchase.  And both sides attempted to galvanize popular 
majorities to support their reasoning.  
As the days of late autumn passed and the country prepared for the opening of the 
Sixteenth Congress, the Missouri issue increasingly became a struggle over constitutional 
interpretation, a hallmark of early nineteenth century political discourse.56  Americans frequently 
met in committee to discuss political issues and issue resolutions expressing their views to their 
elected representatives.  At numerous meetings in the northeastern states, restrictionists claimed 
that Congress could deny admission to statehood if it considered slavery “to be inconsistent or 
inimical to republican institutions.”57  Recriminations flew back and forth in the war of words 
over the extension of slavery as both sides sought political advantage ahead of the upcoming 
session.  Southerners, too, leveled charges against the restrictionists and sought to fuse the link 
between the South and West.  
Numerous conventions met in the largest northern states to express their support for the 
restriction of slavery in Missouri, a development that Thomas Ritchie considered a “source of 
regret to the southern and western states.”58  In the late fall before the Sixteenth Congress 
convened, citizens held a final set of meetings at Trenton, New Jersey, New York City, 
Philadelphia, Boston, and other northern cities.59  On the whole, they added little to the debate 
that had raged all summer and fall, but their proceedings suggest a further hardening of the 
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sectional lines that divided the nation on Missouri’s admission.  Each of the committees passed 
resolutions stating that Congress did have the power and the obligation “to prohibit the 
admission of slavery into any state or territory hereafter to be formed and admitted into the 
union.”60  Indeed, the “honor and interests of the country” demanded congressional action.61  Of 
course, southerners and the Missourians responded in kind, arguing that the “solemn faith” of the 
nation demanded Missouri’s admission “on an equal footing with the other states.”62  They also 
exhibited considerable resentment that Missouri’s proposed admission to statehood had become 
entwined with the larger issue of slavery.  “Nothing has been done to promote our local 
interests,” argued a Kentucky correspondent, “and every scheme to give us a fair participation in 
the benefits of the union, has been thwarted or defeated.”63   
Southerners and proslavery westerners resented northerners’ attempts to thwart admission 
for Missouri, because they increasingly viewed the restriction movement as part of a broader 
movement to end slavery.  Sensing the gravity of the issue, state legislatures throughout the 
Union met to enact resolutions regarding the crisis.  In the days when voters did not elect their 
senators to Congress, the state legislatures who did select them often instructed their senators on 
how to vote on key issues.  Nine northern states passed resolutions instructing senators on how to 
vote on slavery restriction in Missouri.64  Their resolutions articulated the same arguments as 
those ratified by the countless public meetings across the nation, but the legislatures’ resolutions 
carried the additional weight of acting as an instruction on how senators should vote in Congress.  
They gave senators marching orders, in effect, on how to proceed in the congressional session.  
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Northern states issued resolutions condemning the spread of slavery to the western territories and 
asserting the right of Congress to stop its expansion.  Northern state legislatures intended to 
direct the action of senators in Washington by affirming their commitment to restriction, a stance 
that drew the ire of southerners who saw the northern effort as an attack on their section.  A 
series of resolutions from Pennsylvania particularly offended antirestrictionists. Thomas Ritchie 
stated, “it is contrary to the whole genius of our constitution to colonize the regions to the West 
of the Mississippi.”65  The northern scheme promised to deny western settlers their rights by 
transforming their choice of residence into a colony.  Southerners found this unacceptable. 
As legislatures in state capitols and citizens in public meetings weighed in on the right of 
Congress to restrict slavery in the territories, the president monitored the debate from 
Washington.  James Monroe had remained silent on the matter in his State of the Union message 
to Congress in December 1819, but expressed privately his opinions to advisors.  To his son-in-
law and political confidant George Hay, he wrote, “I indulge a strong hope that the restriction 
will not pass.”66  The Virginian Monroe, who had disputed the force of the Northwest 
Ordinance’s prohibition of slavery, sided with the southerners on the Missouri issue, arguing that 
Congress could not admit a new state on conditions different from the old states and that it could 
not prohibit slavery in the territories.  In questioning the force of the Northwest Ordinance, 
Monroe represented the prevailing opinion of his home state—and indeed the South at large. 
Ritchie had cited the 1787 act as a “usurpation” of power and believed that the ordinance had 
gained passage “without adequate discussion and deliberation.”67  Northerners attempted to 
shield their efforts at restriction behind a dubious precedent, southerners argued.  
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Unlike Ritchie and many of his contemporaries, the president did appear amenable to 
some sort of compromise to end the increasingly dangerous dispute, although he could not say so 
publicly.  Virginia’s strong opposition to any compromise on the matter left Monroe in a 
politically precarious situation.68  If Monroe and his advisors openly endorsed a compromise, 
“they were vulnerable to attack from the South because of their broadly national stance; they 
could hardly allow themselves to appear flexible in the defense of slavery.”69 The president faced 
a reelection bid in 1820; if he wanted a chance at a second term, he had to pay heed to the 
opinions of his southern power base—particularly Virginia—by resisting the northern 
encroachment on the South’s peculiar institution.  He also had to keep the nation from falling 
apart over slavery in the territories.   
When the members of a new Congress arrived in Washington, they faced the grim task of 
resolving the crisis over Missouri before events spiraled out of control.  The Sixteenth Congress 
convened on December 6, 1819, returning to the Capitol for the first time since the British had 
burned the structure in 1814.  One absence from the House of Representatives gained notice; an 
ailing James Tallmadge had declined to run for a seat in the new Congress.  The end of his short 
tenure, however, certainly did not mark the death of his amendment.  Three weeks later, the 
House of Representatives resumed debate in earnest on the Missouri statehood bill.  Speaker of 
the House Henry Clay left the speaker’s chair to deliver a speech from the floor, in which he 
recapitulated the debate that had consumed the second session of the last Congress.  The speaker 
took the position of his fellow southerners and westerners by arguing that his northern colleagues 
attempted to treat the territory like “she is our vassal, and we have the right to affix to her 
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conditions not applicable to the States on this side of the Mississippi.”70  Clay rejected such 
expansive congressional authority, arguing, “when the population and extent of a territory had 
been such as to entitle a territory to the privilege of self-government, and the rank of a State, the 
single question had presented itself to admit or reject it, without qualification.”71  Indeed, Clay 
and his fellow southerners implied elsewhere that Congress could not even reject such a bid; the 
Constitution and the treaty of cession entitled the Missourians to statehood. 
The speaker’s opening remarks on the Missouri bill left little doubt that the affair had 
become a great debate over constitutional interpretation as it pertained to slavery.  Northerners 
had committed a grievous error, in the estimation of southerners, by seizing on the Missouri bill 
as an opening to attack the institution of slavery.  As the debate in Congress proceeded, 
legislators from North and South lined up to offer their interpretation of the Constitution’s 
impact on the issue of slavery in the territories.  Again, southerners argued that the federal 
government had no right to restrict Missouri’s sovereign right to permit or prohibit slavery 
within its bounds.  In the previous session of Congress, the senators had remained largely silent 
on the matter, leaving the members of the House of Representatives to conduct the more 
vigorous debate.  In this session, however, the senators eagerly engaged the issues.  Both of 
Georgia’s senators rose in defense of slavery in Missouri.  In addition to the now-familiar 
arguments of congressional authority over slavery in the territories and the terms of the treaty of 
cession and its impact on the rights of slave owners, the issue of self-government emerged in the 
Senate debate.  Georgia’s Freeman Walker argued that the citizens of Missouri, “who certainly 
ought to be esteemed at least as capable of judging of this matter as those so far removed,” 
opposed congressional interference, instead “wishing to have the privilege of regulating their 
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internal police as in their judgment shall best promote their happiness and welfare.”72  The policy 
of self-government, the course most true to the Constitution, ensured that Americans in the 
territories had the same rights as their fellow citizens in the states.  His argument resonated in the 
minds of those who found the concept of territorial oversight unsettling.  “Let us grant to them 
the boon of self-government without alloy,” Walker declared.73  
Just as southern members of Congress took the lead in assaulting the northern restriction 
effort to “alloy” the right of self-government, so too did the southern press coordinate the 
resistance outside of Washington.  In particular, Ritchie’s Richmond Enquirer became a leading 
voice against restriction.  One regular correspondent took great care in analyzing the nature of 
territorial government itself, citing the “temporary” character of a territory.74  Restricting slavery 
hardly represented a needful rule or regulation as envisioned by the framers of the Constitution; 
indeed, it embodied an abuse of power.  Northerners proposed a massive expansion of federal 
power over territorial organization and state making.  They resolved to force policies on the 
people of Missouri that they did not want.  “And if we can make their constitution, and render it 
perpetual,” argued a Virginian, “what will the people of that territory be but slaves?”75 
Southerners insisted that the restrictionists in the North had resolved to force their beliefs 
on the people of Missouri against their will.  Free men could not accept such an infringement on 
their personal liberty.  In speech after speech, southern congressmen attacked the northern 
antislavery vanguard and its cavalier attitude toward the sovereignty of the people.  “A wise 
Legislature,” noted Senator Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina, “will always consider the 
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character, condition, and feeling, of those to be legislated for.”76  Senator Rufus King, 
recognized as the Senate’s leader on restriction, and his antislavery colleagues meant to run 
roughshod over the rights of settlers in Missouri, instead of leaving them “free to do as they 
pleased.”77  Northerners had made an issue of the expansion of slavery, and in their zeal to end 
the expansion of the institution they threatened the Missourians’ right to form a government of 
their choosing.   
To southerners who believed in the virtues of strong local government, the northern 
restriction movement proved that the specter of consolidation loomed larger than ever before.  
Across the Capitol rotunda in the House of Representatives, southerners gained a northern ally 
who spoke in uncommonly prescient terms about the danger of the Missouri debates.  Henry 
Meigs, a lawyer and first-term congressman from New York, lamented the “increasing spirit of 
local and sectional envy and dislike between the North and South.”78  He gave a wide-ranging 
defense of the principles of self-government in the territories, noting that Congress could not and 
should not meddle in its sovereign right to govern its own local affairs.  “We are attempting here 
to legislate for Missouri, without a due attention to the situation, the genius of the people, soil, 
climate, and all the matters which ought to constitute good law.”79  In a thinly veiled attack on 
the New England Federalists, Meigs chastised the efforts of those who held “in doubt and 
apparent dread the extension of Republican Government.”80  Why did they fear the will of the 
people? 
Southerners cried that the restrictionists’ argument treated the Missourians as children 
and viewed them as inferior to the men of the East, a betrayal of northeastern elitism that 
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disgusted southerners and many individuals from the middle states.  But Meigs advanced the 
antirestriction argument further by articulating a theory that would become famous some thirty-
five years later.  He argued that Congress had no power to enact laws “contrary to the genius and 
will of a people.”  Meigs then went on to add, “Such attempts will be mere absurdities—violence 
will be committed upon the fundamental principles of all law, and can never be executed.”81  
Stephen A. Douglas articulated this same concept over thirty-five years later in his debate with 
Abraham Lincoln at Freeport, Illinois.  Meigs likely drew from knowledge of northwesterners’ 
evasion of the slavery prohibition in the Northwest Territory as he made a crucial point that 
became a foundation of the argument for self-government in the territories: settlers would only 
stand for so much federal interference before they started evading the law.  Consequently, it 
behooved Congress to practice a policy of non-intervention not only as a matter of right, but of 
expediency.   
In other words, Meigs argued, Congress did not possess the power to interdict slavery in 
Missouri, nor did it really want that authority lest it offend the settlers and provoke resistance to 
the rule of law.  His speech garnered praise from his southern colleagues and enmity from those 
of the North, especially the New England Federalists whom he attacked most strongly.  Certainly 
southerners agreed with his characterization of the Federalists, particularly Rufus King, who had 
become a favorite target of the southern press.  Other northerners joined Meigs in his criticism of 
the restrictionists’ efforts.  Mathew Carey, a Philadelphia printer and political observer of the 
Jeffersonian Republican persuasion, rejected the efforts to prohibit slavery in Missouri and 
warned of dire consequences if “we are to persist in shackling her with restrictions.”82  Carey 
opposed slavery; indeed, he argued that had southerners looked to the future, they would 
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themselves have approved a restriction similar to the Northwest Ordinance.  But many 
southerners did not believe restriction constitutionally possible.  Carey evaluated the southern 
argument, especially the notion that restriction would deprive southerners of equal rights within 
the Union, and deemed it “sufficiently plausible.”83   
Northerners erred in using Missouri as a convenient means of attacking the institution of 
slavery, according to Carey and Meigs, and in the process they endangered the Union.  Though 
Carey expressed his belief in the evil of slavery, his constitutional arguments could not have 
pleased southerners more.  Men like Carey and Meigs proved that the South still had allies in the 
northern states.  Southerners embraced their arguments against the northern restrictionists.  They 
believed that King and his supporters purposely disregarded the wishes and interests of the 
Missourians, who had formed their own opinions on the subject of slavery.  “With this evidence 
of feeling and of fact before his eyes,” the Richmond Enquirer asked, “will Mr. King contend 
that it is expedient to go on?—What! are the opinions of the people of Missouri, having the 
deepest interest in the question, nothing?”84  What did New Yorkers know of the wants, needs, 
and desires of the people of Missouri?  Again, southerners appealed to the spirit of localism, 
arguing that only the people of the territories could know what local laws and institutions best 
suited them.   
At the same time that southerners chided northern restrictionists for interfering in the 
purely local matter of slavery in the territories, they also struck back at the northern attack on the 
institution of slavery itself.  In numerous speeches before and during the Missouri crisis, 
southern politicians characterized slavery as an institution foisted upon them by generations past.  
Leaders expressed hope that someday the institution would pass away through means most often 
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unclear.  Some politicians, like Henry Clay, argued that African colonization provided the best 
solution for the problem.  Contemporaries and historians alike have questioned the sincerity of 
these pronouncements in favor of a gradual end to the peculiar institution.   
When northerners attacked the institution of slavery in the debates over Missouri, 
“southern congressmen had no choice but to defend it.”85   North Carolina Senator Nathaniel 
Macon, an early leader in the southern defense of slavery, challenged the northerners’ arguments.  
“The Constitution tolerates [slavery]; and that was not adopted from necessity, but through 
choice.  If the necessity ever ceases, who is to decide when?  Congress did not decide for 
Pennsylvania, or any other State; she decided for herself.  Let Missouri do the same.”86  Some 
writers went a step further, offering a biblical and historical defense of slavery designed to thwart 
the institution’s critics and retard their efforts to cast the South in an unfavorable light over the 
issue.87  As the Missouri debate continued and ideological lines hardened, “leading white 
southerners accepted their section’s identification with slavery and fought for its interests and 
reputation with increasing vigor,” a development that presaged significant changes in the 
southern stance on slavery.88 
Even as the debates exhibited the increasing intransigence of both sides on the issue of 
slavery’s expansion into the territories and new states, some leaders in Congress indicated a 
desire to end the contentious dispute.  Samuel Foot of Connecticut suggested a compromise, 
even as he expressed his desire to stop the expansion of slavery into the West.  Congress should 
leave the question “to the good sense of the people of the States to be formed out of that 
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Territory,” but if anyone questioned the right of slavery to exist in any such state, “it might be 
left for the proper tribunal, the Supreme Court, to determine it.”89  Foot’s proposal sounded much 
like popular sovereignty, or permitting the people to make their own decision, but it actually 
discouraged such a popular referendum on the issue of slavery by placing the issue under the 
jurisdiction of the federal judiciary.  Given the makeup of the Supreme Court in 1820, with the 
nationalist John Marshall as its chief justice, the tribunal would almost undoubtedly have sided 
with the restrictionists.  The suggestion went nowhere, but some twenty-eight years later John 
Clayton, a Delaware Whig congressman, would revive the notion when Congress found itself 
mired in a debate over slavery in the Mexican Cession. 
Northern politicians eager to end the congressional stalemate began to express their 
willingness to compromise.  The first overtures toward an mutual concession on the slavery issue 
had emerged in the previous Congress, when Louis McLane of Delaware, a congressman from a 
state closely divided over the issue of slavery in the territories, proposed to draw a dividing line 
between free and slave territory.90  The plan went nowhere in that session, but by January 1820, 
some congressmen appeared willing to entertain the notion.  Another proposal would have 
banned slavery in any territory north of the thirty-eighth parallel, a compromise that the House 
rejected for the moment.91  But on February 3, Illinois senator Jesse Thomas made a similar 
proposal in the upper chamber, suggesting that Congress prohibit slavery in the Louisiana 
Purchase—excepting Missouri—north of the line thirty-six degrees, thirty minutes.  Because the 
southerners in the Senate had successfully maneuvered to combine the admission of Maine with 
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that of Missouri, Thomas’s proposal seemed an appropriate compromise.92  Maine would enter 
the Union as a free state and Missouri would become a slave state, while the amendment would 
prohibit slavery in the remainder of the Louisiana Purchase, save the newly created Arkansas 
Territory.93  
The Thomas plan seemed to offer a way out of the congressional impasse.  Yet the 
southern maneuver to link Maine and Missouri’s statehood had “deeply alienated the North and 
stiffened the South.”94  The ensuing debates in the House and Senate reflected the animosity on 
both sides, even as certain individuals moved toward compromise.  Louis McLane approached 
the debate warily; circumstances in his home state made his course a necessity.  Though he 
argued “that Congress does not possess the power to impose the contemplated restriction,” 
McLane shied away from the bolder pronouncements of his southern colleagues who insisted on 
self-government for the territories.95  Instead he asserted that Congress had vacated its power to 
impose conditions on Missouri when it permitted slavery in the territorial enabling bill.  He 
stumbled on the question of congressional jurisdiction over slavery in the territories; in some 
parts of his speech, he asserted that only the people themselves could make their own municipal 
regulations, while in other instances he noted that Congress “can give laws to a Territory.”96  The 
Delaware representative walked his political tightrope with great difficulty. 
The Virginians emerged as the most ardent defenders of southern interests and slavery in 
the territories, advancing arguments against restriction that seemed to threaten the impetus for 
compromise.  The Richmond Enquirer served as the leading anticompromise voice in the  
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southern press.  “Can we compromise with the constitution of our country?” Thomas Ritchie 
asked.97  The Thomas compromise proposal did just that, according to Ritchie.  Another 
Virginian noted that the “publick mind is all in a ferment about this compromise spoke of in 
Washington.”98  The writer concurred with Ritchie’s condemnation of compromise.  “If the 
Southern people yield – the consequences will be serious – and unless the Northern people 
retrace their steps, the result will be equally so – the naked question will then be presented – war 
or disunion.”99  Congress could not legally restrict even a territory.  After a speech by an Illinois 
congressman, which mockingly accused southerners who supported Thomas’s compromise 
overtures “as conceding the point, that Congress has the power to make the restriction or 
territorial prohibition perpetual and binding on the States hereafter,” the more rigid states’ rights 
members of Congress stood firm in their convictions.100   
Philip Barbour of Virginia advanced one of the most sophisticated arguments about 
congressional power and territorial sovereignty in the course of the debate.  For the sake of 
argument, he deferred on the original question of territorial sovereignty—though suggesting that 
the people of a territory had the right to determine their own local institutions—and assumed a 
position similar to that of Louis McLane.  Even conceding that point (for the sake of argument 
only), Barbour posited, Congress had delegated the power of local legislation by statute.  In the 
case of Missouri, he noted, “we have, by one of our own regulations, given it a legislative body; 
that we have extended to that body the whole power of legislation, subject only to the limitation 
that their laws shall not be inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”  
Because “the question of slavery is one of a legislative character; it, therefore, already belongs to 
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them to decide it by our own grant.”101  Barbour’s argument garnered the praise of several of his 
colleagues.  John Scott of Missouri quickly adopted Barbour’s argument, noting that when 
Congress promoted Missouri to the second grade of territorial government, it ended 
congressional “superintendence over the laws of the territory” and gave the territorial legislature 
“all legislative power without reserve.”102  
 Southerners contended that Congress had “already spoken on the slavery issue” when it 
established territorial governments for Louisiana, Missouri, and Arkansas, without legislating on 
the issue of slavery, but northerners persisted in bending the “needful rules and regulations” 
clause of the Constitution to reassert authority over the issue.103    A South Carolinian argued that 
“in making such regulations for the government of the territory, [Congress is] no more 
authorized to inhibit slavery in the territory, than they are in the State—for, if they should have 
the power, it would indirectly effect the same thing.”104  Southern politicians and their 
constituents continued to ascribe the actions of northerners to a concerted effort at augmenting 
federal authority and assaulting the institution of slavery by advancing a dubious interpretation 
of the Constitution.   
Northern restrictionists had willfully misinterpreted the Constitution to advance their 
antislavery program and to change the nation’s political calculus by creating more free states and 
striking a blow at the heart of self-government, according to southerners.  Their efforts, the 
antirestrictionists argued, threatened the liberty of Americans residing in the territories.  As 
Thomas Ritchie noted, “What is a territorial restriction to-day becomes a state restriction to-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Ibid., 1237. 
102 Ibid., 1502. 
103 Ibid., 1320. 
104 Ibid., 1327. 
 87	  
morrow.”105  Congress could not interfere with the rights of a citizen just because he resided in a 
territory.  “By whom has the territory been settled?” asked a Virginia representative.  “Are the 
inhabitants strangers, foreigners, aliens to our Government, manners, religion?  Or are they 
native citizens of the United States?  They are native citizens; many of whom have fought and 
bled in defence of the principles of which we all proudly boast.”106   
Congress threatened to commit a grievous injustice by depriving American citizens of the 
right to self-government.  John Tyler, a Virginia congressman and future president, disputed the 
right of Congress to intervene in the slavery issue at any stage within the territorial period or at 
the point of statehood, accusing the northerners of wanting the government to act as a colonial 
power.  “England denied to us the right to legislate, except by her special authority; nay, she 
proclaimed the very principle which you now proclaim as applicable to Missouri—the right to 
bind you by her own system of legislation.”107  By recalling the memory of the American 
Revolution, Tyler invoked the ideals of the founders to stop the northern advance against slavery. 
Southern legislators failed to persuade their northern colleagues.  Restrictionists rejected 
outright the southern interpretation of the needful rules clause in the Constitution.  They 
specifically attacked any notion of territorial sovereignty as expressed by many 
antirestrictionists.  Congress had the express power to legislate for the territories at any time.  
The “passing of one act prescribing the manner in which laws for the Territory shall be made, 
does not commit Congress; they can change the mode at their pleasure.”108  Northerners 
attempted to expose a lack of unity among the antirestrictionists, many of whom preferred to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Richmond Enquirer, March 7, 1820. 
106 AC, House, 16th Cong., 1st Sess., 1368. 
107 Ibid., 1382.  For a discussion of the tenth president’s beliefs on republican government and states’ rights during 
the Missouri controversy, see Dan Monroe, The Republican Vision of John Tyler (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 2003), 24-47. 
108 AC, House, 16th Cong., 1st Sess., 1130. 
 88	  
remain silent on the question of territorial sovereignty, instead focusing on the rights of a 
territory preparing for statehood. “Even gentlemen on the opposite side of the question admit we 
may” legislate for the territories, noted one congressman.109  The restrictionists, however, failed 
to recognize that a sizeable majority of southerners at this time did not believe that Congress 
could legislate on slavery at any stage in the territorial existence. 
Additionally, some northern congressman raised questions about the nature of popular 
sovereignty in the territories itself that revealed strong ideological differences on the nature of 
local government.  According to a Massachusetts representative, “absolute sovereignty resides, 
not in minute portions or States, but in the whole people, whose will expressed by their 
Constitutional organs, is the law, and must be obeyed.”110  Popular sovereignty could not rest in 
an inchoate community such as a territory, and respecting the governance of the territories 
themselves, it could not rest in the individual states of the Union.  The federal government 
possessed exclusive power over territories from their infancy to the moment Congress granted 
them statehood.  Few other members of Congress advocated such a nationalist agenda in such 
stark terms. 
Restrictionists argued that Congress possessed the discretionary power to admit states.  If 
the national legislature did not believe admitting a territory to statehood represented the best 
interests of the nation at large, it could deny admission.  In the case of Missouri and any other 
territory seeking admission as a slave state, members of Congress had a right and a duty to 
“judge for themselves, whether it will be for the good of the Union to admit new members who 
hold mankind as slaves.”111  No territory could demand admission to the Union from Congress; 
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no treaty could trump the right of Congress to grant admission as it saw fit.  Any contrary 
argument denied the sovereign power delegated to Congress by the people. 
In spite of the rigid positions taken by members of both sides of the Missouri debate, 
Congress appeared poised to enact a compromise by the middle of February.  Compromise 
offered the only avenue to safely navigate the question.  Moderates appeared willing to negotiate 
on the terms of the Thomas amendment.  Mathew Carey had hinted at drawing a compromise 
line in his pamphlet on the Missouri controversy, written in early 1820.  He cited an 
“understanding” between the free and slave states, “that slavery should be tolerated within a 
certain line, and excluded beyond it.”112  Carey almost certainly referred to the use of the Ohio 
River as a dividing line between free and slave territory.  The Thomas proposal, it seemed, 
merely extended this precedent.  The House of Representatives held out for some time, refusing 
to concur in the Senate’s amendments to the Missouri bill, namely the Thomas amendment.  But 
by March, a final settlement seemed imminent.  Outside of Washington, however, considerable 
resistance to compromise developed.  Some northerners looked at the Thomas amendment with 
alarm, as drawing a line between slave and free territory “would seem to establish different 
interests, and create the worst sort of parties that we can possible have.”113 
To the minds of many southerners, the compromise plan yielded on the issue of 
congressional authority over slavery in the territories, a settlement the South could not afford to 
endorse.  Congress had “no right to restrict even the territorial government,” nor did it have the 
right to “shackle future sovereign states” on the issue of slavery.114  Yet the Thomas amendment 
did both by yielding on the issue of territorial sovereignty north of the thirty-six degree, thirty 
minutes line and by making the prohibition perpetually binding.  “Why use this very expression 
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which seems copied from the ordinance of ’87,” the Richmond Enquirer asked, “if it be not 
intended to pursue the precedent set in the N.W. territory?”  President Monroe, who quietly 
observed the proceedings in Congress and the public debate from the White House, concurred.  
The Thomas amendment inferred “that the restraint should apply to territories, after they become 
states as well as before.  This will increase the difficulty incident to an arrangement of this 
subject, otherwise sufficiently great, in any form, in which it can be presented.”115 
Monroe consulted with several colleagues on the legality of the compromise emerging 
from Congress in the closing days of the congressional session.  The president’s correspondence 
indicates that he remained unsure of the legality of such an arrangement.  James Madison 
provided the president with a carefully reasoned treatise on the subject.  Madison recognized that 
the Constitution left much pertaining to the territories open to interpretation.  The “ductile 
nature” of the needful rules and regulations clause left “much to legislative discretion.116  The 
territories needed some manner of oversight in their infancy, but the “suspension of the great 
principle of self-government, ought not to extend farther nor continued longer than the occasion 
might fairly require.”117  In the specific case of Missouri, Madison deemed the restriction 
unconstitutional. 
In addition to contacting the fourth president and framer of the Constitution for his 
interpretation of the issues of self-government in the territories, Monroe summoned the members 
of his cabinet to the White House for a meeting on March 3.  The president asked his advisors to 
submit written opinions on two questions: whether Congress had the right to prohibit slavery in 
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the territories and whether the Missouri bill, which interdicted slavery forever north of the 
compromise line proposed by Jesse Thomas applied only to territories or to states after their 
admission to the Union.118  The cabinet discussed their opinions in person in addition to 
submitting written opinions.  Secretary of the Treasury William H. Crawford, Attorney General 
William Wirt, and Secretary of War John C. Calhoun—all slaveholders—responded that the 
federal government did indeed possess the power to prohibit slavery in the territories, a stunning 
admission given their respective backgrounds.  
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams noted the aberration immediately.  “The progress 
of this discussion has so totally merged in passion all the reasoning faculties of the slave-
holders,” Adams wrote in his diary, “that these gentlemen, in the simplicity of their hearts, had 
come to a conclusion in direct opposition to their premises, without being aware of or conscious 
of inconsistency.”119 The three men believed that the slavery prohibition in the bill applied only 
to the territories, however.  Adams concurred on the first point with his southern colleagues, but 
argued that the slavery prohibition would apply even in statehood, because “by its interdiction in 
the territory, the people, when they come to form a Constitution, would have no right to sanction 
slavery.”120  Having consulted with his advisors and received their sanction for the proposed 
compromise plan, Monroe resolved to sign the bill as received from Congress. 
The president certainly helped shape the bill that he signed into law on March 6, 1820.  
Historians have reexamined the record in recent years and argued that Monroe worked behind 
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the scenes to craft a moderate coalition between the sections that would vote for compromise.121  
To achieve a workable adjustment, Monroe and the compromisers in Congress, led by Speaker 
Henry Clay, would have to exert pressure on enough northern restrictionists to gain sufficient 
votes to pass the compromise bill.  Fourteen northerners voted with the southern delegation for 
the compromise bill, including Henry Meigs of New York, who had so eloquently articulated the 
antirestrictionist argument in Congress.  These “doughfaces,” a pejorative term coined by the 
eccentric John Randolph of Virginia, gave Henry Clay and the administration enough support in 
the House of Representatives to pass the compromise bill.  Randolph mocked these northern men 
with southern principles, saying that he knew that these men who “were scared at their own 
dough faces” would cave in to southern demands.122  “The seventeen or eighteen doughfaces 
whom Randolph belittled made sectional peace possible in 1820.”123   
Those doughfaces would have to explain their actions to their constituents after the close 
of the congressional session.  Admitting Missouri assuaged the South, explained a congressman 
from the District of Maine, while the Thomas proviso inhibited “slavery from a territory larger 
than all of the original thirteen United States, in exact conformity to the ordinance of 1787.”124  
A second representative from Maine, John Holmes, added that the Constitution represented a 
“compromise of conflicting rights and interests” that necessitated accommodation of diverse 
opinions.125  Of course, the linking of Maine’s admission as a state with that of Missouri might 
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have motivated both of these congressmen as well.  Holmes played an instrumental role in 
gaining statehood for Maine by working on the Arkansas and Missouri bills.  While his 
constituents gratefully acknowledged his efforts, Holmes never escaped the brand of being a 
doughface.126 He resigned after the end of the session and never returned to Congress. 
Southerners compromised on the issue of congressional nonintervention; endorsing the 
Thomas amendment conceded that Congress could determine the status of slavery in the 
territories, at least north of 36° 30’.  Strict constructionists from the South abhorred the 
compromise and predicted that it would injure their section in the future.  Moderate southerners 
saw a good deal and accepted the terms.  They believed that the compromise conceded far less 
than it seemed.  Some southerners “doubted that Congress would actually impose the restriction 
when the region was organized into territories.”127  In Illinois and Indiana, for example, Congress 
had largely ignored the efforts of slaveholders to bypass the Northwest Ordinance, leaving the 
battle over slavery to local citizens.  Furthermore, they interpreted the clause that “forever 
prohibited” slavery in the territory north of the compromise line as applying only to the territorial 
phase.  Once a territory in the region gained statehood, it could amend its constitution to permit 
slavery if it wished.  Regardless of what applied during the territorial phase, no law of Congress 
could overrule the sovereign right of a state to create and alter its own organic law.   
Finally, the legislation left a considerable portion of territory south of the compromise 
line open to slavery if settlers in those areas desired to permit the institution. Congress had 
established the principle of self-government in Arkansas Territory during the last session of 
Congress and the Territory of Florida seemed beyond the reach of northern restrictionists.  
Southerners could feel secure in their rights to hold slaves and to hold a commensurate power in 
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the halls of government given the political calculus that emerged from the Missouri debates.  The 
arrangement provided for a balance between free and slave states that would keep southern 
interests safe.  Speaker Clay, who played an instrumental role in shepherding the bill through a 
hostile House of Representatives, expressed his relief at the denouement of the crisis.  “I gave 
my consent to and employed my best exertions to produce this settlement of the question,” he 
wrote to a political friend, “and I shall be rejoiced if the community will sanction it.”128 
The concept of self-government on the issue of slavery in the territories emerged from the 
Missouri debates in much the same condition as it had entered—unsettled.  For a time, it seemed 
that southerners would insist on congressional sanction of the right of settlers in the territories to 
determine the legality of slavery.  Many southerners, especially the Virginians, essentially 
demanded that Congress recognize this as a right.  Northerners strongly objected to the doctrine 
over the course of the Missouri controversy; they equated self-government in Missouri and the 
western territories as de facto establishment of slavery in the region.  The cases of Illinois and 
Indiana ten years earlier seemed to bolster their claims.  In both territories, even the Northwest 
Ordinance’s provision against slavery did not settle the issue.  A long battle over slavery ensued 
in both territories, indeed in Illinois it had not yet ended.129  Northern restrictionists could not 
allow the territories to decide the issue, for if the federal government affirmed self-government 
“alone to decide the institution’s fate, human nature and the demands of western settlement 
dictated that western territories would choose slavery over freedom.”130  Under the terms of the 
compromise, northerners would have to concede the admission of Missouri as a slave state, but 
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they could prevent its spread into the portion of the Louisiana Purchase north of the compromise 
line. 
Southerners responded to the passage of the compromise with mixed reviews.   Some 
castigated those who voted for the bill and lamented that their fellow southerners had 
compromised on self-government in the territories.  “A constitution warped from its legitimate 
bearings, and an immense region of territory closed for ever against the Southern and Western 
people—such is the ‘sorry sight’ which rises to our view,” Thomas Ritchie wrote.131  
Alternatively, a Georgia correspondent reflected the attitudes of the moderate camp by 
encouraging a novel application of popular sovereignty.  “Now, I think if we go to the people we 
shall find a decided majority in favor of the proposed restriction, at least such appears to be the 
fact from the votes of their more immediate organ, the House of Representatives.”132  His readers 
could debate the existence of a “decided” majority—southerners in the House had voted 39-37 in 
favor of the Thomas proviso.133  In Washington, John C. Calhoun confided to Andrew Jackson 
that the Missouri controversy may have “contributed to weaken in some degree the attachment of 
our Southern and Western people to the Union; but the agitators of that question have, in my 
opinion, not only completely failed; but have destroyed to a great extent their future capacity for 
future mischief.”134  Regardless of the vote tally or the objections of strict constructionists, the 
larger point remained intact: many southerners saw the compromise bill as acceptable.   
Southern press coverage made another point clear in the days after President Monroe 
signed the Missouri Compromise: many southerners still believed that Congress did not possess 
the power to interdict slavery in the territories.  A Missouri editor maintained, “We still believe 
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that under the constitution Congress has no such power over the territories.”135  Now Missouri 
had a solemn duty to conduct.  “Never has a Territory so young been called upon to act so great a 
part; for now is thrown into its hands the decision of a question upon which depends not only the 
liberties of the Missouri people and of their unborn posterity, but also the safety of the Republic 
and the preservation of the Union.”136  The Missourians now had to frame a constitution and 
defend its rights and those of the South. 
When the Missourians did submit their constitution to the second session of the Sixteenth 
Congress, it provoked another firestorm that threatened the initial compromise and promised to 
renew the rancorous debate.  The draft constitution forbade passage of any law that emancipated 
slaves without the consent of their owners and directed the legislature to pass legislation that 
would prohibit free blacks and mulattoes from living in the state.  In their efforts to strike back at 
Congress for attempting to legislate their affairs, many legislators believed that the Missouri 
Constitution’s framers had overstepped their bounds and violated the United States Constitution.  
Baltimore editor Hezekiah Niles argued, “It can hardly be believed that congress will sanction 
either of these provisions: the first, in the present state of the public feeling, is inexpedient. . . 
and the second is unconstitutional.”137  The first provision did not violate the constitution, but it 
offended many northerners who already viewed the compromise with contempt.  The second 
clause clearly violated Article Four, Section Two of the Constitution, which states, “The Citizens 
of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of citizens in the several States.”  
Because free blacks and mulattoes held citizenship in some northern states, Missouri could not 
constitutionally enforce the offending clause.   
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The restrictionists fully intended to do battle again with the proslavery forces in 
Congress.  But because they chose the issue of banning free blacks from Missouri as their 
entering wedge, the second Missouri debate had little impact on the issue of territorial self-
government.  Many southerners realized that the clause violated the U.S. Constitution.  It would 
take all the skill of Henry Clay to broker another compromise that would appease the 
restrictionists while keeping intact the original compromise.  Clay and a joint congressional 
committee drafted a resolution that gave tacit approval to the Missouri Constitution, but declared 
that the free blacks clause “shall never be construed to authorize the passage of any law” that 
would exclude any American citizen “from the enjoyment of any of the privileges and 
immunities” of the United States Constitution.138  Clay averted another crisis that could have 
threatened the stability of the Union.  With the terms of the first Missouri Compromise secure, 
the nation hoped to put the divisive issue of slavery in the territories to a rest, but because the 
compromise itself had not settled the issue of whether a territory had the right to decide the 
slavery issue for itself, considerable room for dispute remained. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES AFTER THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE 
 
Following passage of the Missouri Compromise, many Americans breathed a collective 
sigh of relief.  Congress had averted crisis and had crafted a compromise that many believed 
would provide a lasting arrangement between the North and South.  Questions regarding the 
expansion of slavery might reappear, but the Missouri Compromise formula would provide a 
means of settlement even in the future.  “In the acquisition of new territories (say of Florida, the 
only new territory that we ever wish to see added, taking the line as fixed by the late treaty with 
Spain for our boundary west,) the question may be partially revived,” noted the editor of Niles’ 
Weekly Register, “but sufficient for the day is the evil thereof.”1 
Not all Americans expressed such a sanguine attitude toward the compromise that their 
leaders in Washington had brokered.  A considerable number of southerners viewed the accord 
with skepticism, particularly because they believed that their representatives had conceded a 
legal point crucial to the defense of the South and her institutions: Congress had no right to 
interfere with slavery in the territories.  While supporters of the compromise on both sides of the 
Mason-Dixon Line evaluated the legislation’s merits based on its short-term effects, opponents 
argued that the compromise made intolerable concessions that would have injurious long-term 
consequences.  Northern opponents maintained that the new arrangement conceded too much to 
the South; the North had compromised on the immorality of slavery to quiet the immediate 
discord.  Southerners predicted that the compromise would not satisfy the “insatiable appetite” of 
the restrictionists for the eventual extinction of slavery.2  Congress had prohibited the institution 
in a vast portion of the Louisiana Purchase, leaving a single territory—Arkansas—open to 
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southern slaveholders.  Southerners feared, however, that the opponents of slavery would not rest 
with the generous terms handed to them.  They would push for more concessions from the South 
in the future. 
The terms of the Missouri Compromise applied to a circumscribed portion of the national 
domain in 1821.  In negotiations with the Spanish empire two years earlier, Secretary of State 
John Quincy Adams had determined the location of America’s western boundary. The Adams-
Onis Treaty settled a lingering dispute over the American-Spanish border, much to the 
dissatisfaction of many Americans who desired more favorable terms that would have given part 
of Texas to the United States.3  Regardless of any disappointment with Adams’s work, the treaty 
established a permanent western boundary for the United States and gave the nation title to the 
territories of Florida.  Americans assessing the impact of the Missouri Compromise in 1821 
viewed their nation in the boundaries created by the Adams-Onis Treaty, not by the rhetoric of 
continental expansion expressed twenty-five years later and more exhaustively chronicled by 
historians.  From the vantage point of 1821, few Americans could have imagined the future 
territorial acquisitions that their nation would accomplish.  Viewed in these terms, many 
southerners believed that the Missouri Compromise unequally divided the national domain in 
favor of antislavery interests. 
From a legal standpoint, the Missouri Compromise had significant implications for 
territorial self-government.  The act established the principle of congressional nonintervention in 
the territories of Arkansas and Missouri.  In other words, Congress would not make a positive 
declaration on the issue of slavery in those territories.  Of course, Missouri became a state on 
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August 10, 1821, but Arkansas would remain a territory for fifteen more years.  By declining to 
intervene in the matter of slavery south of the Missouri Compromise line, Congress, by 
implication, sanctioned the principle of territorial self-government.4  Settlers in those territories 
could determine the status of slavery for themselves.  Just as congressional nonintervention 
suggested the practice of territorial self-government, so too did it suggest that those settlers 
would permit slavery.  The legislators who crafted the compromise assumed that the people of 
Missouri and Arkansas wanted slavery within their borders. 
Congress left alone the issue of slavery in the territory south of the Missouri Compromise 
line, but the Thomas amendment expressly and “forever” prohibited slavery in the northern 
portion of the Louisiana Purchase.5  Southerners who even cursorily glanced at any map of the 
nation immediately realized that Congress had declared the preponderance of the national 
domain free territory, a fact that seemed patently unfair to slaveholders.  Another fact provoked 
even greater concern: the South had conceded the cornerstone of their argument in the Missouri 
debates.  “Thoughtful southern leaders recognized that they had suffered at least a partial defeat 
in the Missouri controversy” by acquiescing in congressional power to legislate on the issue of 
slavery in the territories.6  Southerners would come to resent exclusion from such a vast expanse 
of territory, but persisted in denying the right of Congress to interfere with slavery in any 
territory.  Proslavery opponents sensed the inconsistency in such logic, realizing that the 
Missouri Compromise injured their argument for absolute congressional nonintervention on the 
subject of slavery. 
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The Richmond Enquirer’s Thomas Ritchie pounced on the twin concessions of the 
Missouri Compromise.  He criticized the compromisers who ceded so much territory to the 
antislavery interests and at the same time conceded the right of Congress to legislate for the 
territories on the slavery issue.  The compromise had blocked the northward migration of 
slaveholders based on an artificial and arbitrary line.  “If we are cooped up on the north, we must 
have elbow room to the west,” Ritchie noted.7  The Adams-Onis Treaty, however, had blocked 
westward migration as well by setting the southwestern boundary of the nation at the Sabine 
River.  Southern expansionists had alleged that the Louisiana Purchase included much of eastern 
Texas, a claim the Spanish dismissed as absurd.8  The South did gain the Territory of Florida, but 
westward expansion after 1821 seemed unlikely given the realities of the Missouri Compromise 
and the treaty with Spain.  Circumstances had effectively hemmed in the South, leaving no room 
for westward expansion.  No slaveholder would move into a territory where his slaves could not 
follow.  Southerners believed that they possessed the constitutional right to emigrate wherever 
they wished with their property—slaves included.  More pragmatically, the older portions of the 
South relied on westward migration to provide a market for surplus slaves in states like 
Virginia.9  These conditions combined to frustrate many southerners who believed that the North 
had mounted an attack on their peculiar institution.   
The dispute over congressional power over the territories angered southerners who 
believed in the concept of self-government on the slavery issue.  They believed that northern 
congressmen sought to assume power not provided them by the constitution.  In the same issue 
of the Enquirer in which he expressed the need for southerners to look westward toward 
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expansion, Ritchie excoriated northerners for assaulting the right of territorial self-government 
north of the Missouri Compromise line.  That “Congress should forever take from [the settlers of 
the territories] the privilege of self-government, under the pretence that it is a ‘needful 
regulation’” smacked of arbitrary government.10  Southerners could not afford to permit what he 
perceived as an unconstitutional assumption of power.  In his remonstrances against 
congressional intervention with regard to slavery in the territories, Ritchie represented a set of 
principles commonly identified with southern conservatives.  The Missouri controversy 
revitalized the notion of states’ rights and strict construction embodied in the Virginia and 
Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, the twin documents that the “Old Republicans,” or southern 
conservatives, saw as bulwarks of self-government and states’ rights, as well as a defense against 
centralized power.11  Ritchie and other southern conservatives assumed the mantle of strict 
construction to decry the expansion of federal authority over domestic institutions in the 
territories.  Nathaniel Beverley Tucker, who during the Missouri controversy had defended the 
principle of self-government in his Hampden letters, believed that southerners had to “stand in 
the breach between our native states and their assailants—and to call back our countrymen to the 
forgotten principles of their forefathers.”12 
Perhaps the greatest criticism of the Missouri Compromise from a southern conservative 
came from the pen of John Taylor of Caroline.  A brilliant political theorist from Caroline 
County, Virginia, Taylor had long supported libertarian views and a states’ rights interpretation 
of the constitution.13  In his book Construction Construed, and Constitutions Vindicated, the 
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Virginian deprecated the Missouri crisis as an “absurd controversy,” yet he took great pains to 
evaluate the implications of the compromise on southern people and institutions.14  He chastised 
those who thought that a dividing line could settle the slavery issue once and for all.  Indeed, 
Taylor argued in his characteristically prolix language that the Missouri Compromise’s “balance 
of power contemplates two spacious territories, with the population of each separately integral, 
as conglomerated by an adverse interest, and though substantially federal in themselves, 
substantially anti-federal with respect to each other.”15  In other words, Congress had divided the 
national domain into two antagonistic sections over the issue of slavery’s expansion. 
In restricting slavery north of 36° 30’, Taylor argued, Congress had exceeded its 
constitutional authority.  Repeating the argument expressed by many southerners during the 
Missouri debates, Taylor asserted that Congress had no right to make a state, but only to admit it 
once the people of a territory had written a constitution and asked for admission to the Union.  
“Do congress participate of this sovereignty with the people of Missouri,” Taylor asked, or is the 
sovereignty of the people subservient to that of the federal government?16  The antirestrictionists 
had maintained that only the people of the territory themselves could draft a constitution, and 
Taylor concurred.  “It must be the work of the sovereignty of the people, associating by their title 
to self-government,” he concluded.17  
Although self-government had prevailed in Missouri and Arkansas, Congress had 
established a different set of rules for the remainder of the Louisiana Purchase, a point that 
Taylor and his fellow southern conservatives considered unconscionable.  In attempting to force 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Michael O’Brien, Conjectures of Order: Intellectual Life and the American South, 1810-1860 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 785-799. 
14 John Taylor, Construction Construed, and Constitutions Vindicated (Richmond: Shepherd & Pollard, 1820), 229.  
15 Ibid., 292-293. 
16 Ibid., 304. 
17 Ibid. 
 104	  
conditions upon Missouri in order to gain admission to the Union, Congress assumed power over 
local legislation, a move that Taylor considered “evidently inconsistent with reason, with the 
essential character of representation.”18  Southerners had resisted their efforts, only to see the 
Missouri Compromise give legal sanction to the practice north of an arbitrary line.  In ratifying 
the Constitution, according to Taylor, no state had conceived of conveying the power to 
Congress—or to a majority of states—the right to enact local legislation for another state.  Yet 
northerners had precisely this aim; they sought to exercise “feudal power” over the territories in 
order to check the expansion of slavery.19  Southerners would rue the passage of such an odious 
measure, Taylor insisted, for it allowed antislavery leaders a way to attack the institution of 
slavery and the equal rights of the South. 
Southerners hearkened back to the principles of 1798—as embodied in the writings of 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison—by insisting on states’ rights and strict construction, but 
they also advanced the doctrine of territorial self-government.  From the carefully drawn 
arguments found in the writings of John Taylor to the essays found in daily newspapers such as 
Ritchie’s Enquirer, southerners reasserted the primacy of territorial self-government, a principle 
that became “the keystone of the South’s entire constitutional defense system in 1819-1821.”20  
Yet in the compromise legislation, they had scored only a partial victory.  Asserting the right of 
territorial self-government in Missouri and Arkansas seemed to vindicate southerners’ claims, 
but they again insisted that the positive exclusion of slavery north of the compromise line 
suggested otherwise.  Why did Congress deem it safe to only allow self-government south of 
thirty-six degrees, thirty minutes latitude?  Few Americans lived in the northern portion of the 
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Louisiana Purchase in 1821, the area Zebulon Pike had described as uninhabitable and that two 
years later, in 1823, Stephen Long would label the “Great American Desert.”  Certainly some 
southerners, too, considered the land uninhabitable.  Conversely, slaveholders could inhabit 
Arkansas and Missouri, a territory deemed suitable by surveyors for slave-based agriculture.21  
For these reasons, southern moderates likely saw benefit in accepting the Missouri Compromise 
and partially conceding the point of territorial self-government.  Conservatives, however, chafed 
at any retreat on the principle of the matter. 
Though not all Americans expressed pleasure with the Missouri Compromise, the 
arrangement did quiet sectional tension for much of the 1820s and 1830s.  The nation possessed 
little additional territory that demanded settlement, so the issue of slavery in the territories 
seemed settled for the present—or at least held in abeyance.  The absence of additional territory, 
however, did not mean that Congress had no territorial business to transact.  On the contrary, the 
federal government continued its active management of the territories and, in fact, expressed an 
“ever increasing inclination” to exercise greater control over the existing territorial domain.22  
Certain leaders in Congress believed that developing a systematized approach to territorial affairs 
would greatly benefit the nation as a whole.  A uniform approach to territorial establishment and 
governance, however, connoted centralized control over territorial affairs.  Would the revised 
policy threaten self-government on the frontier?  As seen in the debates of the first two decades 
of the nineteenth century, many Americans objected to the lack of democracy in the territories.  
In almost every congressional debate over the organization of a particular territory, some 
congressman spoke in criticism of the way in which the federal government held its territories in 
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a quasi-colonial status.  Settlers in the territories joined these sympathetic congressmen in 
demanding changes to the territorial system that would reflect the growing democratization of 
the nation. 
During the 1820s and 1830s, only three territories existed in the United States—
Michigan, Arkansas, and Florida.  Congress had supplied each territory with a system of 
government that restricted local control over their government and the people’s right to 
suffrage.23  Congress would grant these three territories enhanced autonomy over time, such as 
the right to elect their own territorial legislatures and officials as well as a judiciary selected by 
the respective territorial governments.  At the same time, Congress also attempted to rein in 
territorial legislatures by interfering in their affairs.  With the organization of the Territory of 
Florida in 1822, Congress set the terms of compensation for territorial legislators, a practice that 
would lead to additional controls on legislatures in the territories.24  The federal government had 
always enacted legislation that guided the development of territorial governments, but Congress 
passed laws during the 1820s that restricted legislative sessions in the territories and 
circumscribed the power of territorial governments on matters previously within the jurisdiction 
of local governments, particularly with respect to how the territorial judiciary operated.25  In 
sum, the federal government had yet to establish precisely the relationship between itself and the 
territories. Congress had expanded its power over territorial affairs in the aftermath of the 
Missouri crisis, however, even as it sought to expand democratic institutions in the territories.  
These seemingly contradictory aims defied reconciliation in the minds of the nation’s leaders. 
Slavery presented the greatest anomaly within the territorial system, as the Missouri 
Compromise had perpetuated the dividing line between free and slave territory that southern 
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conservatives disdained.  Might the assumption of greater power over the nation’s territories by 
Congress have further alarmed southerners already wary of the security of slavery after the 
Missouri crisis?  A definitive answer to this specific question is elusive, but given the southern 
response to congressional intervention with slavery in the territories as an unconstitutional power 
grab, they may well have feared intervention in other territorial affairs.  Conversely, and perhaps 
more dangerously, if Congress could dictate when and how a territorial legislature could operate, 
the antislavery cadre within Congress might try to assume enhanced power over slavery in the 
future.26 
Southerners evaluated their stance on slavery and the territories both during and after the 
Missouri crisis, arriving at different conclusions.  The South did not present a united front on 
slavery and territorial self-government.  Most southerners agreed that the settlers within the 
territories could best determine the status of their own local institutions when drafting a 
constitution, but southern leaders divided on the appropriate course of action with regard to 
Missouri and the remainder of the Louisiana Purchase.  On the question of the Thomas proviso, 
which established the 36° 30’ line, the southern delegation in the House of Representatives had 
almost evenly divided.27  Clearly, many southerners in Congress believed that a successful 
compromise to save the Union and secure slavery in Missouri and Arkansas trumped the 
unequivocal application of territorial self-government in the Louisiana Purchase. 
When southern moderates and conservatives battled over the merits of compromise in the 
early 1820s, the conservatives won.  The Thomas proviso had divided the South “between those 
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who were more sensitive to the relationship of slavery to politics and those who were less so.”28  
In 1822, however, the southern electorate sided with the conservatives by reelecting seventy 
percent of the congressman who had voted against compromise.  Conversely, only thirty-nine 
percent of the congressmen who supported the proviso gained reelection, a clear “measure of the 
resurgence of Old Republicanism.”29   Many southerners believed that their section would have 
to guard assiduously its rights in the future, lest northerners try to make further inroads against 
slavery in the territories. 
For southerners, the fear of northern encroachment on slavery and its expansion became a 
reality as antislavery individuals in the northern states began to advocate the abolition of the 
South’s peculiar institution. The argument over slavery in the territories quieted after 1821 
because the Union had organized the preponderance of the national domain.30  This did not 
mean, however, that Americans had forgotten the issues concerning the expansion of slavery.  
Just as southerners had voiced warnings that their section must remain vigilant against 
interference with slavery in the territories, northerners, too, expressed their own concerns.  By 
1830, abolitionists had begun to form a movement in the North to advocate the end of slavery.31  
While slavery in the existing states may have seemed secure to all but the most fearful 
southerners, the abolition movement represented a direct and immediate threat to slavery in the 
territories.  The abolitionists conceived the end of slavery in the territories as an initial step in 
eradicating the institution altogether. 
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Abolitionism and abolitionist rhetoric infuriated southerners who continued to insist that 
decisions on the slavery issue were reserved to the states, or to the people, as the tenth 
amendment to the Constitution provided.  The abolitionists, southerners argued, used incendiary 
techniques that had the potential to stoke resistance among slaves and provoke fear among 
slaveholders in order to advance their agenda of ending slavery.  Perhaps no event so vividly 
illustrates the motives of abolitionists as their efforts to flood Congress with antislavery 
petitions.32  Likewise, few other episodes in antebellum history reveal southerners’ resistance to 
abolitionism as the effort to impose a “gag rule” on Congress by refusing to receive the 
antislavery petitions.  The gag rule controversy heightened tensions in Congress over the slavery 
issue, further hardening the lines between North and South.33  The debate over antislavery 
petitions emerged in full force during the Twenty-Fourth Congress, with the infamous gag rule 
devised during the first three months of 1836.34  
The debate over admitting Arkansas to the Union—the first territory desiring statehood 
since the Missouri crisis—commenced in this rancorous atmosphere.  The citizens of Arkansas 
who desired statehood, however, had carefully watched developments in Washington for much 
of the year 1835.35  Sensing a change in mood—and tactic—among northern opponents of 
slavery, the Jacksonian pro-statehood element in Arkansas Territory advocated the immediate 
drafting of a constitution and petitioning Congress for statehood in the first session of the 
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Twenty-Fourth Congress.  They had several reasons for settling on this course of action. 
Michigan Territory seemed poised to become a state at the same time, and it would enter the 
Union as a free state.  To keep the sectional balance of power in the Senate equal, statehood for 
Arkansas, which would certainly permit slavery within its bounds, would most likely gain broad 
support in Congress.   
Arkansans also recognized that if they sought statehood at some later time, without a free 
state complement to preserve the balance of power, northerners would almost certainly object to 
their entry.  One correspondent from the territorial capital of Little Rock summed up the 
dilemma that the territory faced if it delayed the push for statehood to a later date: “We 
apprehend that strong opposition will be made to our admission, unless trammeled with 
restrictions which the people of Arkansas will never submit to.”36  In other words, Arkansas 
would provoke a dispute similar to the Missouri statehood debate fifteen years earlier.  
Proponents of statehood for Arkansas feared just such a development, citing the recent flurry of 
petitions entering Congress praying for interdiction of slavery in the District of Columbia and the 
territories.  A Pennsylvania congressman had recently introduced a petition asking for legislation 
on this very topic. Pro-statehood citizens within the territory contended that northerners almost 
certainly would try to block Arkansas’s entry as a slave state.  “That an attempt of the kind will 
be made, whenever we do apply,” one resident wrote, “by some of the miserable fanatics of the 
northern and middle States, we have pretty good reason to believe.”37  If Michigan entered the 
Union alone, without a slave state counterpart, northern legislators would have added leverage to 
impose conditions on the admission of Arkansas to the Union.  Many citizens of Arkansas 
Territory predicted another move against self-government in the territories. 
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Given the logic of those who sensed danger in delaying their cause, the citizens of 
Arkansas would need to move forward rapidly with plans to draft a constitution and apply for 
statehood.  Congress had already failed to pass an enabling act to permit the residents of 
Arkansas to form a constitutional convention.38  Arkansas’s territorial delegate to Congress, 
Ambrose H. Sevier, noted that Michigan had organized a constitutional convention without 
congressional sanction and declared that Arkansas should do the same.39  Sevier emerged as a 
leader in the statehood movement, mobilizing political operatives in the territory to expedite the 
process of applying for statehood.  In an appeal to the citizens of the territory written in March 
1835, Sevier portrayed the statehood movement as a safeguard against northern encroachment on 
slavery.  Appealing to the sanctity of property, Sevier wrote specifically to Arkansas’s 
slaveholders.  “It is wise in us, I think, to risque [sic] the imposition of additional burthens which 
an economical administration of our State Government may impose, rather than, by attempting to 
avoid it, for a few years of delay, to jeopardize the principal part of your estates, or find 
yourselves, by Congressional legislation, forced into exile in quest of new homes.”40  Sevier 
clearly implied that Arkansas would have to guard carefully its right to self-government, lest 
northern congressmen make a successful assault on the doctrine and threaten the sanctity of 
property in slaves. 
Slavery had not exactly flourished in Arkansas during its fifteen years of territorial 
existence, but slaveholders remained determined to maintain their society free from 
congressional interference.  In 1830, slaves composed only fifteen percent of the territory’s 
population, a figure similar to that of Arkansas’s northern neighbor Missouri.  While certainly 
not on the scale of America’s other southern territory, Florida, in which slaves counted as fifty-
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four percent of the total population, slavery played an important role in the agricultural economy 
of the Arkansas Territory.41  And the Arkansans intended to protect their property from any 
abolitionist effort to end slavery in the territories. 
The supporters of immediate statehood increased the intensity of their pleas to the people 
of Arkansas to support statehood and avoid the potential disaster of repeating the history of the 
Missouri crisis.  Although not all citizens of the territory deemed the statehood movement wise 
policy, those who did ceaselessly cited the efforts of northerners to reignite the issue of slavery 
in the territories and end the policy of congressional nonintervention.  The ardently prosouthern 
editor Duff Green wrote in his Washington, D.C., newspaper that the abolitionists intended to 
“direct their missiles against the institutions of the south” by moving against slavery in the 
nation’s capital and then in the territories.42  Green predicted that “Arkansas and Florida are next 
to be reformed” as the supporters of abolition sought with increasing vigor to make inroads 
against slavery.43 
Arkansas residents pounced on Green’s latter point by vigorously objecting to any 
interference with the territory’s sovereign right to draft its own constitution.  “Florida and 
Arkansas are to be stopped at the door, and stripped of their property, before they are admitted 
into the Union,” cried one writer, a move that would “operate destructively upon our interests” as 
well as violate the rights of Arkansas’s citizens.44  Although northerners made “a doleful 
howling about humanity” in their condemnation of slavery, they hypocritically sought to end the 
institution by abridging the rights of others.  “When we ask for admission into the Union, we ask 
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for a Constitutional right, but when Congress stops us at the door, until we consent to abandon 
our property, she acts the part of a tyrant.”45  Northerners sought establishment of rights for 
slaves at the expense of freemen, an Arkansas writer observed, a proposition that Arkansans and 
southerners alike could not countenance in any way.  The crisis assumed immediacy with 
Arkansas preparing for statehood.  The territory could “prevent a renewal of the alarming 
difficulties of ‘The Missouri Question,’” a group of citizens in Jackson County resolved, only by 
seeking prompt admission concurrently with Michigan.46 
In the months immediately before Congress prepared to go into session, the territorial 
government of Arkansas officially endorsed immediate statehood.  Echoing the sentiments of 
Sevier and others who expressed trepidation at delaying statehood, territorial governor William 
S. Fulton convened the Arkansas Legislature in October by warning the solons of the peril of 
delaying action on the statehood issue.  Fulton expressed dismay at the efforts of the 
abolitionists, who sought to prohibit slavery in a territory surrounded by slaveholding states.  He 
surmised that the “momentous question of the right of restriction, which once threatened the 
integrity of the Union, will again be agitated with reference to this Territory” and that “the rights 
of the citizens of the Union will again be disturbed by it.”47  By recalling the memory of the 
Missouri controversy and predicting a similar calamity if northerners should have their way with 
the debate in Congress over statehood for Arkansas, the governor astutely appealed to 
southerners who began to believe that northerners could not even abide by a compromise that 
had given so much to their section at the expense of the South.  This feeling would only grow 
stronger with time. 
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Fulton’s message resonated with Arkansans and southerners alike, but he badly 
miscalculated in making a statement about the power of Congress to review a territory’s 
proposed constitution.  The governor opined that Congress most likely did not possess the power 
to require submission of the constitution for approval.48  Clearly this violated the federal 
Constitution’s provision that Congress had the duty to ensure a republican form of government 
for territories seeking admission to the Union as states.  Whether Fulton may simply have made a 
mistake in his message to the territorial legislature or may have intended something more of his 
remarks is impossible to know.  The fact that he had taken precisely the opposite point of view 
on the subject just two months earlier makes the issue more vexing.49  Northerners, however, 
pounced on the impolitic statement as evidence that southerners would use any means necessary 
to ensure the future of slavery in the territories, even flouting the authority of the constitution.  
Territorial Delegate Sevier worked assiduously in Washington to undo any harm caused by 
Fulton’s message, assuring the president and members of Congress that the proponents of 
statehood had no intention of forming a state government and dissolving the territorial 
government “without the approbation of Congress.”50  Sevier and his allies had good reason to 
assuage politicians in Washington, for Arkansas had elected delegates to a constitutional 
convention that would soon draft a charter for the territory.  No one wanted to cloud the 
legitimacy of its work and risk delaying statehood.   
Arkansas’s constitutional convention met at Little Rock on January 4, 1836, and 
promptly began the process of writing the organic law for the prospective state, including the 
manner in which it would govern the institution of slavery.  The framers of the Arkansas 
constitution included an express constitutional protection for slavery.  The committee assigned to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Ibid. 
49 White, Politics on the Southwestern Frontier, 175-177. 
50 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, December 29, 1835. 
 115	  
address slavery recommended passage of a clause prohibiting the General Assembly from 
emancipating slaves without the owners’ consent and without compensation.  Furthermore, the 
constitution guaranteed the right of emigrants to bring their slaves into the state.51  The 
committee borrowed the substance of both provisions from the constitutions of Alabama, 
Mississippi, and Missouri, all three of which established explicit protections for slavery and 
slaveholders’ rights to their property.52  The convention delegates approved the committee’s 
draft of the slavery provisions without discussion.  Within the month, the convention had 
completed and ratified a constitution and sent it to Congress for approval. 
Congress received the Arkansas constitution on March 10, 1836, and prepared for debate 
on the document.  Because similar provisions for slavery had garnered criticism in the past, 
southern congressmen expected that their northern counterparts would revisit the issue of slavery 
and constitutional law.  The day after Congress received the constitution, Sevier wrote to his 
associate William E. Woodruff, the pro-statehood editor of the Arkansas Gazette, “Don’t be 
astonished if we should have another Missouri discussion upon the subject of slavery.”53 
Thomas Hart Benton, the Democratic senator from Missouri, too perceived the potential 
for a fight over the slavery provisions.  When the Senate commenced debate on the document on 
April 4, 1836, he “alluded to the great agitation on the subject of slavery” and sought to calm the 
atmosphere by dismissing the significance of the issue.54  The senator noted that the Arkansas 
application had been given to a senator from a free state, James Buchanan of Pennsylvania, while 
the Senate had placed Michigan’s constitution in his hands—a senator from a slave state—
illustrating the “total impotence of all attempts to agitate and ulcerate the public mind on the 
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worn-out subject of slavery.”55  Benton’s effort proved ineffective; a Vermont senator rose 
immediately to object to the slavery clause in the Arkansas constitution.  The issue of slavery in 
the territories had clearly not died. 
The Senate dispatched the Arkansas issue within a relatively short period of time, passing 
the statehood bill on April 6 by a vote of 31-6.  In spite of objections from northern senators that 
the Arkansans had drafted their constitution without congressional sanction and that the slavery 
clause “made slavery perpetual,” few senators felt that they could in good conscience block 
admission.56  Doing so would violate the principle of self-government.  An Ohio senator asserted 
that Congress had no reason to believe that the proposed constitution expressed “the opinions 
and wishes” of the people of Arkansas.57  Furthermore, congressional leaders had paired the 
admission of Michigan with Arkansas in order to allay fears that one section would gain power 
over the other.  Citing the support of the president and several southern senators as critical to the 
swift passage of the bill with minimal debate on the slavery issue, Arkansans demanded 
immediate statehood.58 
The Arkansas debate resumed briefly a week later when Henry Clay introduced a set of 
petitions from antislavery citizens of Philadelphia opposing the territory’s constitution.  
Apparently Clay knew some of the petitioners as casual acquaintances, which most likely 
explains why he felt compelled to submit the documents to the Senate.  The Great Compromiser, 
however, made clear that he did not support the petitioners’ aims since the Missouri Compromise 
had settled the issue.  Clay argued that “all the States admitted into the Union were bound by the 
terms of the Missouri compromise; that all those north of the line described in the bill were 
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prohibited from holding slaves, and that all those south of the line were permitted to hold 
them.”59  In the Kentucky senator’s mind, the Compromise of 1820 offered a permanent and 
inviolate adjustment for the issue of slavery in the territories.  No one could disturb the great 
settlement. 
Clay’s remarks provoked a rejoinder from an Alabama senator who used the opportunity 
to express his dissatisfaction with the Missouri Compromise.  William King bitterly resented the 
introduction of the antislavery petitions, especially when the Senate had already voted on the 
Arkansas bill—a point Clay himself had conceded.  King expressed regret at his role in the 
passage of the Missouri Compromise, stating that “he had yielded too much in a spirit of 
conciliation and harmony; and that, under like circumstances, he never would consent to yield so 
much again.”60  The Alabamian’s remarks implied that the South had conceded a great deal in 
the compromise negotiations only to find that northerners wished to renegotiate after the fact.  
Territories seeking admission to the Union should possess the freedom to “make what 
regulations they pleased on the subject of slavery, or any other subject relating to their internal 
concerns,” according to King.61  The abolitionist phalanx sought to abridge this right, which in 
the case of Arkansas directly violated the Missouri Compromise.  What assurances, then, did 
Clay’s grand compromise offer to the South?  None, according to King and other southerners 
who increasingly regretted their support of the Missouri Compromise. 
The House of Representatives greeted the Arkansas bill with a flurry of petitions from 
northerners who opposed the slavery clauses in the proposed constitution.  Southern members 
rallied to meet the challenge posed by their northern counterparts who, as one North Carolina 
representative argued, sought to advance the designs of “a miserable degraded faction” of 
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abolitionists.62  With passions running high in the lower chamber of Congress, the Arkansas 
statehood bill became entwined with the long-running debate over slavery petitions and the 
rising abolition movement.  Because the House of Representatives had recently impaneled a 
special committee on the abolition of slavery, the Arkansas bill only fueled an already roaring 
fire over the future of slavery. 
In the midst of the vitriolic debate, the indefatigable Ambrose Sevier maintained focus on 
his territory’s application for statehood.  Exasperated with the plodding pace of the House debate 
on the Arkansas bill, the delegate moved to end the waiting and secure passage of the statehood 
bills for Arkansas and Michigan.63  On June 13, the House finally addressed the Arkansas bill, 
but not before the former president and current Massachusetts representative John Quincy 
Adams made one final attempt to block passage by introducing a resolution condemning the 
proposed state constitution for its stance on slavery.64  His three-hour effort to introduce the 
amendment went for naught, as the House moved to pass the bill and admit Arkansas to the 
Union by a vote of 143-50.65  Those who voted against the admission of Arkansas 
overwhelmingly came from the New England and mid-Atlantic states and belonged to the 
nascent Whig Party.66  Arkansas and Michigan would enter the Union simultaneously so as not 
to disturb the sectional balance of power in the Senate. 
Although the Senate had dispatched with the Arkansas bill relatively quickly, the House 
debated the measure for several months, concluding with an “arduous session of twenty-five 
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hours.”67  Thomas Hart Benton noted that the main obstacle to passage concerned bringing the 
bill to a vote; once the parliamentary maneuvering had ceased, the House passed it by a 
comfortable majority.  The Missouri senator argued that party politics had delayed passage of 
both the Michigan and Arkansas bills because the Democrats believed that both states would 
vote for Martin Van Buren in the upcoming presidential canvass.68  Arkansas did become a 
strongly pro-Democratic state, as the faction within Arkansas that supported statehood became 
the Arkansas Democratic Party.69  Whigs based their opposition on the potential effect that the 
two states could have on their candidates, William Henry Harrison and Hugh Lawson White.  
Benton’s assessment correctly explained the relation of partisan politics to passage of the 
Arkansas bill, but he failed to mention that the entire southern congressional contingent—save 
two Whigs—voted for statehood.  Northern Whig congressmen attempted to use the Arkansas 
issue not only in an attempt to better the chances of their presidential candidates, but more 
significantly for advantage in the continuing struggle over slavery in the territories and the rise of 
the abolitionist movement in the North. 
The partisan debate in Congress over statehood for the territory revealed some of the 
changes that would come from the birth of a two-party political system in the United States.   
Jacksonian Democrats and the anti-Jackson opposition—soon referred to as Whigs—took 
different sides on the Arkansas issue, at least in the North.  Nearly all southerners in Congress, 
whether Whig or Democrat, united on statehood for Arkansas.  Within Arkansas, however, 
Democrats and anti-Jackson leaders fought over immediate statehood, presaging the two-party 
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political system that would mature in the coming years.  Indeed, the debate over statehood gave 
birth to the second party system in Arkansas.70   
Party politics did successfully contain the slavery issue for some time, as politicians 
raised and debated other salient issues that the nation faced.  The slavery issue, however, always 
tended to transcend party lines and take on distinct sectional overtones.  Especially in the South, 
the slavery issue never strayed far from the political scene.  First and foremost, southerners 
demanded protection for their peculiar institution from outside encroachment.  Partisan leaders 
from both the Whig and Democratic parties knew this and sought to portray their respective 
parties as the more trustworthy protectors of slavery and southern rights.71  Though southern 
Democrats could usually count on substantive support from the northern wing of their party, the 
Whigs remained hopelessly divided on the slavery issue throughout their history.  Consequently, 
and as seen in the Arkansas debate, the Whig Party divided on statehood while Democrats North 
and South tended to support the bill for admission. 
 The rise of abolitionism in the North and the efforts of some northern politicians to block 
the expansion of slavery threatened southerners, who looked to their representatives for answers 
on how to check the advance of antislavery sentiment and abolitionist agitation.  In the minds of 
many southerners, northern antislavery partisans not only sought to promote the abolitionist 
agenda at the expense of the South, but they did so by reneging on the Missouri Compromise.  
Southerners had thwarted the attempts of abolitionists to delay statehood for Arkansas, but many 
slaveholders worried that the situation would merely repeat itself the next time a southern 
territory, namely Florida, applied for statehood.  Furthermore, the Arkansas debate had given 
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southerners who had always opposed the Missouri Compromise the opportunity to vocalize their 
disdain for the sectional adjustment brokered in 1820.  In the winter of 1837-1838, the issue of 
slavery in the territories reappeared in the Senate when John C. Calhoun offered a provocative 
set of resolutions designed to assert southern rights.  One of his resolves dealt expressly with the 
issue of slavery in the territories. 
As the Twenty-Fifth Congress opened, the nation had entered a sharp economic downturn 
that had become greatly politicized because of Andrew Jackson’s epic—and ultimately 
successful—war against the Bank of the United States.  He left his handpicked successor Martin 
Van Buren in a precarious position, which only grew worse as the economy sagged and 
recriminations flew in the halls of Congress.  More significantly for the slavery issue, the 
continuing discord over petitions to abolish slavery had not abated.  Indeed, the abolitionists had 
only strengthened in their resolve by sending more petitions to the legislators in Washington; in 
1836 alone, some one hundred thousand petitions arrived at the capitol.72  The petition 
movement alarmed Calhoun, who held the abolitionist movement in great contempt as he 
carefully watched its movements.73  
Petitions from abolitionist organizations always angered southerners, who detested the 
members of such organizations and viewed their work as incendiary, but one from the Vermont 
legislature infuriated southern senators.  In November 1837, that state’s legislature passed a 
series of resolutions affirming the right of the federal government “to abolish” slavery and the 
slave trade “in the several Territories of the Union where they exist” and arguing that Congress 
“ought immediately to exercise that power.”74  Benjamin Swift of Vermont introduced the 
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petition to the Senate on December 19, 1837, and asked that it be read into the record.75  
Southern senators immediately protested and when news reports of the Vermont legislature’s 
actions reached the southern public, they too objected.  “The intermeddling of any of the States, 
or their representatives in Congress” to abolish slavery in the states or the territories, a Georgia 
editor wrote, “is an assault on the Southern States, and should be considered by their citizens as a 
direct attack upon the institutions of the slave holding States.”76   
 The apoplectic Senator Calhoun could hardly believe that a state legislature had taken up 
the abolitionist mantle.  “You have seen the Vermont resolutions,” he wrote to Nathaniel 
Beverley Tucker.  “They go far beyond the wildest fanaticks.”77  Calhoun vigorously objected to 
one sovereign state attempting to impair the sovereignty of others, or of the territories and the 
District of Columbia.  He believed the actions of the Vermont legislature marked a radical 
departure from precedent and intended to take action to prevent other states from taking similar 
action.  Calhoun determined to meet this latest abolitionist assault with his own pronouncement 
on slavery and the nature of the federal government, one designed to ensure the safety of slavery 
where it currently existed and to ensure its potential expansion in the territories. 
Calhoun launched his attack against the abolitionist cadre on December 27, 1837, when 
he introduced in the Senate a series of six resolutions concerning slavery and the Union.78  “My 
object,” he wrote to a northern associate, “is to rally all States rights men of any creed on the old 
States rights principles of ’98, against the dangerous sperit [sic] of fanaticism now abroad.”79  
The abolitionist fervor threatened the safety of the Union, Calhoun would claim repeatedly.  In 
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his resolutions, the South Carolinian essentially distilled the theory of the nature of American 
government that he had developed over the course of the past decade.  Two of the resolves 
specifically addressed the issue of slavery in the states and the territories, respectively.  In the 
fourth resolution, Calhoun contended that “domestic slavery, as it exists in the Southern and 
Western States” composed an integral part of their society that neither Congress nor any other 
state of the Union could abridge.80  Calhoun almost certainly made the conscious link between 
the southern and western states to isolate the North as a section bent on imposing arbitrary 
authority on sovereign states.  Southerners had long sought to ally themselves with the people of 
the West as fellow slaveholders and defenders of local self-government.  
Calhoun’s fifth resolve addressed the issue of slavery in the territories by attacking any 
effort at intervention, whether by Congress or by the petition of citizens from any portion of the 
Union.  He wrote,  
That the intermeddling of any State or States, or their citizens, to abolish slavery  
in the District, or any of the Territories, on the ground, or under the pretext, that it is 
immoral or sinful; or the passage of any act or measure of Congress, with that view, 
would be a direct and dangerous attack on the institutions of the slaveholding States.81 
 
Clearly aimed at the abolitionist petitioners of the North, Calhoun’s fifth resolution advanced a 
stronger position on the slavery issue than heretofore articulated by other proslavery southerners.  
His logic bore many hallmarks of past arguments, from the implicit assumption that northerners 
meant to abridge the rights of southerners to the explicit assertion that neither Congress nor the 
people of other states could legislate for the domestic affairs of a territory or state.   
Calhoun also implied that the designs of the abolitionists had forced southerners to stand 
for their rights and demand that Congress—and those not involved in slavery—leave southerners 
and their peculiar institution alone.  The senator had changed his opinions on federal jurisdiction 
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over slavery in the territories, however.  During the Missouri controversy, Calhoun, then a 
nationalist, had confirmed the federal government’s power to prohibit slavery in the national 
domain.  Responding to the changed political climate of the 1830s, especially the rise of the 
abolition movement in the North, the South Carolinian saw congressional intervention as a back 
door movement “to usurp the power to suppress slavery in the Southern States.”82 
 The Calhoun resolves provoked considerable debate in the Senate.  James Buchanan of 
Pennsylvania expressed dissatisfaction with Calhoun’s tactics. “I therefore deprecate a protracted 
discussion of the question here,” Buchanan stated, after explaining why he believed Calhoun had 
acted rashly.  “It can do no good, but may do much harm, both in the North and the South.”83  
Ever the careful politician, he recommended forming a select committee to discuss the matter 
and report its own set of resolutions, which surely would prove less offensive.  Other northern 
senators stood with their antislavery constituents and attacking Calhoun’s handiwork as 
extremist.  A Massachusetts Whig dismissed as absurd Calhoun’s implications that northerners 
meant to attack slavery in the states.  Defending the petitioners, the senator noted that “they 
repudiate, and very properly, all right to interfere with the States, and confine themselves to the 
Territories and the District of Columbia.”84  Any senator who argued that northerners meant to 
tamper with slavery in existing states merely sought to fan the flames of sectional discord, the 
Whig senator argued.  Southerners could in no way countenance the assertion that Congress 
could interfere with slavery in the territories.  The Massachusetts senator sought to refute claims 
that the North aimed to end slavery throughout the Union.  To the minds of southerners like 
Calhoun, however, he defeated his own argument by advocating the right of congressional 
intervention in the territories. 
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 Calhoun unflinchingly asserted that Congress had no power to prohibit slavery in the 
territories.  But who did possess the power to legislate on the issue?  In answering this question, 
the South Carolina senator broke new ground by arguing that Congress could not grant to a 
territory a power which it did not itself possess.  In his memoirs, Thomas Hart Benton 
summarized Calhoun’s position brilliantly.  “Congress had no power to legislate upon slavery in 
a territory, so as to prevent the citizens of slaveholding States from removing into it with their 
slave property,” Benton recalled.85  Calhoun’s statement reiterated the southern argument as it 
had stood since the Missouri Compromise.  He moved beyond this point in the second and third 
parts of his position, affirming that “Congress had no power to delegate such authority to a 
territory,” nor did the territory possess the power itself.86  Benton acidly wrote that Calhoun’s 
logic left “the subject of slavery in a territory without any legislative power over it at all.”87  
Actually, Calhoun raised a critical point in the doctrine of territorial self-government.  
Southerners had never before objected to allowing the people of a territory to legislate for 
themselves on the slavery issue because, in the past, such action had always provided for the 
expansion of slavery.  The concept of territorial self-government, however, clearly implied that 
the citizens of a territory had a choice in the matter.  Calhoun’s logic anticipated the potentiality 
that a territory could move to bar slavery from within its borders.  In his formulation, because the 
states held the territories in common trust, the Constitution dictated that slavery could go into 
any territory over which the American flag flew.88 
 Almost every other southern senator, and some northerners, agreed with Calhoun’s initial 
supposition that the government “had no right to interfere, either to protect or to invade any 
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institution.”89  Any semblance of accord ended there.  Calhoun, it seemed, wanted congressional 
nonintervention in one instance, and congressional intervention in another.  The resolutions 
assumed, an Indiana senator argued, “that it may become necessary for this nation to attach 
territory (Texas) to the Union, for the purpose of protecting and extending the domestic 
institutions (slavery) of the South.”90  By no means would northerners brook such a policy.   
Even some southerners found Calhoun’s opinions unpalatable.  When on January 9, the 
Senate commenced debate on the fifth resolution, John J. Crittenden of Kentucky delivered a 
stinging rebuke to the resolutions.  Calhoun “reiterates, over and over again, the trite theme and 
cry of ‘danger to the Union,’” Crittenden argued, and if the Senate did not pay heed to his words, 
Calhoun “urges the inevitable consequence of the ‘destruction of the Union.’”91  In other words, 
Calhoun went too far in his efforts to defend southern institutions; indeed, he went on the 
offensive.  Many senators questioned the wisdom of Calhoun’s methods, even if they did object 
to the movement of abolitionists against slavery in the territories. 
Henry Clay had listened quietly to the debate as it developed in the Senate, growing 
especially concerned at the remarks of some ardent northerners and southerners who sought to 
bring the issue of Texas annexation into the debate.  Northerners feared that admitting Texas to 
the Union would provide a vast new domain from which numerous slave states could grow.  
Southerners, on the other hand, hailed the prospect of annexation for precisely the reason that 
they could expand the slave society west.  The injection of Texas into the discussion alarmed the 
Kentuckian and provoked him to speak.  Clay worried that the deliberations over the resolutions 
could quickly spiral out of control if someone did not restore some sense of order to the 
proceedings.  Like his junior colleague Crittenden, Clay did not support Calhoun’s redefinition 
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of the power of Congress over slavery in the territories.  Accordingly, Clay submitted to the 
Senate his own substitutes for Calhoun’s resolutions, and “a battle of the Titans began.”92  
Whereas Calhoun had spoken in “strong language, menacing tones, and irritating measures,” 
Clay sought “conciliation” through “firm, but temperate language.”93 
In his alternative for Calhoun’s fifth resolution, Clay wrote that “it would be highly 
inexpedient to abolish slavery in Florida, the only Territory of the United States in which it now 
exists, because of the serious alarm and just apprehensions” such action would surely provoke.94  
Clay consciously made a point of limiting the discussion to Florida and not allowing it to enter 
into the Texas debate.  In the second part of his resolution, Clay reaffirmed the standard southern 
interpretation of congressional nonintervention—one that he had offered during the Missouri 
crisis—by advocating self-government.  Congress should refrain from abolishing slavery in 
Florida “because the people of that Territory have not asked it to be done, and, when admitted as 
a State into the Union, will be exclusively entitled to answer that question for themselves.”  
Furthermore, any intervention by Congress would violate the “solemn compromise” of 1820.95  
In his efforts to craft a tamer version of the Calhoun resolves Clay advocated, in the words of 
one constitutional historian, an “early version of the doctrine later popularized by Lewis Cass 
and Stephen A. Douglas known as popular or squatter sovereignty.”96  Clay, however, actually 
upheld the doctrine of territorial self-government he had so forcefully articulated in 1820 and 
that southerners had endorsed as sound constitutional law for much of the nineteenth century. 
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Clay espoused established southern doctrine on the issue of slavery in the territories, but 
some of his southern colleagues objected to the conciliatory wording of his resolution on the 
issue.  Some wondered if the Kentuckian had moderated Calhoun’s sentiments too much.  Clay’s 
suggestion that Congress should refrain from abolishing slavery in Florida obfuscated the true 
constitutional interpretation that Congress could not abolish slavery there.  William Cabell Rives 
of Virginia raised this issue, noting that the “rights and interests of the inhabitants” in any of the 
territories precluded congressional intervention.97  While Clay’s colleagues certainly 
understood—and in most cases endorsed—his efforts to quiet agitation on the Texas issue, they 
believed that any satisfactory resolution must include a statement on the territories in general and 
not just Florida.  An Alabama senator suggested inclusion of all the territories in the resolution, 
to which Clay agreed.98 
Undeterred by the proponents of moderation, Calhoun persisted in his attempts to 
persuade the Senate to adopt his resolution on slavery in the territories and not accept a more 
conciliatory version.  The South could no longer afford to compromise on equal rights in the 
territories, the senator maintained.  Clay’s proposal “would be an utter abandonment of the entire 
ground assumed in the resolutions already adopted.”99  The Senate had passed four of the six 
resolutions initially proposed by Calhoun.  And now Clay’s compromise version of the fifth 
threatened the meaning of Calhoun’s entire platform.  The South Carolinian “regarded slavery, 
wherever it exists throughout the whole Southern section, as one common question, and is as 
much under the protection of the Constitution here, and in the Territories, as in the States 
themselves; and herein lies our only safety.”  He intoned a final warning, “Abandon this, and all 
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is abandoned.”100  Calhoun would not retreat from his effort to redefine the southern doctrine on 
congressional nonintervention.   
Calhoun’s proslavery clarion call provoked a northern backlash, as senators from the 
North renewed the long-running protests against congressional nonintervention with slavery in 
the territories.  Daniel Webster emphatically stated that the constitution left the issue “entirely to 
the discretion and wisdom of Congress,” but his characteristically impressive efforts to defend 
the right of Congress to legislate on slavery in the territories failed to gain traction. 101 Most 
senators focused on endorsing either Clay’s interpretation of congressional nonintervention or 
Calhoun’s expanded doctrine on the issue.  Even the South Carolinian, however, began to 
recognize that he did not possess the support necessary to gain passage of his resolution on 
slavery in the territories.  A majority of senators clearly favored Clay’s version, amended to 
include all of the territories within its scope and not merely Florida.  Southerners wanted 
assurances that Congress would not interfere with slavery in any of the territories currently held 
or subsequently acquired.  In vain, Calhoun fired one last broadside against Clay’s resolution by 
attacking the Missouri Compromise itself.  The South, according to Calhoun, had committed a 
grievous error by acquiescing in the Compromise of 1820, which in no small part led to the 
circumstances the nation found itself in 1838.  Calhoun conceded that he had favored the 
compromise in 1820.  Indeed, as a member of the Monroe cabinet he had endorsed the measure 
as constitutional.  He “now believed that it was a dangerous measure, and that it had done much 
to rouse into action the present spirit” of abolitionism and antislavery politics.102  The South had 
practically invited antislavery agitation by conceding its true constitutional rights in an effort to 
achieve sectional concord.   
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Calhoun lost his battle on the fifth resolution, as the Senate overwhelmingly passed 
Clay’s less incendiary version.  Eight New England Whigs and one Pennsylvania Democrat 
voted against the Clay substitute, exhibiting again that the locus of antislavery sentiment came 
from the New England states.103  “Calhoun, in fact, had nothing approaching united southern 
support for his extremist position.”104  Continuing the division between Calhounite and moderate 
southerners—both Whig and Democrat—that had existed since the beginning of the petition 
controversy, the moderates simply could not accept the redefinition of the southern position on 
slavery in the territories Calhoun proposed.105  They accepted the Clay substitute as sufficient 
protection, provoking even Calhoun to concede defeat and voted in its favor.106   
The debate over the Calhoun resolutions had little practical effect in squelching 
abolitionist fervor, but it did define where northern and southern politicians stood on the issue of 
slavery in the territories.  Northern Whigs stood most strongly against the expansion of slavery.  
Calhoun knew precisely that the issue of congressional power over slavery in the territories 
remained ambiguous, in part he argued because the South had unwisely compromised on the 
issue in the past.107  He also knew that his fellow southerners considered the ongoing abolitionist 
petition drives menacing.  Moreover, they believed the Vermont legislature’s resolutions had, in 
the words of one Virginia writer, “given to this matter a new and more serious aspect than it has 
yet assumed.”108  A state government had endorsed the tactics of the abolitionists southerners 
considered fanatical by calling for a federally imposed ban on slavery in the territories.  
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Southerners continued to insist on territorial self-government over the issue.  Congress, in their 
view, had no authority to determine the status of slavery in the territories.  The people of the 
territories possessed this power, presumably when they sought admission to the Union and 
drafted a constitution.  The South would have to wait and see what northerners would do when 
the last slaveholding territory—Florida—asked for admission to the Union. 
When Congress established Florida Territory in March 1822, it implicitly recognized the 
role that slavery in the region’s society by making no attempt to intervene against the 
institution.109  Furthermore, few congressmen considered debating the merits of slavery in the 
southernmost territory of the United States, especially after passage of the Missouri 
Compromise.  If Henry Clay’s masterstroke of sectional conciliation did represent a compact 
between North and South, no one could consider prohibiting slavery in Florida.  Over the course 
of fifteen years, however, the political calculus of the slavery issue had changed drastically.  As 
the debate over statehood for Arkansas in 1836 and the Calhoun resolutions on the nature of the 
Union amply exhibited, according to southerners, antislavery northerners would not limit their 
actions against slavery based on geographic lines or sectional compacts.  Southerners anticipated 
that Florida’s petition for statehood would provoke a struggle similar to the experience of the 
Arkansas debate. 
Florida took a long and circuitous route to statehood because of internal political factors.  
Plagued with internal dissension over the potential of dividing the territory into its two historical 
segments—West Florida and East Florida—versus asking for immediate statehood for the entire 
territory, the territory’s citizens delayed action on the issue numerous times.110  In 1838, the 
territory finally elected a convention to draft a constitution for and to seek admission to the 
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Union.  The St. Joseph convention took almost exactly the same approach with regard to slavery 
as did the Arkansas constitutional convention of 1835-1836.  The Committee on the Subject of 
Domestic Slavery proposed that the state legislature would have “no power to pass laws of the 
emancipation of slaves” and that emigrants to the state possessed the right to bring slaves with 
them.111  The committee also recommended banning free blacks from settling in the state.  The 
convention accepted the recommendation without debate and included the article regarding 
slavery into their final product.112  
Even before the territory’s citizens had ratified the document, antislavery northerners 
took notice of the Florida constitution.  Abolitionist newspapers in the North raised objections to 
the proslavery clauses in the document, especially the clause that prohibited the state legislature 
from abolishing slavery.113  The abolitionists may have lost their battle to block admission of 
Arkansas based on its proslavery constitution, but they intended to try again with Florida.  
Florida’s own citizens would delay their efforts.  During the first half of 1839, it seemed 
ratification of the constitution might fail in the territorial referendum because of the ongoing 
battle over immediate statehood versus division of the territory.  Finally, in August, the 
constitutional convention announced that voters had accepted the document by a majority of just 
ninety-five votes.114  Internal dissension persisted, though Florida would wait six years for 
statehood.  Congress received conflicting petitions asking both for immediate statehood and 
division of the territory, leaving legislators in Washington perplexed.  Finally, Florida presented 
a united front in 1844 and 1845 and asked for immediate statehood based on the St. Joseph 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 “Report of the Committee on General Provisions, including the Subject of Domestic Slavery,” December 11, 
1838, Journal of the Proceedings of a Convention of Delegates to Form a Constitution for the People of Florida, 
Held at St. Joseph, December 1838, in Dorothy Dodd, ed. Florida Becomes a State (Tallahassee: Florida Centennial 
Commission, 1945), 170.  
112 Ibid., 325. 
113 See Boston Emancipator, February 14, 1839, April 11, 1839; Philadelphia National Enquirer, July 18, 1839. 
114 Martin, Florida During the Territorial Days, 272. 
 133	  
Constitution of 1838.115  Congress paired Florida with Iowa in the long-standing practice of 
admitting one free state and one slave state to maintain sectional balance in the Senate. 
Predictably, northern members of Congress raised objections to the admission of Florida 
with her ardently proslavery constitution.  A Maine representative moved to force Florida to 
amend the constitution as a condition of admission to the Union, prompting a debate over the 
right of the citizens of Florida to determine their own form of government.116  Southerners 
objected to any interference with Florida’s right to draft its own constitution.  “But here came a 
proposition from the extreme northern portion of this Union,” a Virginian objected, “to remodel 
the form of government which the people of Florida had adopted for themselves—a proposition 
which, on its very face, assumed the people of Florida were not able to judge what form of 
constitution was best adapted for them.”117  The citizens of Florida possessed the express right to 
install whatever provisions they deemed necessary to protect slavery.  After all, northern 
abolitionists had driven the South to take such precautions in order to protect their rights. 
The deliberations over Florida statehood became especially bitter because of the 
concurrent debate in Congress over the annexation of Texas.  The Texas issue took center stage 
in the congressional session of 1844-1845 as the legislators debated the merits of annexation and 
the effect that incorporating Texas into the Union would have on the welfare of the nation itself.  
Northern antislavery partisans viewed the situation with concern, for Texas annexation would 
give the South a sectional advantage in the Senate.  Furthermore, many Americans from North 
and South believed that Texas would eventually be divided into several smaller states, promising 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 CG, 28th Cong., 2nd Sess., 273. 
116 Ibid., 283. 
117 Ibid. 
 134	  
more conflict in the future as the South gained more slave states.118  A New York journal linked 
the Florida and Texas issues by accusing the South of engaging in aggressive efforts to expand 
the slave domain.  “While the South was content with so much slavery as the constitution 
tolerates she was safe, but the attempt to enlarge its boundaries and increase its power, will 
surely be resisted.”119  Texas annexation occupied far more attention than did the petition of 
Florida for statehood because of the higher stakes involved in bringing the Lone Star Republic 
into the Union. 
Nevertheless, the Florida statehood bill represented the latest battleground over the 
interpretation of congressional authority over slavery in the territories, a point not lost on 
northern and southern members of Congress.  Lawmakers seemed never to grow weary of 
debating who possessed the power to legislate on slavery—Congress or the people of the 
territories themselves.  Members from the North and South stridently debated the issue in the 
course of the Florida debate.  A young Democratic representative from Illinois sought to bridge 
the gap between the sections by occupying a middle position on the matter.  Stephen A. Douglas 
made clear that he did not support all of the provisions of the constitutions of either Florida or 
Iowa.  Determining the prudence of individual clauses within a prospective state’s constitution, 
however, did not fall under the purview of Congress.  “Sufficient had been said,” in the debate, 
Douglas argued, “to show that it could never have entered the minds of the framers of the 
constitution that Congress was to pass on the propriety and expediency of each clause of the 
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constitution of the new States.”120  Congress could not and should not exercise control over 
“regulations and institutions, local and domestic in their character.”121 
Douglas framed the congressional authority over state making in a way that few, if any, 
southerners would have found objectionable.  He repeated an argument standard to the defense 
of self-government: that the “people of each State are to form their constitution in their own way 
and in accordance with their own views, subject to one restriction only; and that was, it should be 
republican in its character.”122  Douglas, however, “was not yet prepared to concede the same 
freedom to the people of a territory.”123  The Illinoisan made clear that the privilege of self-
government applied only at the moment that a territory sought statehood and not a moment 
before.  Noting that “the father may bind the son during his minority,” Douglas argued that 
Congress possessed jurisdiction over the territories until they reached the point where they could 
safely and responsibly assume statehood.124   
By advocating congressional authority over the territories during the territorial phase 
itself, Douglas assumed ground more akin to the northern argument on federal power in the 
national domain.  Indeed, in his young career as a congressman the Illinois representative had 
generally supported the form of territorial governance that Congress had developed and refined 
over the course of the nation’s history.  He also supported the effort by many in Washington to 
systematize the territorial system.  To Douglas’s mind, this ensured the speedy and uniform 
development of the national domain.125  Florida had matured to the point where it could assume 
its place as a state and therefore, Douglas argued, members of Congress should drop their 
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objections to the prospective state’s constitution and approve its admission to the Union.  Just as 
had transpired in the Arkansas statehood debate nine years before, northern Whigs voted en 
masse against the Florida bill.  Nevertheless, on February 13, the House of Representatives 
passed the bill on February 13 by a vote of 145-46. 126   Thirty-eight Whigs from across the 
North voted against the bill, while only one Maryland Whig joined his northern colleagues in 
opposition.  Even though the Whigs had to know that opposition would prove futile, they still 
objected to Florida and its proslavery constitution.  With passage secured, the House sent the bill 
to the upper chamber, where an abbreviated debate soon ensued over the slavery issues the 
representatives had debated.  
On March 1, the same day that President John Tyler signed the joint resolution of 
Congress annexing Texas, the Senate began debate on Florida statehood.  The senators merely 
repeated the deliberations that had occurred in the House.  Northern antislavery senators 
announced their intentions to vote against the bill because of the slavery provisions in the 
constitution.  Southerners and some westerners refuted the northern argument by insisting that 
Congress had only to ensure that Florida would have a republican form of government.  Late in 
the evening of March 1, the Senate—now far more concerned with the issues surrounding 
Texas—voted to admit Florida to the Union by a vote of 36-9.  In the Senate, only the New 
England Whigs maintained opposition to the admission of Florida.127 
The debates over slavery in Arkansas and Florida revealed sectional fissures within the 
American political establishment, as northerners fought more boldly to circumscribe the limits of 
slavery within the Union and southerners fought to protect the existence and expansion of their 
peculiar institution.  The Missouri Compromise, designed as a grand sectional compact, pleased 
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neither the North nor the South.  An increasingly large number of southerners came to believe 
that moderates from their section had acquiesced in a compromise that infringed their 
constitutional rights north of an artificial line of latitude.  Swayed by antislavery and abolitionist 
rhetoric, northerners challenged the morality of slavery and sought to limit its existence to the 
states of the South.   
The debates in the 1830s and 1840s over admitting Arkansas and Florida to statehood 
also revealed that the Missouri Compromise had settled absolutely nothing concerning the issue 
of territorial self-government.  In one respect the sectional accord did work, as both North and 
South acquiesced in the parameters set by the compromise line.  But it only masked the 
underlying issues of constitutional interpretation; it did not settle them.  Southerners still claimed 
the constitutional right to carry slaves into any territory, even though they had seemingly ceded 
that right north of 36° 30’.  Northerners claimed that Congress possessed the indisputable right to 
prohibit slavery in any territory as it saw fit.  With both Arkansas and Florida, the South claimed 
that antislavery northerners sought to break the Missouri compact by attempting to deny 
statehood based on the slavery issue.  The South, many of its residents believed, could not trust 
the North to let territorial self-government prevail. 
The debate over the resolutions of John C. Calhoun exhibited all too clearly for 
southerners, however, that their section hardly presented a united front on the issue of slavery in 
the territories.  Some southerners promoted sectional unity as the only means of defending 
slavery.  During the debate on Calhoun’s resolutions, a Georgia editor wrote, “So long as we are 
divided, feverish and powerless, we cannot expect the northern fanatics to cease their 
mischievous endeavors to wound our feelings.”128  A significant number of southerners, 
however, simply could not accept Calhoun’s original resolution on slavery in the territories.  
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Calhoun had advocated a bold new stance on the issue; the right to hold slaves in the territories 
transcended territorial law or congressional intervention.  Supposedly the constitution protected 
the sanctity of slave property across state and territorial boundaries, but many southerners did not 
support Calhoun’s doctrine.  They adhered to the long-standing rule of territorial self-
government as sufficient protection for slavery. The admission of Texas into the Union in 1845 
seemed to promise further debate on the subject.  Sectional lines had undoubtedly hardened over 
the course of the past twenty years and if the United States ever did gain additional territory, no 
one knew how Americans would respond in the changed atmosphere.
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CHAPTER 4 
“A FIT OF CONVULSIONS”: THE WILMOT PROVISO AND SLAVERY IN THE WEST 
 
 The annexation of Texas in 1845 intensified the debate over the westward expansion of 
slavery.   The very possibility of annexation had changed the tenor of the congressional 
deliberations over Florida’s application for statehood, as northern opponents calculated the effect 
of annexing such a vast land—a land where slavery existed and presumably would grow.  For 
those who jealously watched the sectional balance of power, Texas annexation seemed to 
portend a resurgence of power for the proslavery delegation in Congress.  Some northerners 
adopted a cautious approach while others vigorously disputed the addition of Texas to the Union 
as a blatant attempt to expand the slave domain and the Slave Power.1  Southerners viewed 
annexation as essential to the stability of their section and the continued prosperity of their 
agricultural economy. 
 Slavery in Texas, however, seemed safely beyond the reach of those who had resolved to 
halt the expansion of the South’s peculiar institution.  The annexation of Texas presented 
opponents of slavery expansion with a host of complicated legal issues.  The United States had 
assumed a formerly sovereign nation into its national union as a state, a move that almost 
certainly meant that Congress could not disturb its domestic institutions.  Additionally, the joint 
resolution for annexation provided for the formation of four additional states if the State of Texas 
should consent.2   The resolution extended the Missouri Compromise line through Texas; any 
additional states formed to the south of 36° 30’ could seek admission with or without slavery, 
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while the institution was prohibited in the small and irregular portion north of the line.3  It 
seemed unlikely that Texas would consent in the future to a division of its domain into smaller 
states unless their residents preserved slavery.  The furor over annexation, however, greatly 
strengthened the antislavery movement and its resolve to check the westward expansion of 
slavery.  The potential that five new states, including Texas, could enter the Union almost 
certainly as slave states alarmed the opponents of slavery.  Their efforts to prevent that 
eventuality would only gain urgency as the nation went to war against Mexico in May 1846, and 
discussion of a “territorial indemnity,” or the assumption of Mexican lands into the territorial 
domain of the United States gained traction. 
 As politicos debated the implications of Texas annexation and as the Mexican War 
captivated the attention of all Americans, a second front emerged in the nation’s territorial 
situation.  After years of tedious—and sometimes bellicose—debate between the United States 
and Great Britain, the two nations signed the Oregon Treaty on June 15, 1846, setting the 
northern boundary of the territory at the forty-ninth parallel.  With the treaty ended the rallying 
cry of fifty-four forty or fight, but so too did the potentiality of a second war.4   In negotiating the 
treaty, Secretary of State James Buchanan had averted war with the British, but a battle on the 
home front ensued within the Democratic Party.  Northern Democrats expected that a free 
territory of Oregon would offset the recent acquisition of slave Texas.  The Democratic platform 
of 1844 had implied as much.  Soon, however, Texas annexation overshadowed events 
concerning Oregon.  But when Congress took up discussion of the Oregon treaty, “the pent-up 
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resentments of the northern Democrats burst out in a flood of bitter incrimination.”5  Angered by 
the actions of President James K. Polk’s administration, with their proslavery implications, the 
Democratic Party for the first time split on sectional lines over the Oregon treaty.  Indeed, 
northern Democrats nearly derailed the president’s plans.  The bitter feelings created by ardent 
support for Texas annexation and tepid endorsement of incorporating a circumscribed Oregon 
into the territorial domain wounded the Democratic Party, prompting its leaders to search for 
ways to compromise on slavery expansion.   
 Northern Democrats committed to antislavery policy resolved to stand firm against their 
expansionist, and seemingly proslavery, president.  A wellspring of antislavery sentiment in parts 
of New England and the Old Northwest had only grown in the aftermath of Texas annexation, 
leading other northern Democrats who once evinced less interest in the politics of slavery to 
reconsider their stance—if only to preserve their chances at election time.  Accordingly, these 
northern Democrats distanced themselves from the southern wing of the party.6  Their efforts to 
resist the expansion of slavery would culminate in the discussion over assuming Mexican 
territory into the United States.   
On August 10, 1846, President Polk reported in his diary, “Late in the evening of 
Saturday, the 8th, I learned that after an excited debate in the House a bill passed that body, but 
with a mischievous & foolish amendment to the effect that no territory which might be acquired 
by treaty with Mexico should ever be a slave-holding country.”7  The president had requested a 
two million dollar appropriation to pay Mexico for a territorial cession.  Assuming that 
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congressional Whigs would attempt to derail the legislation, Polk arranged to have the bill 
introduced at the end of the congressional session in order to minimize, if not stifle, debate.  
Though the president certainly did not know it, and the members of the House on the floor that 
Saturday night could hardly have perceived what would happen, a Pennsylvania Democrat, not a 
“no-territory” Whig, would cause the administration trouble.  The “mischievous & foolish 
amendment” proposed by David Wilmot injected the issue of slavery into the debate over the 
Two-Million Bill.8  Perhaps most alarming, the vote on the bill produced a sectional cleavage as 
nearly the entire southern bloc voted against the bill while the northern representatives voted in 
the affirmative.  The House passed the Two-Million Bill with the Wilmot Proviso, but on the last 
day of the session the Senate let it expire without a vote.  Though the Wilmot Proviso had failed 
to pass Congress amid the bustle of the ending session, it had transformed the debate over 
slavery in the territories.  “Grave topics to be decided during a fit of convulsions!” the editor of 
Niles’ National Register remarked.9 
 The Wilmot Proviso would provoke fits of convulsions for the next fourteen years, 
because it inextricably linked westward expansion with the slavery issue.  It also linked the 
debates of 1846 with past discussions of the slavery issue.  Wilmot borrowed the language of his 
proviso from the Northwest Ordinance—that “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall 
ever exist in any part of said territory, except for crime, whereof the party shall first be duly 
convicted.”10  The proviso also bore striking resemblance to the amendment of James Tallmadge 
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in the Missouri debates some twenty-five years earlier.  Tallmadge’s amendment sought to check 
the westward expansion of slavery just as did the Wilmot Proviso.  Of course, Tallmadge sought 
to legislate for territory within the Union, whereas Wilmot sought to check slavery expansion in 
a territory not yet owned by the United States.  Nevertheless, both the Tallmadge amendment 
and the Wilmot Proviso had similar aims, as both borrowed from the antislavery heritage 
embodied in the Northwest Ordinance. 
 The Wilmot Proviso served as the platform of disaffected northern Democrats who 
resented the proslavery expansionism of the Polk administration.  The “friends of the 
administration led off the opposition to their southern brethren,” according to a Baltimore editor, 
because of “the ‘bad faith’ of the south, as they called it.”11  To their minds, the southern 
members of Congress and the president had pushed zealously for Texas annexation and 
proslavery interests while practically abandoning the northerners’ pet project of Oregon.  These 
sentiments held true, to a degree, but many northern Democrats did not intend to take a 
“gratuitous slap at the South.”12  They initially sought to maintain the support of their 
constituents, but it soon became clear that the antislavery Democrats had united with their 
erstwhile opponents, who became known as the Conscience Whigs, in opposing the expansion of 
slavery on constitutional grounds.13  In sum, these antislavery politicians had taken a major step 
toward dissolving party lines that had held reasonably firm since the 1830s.  But Americans had 
witnessed hints that the sectionalization of politics could occur when slavery expansion entered 
congressional deliberations.  The debate over John C. Calhoun’s resolutions on slavery in 1837 
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had shown that southerners would rally to the defense of slavery to ensure their own support at 
home.  Northern opposition to slavery had appeared with the admission of Arkansas and Florida 
to the Union, though northerners could offer only minimal resistance.  The introduction of the 
Wilmot Proviso reinvigorated old debates over the expansion of slavery.  The massive expansion 
of territory that seemed all but imminent with victory in the war against Mexico gave the utmost 
urgency to the issue. 
 The United States seemed certain to gain a vast “territorial indemnity” from Mexico, but 
at what cost to the bonds of Union?  Discussion of adding California to the American territorial 
domain began even before war commenced.  So too did the discussion of whether slavery would 
follow the flag west.  A Virginia congressman received a letter from a northern friend arguing 
that slavery would never enter California—that slavery could not prosper there.  “I think the 
southern members [of Congress] manifest too much feeling,” the northerner wrote.  “You admit 
slavery to be an evil, but a necessary one, why then impose it on a country in which it is not 
necessary[?]”14  Many northerners, especially those Democrats who sought to bridge the divide 
that the Wilmot Proviso had made within their party, would argue that slavery could never exist 
in California.  Discussion of the issue, they argued, inflamed sectional tensions for a mere 
abstraction.  Southerners, of course, would counter that they sought to defend their constitutional 
rights and their equality within the Union, which to their minds, was hardly an abstraction. 
 Even if climate and soil did preclude the successful introduction of slavery in California, 
a point that many southerners disputed, the fact that Mexican law prohibited slavery further 
complicated matters. Virginia congressman Henry Bedinger’s northern friend proved remarkably 
prescient when he raised an issue that would appear frequently in the debate over slavery after 
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1846: the people in the territories would chiefly determine whether slavery could or would exist 
there.  “It will be said that Congress has no right to interfere with this question in her territories; 
so I think, but she has done it, and if the people of the territories do not concur, it has no effect.”  
In the case of California, “Anti slavery has the start there and will preclude the introduction of 
slaves.”15  Issues of territorial sovereignty vis-à-vis the ability of the federal government to 
impose its will on its territories would become paramount to the debate over the expansion of 
slavery. 
 Politicians interested in preserving party lines feverishly sought ways to navigate the 
treacherous slavery debate.  In particular, Democrats seeking to rediscover party unity would 
revisit the issues of self-government and territorial sovereignty that had appeared years before.  
Prominent voices in politics began to suggest that endorsing self-government could alleviate 
sectional tension by deferring on the slavery issue to the people of the territories.  During the 
debate over Texas annexation in January 1845, the Missouri General Assembly sent a series of 
resolutions to Congress addressing the slavery issue and advocating territorial self-government.  
According to Missouri’s legislators, the state’s citizens overwhelmingly endorsed annexation, 
but they preferred “that Texas should be annexed to the United States without dividing her 
territory into slaveholding and non-slaveholding States,” instead “leaving that question to be 
settled by the people who now, or may hereafter, occupy the territory that may be annexed.”16 
 Texas would not prove the most opportune instance in which to apply popular 
sovereignty, but the Missouri resolutions show that some westerners saw the doctrine as a logical 
way to settle the debate over slavery and territorial expansion.  The Missouri resolutions clearly 
endorsed a form of popular sovereignty, though the document’s authors did not consider the 
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implications of Texas entering the Union as a state.  Could Texas itself impose conditions on the 
division of its domain into several smaller states?  In one sense, the question would prove moot 
anyway; no one doubted that Texas and any states carved from its vast domain would enter the 
Union as slave states.  For this very reason, since the 1830s a significant number of northern 
Democrats and Whigs alike had criticized Texas annexation as a blatant proslavery expansion 
project.17 
The effort to apply the principles of self-government in the territories continued after the 
annexation of Texas and intensified after the introduction of the Wilmot Proviso.  The issue 
would gain far greater urgency as northern Democrats sought a compromise plan to bury the 
Wilmot Proviso and safely dispense with the slavery issue.  When the New Hampshire 
Democratic Party met for its state convention in June 1846, it inevitably had to address the issues 
of Texas annexation, the Oregon treaty, and the possibility that the nation could gain more 
territory in the war with Mexico.  One might have expected the convention to affirm the actions 
of antislavery Democrats who had recently bolted party ranks and joined the Conscience Whigs 
in condemning the expansionist and proslavery policies of the Polk administration.  The spirit of 
compromise, however, prevailed among the New Hampshire Democrats.  Seeking to maximize 
party unity, the convention heartily endorsed territorial expansion in the broadest terms.   
The rebellion against the Polk administration had emerged most virulently in 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New York.  In the immediate term, the New Hampshire party seemed 
largely immune to party divisions, even if its leaders recognized the precarious situation in other 
states.  With that knowledge in mind, former senator and future president Franklin Pierce 
reported a series of resolutions that carefully addressed the Texas and Oregon issues, hailing 
both acquisitions as equally important to the future of the Union.  More interestingly, the 
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resolutions committee suggested a compromise for addressing slavery in the territories based on 
the principle of self-government.  The resolutions stated, “That the policy to be pursued in 
reference to slavery, rests with the States and Territories within which it exists—that whatever 
parties may profess, it is only as citizens of such States and Territories that the members of those 
parties can efficiently influence that policy.”18  Pierce and his committee on resolutions had 
outlined the basic tenets of territorial self-government. 
 The resolution on slavery in the territories passed by the New Hampshire Democracy 
hearkened back to the discussion of self-government in Louisiana and Missouri.  Allowing the 
people of the territories to decide whether they would permit or prohibit slavery within their 
bounds removed the fractious issue of slavery from the halls of Congress.  It capitalized on the 
democratic spirit of American politics, present since the Revolution itself, by affirming the 
sovereignty of the people in their local concerns.  It neutralized the Wilmot Proviso by denying 
the expediency, if not the right, of Congress to legislate on the local institution of slavery.  It 
showed, in sum, significant promise as a policy that could heal the broken Democratic Party. 
 Some Democrats, however, had no intention of compromising if it meant papering over 
their antislavery beliefs.  New York Representative Preston King dealt a significant blow to the 
impetus for party reconciliation when the Twenty-Ninth Congress convened for its short session 
in December 1846.  Within a month of the session’s commencement, King reintroduced the 
Wilmot Proviso in a fiery speech that gave no ground to the southern wing of the Democracy. He 
noted that the North had yielded on the issue of slavery in Texas.  As for the Mexican Cession, 
King intended to yield no further.  He specifically rebuked those who preferred to let the slavery 
matter alone by deferring to the people.   “If left alone, slaves, more or less, will be carried to the 
new territory; and if the country, while it remains a territory should be settled by a population 
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holding slaves,” King argued, “the new and additional question of abolition is presented, and in 
order to get a free state, slavery must first be abolished.”19  If Congress truly wished to respect 
the voice of the people on slavery in the cession, it would prohibit the institution during the 
territorial phase.  “In order, then, to secure this freedom of choice to the state and to the people, 
slavery must be excluded from the country while it shall be a territory, and until it shall become a 
state.”20  The New Yorker, of course, firmly believed that slavery could only exist in the cession 
if Congress afforded it express protection, specifically by endorsing John C. Calhoun’s common-
property doctrine.  To the minds of King and his northern colleagues, the South intended to gain 
federal protection for slavery in the territories. 
 King’s speech and his renewal of the Wilmot Proviso dismayed the president.  Polk 
called his efforts “a fire-brand in the body” and deprecated the effort to renew an “abstract 
question.”21  The president knew that the Wilmot Proviso threatened his efforts to gain a vast 
cession of land by uniting northern Democrats and Whigs against the expansion of slavery.  
King’s speech galvanized the free soil element in the northern Democracy.22  It, too, would call 
the South to action.  Polk surely recognized the implications of the King speech when he 
summoned his cabinet to discuss the issue.  But the council of advisers gave little comfort to 
their worried executive.  “All deprecated the discussion now going on in Congress,” Polk wrote 
laconically, “but all feared it would be impossible now to arrest it.”23  Prescient observers of the 
debate in Congress concurred.  “Old party distinctions—war measures and peace measures—
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president making and tariff making,” the editor of Niles’ Register wrote, “are all influenced by 
the new line of parties which this question chalks out.”24 
 The abstract nature of the slavery debate, to the minds of Polk and many pro-expansion 
Democrats, rendered the remarks of King and his colleagues needless.  Polk flatly denied that 
slavery could ever exist in the Mexican territory, an argument that many in his cabinet—most 
notably Secretary of State James Buchanan—would endorse.  “There is no probability that any 
territory will ever be acquired from Mexico in which slavery could ever exist,” the president 
argued.25  But southerners disagreed vigorously with those who portrayed the debate as involving 
abstract principles.  Just before Congress convened, Polk had met with John C. Calhoun to 
discuss possible treaty issues with Mexico and reiterated his belief that slavery would never 
thrive in the Mexican Cession.  Calhoun “readily assented,” but noted, “if the slavery restriction 
was put into a Treaty, it would involve a principle, and that whatever the other provisions of the 
Treaty were, he would vote against it.”26   
 Calhoun spoke with a certain degree of authority when he informed Polk that neither he 
nor his fellow southerners would stand for the Wilmot Proviso in any form.  Preston King’s 
speech immediately provoked spirited rebuttals from congressmen and the press alike.  
Virginia’s James Seddon took to the floor two days after the King speech to defend the rights of 
the South.  “On what ground,” he cried, should the North “arrogate superiority, and claim 
exclusive appropriation of all” the territories?27  Northerners, Seddon argued, had abandoned any 
semblance of compromise or sectional comity to promote their antislavery agenda—all at the 
expense of southern rights.  “Let the white men of the north and of the south, each with 
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privilege,” emigrate to the territories with their property as they saw fit.  “Let them determine for 
themselves according to their circumstances and necessities whether they will be free or slave 
states.  As they determine, in such character admit them to full communion in the Union, 
composed alike of slaveholding and free states.”28 
 The southern press echoed Seddon’s protest against King’s speech and the free soil 
movement against slavery in the territories.  The Richmond Enquirer took a cautious approach in 
venting anger towards the antislavery bloc.  “All patriots will deeply regret to see the question of 
slavery introduced into the discussions in Congress,” its editor wrote.  “It is premature and 
mischievous.”29  In a more comprehensive examination of the Wilmot Proviso and slavery in the 
Mexican Cession, the Charleston Mercury directly accused the proviso’s supporters of 
misinterpreting the constitutional relationship between the federal government and the states and 
territories.   The territories, according to the Mercury’s editor, were “raw material for States, to 
be finally admitted into the Union upon the same terms as the Old Thirteen.”30  Congress had no 
right to prohibit slavery in the territories; only the people of the territories themselves, in 
constitutional convention, could legislate on slavery.    
 In denying the constitutionality of the Wilmot Proviso, the editor of the Mercury left 
little, if any, room for compromise on the issue, referring to the Missouri Compromise itself as 
“mere shallow clamor.”31  A significant number of Democrats, especially in the North, however, 
believed that extension of the compromise line of 1820 might avert the present sectional crisis.  
James Buchanan emerged as the leading proponent of extending the Missouri line to the Pacific 
Ocean.  Buchanan had introduced the idea in a cabinet meeting and received the approbation of 
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his colleagues.  President Polk assented to the idea, but resolved to wait until the terms of a 
potential territorial cession became clearer to “recommend it to the Congress as the policy of 
administration.”32 
 The proposed extension of the Missouri Compromise line had surfaced in a curious 
congressional debate over creating a territorial government for Oregon.  A territorial enabling 
bill had emerged from committee that extended the Northwest Ordinance to Oregon Territory.  
No one seriously believed that slavery would ever exist in Oregon, but southern congressmen 
promptly objected to the slavery provision because it set a precedent for congressional 
intervention over slavery in the territories.  They intended to use the Oregon bill as a test case for 
extension of the Missouri line.33  Oregon, consequently, “assumed strategic importance as a 
bargaining point” in the ongoing debate over the Wilmot Proviso.34  A Virginia representative 
argued that applying the sixth article of the Northwest Ordinance stemmed from a 
“predetermined purpose here to apply that article to all the territory of the United States no 
matter how acquired, or where situated or in what manner it may be affected by past 
compromises of legislation.”35  Other southerners agreed that it served no other purpose than to 
inflame slaveholders.  South Carolina Representative Armistead Burt introduced an amendment 
to the bill that provided for Oregon to remain free territory because it lay north of the Missouri 
Compromise line.  Burt’s amendment would remove the odious language of the Northwest 
Ordinance, while strongly implying that any territorial acquisitions south of the compromise line 
would be open to slavery.36 
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 A considerable number of southerners supported extension of the Missouri line in order 
to secure the right to carry slaves into at least part of the potential Mexican Cession, even if they 
debated or doubted its constitutionality.  More doctrinaire southerners, however, opposed the 
maneuver.  Declaring his opposition to extension, Virginia Representative Shelton F. Leake 
stated, “I am heartily sick of ‘compromises.’”37  He maintained that the South had compromised 
too often, only to see the North breach its part of the compact.  To his mind, extending the 
compromise line merely obscured a movement among northerners to deny the South equal 
privilege in the territories.  Speaking for the South, the Virginia Democrat stated: “We maintain 
that it is a matter of municipal regulation, with which this Government cannot, rightfully, 
interfere; but which ought to be left to the people of the States and Territories to arrange for 
themselves.”38  Instead of extending the Missouri Compromise line, Leake advocated adhering to 
the principle of self-government.  He did not specifically state when a territory could legislate on 
the slavery issue, but his other remarks strongly suggest that, like Calhoun, he believed that 
settlers acting in a constitutional convention had the power to permit or prohibit slavery. 
 South Carolina Representative Robert Barnwell Rhett followed with a speech in which he 
disputed the right of Congress to prohibit slavery in the territories.  Rhett took a slightly different 
approach than Leake by recapitulating the old southern argument that the “needful rules and 
regulations” clause of the Constitution did not allow Congress to legislate for the territories.  
Sovereignty rested in the people, not the government, lest the people become ruled, “and do not 
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rule themselves.”39  But in what way and at what time could the citizens of the territories 
exercise sovereignty over the slavery issue?  Like Leake, Rhett did not specifically address this 
issue though the context of his speech strongly suggests that he believed that the territories could 
prohibit slavery only in constitutional convention.40  Rhett essentially staked out a position 
similar to that of his fellow South Carolinian John C. Calhoun, as had Leake, though their 
statements largely fell on deaf ears.  At the moment, too many southerners considered the 
Missouri Compromise a safer and more desirable way to dispose of the Wilmot Proviso.  
Although the Burt amendment failed to gain passage in the House of Representatives by a vote 
of 82-113, 76 southerners had voted in the affirmative.41  Southern support of the compromise 
line would not die with the failure of Burt’s amendment.  The South, according to a Georgia 
writer, would abide by an extension of the Missouri Compromise line, but no more.42  Over the 
course of 1847 as the debate over the Wilmot Proviso continued, northern and southern 
Democrats would revisit the extension issue in their efforts to unite on a compromise program. 
 The failure of the Burt amendment, however, gave the Calhounites ammunition to use 
against the North.  Some southerners had already attacked the premise of compromise itself.  The 
defeat of the Burt amendment by northern votes, the ultra southerners believed, merely 
confirmed that northerners would not abide by compromises anyway.  “Let us be done with 
compromises,” John C. Calhoun intoned in the Senate.  “Let us go back and stand upon the 
Constitution!”43  In his speech, Calhoun claimed that he had suggested extension of the Missouri 
Compromise line to his fellow South Carolinian Burt, even though he disapproved of the 
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principles behind the compromise itself.  But the North rejected this latest effort at magnanimity 
from the South—as Calhoun portrayed it—when its representatives in the House 
overwhelmingly voted against compromise.   
Calhoun echoed the earlier statements of his southern colleagues that the time for 
compromise had passed.  He introduced a series of resolutions that affirmed southern rights in 
the territories.  Calhoun stated, “That it is a fundamental principle in our political creed, that a 
people in forming a constitution have the unconditional right to form and adopt the Government 
which they may think best calculated to secure their liberty, prosperity, and happiness.”44  
Neither Congress nor any individual state could abridge the right of a territory, when in its 
constitutional convention, to draft its own organic law provided that it embodied republican 
principles.  Calhoun’s resolutions stated explicitly what Leake’s speech on territorial self-
government had implied: that the ultra southerners believed that a territory could act on the 
slavery issue only at the formation of their constitution. 
In developing a southern “counterpoise” to the Wilmot Proviso, Calhoun had developed a 
subtly different version of self-government that advanced what has become known as the 
common-property doctrine on the territories.45  Indeed, Calhoun’s statement regarding slavery in 
the territories built on the political theories he had developed over his long political career.  First, 
Calhoun asserted that neither Congress nor a territorial legislature could prohibit slavery in the 
territories.  Most southerners had agreed for at least the past forty years that Congress had no 
right to legislate for the territories on domestic institutions, a point that Calhoun himself had 
declared in his 1837 resolutions on slavery in the territories.  The right of a territorial legislature 
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to pass laws restricting slavery remained in doubt, largely because the concept had never been 
tested.  The Missouri Compromise had basically settled the issue by dividing the territorial 
domain, as it existed in 1820.  Second, Calhoun believed that a territory could legislate on 
slavery only when drafting a constitution, a concept likewise rooted in traditional southern 
political doctrine on the issue of slavery and territorial expansion.  Southerners had amply 
explained and defended the people’s sovereignty to craft their own organic law regarding slavery 
during the Missouri controversy and in subsequent debates on statehood for Arkansas and 
Florida.   
Calhoun’s formulation added a new element to the debate over slavery in the territories.  
Slavery followed the flag; it existed in territories purchased or conquered by the United States 
and remained a legal institution unless a territory prohibited it as part of their constitution. Then, 
and only then, could someone bar the expansion of slavery. By arguing that neither Congress nor 
a territorial legislature could prohibit slavery, Calhoun implied a subtle but powerful corollary: 
that the federal government had an obligation to protect the institution’s existence during the 
territorial phase.46  Calhoun’s speech only hinted at this concept, but the South Carolinian 
himself and others would develop it further with time.  The senator also launched a preemptive 
attack against any legislator who would argue that territorial legislatures could prohibit slavery if 
they so desired.  In sum, Calhoun’s doctrine represented the extreme southern position, just as 
the Wilmot Proviso was the extreme northern position. More conciliatory politicians would have 
to stake out a position somewhere in between. 
Presidential aspirants from the North and South, particularly among the Democrats, 
mobilized in 1847 to advance their respective positions on the slavery issue.  All interested 
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parties attempted to establish safely a position that could restore sectional harmony.  They did so, 
however, amidst growing bellicosity among the most ardent supporters of the Wilmot Proviso in 
the North and the Calhounite position in the South.  Preston King’s reintroduction of the proviso 
prompted a flurry of resolutions from northern state legislatures demanding no further extension 
of slavery.  In February, the legislatures of New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio instructed their 
senators to oppose the extension of slavery; by July, New Hampshire and Maine had joined in 
passing their own resolves.47 
In spite of the continued enthusiasm for the Wilmot Proviso in the North and the 
emergence of Calhoun’s proslavery doctrine as the ultra southern doctrine, extension of the 
Missouri Compromise line remained the leading solution to compromise in the summer of 1847.  
Indeed, no other solution seemed more likely to gain sufficient support from the public and in 
Congress.  Leading southern journals approved of extension as a way of securing southern rights 
in at least a portion of any potential cession from Mexico.  The Milledgeville Federal Union, for 
example, reaffirmed the support of the South for extension: “Thus far she will go, but not an inch 
beyond.”48  Other journals echoed the the sentiment. “We go for the compromises of the 
constitution,” one Louisiana editor wrote, “as continued and carried out by the Missouri 
compromise.”49  The Richmond Enquirer maintained pressure on supporters of the Wilmot 
Proviso, insisting that Congress had no right to “fetter” the territories by affixing conditions to 
their admission into the Union.50  The South could not afford to “trust the whole matter to the 
justice and good sense of Congress—which would make us admit that Congress has the power to 
abolish slavery in our territories, and to impose conditions on new States coming into the 
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Union.”51  Herein lay the problem with extending the Missouri Compromise line.  While 
moderate southerners endorsed extension, they did so at the peril of admitting that Congress 
possessed the power to legislate over the territories.  Thomas Ritchie himself, who had edited the 
Enquirer until 1845, had lamented passage of the Compromise of 1820 precisely on the grounds 
that it surrendered the South’s constitutional rights north of 36° 30’.52 
Calhoun had illustrated the inherent flaw in the Missouri Compromise when he advocated 
his own theory on slavery in the territories.  The South Carolina senator, however, conveniently 
neglected to mention that he had supported the compromise as a member of President James 
Monroe’s cabinet.  Nevertheless, Calhoun raised an important caveat that southerners could not 
help but heed.  Could the South afford to surrender constitutional ground—even in the spirit of 
compromise—at a time when it had less influence in national councils than ever before?53  
Calhoun gave a rousing speech in Charleston, South Carolina, upon his return home from the late 
congressional session.  He repeated the thesis of his Senate speech: “As constituent members of 
the Union, all the Territories and other property of the Union belong to them, as joint owners or 
partners, and not to the Government, as is er[r]oneously supposed by some.”54  Calhoun 
excoriated the abolitionist minority that used its power to sway elections in several key northern 
states where Whigs and Democrats consistently ran even in balloting.  They used party politics to 
advance their anti-southern agenda.  They also exhibited no reverence for the Constitution in 
attempting to deny southern slaveholders equal participation in westward expansion.  The 
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senator appealed for southern unity to resist the corrosive effects of party politics and to deny 
Congress the ability to legislate for slavery in the territories.55 
Calhoun found a close ally in his efforts to galvanize southern resistance to the Wilmot 
Proviso and to advocate his common-property doctrine on the territories.  In May 1847, William 
Lowndes Yancey, a former representative from Alabama and an ardent advocate of southern 
rights, shepherded a series of resolutions that closely resembled the Calhoun doctrine through a 
state Democratic meeting.  Democratic party conventions in several southern states had drafted 
resolutions in response to the Wilmot Proviso.  The Virginia Resolutions affirmed the right of 
any citizen to enter the territories with his property.  In Georgia, the state Democratic convention 
vowed not to support any presidential candidate who did not state his opposition to the Wilmot 
Proviso.56   Whereas many Democratic regulars in Virginia and throughout the South wished to 
restore party unity and cooperation with the northern Democrats, Yancey sided with Calhoun in 
considering southern rights paramount to intersectional political collaboration.  Yancey’s 
resolutions at the May 1847 Democratic meeting in Montgomery stated the familiar refrain that 
Congress had no power to interfere with slavery in the territories.  At another Alabama 
Democratic meeting, party regulars vowed not to vote for any presidential candidate who did not 
explicitly refuse to interfere with slavery in the territories.57  In time, Yancey would link the two 
ideas in a formidable defense of southern rights squarely in the Calhoun tradition. 
Despite Calhoun’s warnings and the movement of his allies in other southern states, most 
Democrats forged on with their efforts to achieve a compromise solution and appease Americans 
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on both sides of the slavery issue.  The senator may have found “perfect unanimity” in 
Charleston regarding his recent pronouncements on slavery and the territories, but other 
southerners as well as many northern Democrats continued to look for common ground.58  James 
Buchanan took the lead by offering the most reasoned rationale for extending the Missouri 
Compromise line.  In a practice common in nineteenth-century politics, presidential aspirants 
announced their candidacy by drafting a letter to a friend, who in actuality was a campaign 
supporter.59  Buchanan announced his candidacy in a letter to the Democrats of Berks County, 
Pennsylvania, in which he reiterated his position that the “harmony of the States & even the 
security of the Union itself require that the line of the Missouri Compromise should be extended 
to any new territory which we may acquire from Mexico.”60  In what became known as the Old 
Berks letter, the presidential hopeful asserted that designing politicians advocated the Wilmot 
Proviso for naught.  Slavery could never exist in any territory acquired from Mexico.  “Neither 
the soil, the climate, nor the productions of that portion of California south of 36° 30’, nor indeed 
of any portion of it North or South, is adapted to slave labor.”61  Buchanan’s assessment of 
whether slavery could thrive in the Mexican territory most likely came from reports from the 
West.  Numerous commentators considered the land unsuitable for slavery and plantation 
agriculture.  One observer wrote that Americans had overestimated “to an absurdity the arable 
surface of California”; he believed that only four percent of the land would prove suitable for 
“the purposes of civilized life.”62 
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With his statement endorsing extension of the Missouri Compromise line, Buchanan 
became the first presidential contender to solidify his position on the Wilmot Proviso.  Other 
politicians soon followed.  “Parties are beginning to define their position with somewhat more 
clearness on this vexed question” of the Wilmot Proviso, Niles’ Register editor Jeremiah Hughes 
noted, “and we find considerable diversity of opinion prevailing in the same party in different 
sections of the country in regard to it.”63  In the southern press, Democratic journals maintained 
pressure on Whigs and the northern Democracy to reject the idea of congressional power over 
slavery in the territories.  The Richmond Enquirer endorsed the Buchanan plan, citing the old 
Berks letter as “evidence that our friends at the North do not mean to desert us at this crisis.”64  
Democratic moderates throughout the South looked to extension as a viable compromise and a 
hopeful sign that abolitionism had not co-opted the northern wing of their party.65   
At the same time, however, wary southerners maintained pressure on the Wilmot Proviso 
issue, affirming its unconstitutionality.  The editor of the Richmond Enquirer chastised his Whig 
counterpart for its “insidious” contention “that because the old Federal Congress of 1787 thought 
itself empowered to prohibit slavery in the territory ceded by Virginia, the present establishment 
. . . must have greater, or at least equal, power over slavery.”66  Debate over the Wilmot Proviso 
had assumed the level of a constitutional discourse, as did so many issues in mid-nineteenth-
century politics—a development that provided even greater impetus to reach a compromise on 
the vexed slavery issue. 
Many Democrats received Buchanan’s compromise proposal favorably precisely because 
of the need to restore intersectional party unity for the upcoming election.  Thomas Ritchie, the 
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editor of the Democratic Party’s organ Washington Union, endorsed the Old Berks letter as 
sound policy, noting that the Polk administration “oppose[s] all restrictions upon the South, and 
all efforts to restrict slavery south of the 36° 30’ north latitude.”67  Ritchie signaled that 
extension of the Missouri Compromise line, which the Polk administration had endorsed 
privately since January 1847, had become the president’s favored policy.  Moderate northern 
journals also exhibited willingness to embrace compromise.  In New York, a state riven with 
political discord over the slavery issue, moderate Democrats acknowledged the futility of 
imposing the Wilmot Proviso on the South.  Like Buchanan, a number of northern editors 
considered slavery in the Mexican territories an abstraction.  Several New York editors noted 
that “the moment state governments are formed, the power of Congress ceases—and the people, 
acting in their sovereign capacities, can establish slavery at any moment.”68  Why, then, 
jeopardize the harmony of the Union and the successful negotiation of a territorial indemnity 
over the issue of slavery?   
A number of southern politicians also began to express their views on slavery in the 
territories as presidential politics intensified in late 1847.  Mississippi Senator Jefferson Davis 
recognized the need for party unity, but demanded that prior to nomination of presidential 
candidates northern Democratic delegates profess “a disavowal of the principles of the Wilmot 
Proviso; an admission of the equal right of the south with the north, to the territory held as the 
common property of the United States; and a declaration in favor of extending the Missouri 
compromise to all States to be hereafter admitted into our confederacy.”69  Even southern Whigs 
insisted on gaining equal rights in the territories, though many endorsed the no-territory position 
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as the safest means of maintaining the Union.  Georgia Senator John M. Berrien, one of the 
architects of the concept, asked his constituents “if they would consent to acquire this territory by 
our common sufferings, blood and treasure, and have it, except upon terms of perfect equality 
with our northern territory and exclude slavery from it?”70  No southerner, of course, could 
accept such unequal terms.  “Far better go with our whig brethren at the north, leave our weak 
and distracted sister republic to the possession of her territory, and save the constitution and the 
country.”71  Most Americans, however, embraced the idea of a Mexican cession.  The Union 
would simply have to find a way to compromise on the slavery issue. 
The machinations behind presidential politics spawned a second compromise formula 
that would compete for Democratic fealty.  Vice-President George M. Dallas held hopes of 
becoming president after serving a long and distinguished career in a variety of public offices.  
The Pennsylvanian, however, had never exhibited any outstanding qualities for the highest 
office; indeed, he gained the vice-presidential nomination in 1844 only after New York senator 
Silas Wright declined the offer.72  Dallas wanted to seek the Democratic presidential nomination 
in 1848, but he had to find a way to distinguish himself from his bitter rival and fellow 
Pennsylvanian James Buchanan, by most accounts the leading contender in late 1847.73  He did 
so by rejecting extension of the Missouri Compromise line and espousing the doctrine of 
territorial self-government.   
Dallas launched his presidential campaign in a speech given at Pittsburgh in September 
1847.74  While the vice president discussed other issues such as the conduct of the Mexican War 
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and the tariff, he directed most of his remarks to the Wilmot Proviso and the slavery issue.  
Paying lip service to the antislavery faction of the Democratic Party, Dallas observed that they 
objected to the expansion of slavery on moral grounds.  He claimed, however, that the 
Constitution prevented the federal government from interfering with the institution of slavery 
where it existed.  If the antislaveryites wanted to end slavery, they would have to do so through 
amending the Constitution, a prospect that Dallas almost certainly knew would prove impossible.   
After chastising the free soilers for their misinterpretation of the Constitution, Dallas 
turned to the issue of compromise.  “But we hear, in some quarters, much talk of what is called 
compromise,” Dallas stated.  “I am of that old school of Democrats who will never compromise 
the Constitution of my country.75  Perhaps Dallas aimed this remark at southerners who had 
voiced objections to the extension of the Missouri Compromise line as an unfair accord forced 
on the South by northerners.  No matter for whom he intended the remarks, he followed with a 
stinging criticism of the Missouri Compromise itself.  In 1820, Dallas argued, “men got together 
and talked of compromises, and made compromises, and one-half insisted on what they had no 
right to ask, and the other half submitted to that which they never should have submitted to.”76  
Such compromises actually undermined, rather than preserved, constitutional government and 
sectional comity.  By perpetuating an already flawed compromise formula, Buchanan’s proposal 
to extend the Missouri Compromise line would only exacerbate sectional tensions.   
Dallas proposed an appealing way to settle the dispute over the expansion of slavery and 
bury the dreaded Wilmot Proviso.  “The very best thing which can be done,” he argued, “will be 
to let it alone entirely—leaving to the people of the territory to be acquired, the business of 
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settling the matter for themselves.”77  Dallas asserted that the people of the territories would 
achieve their desires regardless of congressional mandate, “for where slavery has no existence, 
all the legislation of Congress would be powerless to give it existence; and where we find it to 
exist the people of the country have themselves adopted the institution; they have the right, 
alone, to determine their own institutions.”78  The vice president ended his remarks on slavery in 
the territories by appealing to both sides of the issue not to condemn the other for their respective 
opinions on the slavery issue. 
In the course of his short speech, Dallas had proposed a thoughtful application of 
territorial self-government that would captivate the attention of his fellow Democrats as a 
promising means of bypassing the Wilmot Proviso and assuaging the party rank and file in the 
North and South.  Dallas had carefully assembled his proposal in a way that conceded specific 
points to each section.  He would surely have objected to calling his plan a compromise, but in 
fact the vice president had developed just that—a proposal that balanced northern and southern 
concerns regarding the expansion of slavery.  Dallas recognized the labors of antislavery 
politicians in the North to end the institution, even if he plainly disagreed with their rhetoric.  He 
rejected their efforts to interfere with slavery in the South, but in doing so he clothed himself 
with the armor of the Constitution.  “If you can accomplish the abolition of slavery in the 
Southern States through its instrumentality,” Dallas instructed the antislaveryites, “why do so. . . 
. The only true test, however, to which we can submit this question, or any other that may arise, 
is the Constitution.”79  In donning the constitutional mantle, Dallas appealed to moderate 
northerners and the southern wing of the Democracy by implicitly accusing abolitionists of 
operating against the Constitution. 
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Dallas’s condemnation of the Missouri Compromise served a twofold purpose: it 
immediately distinguished him from his archrival James Buchanan and it appealed to southerners 
who viewed the compromise warily.  Calhoun and his followers had raised concerns about 
extending the compromise line that resonated with southerners.  The Dallas plan merely 
dispensed with extension altogether by assuming the old southern argument that the Compromise 
of 1820 was at least extraconstitutional, if not unconstitutional.  Again, Dallas appealed to the 
higher authority of the Constitution as the final arbiter of the slavery issue.  Upholding the tenets 
of the founding charter, however, required some plan of action.  To Dallas, the Constitution 
clearly dictated that the people themselves would have to decide whether to permit or prohibit 
slavery within their bounds.  The Tenth Amendment, in the vice president’s reasoning, 
represented not only fundamental law, but also an axiom of political behavior.  The Constitution 
affirmed that powers not delegated to the federal government resided with the states, or the 
people.  Therefore, the states possessed sovereignty over slavery within their bounds.  In the 
territories, the people would presumably possess the power to determine their own domestic 
institutions.  Regardless of what Congress dictated, the people would decide the issue for 
themselves.  Constitutional law and human nature suggested no other way. 
The Dallas plan, however, raised several significant questions that the vice president 
himself did not answer.  No one disputed the power of the states to determine their own domestic 
institutions, but how could a territory—as an inchoate political community—make the decision?  
From the organization of the Louisiana Purchase forward, southerners, and many northerners, 
had affirmed that the territories could make the decision when they drafted a constitution.  More 
recently, Calhoun had taken this opinion in articulating his theory on slavery in the territories.  
But if read another way, Dallas’s speech seemed to suggest that the people of the territories, 
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during the territorial phase, could legislate on the matter for themselves.  Might territorial 
legislatures, then, have the power to permit or prohibit slavery?  The Dallas speech left 
unanswered the questions of how to apply the doctrine of territorial self-government.  The 
presidential candidate may have refrained from offering a more precise definition of his doctrine 
in order to create ambiguity.80  Without further clarification, northerners could view the Dallas 
plan as essentially antislavery.  Northern Democrats knew that Mexican law prohibited slavery.  
If settlers could legislate on the institution during the territorial phase, the Mexican inhabitants 
could reaffirm their prohibition of slavery before slaveholders had a chance to emigrate to the 
territory.  Conversely, southerners could argue that Dallas had merely reaffirmed the 
longstanding policy of the Democratic Party and Calhoun’s formulation. 
Southerners hailed the Dallas speech as a bold defense of their rights in the territories.  
“Could the most ultra opponent of the Wilmot Proviso—the most rigid stickler for the rights of 
the South,” the Richmond Enquirer asked, “take stronger ground?”81  A Louisiana journal stated 
that Dallas’s pronouncement essentially endorsed the Calhoun theory on slavery in the 
territories.82  Some southerners expressed their satisfaction with the speech to the vice-president 
himself.  One Mississippi citizen applauded Dallas’s rejection of the Missouri Compromise.  
“Had you supported the principles of the Missouri compromise as being the true standard, & set 
it up before the Union as a reason why the line should not be continued upon the present 
compromise parallel to the Pacific, we could not have reposed our confidence in you to the same 
broad extent which we do now.”83  A Pennsylvania jurist, though openly professing his 
antislavery beliefs, felt reassured that Dallas’s “long tried democratic principles have not been 
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extinguished by the centralism which has long been at war with the rights of the states.”84  Praise 
from the North and South showed that Dallas’s malleable statement for self-government seemed 
to have potential as a compromise. 
The Pittsburgh speech, however, did have its critics.  The Richmond Times, a Whig 
journal, argued that “Southern interests would be far more certainly secured by the adoption of 
Mr. Buchanan’s proposition, than by leaving the question open, as Mr. Dallas advises, to the 
bone of future contentions.”85  In an effort to portray the Whig Party as a superior guardian of 
slavery, the Times cautioned fellow Whigs to view both the Buchanan and Dallas with 
skepticism, “for we cannot but suspect them of bidding for Southern support.”86  Criticism of 
both Buchanan and Dallas stemmed from a larger issue: Whigs feared territorial expansion.  The 
Democrats, in the words of a Maryland Whig, “blindly pursue a war of conquest having in view 
the acquisition of more territory without considering the effect such a course may have upon our 
domestic institutions.”87 Even southern Whigs who took the no territory stance, though, had to 
defend the institution of slavery in the states and territories in order earn the trust of southern 
voters.  The same Marylander who objected to the Mexican War also emphatically stated that the 
expansion of slavery “should be a discretionary matter with the State or States that may be 
carved out of Territory.  It is a matter with which the general government has no concern, the 
constitution having invested them with no despotic power.”88  In one sense, southern Whigs 
almost had to pay respect to the doctrine of self-government. 
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 Dallas’s plan for self-government in the territories had the potential to surpass 
Buchanan’s call for extension of the Missouri Compromise line because of its unmistakable link 
to democracy and popular government.  A South Carolina Whig best explained the difference 
between Buchanan and Dallas on the slavery issue, at least according to southerners.  In a speech 
in Greenville, South Carolina, Waddy Thompson offered resolutions “complimentary to two 
distinguished citizens of Pennsylvania, who have the boldness and virtue (rare in these times) to 
take high ground in favor of the south, and one of them (Mr. DALLAS) in support of our 
constitutional rights.”89  Even Thompson, a no-territory Whig, perceived the difference between 
Buchanan and Dallas.  Buchanan’s proposal merely extended a compromise that many 
southerners found imperfect at best, while Dallas advocated a plan that seemed congruent with 
the statements of the most ardent southern rights men.  Men of the South found great appeal in 
the Dallas plan and the “noble stand” the candidate had taken “in defence of her institutions.”90 
 The Polk administration remained aloof from the debate between the competing plans of 
how to dispose of the Wilmot Proviso.  The president himself seemed reluctant to choose sides, 
for fellow Democrats might construe an endorsement of either the Buchanan or Dallas plan as 
backing the candidate himself.91  The administration’s official newspaper made note of the 
Dallas speech and his denouncement of the Missouri Compromise, but made no further comment 
on the matter.92  The vice president remained an outside contender; in the fall of 1847, Buchanan 
seemed a stronger choice.  But a number of southern Democrats had shifted their support to the 
Dallas proposal.  Given the delicacy of the situation and the fact that the presidential election 
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season had only recently begun in earnest, the administration chose to remain silent awaiting 
further developments.  
 To some degree Polk’s silence may have stemmed from the lingering questions regarding 
the true meaning of Dallas’s version of self-government.  A New York editor perhaps 
unwittingly illustrated the confusion inherent in the Dallas statement when he endorsed the vice-
president’s speech.  “Let [the Democrats] leave the embarrassing question of slavery where the 
framers of the constitution left it; let them leave to the future what belongs to the future, and 
await the influence of time and the dispensations of Providence, and all will be well.”93  More 
prescient political observers knew that the future would eventually arrive, with all its questions 
about how to apply the principle of self-government to the territories.   
Abolitionists from the North took quick aim at the territorial self-government doctrine, 
arguing that territorial legislatures could not constitutionally possess the power to pass laws 
concerning slavery.  Liberty Party luminary James G. Birney asked rhetorically, “Is it not true, 
that if Congress choose for any reason to give its legislative authority to a Territorial legislature, 
it cannot give a power which it did not itself possess[?]  Congress, being responsible, too, the 
Territorial legislature cannot exercise a power that it did not receive.”94  Birney clearly based his 
argument on the fact that slavery did not exist in Mexican territory, and to his mind could not 
unless Congress or territorial legislatures passed enabling legislation.  Indeed, neither legislative 
body had the power to permit slavery.  Interestingly, John C. Calhoun and his followers attacked 
the doctrine of territorial self-government by raising almost the same questions, but asserting 
conversely that the U.S. Constitution would prevail over existing Mexican law, dictating that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Binghamton Democrat, quoted in New Orleans Louisiana Courier, October 28, 1847. 
94 James G. Birney to William Cullen Bryant, October 18, 1847, Box 13, James G. Birney Papers, William L. 
Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. 
 170	  
slavery would follow the flag.  Calhoun insisted, too, that neither Congress nor territorial 
legislatures had the power to prohibit slavery. 
While abolitionists became the major critics of territorial self-government in the North, 
Whigs in the South pointed out the danger in adopting the Dallas principle, especially if the 
implication that territorial legislatures could decide the slavery issue prevailed.  A Virginia Whig 
editor asked the pivotal question: who were “the people” of the territories?  “Interpreting Mr. 
Dallas’ obscurity with the aid of the light imparted by his official rival, we must believe that the 
people in question are, ‘in large proportion, a colored population,’ among whom ‘the negro does 
not socially belong to a degraded race.’  Must the South return thanks for the boon which Mr. 
Dallas proffers it, through the hands of such delectable governors?”95  By asking the question 
“Who governs?” Southern Whigs had raised an issue that would plague Dallas and any other 
proponent of territorial self-government.  Could the people of any territory gained from Mexico 
prohibit slavery before southern slaveholders, in theory, had the chance to emigrate to the West? 
James Buchanan, who also had a low estimation of the Mexican people, addressed the 
ability of the Mexican people to assimilate to American government and institutions in 
advocating extension of the Missouri Compromise line.  “How should we govern the mongrel 
race which inhabits” the territory, Buchanan asked General James Shields.  “Could we admit 
them to seats in our Senate & House of Representatives?  Are they capable of Self Government 
as States of this Confederacy?”96  Other politicians such as Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan had 
questioned territorial acquisition because they believed the inhabitants could not govern 
themselves effectively, according to Buchanan.  Many Americans viewed the Mexican republic 
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as a farce and the people of Mexico as unable to contribute to Anglo-American society.97  They 
presumably would need a period of tutelage where they could learn the ways of American 
society and political institutions. 
Buchanan argued that the Mexicans would never consent to establish slavery within their 
territory.  They had ended the institution of slavery when they gained independence.  Buchanan 
argued that the United States could never establish slavery there not only because of the climate, 
but also because of the people themselves.  Should the United States gain a territorial indemnity, 
Buchanan wrote, “it is still more improbable that a majority of the people of that region would 
consent to re-establish slavery.”98  Buchanan basically admitted that the inhabitants of any 
territory gained from Mexico would have, by virtue of their very presence, some role in deciding 
whether slavery would or would not exist within the territory—a prospect that many Americans 
in 1847 would find troubling.  Anti-Mexican rhetoric would only intensify as politicians 
continued to debate self-government and the expansion of slavery into the future Mexican 
Cession. 
 In a speech given at Hollidaysburg, Pennsylvania, just over a month after his Pittsburgh 
address, Dallas did little to clarify his position on slavery in the territories or address the 
concerns of his critics.  He merely reiterated his interpretation of the Constitution that Congress 
had no right to “extinguish the privilege of self-government, and to do precisely with the local 
communities what it pleased.”99  The vice president once again neglected to state when a territory 
could legislate on slavery, an omission that many southern Democrats ignored.  For the sake of 
party unity they embraced the Dallas formula in spite of the questions concerning its application.  
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But southern Whigs who sought to strengthen their own party’s record on slavery immediately 
pounced on the inconsistencies of the Pennsylvanian’s plan for territorial self-government.  “So 
long as the Democracy of the South, can find such men at the North to sustain their principles,” a 
Georgia editor declared, “they will not despair of the republic.”100  Yet the lack of clarity in 
Dallas’s position ultimately put southern Democrats on the defensive, as their Whig opponents 
and ultra southern rights men would question what the doctrine of self-government would 
actually mean when put into practice.101 
 The opponents of the Dallas doctrine, however, could not overcome the popularity of the 
idea of self-government as defined by the vice-president.  Although the introduction of the 
doctrine raised serious questions regarding when people in the territories could permit or prohibit 
slavery, a significant number of southern Democrats embraced the concept while dismissing or 
ignoring the caveats raised by their opponents.  The power of Congress over the territories, a 
Virginia correspondent wrote, “must be determined by the Constitution also and the reserved 
rights of the community.  Where a doubt rises in the construction of the former, it may often be 
solved by reference to the latter.”102  Moderate northern Democrats largely agreed.  If new states 
carved from the western territories desired to permit slavery, the New York Herald asked, “what 
right would the people of Massachusetts or Connecticut have to interfere with their 
regulations?”103 
 By the time that the Thirtieth Congress convened in the first week of December 1847, the 
self-government doctrine had largely surpassed extension of the Missouri Compromise as the 
preferred Democratic stance on the slavery expansion issue.  Several Democratic senators from 
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the North had decided to test congressional support for self-government by introducing a refined 
version of the Dallas doctrine.  After consulting with several Senate colleagues, including 
presidential contender Lewis Cass of Michigan, Daniel S. Dickinson of New York introduced 
resolutions endorsing territorial self-government.  The senator argued that the federal 
government could impose no conditions on states or territories that placed them in an inferior 
status to the original thirteen states.  More importantly, he specifically sanctioned the practice of 
self-government by the territories themselves.  “That in organizing a territorial government for 
territory belonging to the United States,” Dickinson wrote, “the principles of self-government, 
upon which our federative system rests, will be best promoted, the true spirit and meaning of the 
Constitution be observed, and the confederacy strengthened, by leaving all questions concerning 
the domestic policy therein to the legislatures chosen by the people thereof.”104 
 Dickinson’s interpretation of territorial self-government removed any inherent 
uncertainty from the version presented by Vice President Dallas three months earlier.  Territorial 
legislatures would have the express right to legislate on slavery within their boundaries, a 
stipulation that fixed precisely when territorial self-government went into effect.  As soon as 
Congress enabled a territory to elect a legislature, commonly known as the second grade of 
territorial government, it could permit or prohibit slavery as it wished.  In sum, Dickinson had 
taken sides on the issue of how to apply the practice of self-government by rejecting the notion 
that a territory could legislate on slavery only preparatory to drafting its constitution and seeking 
admission to the Union.105 
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 The full Senate delayed consideration of the Dickinson resolutions for several weeks, but 
that did not stop senators and the public alike from commenting on their merits.  As many 
politicians might have expected, John C. Calhoun emerged as the fiercest critic of Dickinson’s 
version of territorial self-government.  By resolving the ambiguity of the Dallas proposal and 
asserting the power of territorial legislatures to pass laws concerning slavery, the Dickinson 
resolutions repudiated the Calhoun doctrine on slavery in the territories.  The South Carolinian 
immediately attacked the resolutions as a free soil maneuver, though he ascribed their origin to 
the Polk administration.  Calhoun believed that the president had sanctioned their introduction as 
a compromise measure designed to unite moderates on both sides of the slavery issue.  He wrote, 
“Much circumlocution is used, in order to disguise their real meaning, but their real object is to 
affirm, that the territorial Legislatures may exclude the introduction of slaves, while they deny 
that Congress can.”106 
 Calhoun vehemently objected to the notion that the Mexicans residing within the territory 
the United States stood to gain in the war with Mexico could have a hand in determining the 
future of slavery in the southwest.  “Now, when we reflect that the Mexicans are all 
abolitionists,” he wrote to a close associate, “it is easy to see that the scheme will, as effectually 
exclude slavery, as would the Wilmot Proviso itself.”  Calhoun stated that he would rather let 
Congress decide the matter “than to leave it to the Mexicans to decide.”107  To Calhoun’s mind, 
the Dickinson resolutions effectively barred the South from expanding into the Mexican 
territories regardless of whether the land could sustain slavery.  The venerable South Carolinian, 
however, doubted that a majority of southerners would see the resolutions as he did.  “[T]here 
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are Southern men, who I fear will be either too blind to see the truth, or too much devoted to 
party & President making” to oppose the Dickinson resolutions and endorse his stronger line.108 
 Calhoun assumed correctly that his opposition to the Dickinson resolutions lacked unified 
support.  One of Georgia’s leading Democratic journals immediately endorsed the Dickinson 
resolutions as constitutionally sound and “acceptable to the South.”109  Indeed, a state 
Democratic convention in Milledgeville, Georgia, seemingly gave sanction to territorial self-
government.  The convention’s resolutions affirmed that the South did not ask Congress for 
positive establishment of slavery in the territories—a request that the federal government could 
not grant constitutionally.  The states of the South “simply require that the inhabitants of each 
territory shall be left free to determine for themselves, whether the institution of slavery shall or 
shall not form a part of their social system.”110  Georgia Democrats emerged first as the 
proponents of the Dickinson resolutions, but their effusions of praise are significant for what 
they did not say as much as what they did.  They praised the principle of self-government, but 
made no comment on Dickinson’s assertion that territorial legislatures could pass laws 
concerning slavery.  In other words, a number of southern Democrats professed support for the 
Dickinson resolutions, but in reality they maintained the ambiguous interpretation of George 
Dallas.  Most Democrats in the South either ignored the implications of Dickinson’s resolutions 
for the sake of party unity, or simply maintained the traditional southern interpretation of 
territorial self-government in spite of what their northern brethren said. 
 Support for Dickinson’s stance among southern Democrats revealed the impetus for 
compromise among moderates.  Hopkins Holsey, an Athens, Georgia, editor and political 
operative expressed his support for the Dickinson resolutions, which he stated, “assumed the 
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same ground taken by Mr. Dallas of Pennsylvania last summer.”111  Like a number of southern 
Democrats, though, Holsey questioned whether the northern wing of the party would support the 
doctrine of territorial self-government.  “Satisfactory as this position must be to us in all respects 
(leaving out the absolute monomania of the Calhoun faction) it becomes us to ascertain, before 
we adopt it as the basis of our action in the next campaign, whether the Northern Democracy will 
rally to its support?”112  While self-government seemed the preferred choice over extension of 
the Missouri Compromise line, southerners recognized the necessity of finding a position that 
Democrats from the North and South could agree upon.   
 Holsey professed that he expressed the fears of other southern Democrats that party unity 
would fail over the slavery issue.  He surmised that extension might prevail over self-
government in the North, because it enabled northerners to “retain their constitutional 
prepossessions.”113  But southern Democrats who professed this belief underestimated the extent 
to which the Calhoun faction had discredited the Missouri Compromise in the South.  While the 
Calhounites did not enjoy sufficient support to advance their position on slavery in the 
territories—at least in late 1847, they did in part succeed by appealing to the South’s own 
constitutional prepossessions.  Those who endorsed self-government over extension did so in no 
small part because it allowed them to avoid the traditional southern opinion that the Missouri 
Compromise was not entirely constitutional.114   
 By the end of 1847, the slavery debate had advanced to a point where a compromise 
seemed within grasp.  The coming of a presidential election season linked the issue of slavery in 
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the territories with the politics of president making.  Already two Democratic contenders for 
president had advanced competing plans for disposing of the Wilmot Proviso.  Extension of the 
Missouri Compromise line seemed a straightforward policy.  Tepid support from southern 
Democrats and the Polk administration, however, had compromised support for the plan.  The 
ambiguous version of territorial self-government proposed by Vice President Dallas had received 
warm approval from southern Democrats and even some Whigs.  Abolitionists from the North 
had attacked the Dallas plan as a proslavery subterfuge, while Calhounites in the South 
characterized it an antislavery policy clothed in the rhetoric of moderation.  Southern Whigs had 
taken the lead in illustrating the dangers inherent in the nebulous compromise plan, arguing that 
it merely deferred the serious questions surrounding slavery and westward expansion to a later 
date.  The efforts of Daniel Dickinson to clarify the doctrine and assert the right of territorial 
legislatures to pass laws concerning slavery only made matters worse among skeptical 
southerners. 
 As northern Democrats had debated the merits of one compromise plan over the other, a 
third Democratic presidential hopeful had observed developments and quietly waited to make his 
own statement launching his presidential campaign.  Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan, an 
experienced politician who had served in government for over thirty years, understood the 
calculus of the political situation in 1847.  No Democratic presidential candidate could seriously 
contend for the office without advancing a plan to eliminate the threat of the Wilmot Proviso. 
While Dallas and Buchanan had sparred over their competing proposals and the Democratic 
Party remained split in factions, Cass worked behind the scenes to enhance his chances while 
maintaining silence in public.115  The Michigan senator’s prospects for gaining the nomination 
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looked promising.  In late September 1847, Cass had written a political confidant, “I am however 
very quiet, and am determined to remain so.  I shall write no letters for publication, author no 
inquiries, give no pledges.”116  By late December, Cass decided to break his silence and enter the 
presidential field with his own pronouncement on the slavery issue.  As a formidable competitor 
against Buchanan and Dallas for the Democratic nomination, political observers eagerly awaited 
his solution to the crisis over slavery in the territories. 
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CHAPTER 5 
TERRITORIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT AND THE ELECTION OF 1848 
 
On Christmas Eve, 1847, Lewis Cass finally broke his silence on the territorial issue.  He 
issued a public letter summarizing his views on the main questions of the day and offering his 
approach to the problems the country faced.  Following the practice of his political rivals George 
Dallas and James Buchanan, Cass began his presidential campaign in the letter to Tennessee 
political operative Alfred O.P. Nicholson.1  Like his rivals for the nomination, Cass rejected the 
Wilmot Proviso and sought to offer an alternative to settle the question over slavery in the 
territories.  Out of political necessity, slavery ranked first and foremost on his political agenda.  
The Michigan senator had bided his time, waiting until the right moment to enter the political 
fray with a bold statement of his principles on the vexing question of slavery.  Dallas and 
Buchanan had inaugurated their candidacies some three months earlier, engaging in a contest that 
meant nearly as much about who would control Pennsylvania state politics as it did the 
upcoming presidential contest.  Other contenders such as Levi Woodbury of New Hampshire and 
former New York governor Silas Wright had expressed interest in gaining the nomination.  The 
time seemed appropriate for Cass to enter the presidential race and to make a significant 
statement on the slavery issue that would propel him to the top of the list of presidential 
contenders.2  
 Cass had hoped to secure the Democratic presidential nomination in 1844, but saw his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Nicholson had supported Cass’s bid for the Democratic nomination in 1844, much to the chagrin of James K. Polk.  
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2 For the nominees and the status of the presidential campaign season in the latter months of 1847, see Joel H. 
Silbey, Party over Section: The Rough and Ready Presidential Election of 1848 (Lawrence: University Press of 
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Kentucky, 1970), 56-80.  Wright unexpectedly died in August 1847 just as his name entered discussion over the 
nomination. 
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slim hopes dashed by a younger Tennessean in the mold of Andrew Jackson—James K. Polk.3   
Cass still yearned for the presidency, and in a political system designed to reward fealty to party, 
he almost certainly felt that his fellow Democrats should give him the reward for his years of 
service.  But Cass, like the perennial presidential contender Henry Clay, learned that one’s 
service to party certainly did not guarantee the presidency.  Though rebuffed by his party in 
1844, Cass hoped to gain the nomination—and the presidency—in 1848, when a mentally and 
physically exhausted Polk declined to seek a second term in office.4 
Cass used the issue of slavery in the territories to advance his candidacy for president by 
promising to dispose of the Wilmot Proviso and the principle of congressional intervention 
against the institution.  During the silent phase of his presidential campaign in the latter months 
of 1847, Cass had circulated a draft of the Nicholson letter among thirty to fifty members of 
Congress and almost certainly communicated with other political operatives in an effort to draft 
an alternative policy to the Wilmot Proviso.5  He also had a strong association with New York 
Senator Daniel S. Dickinson, who had very likely introduced his resolutions advocating 
territorial self-government with Cass’s blessing.6  Ten days after the Senate received the 
Dickinson resolutions, Cass brought out his letter to Nicholson and advocated essentially the 
same principles on the slavery issue. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For Cass’s presidential aspirations in 1844, see Willard Carl Klunder, Lewis Cass and the Politics of Moderation 
(Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1996), 119-144. 
4 In 1844, Polk had promised to serve only one term, yet many politicos believed he would seek reelection in 1848.  
See Eugene Irving McCormac, James K. Polk: A Political Biography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1922), 713-717. 
5 Lewis Cass to John Larwill, February 6, 1848, Box 20, [photostat], Lewis Cass Papers, William L. Clements 
Library, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. 
6 See David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861, completed and edited by Don E. Fehrenbacher (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1976), 71. 
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In the Nicholson letter, Cass advanced a carefully wrought yet somewhat vague argument 
that not only confused his contemporaries, but has puzzled historians ever since.7  He began with 
a defense of the war with Mexico and the need to finish the effort, but the letter concentrated 
most on the issue of slavery in the territories.  The Wilmot Proviso had upset the national 
councils by forcing Congress to provide resolution for the slavery issue, a duty it had heretofore 
proved unable to discharge.  Cass endorsed the doctrine that southerners had advanced for almost 
thirty years—the slavery issue “should be kept out of the national legislature, and left to the 
people of the confederacy in their respective local governments.”8  After penning a statement 
that would surely please southern Democrats, the senator aimed to satisfy his fellow northerners.  
Cass maintained that like many northerners, he deprecated the institution of slavery.  Regardless 
of the morality of the institution, however, Congress did not have the power to interfere with the 
institution where it currently existed.  Matters concerning slavery rested solely with the local 
governments in places where it existed  “Local institutions,” Cass declared, “whether they have 
reference to slavery, or to any other relations, domestic or public, are left to local authority; 
either original or derivative.”9  But what about slavery in the territories, namely in any territory 
gained from Mexico, where slavery did not exist by virtue of local law? 
To this point, Cass had made no original statement; he had merely affirmed the 
established Democratic orthodoxy.  He had taken great pains to portray himself as a northern 
man attuned to southern interests—a doughface.  Yet he had also stated his own distaste for 
slavery, a clear gesture toward northerners who considered the institution undesirable even if 
they believed that they had no power to force its extinction.  After avowing that slavery was a 
local institution, Cass now turned to the situation in the territories.  He noted that territories 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




differed from states; as inchoate political communities, territories did not have the same political 
standing within the Union.  The only explicit passage regarding the territories—the “needful 
rules and regulations” clause—had provoked considerable debate since the earliest days of the 
republic.  After briefly citing the history of the debate over the territories clause, Cass sided with 
those who believed the clause referred solely to the territories as tangible property.  To his mind, 
it did not “extend to the unlimited power of legislation” over them.10 
In order to uphold the principles of the Constitution and preserve the safety of the Union, 
Cass argued, the nation had to reject the Wilmot Proviso and its assumption of federal control of 
local institutions.  Here the senator summed up his stance on the slavery issue: “I am opposed to 
the exercise of any jurisdiction by Congress over this matter; and I am in favor of leaving to the 
people of any territory, which may be hereafter acquired, the right to regulate it for themselves, 
under the general principles of the constitution.”11  Cass claimed the right of the territories to 
determine the status of slavery for five reasons.  First, the Constitution did not grant Congress the 
power to interfere with slavery.  Certainly northerners could debate this point vigorously, as the 
Northwest Ordinance explicitly sanctioned congressional intervention against slavery.  
Southerners, however, could interpret Cass’s reasoning as an attack on such legislation.  Second, 
Cass believed that implementing the Wilmot Proviso would “sow the seeds of future discord, 
which would grow up and ripen into an abundant harvest of calamity”—an overt reference to the 
possibility of civil war.12  Southerners, he implied, would not stand for the passage of the Wilmot 
Proviso.  Third, implementation of the Wilmot Proviso would handicap the efforts to conclude 
successfully the Mexican War.  If Congress did not remove the offending proviso from efforts to 
fund the war effort, it might never pass a bill to fund the army.  Likewise, Cass argued that if the 





Wilmot Proviso became law southerners in Congress would withhold support for any peace 
treaty with Mexico providing for a territorial indemnity. 
Finally, Cass returned to the crux of his argument by addressing the issue of state versus 
territorial sovereignty.  Even if the Wilmot Proviso became law and barred slavery from the 
proposed Mexican Cession, it would only carry force during the territorial phase.  Once settlers 
carved states from the cession and gained admission to the Union, the right of Congress to 
impose a ban on slavery would unquestionably disappear.   State sovereignty would prevail and 
the people would then have the right to determine the status of slavery for themselves.  Here 
Cass broached the nettlesome issue of when a political community gained sovereignty.  For 
many if not most Americans, a territory gained sovereignty only when an elected convention 
drafted a constitution and sought admission to the Union.13  Cass responded to the question of 
state sovereignty and constitutional law with a pragmatic question: why should Congress assume 
jurisdiction over the status of slavery during the presumably brief territorial phase when its 
authority would cease with the territory’s admission to the Union?  “Is the object, then, of 
temporary exclusion for so short a period as the duration of the Territorial governments,” Cass 
asked, “worth the price at which it would be purchased?”14  Most of Cass’s statements up to this 
point had merely reiterated established Democratic doctrine.  The candidate broke new ground, 
however, by strongly implying that territorial legislatures should have the power to determine the 
status of slavery.  Many Democratic politicians had simply insisted that Congress had no power 
to address the issue of slavery in the territories, without addressing who did possess jurisdiction.  
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In the Nicholson letter, Cass answered the question by maintaining that the territories themselves 
had the right to permit or prohibit slavery.   
Cass had advanced a thoughtful argument that portrayed the Wilmot Proviso as an absurd 
attempt by Congress to legislate on the slavery question for a brief period of time and in a place 
where it did not currently, and most likely, never would exist.  Moderates on both sides of the 
slavery issue could endorse the former idea as a sound and pragmatic approach to a divisive 
political issue.  But the latter point received the scorn of southern slaveholders who viewed 
Cass’s rationale as a blithe dismissal of their constitutional rights.  Unfortunately for Cass’s 
standing with the South, he expanded on his reasoning concerning the viability of slavery in the 
Mexican territory.  The senator essentially adopted the stance of James Buchanan and Secretary 
of the Treasury Robert J. Walker on slavery; the institution could never exist in the cession 
because of the race of the indigenous population and because the laws of nature precluded the 
development of plantation agriculture.  In 1844, Walker, then a senator from Mississippi, had 
asserted that slavery would never exist in California and New Mexico “not only because it is 
forbidden by law, but because the colored race there preponderates in the ratio of ten to one over 
the whites; and holding, as they do, the government and most of the offices in their possession, 
they will not permit the enslavement of any portion of the colored race, which makes and 
executes the laws of the country.”15 
Walker’s pronouncement had offended southerners—and their hostility to his argument 
did not abate.  Southern Democrats especially rejected the notion that the Mexican laws 
prohibiting slavery would prevail under American control.  Furthermore, many considered the 
prospect that Mexicans would control territorial governments in the cession outrageous.  
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Allowing Mexicans to govern the cession amounted to the conquered governing the conqueror.  
And to the minds of many southerners, both points seemed to deprive Americans of their 
sovereignty in the Mexican Cession, an assertion that one could argue directly controverted 
Cass’s aim in the Nicholson letter—to affirm territorial sovereignty.  During the election year, 
southern Whigs and Calhounites alike exploited the fact that in the Nicholson letter, Cass 
endorsed the statements of Walker.   
Cass, however, faced a greater obstacle than any offending remarks found within the 
Nicholson letter.  In the waning days of the Twenty-Ninth Congress when the Senate deliberated 
over the Two Million Bill, Cass had tacitly agreed to vote for passage with the Wilmot’s 
amendment.  Of course, the Senate did not vote on the Two Million Bill—the House had 
adjourned before Senate managers could take a vote—but Cass had made his position clear.  
Even after the session’s end, the senator remarked to a New York congressman that the northern 
Democrats had agreed to vote for the amended bill and that “’he regretted very much’ not 
receiving the opportunity to vote on it.”16  Most likely Cass did not recognize the extent of 
southern feeling against the proviso and instead opted to support prosecution of the war, even if 
it meant accepting the amendment.17  Cass had changed his opinion by the time he penned the 
Nicholson letter.  Indeed, when he wrote of a “great change” in the public mind, as well as his 
own, he may have intended an oblique reference to his actions in August 1846.18  When news 
surfaced of Cass’s conversation with the New York congressman, though, a number of 
southerners fumed at the presidential candidate’s one-time support of the hated Wilmot Proviso. 
In the meantime, the Nicholson letter gained the approbation of northern and southern 
Democrats.  The New York Herald called the letter “[o]ne of the most important moves on the 
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political chess-board.”19  Echoing the sentiments of individuals from both sections, the Herald 
posited that Cass “goes farther than Mr. Calhoun himself.”20  By arguing that Congress had no 
right to legislate for the territories on the slavery issue, Cass had advanced a position more 
strident than most southern ultras.  He had advanced an argument in which southerners could 
find safety, a Virginia editor affirmed.21   The senator had developed a strong argument based on 
principles of the past, a doctrine most Democrats believed “destined to become the platform” of 
the party.22 
What did the Cass doctrine, as many would come to call it, really mean?  Though many 
Democratic partisans wanted to believe that “Gen. Cass’s letter contains its own best 
interpretation,” the document actually left supporters and opponents alike befuddled. Like many 
of his predecessors during the earlier debates over the expansion of slavery, Cass did not take an 
explicit stand on the right of Congress to legislate on slavery in the territories.  He merely 
considered congressional intervention impolitic.  More interestingly, many of Cass’s 
contemporaries as well as historians up to the present have advanced competing theories on the 
true meaning of Cass’s version of territorial self-government.  As one scholar has colorfully 
written, the senator “was as silent as the dumbest oracle on the precise stage of territorial 
development at which inhabitants were to regulate slavery.”23 
Because Cass wrote the Nicholson letter to advance his candidacy for president, he 
artfully balanced his remarks to appease the differences within his party, thereby sacrificing 
clarity to placate the different factions within the party.  On the issue of the expansion of slavery, 
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Cass sought to insert himself into a long tradition of Democratic doctrine on the right of the 
people to engage in self-government.  By advancing the cause of self-government, the Nicholson 
letter exhibited its author’s sterling credentials as a Jacksonian Democrat and a defender of 
democratic rights.  Paeans to the revolutionary doctrine of popular sovereignty and self-
government did not settle the pragmatic question of when the settlers of a territory could exercise 
their presumptive right to permit or prohibit slavery within the bounds of their territory.  
In spite of the Nicholson letter’s perhaps intentional lack of precision, Cass left 
significant clues as to when he believed settlers of a territory could decide the slavery issue.  
Whereas most Democrats believed that self-government came in the phase immediately 
preceding statehood, when a territorial convention met to draft a constitution, Cass strongly 
implied that he believed Congress should let settlers decide the question at some point earlier.  
Cass had asked his readers whether a “temporary exclusion” of slavery from the territories 
merited the inevitable struggle that would result.24  The people of the territory would possess the 
unquestionable right to legislate on slavery when admitted to statehood.  The senator clearly 
implied that Congress should let territorial governments decide the slavery issue rather than risk 
a firestorm of sectional discord over the Wilmot Proviso and congressional intervention for or 
against slavery in the territories. 
Cass did little to clarify his position on when a territory could legislate on slavery, 
perhaps because of the sharp criticism leveled against the Dickinson resolutions in the Senate.  
Some two weeks after the Nicholson letter appeared in the press, the New York senator rose to 
defend his resolutions calling for territorial self-government.  Dickinson basically echoed the 
reasoning of the Nicholson letter. Why risk sectional discord in Congress for a prohibition that 
would carry no force once a territory became a state, Dickinson asked.  His resolutions promised 
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to “leave, under the Constitution, all questions concerning the admission or prohibition of this 
institution in the territories, to the inhabitants thereof, that its intrusion may not hereafter arrest 
the policy, defeat the measures, or disturb the councils of the nation.”25  Dickinson took a 
position stronger than any other legislator on the right of self-government in the territories.  He 
argued that the territories should possess the same rights to self-government as other “political 
communities,” a point that considerably blurred the difference between territory and state.26  
Dickinson maintained that Congress could not abridge the rights of an American citizen because 
he resided in a territory rather than a state.  Certainly the framers of the Constitution did not 
intend to impose a colonial status on the territories and their inhabitants.   
The Dickinson resolutions—and indeed the entire issue of territorial self-government—
not only had profound implications for the expansion of slavery, but they also raised significant 
questions about the nature of American government.  Dickinson advocated territorial sovereignty 
in its purest form, though even he did not explicitly state precisely when a territory and its 
inhabitants became imbued with sovereignty.  The New York senator went too far, however, in 
the opinion of a number of his colleagues.  Immediately following Dickinson’s speech in the 
Senate, David Yulee of Florida introduced a resolution of his own, stating that “the federal 
government has no delegated authority, nor the territorial community any inherent right, to 
exercise any legislative power” that might prohibit slavery.27   
Yulee’s resolution embodied the Calhounite position that neither settlers in the territories 
nor Congress could interfere with the right of an American citizen to emigrate to a territory with 
his slave property.  The Calhounites left open the possibility that a territorial legislature could 
enact slave codes to regulate the institution, but they explicitly denied the right of anyone to 
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prohibit slavery in a territory.  Dickinson’s resolutions, to the minds of ultra southerners, 
offended the right of slaveholders to enjoy the common property of the territories, which 
Congress merely administered as an agent for the states.  In sum, the Calhounites believed that 
Cass and Dickinson’s version of territorial self-government unquestionably gave settlers the right 
to legislate on slavery during the territorial phase.  They saw no lack of clarity in the 
pronouncements of these two northern Democrats.  Calhoun remarked to an associate that the 
speeches of Dallas and the letters of Buchanan and Cass “are intended to delude the South.”28  
Throughout the election year of 1848, politicians and interested observers would grapple with the 
Cass doctrine and attempt to give precision to his assertion that the people of the territories 
possessed the right to determine their own domestic institutions.  As individuals lined up for and 
against the principles embodied in the Nicholson letter, the doctrine of territorial self-
government itself assumed different meanings.  Cass’s initial statement may have lacked clarity, 
but proslavery and antislavery partisans would further muddle its meaning in order to gain 
political advantage. 
 In the early months of 1848, northern Democrats, especially the doughfaces, offered their 
endorsement of the Nicholson letter and the Dickinson resolutions.  A New Yorker expressed his 
satisfaction with Dickinson’s effort in the Senate.  “The Wilmot Proviso as it is termed or 
whoever may be its putative Father,” he wrote, “I have always considered Abolitionism in 
disguise.”29  Northern Democrats saw abolitionists as radicals bent on destroying the Union and 
consequently sought to steer a more conciliatory course.  Cass and Dickinson provided a 
compromise that seemed able to reunite the fractured Democratic Party.  In the press, moderate 
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supporters of territorial self-government found their voice in James Gordon Bennett’s New York 
Herald, which endorsed the Cass doctrine as a position that northern and southern Democrats 
could unite upon.30   
Not all Democrats could endorse the Nicholson letter wholeheartedly, because Cass 
conceded much to the proslavery interests.  In an effort to “make the amplest reparation for his 
former support of the Wilmot proviso,” a Washington correspondent noted, the senator had given 
the South “not only all it requires, but what it never dreamed of asking.”31  Some Democrats, 
including the correspondent, wondered if Cass had given too much to the South.  They 
recognized that many northerners abhorred the institution of slavery and did not entirely trust 
southern politicians to stand for national interests.  At an Ohio Democratic convention in 
January, the delegates expressed their fears of ceding too much power to slaveholder interests.  
The convention gave only a tepid endorsement of the Nicholson letter by affirming the ages-old 
doctrine that Congress could not interfere with slavery in the states, but ignoring Cass’s 
implication that territorial legislatures could pass laws permitting or prohibiting slavery.32 
Southern Democrats hailed the Nicholson letter as an important defense of southern 
rights in the territories.  “Gen. Cass has taken his place side by side with Buchanan and Dallas 
upon this great question,” a Georgia editor effused.  “What a brilliant trio!  And they all are 
Democrats!”33  Southern Democrats noted that their section still had friends in the North who 
would stand for the constitutional rights of slaveholders and non-slaveholders alike.  The Cass 
doctrine promised to heal the division caused by the Missouri Compromise over twenty-five 
years before.  Democrats in the South insisted that territorial self-government would give 
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southerners equal rights in the territories, which the Compromise of 1820 had denied—at least 
north of the 36° 30’ line.34 
Although many southern Democrats supported the Cass doctrine, they differed as to how 
they interpreted the Nicholson letter and its definition of territorial self-government.  
Considerable differences exist within the South over the application of self-government, which 
subtly changed over the course of the election year.  In the first half of 1848, certain Georgia 
Democrats emerged as stalwart supporters of the Cass doctrine.  One Georgia editor clearly 
explained his interpretation of territorial self-government.  Congress had no right “to interfere 
either one way of the other in a question of slavery in the territories” because the Constitution 
“looks with equal regard upon the respective social organization of the different states.  The 
whole disposition of the matter must then be with the Territorial Legislature.”35  Moderate 
Georgia Democrats assailed the Calhounite position, which to their minds forced slavery upon 
the territorial legislatures without their consent.  If Congress possessed the power to force 
slavery upon a people, could it not conversely force abolition, a Democratic editor asked.36 
Other Democrats exhibited a curious understanding of what their northern brethren meant 
in proposing territorial self-government.  The Dickinson resolutions had clearly vested power 
over slavery in the territorial legislatures, but some southern Democrats either did not fully 
understand or chose to ignore the implications of Dickinson’s resolutions and Cass’s Nicholson 
letter.  More likely they desired to reshape the doctrine to suit their own political purposes.  
Georgia politician Henry L. Benning wrote to his close friend Senator Howell Cobb, “The 
resolutions do not declare what principle ought to govern in the interval between the time of 
acquiring the territory and the time at which the people thereof may choose to settle those 
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‘questions of domestic policy’, which it is left to them to settle.”37  Benning took a unique stance 
that straddled the line between the position of northern Democrats that territorial legislatures had 
the unquestioned power to legislate on slavery and the Calhounites who insisted that neither 
Congress nor territorial legislatures could exercise such power.  He did not object to allowing 
territorial legislatures, once created in the second stage of territorial government, to decide the 
slavery question.  Benning did propose adding a clause to the resolution on territorial self-
government, however, that would permit slaveholders to enter the territory until a territorial 
legislature passed laws to the contrary. 
The remarks of men like Benning show that while a significant number of southern 
Democrats committed themselves to territorial self-government, they did so with certain 
reservations and on their own terms.  Furthermore, the issue had sharply divided the South.  
Neither southerners nor the national Democratic Party had unified on the best way to dispose of 
the Wilmot Proviso.  In Alabama, for example, moderate Democrats who supported territorial 
self-government faced stiff opposition from the allies of William Lowndes Yancey, who had 
endorsed the Calhounite position.  At a state Democratic convention, the moderates resolved to 
combat the rhetoric of the Yancey faction by expressing their satisfaction with “the Democracy 
of the North for their conduct on the Slavery question.”38  Yancey and his followers, however, 
would strengthen their opposition to the Cass doctrine over the course of the election year.  And 
in Georgia, where significant support among moderates emerged for territorial self-government, 
moderate Democrats feared that the northern wing of the party would withhold support for the 
Cass doctrine because of their objections to the institution of slavery.  “Why, then, will not our 
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Northern brethren,” a Milledgeville editor asked, “consent for this doctrine to apply to territory 
which may be hereafter acquired?”39 
Democrats faced a daunting task in 1848: “to gain South and not lose North,” in the 
words of Henry L. Benning.40  Democrats had to convince southerners that their party would best 
protect slavery and southern interests in the territories, but at the same time keep northerners who 
objected to slavery and addressing southern demands in the party fold.  They faced considerable 
opposition in the North and South.  As early as March, some southern Democrats doubted if Cass 
could garner sufficient votes from northerners or southerners.41  Growing northern hostility to the 
institution of slavery had forced some politicians to reckon with the Wilmot Proviso and to 
abandon efforts to build intersectional ties with southern leaders.  In the South, moderate 
Democrats contended with the Calhounites, who doubted the efforts of men like Cass.  The 
followers of Calhoun would insist on a platform that would give positive protection to southern 
rights in the territories. 
Democrats from the North and South never expected to convert either abolitionists or 
antislavery zealots to their cause.  According to a southern observer who believed that “Politics 
& Fanaticism are confederated for our destruction,” antislavery northerners viewed slavery “as 
sinful—and thy think that if they suffer new—free territory to be occupied by Slaves—the sin 
will be upon them.”  In opposition, party regulars portrayed themselves as moderate patriots who 
sought to save the bonds of Union from the machinations of antislavery fanatics.  Antislavery 
northerners criticized Cass for his stance on the slavery issue.  “Mr. Cass does not mean to be 
behind Messrs. Woodbury, Buchanan or Dallas, who are each anxious to receive the reward of 
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their subservience to slavery,” a New Hampshire editor wrote.42  Cass merely presented another 
example of doughfaces doing the bidding of the South.  The efforts of moderate Democrats to 
unite the party fell flat with the increasingly strident opponents of slavery in the North. 
Antislavery leaders responded to the Nicholson letter as expected; so too did the 
Calhounites, who had objected vociferously to the proposals of northern Democrats since George 
Dallas had spoken in support of territorial self-government.  Calhoun recognized the allure of 
Cass’s position on the slavery question and sought to solidify his ranks in support of his own 
common property doctrine. Dallas, Buchanan, and Cass certainly opposed the Wilmot Proviso, 
“but not the end at which it aims; to exclude the South from whatever Territory may be acquired 
from Mexico.”43  The Nicholson letter offended Calhoun by quoting the remarks of Buchanan, 
who had insisted that slavery would never thrive in the Mexican Cession.  To Calhoun, the 
viability of slavery in the West did not matter; the right of a slaveholder to carry his property into 
the territories was paramount.  Northern Democrats had drafted grand proposals to replace the 
Wilmot Proviso with an affirmation of the people’s right to determine their own institutions.  But 
what people—American citizens or Mexican inhabitants?  And for what purpose?  Buchanan and 
Cass had both suggested that slavery would never exist in the Mexican Cession.  Calhoun 
pounced on these issues, and directed his associates to do the same in an effort to rally the South 
behind his banner.44 
 The Calhounites launched their offensive against territorial self-government by accusing 
its proponents of deceiving slaveholders.  Cass and Dickinson maintained that their proposal 
preserved southern rights in the territories, according to a Charleston editor, but they “had also 
said, in the way of a confidential whisper to the north, ‘the inhabitants of the territory that may 
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be acquired will have the right to decide whether slavery shall have entrance upon the soil or not; 
and as the institution has now no existence there, and is regarded with great aversion by the 
people, there is no danger whatever that slavery will ever be permitted to advance beyond its 
present limits.’”45  The doughfaces, according to Calhoun and his allies, wanted to gain votes in 
the South by proposing the right of the people, rather than Congress, to determine the status of 
slavery in the West.  They also wanted to keep wary northerners in the Democratic fold by 
suggesting that slavery would never take root in the Mexican Cession.  Calhoun sought to show 
that the northern Democrats saw self-government as an essentially antislavery doctrine.  
Calhoun’s indictment of the Cass doctrine resonated with those southerners who trusted 
neither the northern Democrats nor the current residents of the Mexican Cession to uphold 
southern rights.  While most southerners endorsed the principle of self-government in its 
broadest definition, more doctrinaire citizens of the section disagreed with the application of 
territorial sovereignty as proposed by Cass and other northerners.  Because Mexican law 
prohibited slavery, it seemed highly unlikely that the Mexican residents would consent to 
introducing the institution.  Only if Americans emigrated to the cession and took control of the 
institutions of territorial government could slavery have a chance to flourish, which necessitated 
two preconditions.  First, slaveholders needed time to emigrate to the West.  Southerners—
indeed all Americans—could not allow the Mexican citizens to shape American law.  Second, 
and especially in the minds of the Calhounites, the federal government had to affirm and defend 
the right of slaveholders to carry their property into the cession.  For this reason especially, 
southerners had looked to extension of the Missouri Compromise line as a viable compromise 
solution.  The pronouncements of Dallas and Cass, however, had brushed aside the compromise 
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in favor of the alluring idea of self-government, a doctrine rooted in America’s revolutionary 
ideology and Jacksonian democracy.46 
Calhoun’s own strict construction of the Constitution may have contributed to the 
rejection of extending the Missouri Compromise line, since the South Carolinian had vigorously 
attacked the old compact as an infringement on the South’s constitutional rights.  In July 1848, 
Calhoun gave a speech in the Senate opposing the extension of the Missouri Compromise line to 
the Pacific Ocean.47  Yet the compromise offered perhaps the best alternative by which Congress 
could dispose of the Wilmot Proviso and restore sectional harmony.  It would have essentially 
permitted slavery in a significant portion of the Mexican Cession and, by past convention, would 
presumably have delayed the decision of whether to permit or prohibit slavery to the moment 
when the territories drafted their respective constitutions and applied for statehood, an argument 
to which the Calhounites held fast.  In the waning days of the congressional session, the 
Senate—Calhoun included—voted for a measure that would have extended the Missouri 
Compromise line to the Pacific Ocean, but the bill died in the House of Representatives.48  
Calhoun supported extension only as a temporary measure and disclaimed that it would set any 
constitutional precedent for congressional restriction of slavery, though his support for extension, 
however tepid,  must have puzzled those who witnessed his effusions against the Missouri 
Compromise in the past.49  President Polk’s timidity to endorse extension of the compromise 
line—he did not express support for the proposal until June 1848—and southern hostility toward 
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the Missouri Compromise itself encouraged politicians to find an alternate solution.  The 
Nicholson letter and its endorsement of territorial self-government filled the void.50  
The Calhounites could not endorse the Cass version of self-government, with its 
implication that territorial legislatures could potentially prohibit slavery.  The venerable South 
Carolina senator had devoted allies in Congress and in key southern states who raised objections 
to the efforts of the moderate Democrats to settle the slavery question.  Florida Senator David 
Yulee had objected to the Dickinson resolutions immediately after the New Yorker introduced 
them in the Senate by insisting that settlers in the territories had no right to prevent slaveholders 
in the states from emigrating with their property.  Just weeks later, Alabama Senator Arthur P. 
Bagby introduced a similar resolution asserting that Congress could not confer a power on a 
territorial legislature that it did not itself possess.  Neither Congress nor territorial legislatures, 
Bagby claimed, could prohibit slavery in the territories.51 
Aside from the pronouncements of Calhoun himself, the most sustained objections to 
territorial self-government came from Alabama politician William Lowndes Yancey.  Brilliant in 
oratory but often a dour, insecure man with a violent temper, Yancey moved in lockstep with 
John C. Calhoun in an effort to unite southerners in a “bipartisan southern political bloc.”52  In 
1848, Yancey focused his efforts on removing the Cass doctrine of territorial sovereignty from 
southern political discourse and substituting the Calhoun common-property doctrine.  The 
Alabamian staunchly opposed any intimation that settlers in the Mexican Cession could 
determine the status of slavery.  Furthermore, he insisted that the federal government had the 
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obligation to protect slaveholders’ rights to take slaves into any territory.  Beginning in 
December 1847, Yancey and his Alabama associates began advocating their own doctrine on the 
slavery issue, which became known as the Alabama Platform.  He demanded that southerners 
refuse to vote for any presidential candidate who did not explicitly disavow any intention to 
interfere with slavery in the territories.53  More specifically, Yancey considered the Cass version 
of territorial self-government a fraud—essentially the Wilmot Proviso couched in language 
designed to deceive the southern populace.  The Alabama Platform, as crafted by Yancey and 
future Supreme Court Justice John A. Campbell, repudiated the presidential candidacy of Cass 
and his interpretation of self-government. 
Yancey and Campbell’s platform consisted of four statements that affirmed southern 
rights in the territories and, indeed, in the Union.  First, they denied congressional power to 
prohibit slavery in the territories. The second plank of the platform stipulated that the people of a 
territory could prohibit slavery only when drafting their constitution.  At any time prior to the 
conferral of statehood, slavery was protected by the federal constitution.  Though a territorial 
legislature could not exclude slavery, the platform did not expressly prohibit legislation such as 
slave codes.  Third, the platform instructed Alabama’s delegates to the Democratic national 
convention to withhold support for any candidate who refused to repudiate the Wilmot Proviso 
and the Cass doctrine.  Finally, in its most controversial plank, the platform dictated that the 
federal government had the obligation to protect the institution of slavery in the Mexican 
Cession.54  In sum, Yancey and Campbell had crafted the most proslavery statement of their time 
regarding slavery in the territories.   
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Yancey expressed the most comprehensive and vehement attack against the presidential 
candidacy of Cass and his version of territorial self-government of any southerner in politics.  He 
reminded his audience that Cass had once supported the Wilmot Proviso, speciously calling the 
Michigan senator a “leading advocate” of the infamous measure.55  Cass’s opinion that the 
Mexicans could determine the status of slavery for themselves, even before Americans had a 
chance to emigrate there, smacked of antislavery sentiment.  In assessing the character of the 
Mexican people, Yancey echoed the sentiments of Buchanan, who had argued that Mexicans 
would never allow slavery in their midst because to them, “as we are assured by the letters of 
Gen. Cass and Mr. Buchanan, ‘the negro does not belong socially to a degraded race.’”56 
The Alabama Platform received the unanimous approbation of the state’s Democratic 
convention in February 1848, after Yancey rose to give an impassioned speech in defense of 
southern rights in the territories and asserting that the Cass doctrine violated the Constitution.57  
Having discredited Cass and the doctrine of self-government, the crafty Alabamian revealed that 
his fellow southerners should rally around Supreme Court Justice Levi Woodbury of New 
Hampshire for the Democratic nomination.  Yancey claimed that Woodbury opposed “both 
federal and popular interference with slavery in the Territories, and that he believed that the 
people of a Territory could only legislate on a subject when they met to frame a constitution 
preparatory to admittance as a State into the Union.”58  Though Yancey and his close friend 
Senator Dixon Lewis had received private assurances from Woodbury that he opposed the 
Wilmot Proviso and the Cass doctrine, they could never seem to coax a public statement from 
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the justice.  Although considered a frontrunner for the nomination, Woodbury never mustered 
much support outside of the Deep South—and most of that came from the Yancey faction in 
Alabama.59 
The initial enthusiasm for the Alabama Platform and its bold defense of southern rights 
cooled after people realized that Yancey timed his pronouncement to damage the Cass campaign 
and advance the cause of Woodbury.60  Yancey intended to build his movement among those 
individuals who remained skeptical of Cass and the Nicholson letter.  A number of southerners 
viewed Cass, Dickinson, and other northern Democrats as, in the words of a Macon, Georgia, 
editor, “trimmers between downright Abolitionism, and the true Democratic States-Right 
doctrine.”61  Yancey relied on the groundswell of proslavery and expansionist sentiment in 
southern legislatures to advance the Alabama Platform.  Legislatures in Alabama, Georgia, 
Florida, and Virginia passed resolutions in the early months of 1848 insisting that the citizens of 
the states had a right to bring slaves into any new territory acquired from Mexico.62  On first 
impression, these resolutions seemed to discredit the Cass doctrine as they upheld the traditional 
southern conception of territorial self-government—that the people could permit or prohibit 
slavery when they drafted a state constitution. 
Yancey and his associates, however, miscalculated on two crucial points. In supporting 
Levi Woodbury for president, they rallied behind a candidate who refused to make public his 
views on the slavery question.  Woodbury drafted a letter on the slavery issue that, by 
comparison, made the Nicholson letter look crystal clear.  The Supreme Court justice penned 
broad platitudes of strict construction of the Constitution, but he equivocated on the issue of 
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slavery in the territories.63  More importantly, the Yanceyites underestimated the ability of 
moderate southern Democrats to craft their own interpretation of the Nicholson letter—or simply 
ignore Cass’s implication that territorial legislatures could regulate slavery.     
Southern Democrats desperate to hold their party together also took a perilous course of 
prevarication on the meaning of the Cass doctrine.  Northern Democrats, according to a New 
Orleans writer, had “almost en masse, come forward to sustain the constitutional rights of the 
South—to declare that Congress has no right to prescribe what social institutions the people of a 
territory shall or shall not have.”64  The correspondent, like many of his fellow Democrats, 
deferred comment on when the people could make their decision—or even which people could 
take part in the process.  In many respects, those individuals eager to restore party unity 
selectively read the Nicholson letter.  And Cass played along in lending a degree of mystery to 
its meaning.  When a Florida delegate to the Democratic National Convention asked for 
clarification on whether Cass believed that territorial legislatures possessed the right to permit or 
prohibit slavery, Cass “referred the Floridian to the Nicholson letter—the very document he had 
been asked to clarify.”65 
The debate over the meaning of the Cass doctrine gained added significance at the 
Democratic National Convention at Baltimore in May.  A palpable tension shrouded the 
convention, as two sets of New York delegates demanded recognition, a development that 
paralyzed the party’s business for several days as leaders sought desperately to achieve a 
compromise.  But the allies of Martin Van Buren—the Barnburners—would ultimately bolt from 
the convention.  At the same time, other state delegations maneuvered feverishly on behalf of 
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their preferred candidates for nomination.66  Yancey came ready for battle, as he intended to 
introduce his Alabama Platform on the convention floor.  The delegates took a step, however, 
that incensed Yancey and other southern ultras—they agreed to choose nominees for president 
and vice president before they agreed on a platform.  An apoplectic Yancey well understood the 
meaning of the development; his chances of advancing the Alabama Platform had markedly 
decreased.67  To his mind, the convention sought conciliation and compromise over principle.  
Delegates placed three candidates before the convention—Cass, Buchanan, and Woodbury, and 
on the fourth ballot they nominated Cass for the presidency.  In the balloting, the sixty-six year 
old Michigan senator carried all the states in the Old Northwest, five southwestern states, and 
Virginia.68 
With Cass’s nomination secured, the convention moved to draft a platform, but at a 
convention marred by the presence of dissent, especially the debacle over New York’s 
delegation, most delegates desired to craft a mild and conciliatory statement of Democratic party 
faith.  The platform committee drafted a document that reiterated the usual statements of 
platforms past.  On the slavery question, the platform took only the broadest stance, asserting 
that Congress had no power to interfere with slavery in the states and, in a glancing blow to the 
supporters of the Wilmot Proviso, “that all efforts of the Abolitionists or others made to induce 
Congress to interfere with the questions of slavery, or to take incipient steps in relation thereto,” 
threatened the Union.69  The platform made no mention of territorial self-government as the 
alternative to the Wilmot Proviso.  Yancey, already incensed by the nomination of Cass, 
immediately rose to protest the wording of the platform, which he argued imperiled southern 
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rights in the territories by its vagueness on the slavery question.  He would later write, “When 
Gen. Cass was nominated the great deed of wrong and injury to the South was consummated and 
could only have been alleviated by a bold and decided expression of constitutional principles on 
the part of the Convention.”70  But as Yancey must surely have recognized by the time the 
platform committee presented its work, few delegates spoiled for a fight over the slavery issue.  
Speaking for the minority of delegates unsatisfied with the platform’s indistinct stance on slavery 
in the territories, Yancey introduced an amendment designed to clarify the party’s position: 
“Resolved further, That the doctrine of non-interference with the rights of property of any 
portion of the people of this confederacy, be it in the States or Territories, by any other than the 
parties interested in them, be the true republican doctrine recognized by this body.”71 
 Yancey had again erred badly in proposing the poorly worded amendment to the 
platform, as it by no means clarified his position on the slavery question.  Members of the 
Virginia delegation rejected the ambiguous statement, maintaining that “Mr. Yancey’s 
amendment surrendered the very doctrine he had contended for,” the inability of territorial 
legislatures to prohibit slavery.72  Delegates from North Carolina and Georgia concurred.73  Even 
if one assumed Yancey’s intent to uphold the spirit of his Alabama Platform, John Slidell of 
Louisiana posited, the resolution “would rebuke the opinions of Gen. Cass, and be inconsistent 
with itself!”74  The delegates rejected the statement by a vote of 216-36, though five southern 
state delegations voted in favor of the amendment.75  A disgusted Yancey left the convention 
floor with a fellow Alabamian and the Florida delegation, an exhibition of political theater in the 
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face of the inevitable more than a serious protest of the convention’s actions.  The Democrats 
soon adopted the platform by a unanimous vote—in an effort to show party unity—and 
adjourned to celebrate their work. 
 As the Democrats left Baltimore with Lewis Cass as their presidential nominee, the 
Whigs journeyed to Philadelphia to nominate a candidate of their own.  Members of the Whig 
Party had criticized the Democrats and Cass for taking what they perceived as a duplicitous 
position on the slavery question.  Northern Whigs could argue that the Cass doctrine gave 
slavery a chance to expand to the Mexican Cession, whereas the Wilmot Proviso specifically 
forbade it.  The South, however, presented Whigs with a significant challenge.  In order to gain 
votes in the slave states, they had to field a candidate who would appear safer on the slavery 
issue than the northerner Cass.  The Whigs resolved on a two-front attack by nominating Zachary 
Taylor.  A career soldier whose political beliefs remained largely shrouded from public 
knowledge, Taylor seemed an ideal Whig candidate.  Northern Whigs could point to his 
distinguished military career, while southern Whigs could portray the Louisiana slaveholder as a 
southern man who would safeguard the institution of slavery.  A significant number of Whig 
stalwarts believed that Taylor “could give them what Jackson had given the Democrats two 
decades earlier: the domination of southern politics.”76 
 The southern Whigs used the Cass doctrine itself as the second weapon with which they 
fought the Democrats.  While northern Whigs interpreted the Cass doctrine to mean that settlers 
in the territories could establish slavery where it did not exist, southern Whigs argued that the 
Cass doctrine allowed the settlers to prohibit the institution, even before Americans could 
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emigrate west.  The argument bore striking resemblance to the Calhounite position, a similarity 
that blurred party lines and further complicated an already complex argument over the status of 
slavery in the Mexican Cession.  The Whigs, however, exposed their one weakness in their 
Philadelphia convention; they drafted no platform and made no statement on the issue of slavery 
in the territories.  They hoped that the appeal of Taylor as a military hero in the North and as a 
slaveholder in the South would suffice.  While the move made sense for the sake of party unity, 
it allowed Democrats to pillory their opposition for “Taylor’s cowardly silence.”77  Privately, 
Taylor had ridiculed the Democrats for their position on the expansion of slavery.  Before the 
Democratic convention, he wrote his former son-in-law Jefferson Davis, “Cass, Buchanan, & 
Dallas in defining their position in their letters addressed to the public in relation to [slavery in 
the territories], bid for the votes of the Slave holding portions of the Union; which I apprehend 
will have the effect to prevent the election” of any of the three.78  But the Whig Party’s silence 
on the slavery issue exposed them to attack from the opposition. 
Democrats and southern ultras alike pounced on the Whig Party’s lack of a platform.  
Even some Calhounites who opposed the Cass doctrine questioned Taylor’s stance.  Southern 
Democratic newspapers practically mocked the Whig offensive against Cass and territorial self-
government.  A Virginia editor assured the Whigs that “the whole Democracy of Virginia, and 
ourselves, are satisfied with the ticket that floats at our masthead.”79  Would the Whig nominee 
equally satisfy those who demanded a defense of southern rights, he asked?  A Charleston 
correspondent and Calhoun supporter wrote that some southerners inexplicably believed that 
neither the Wilmot Proviso nor territorial self-government would not endanger slavery in the 
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states, and “for anything that we know, Gen. Taylor may be one of these, and may not even be 
opposed to the Wilmot Proviso, as Gen. Cass professes to be.”80 
Regardless of the Whig Party’s lack of a definite stance on the slavery issue, southern 
Democrats faced inescapable problems surrounding the meaning and interpretation of the Cass 
doctrine.  Southern Whigs assailed the Democrats’ position as unclear at best and injurious to 
southern rights at worst.  In a lengthy speech on the Senate floor, Willie P. Mangum of North 
Carolina dismissed the Cass doctrine as a “manifest evasion.”81  He accused Cass of selling 
different versions of his doctrine to the North and the South in an effort to gain votes.  Mangum 
further charged the Cass campaign with distributing separate biographical sketches in both 
sections that differed subtly on issues relating to slavery in the territories.  “General Cass, in the 
‘Nicholson letter,’” Mangum concluded, “has evaded the only ‘real issue’ on this subject, and 
left the public wholly in the dark in regard to his opinions.”82 
Democrats scrambled to defend Cass against the Whig accusations and depict the 
Nicholson letter as a solid statement in favor of southern rights.  Southern Democrats seized on 
an important statement in the Nicholson letter; while Cass “concedes to the people of the 
territories the right to regulate the [slavery] question for themselves, he does it with the 
qualification ‘under the general principles of the constitution,’ and the ‘relations they bear to the 
confederacy.’”83  They could contend, therefore, that since the Constitution guaranteed equal 
protection to American citizens’ property, and since the territories belongs to the states as a 
whole, Cass’s “clear and palpable meaning” was to uphold the traditional southern formula for 
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legislating on slavery in the territories.84  The settlers could determine the status of slavery when 
they drafted a constitution and sought admission to the Union.  According to Cass’s most ardent 
southern supporters, no reasonable observer could contend that he meant otherwise.  In sum, any 
ambiguity in the Nicholson letter stemmed form interpretation of the clause “under the general 
principles of the constitution,” and far less so from his statements regarding when a territory 
could decide the slavery question.  The Constitution and its interpreters, which in the absence of 
a national consensus meant ultimately the Supreme Court, would dictate the terms of application 
for territorial self-government.  
Not all southern Democrats, however, could so easily dispatch with the questions 
surrounding the Nicholson letter.  Proslavery Democrats knew what they wanted the Cass 
doctrine to mean, but they did not fully grasp Cass’s true intentions.  The calculus of bisectional 
politics, which led parties to endorse one idea in the North and another in the South, had become 
injurious to the party system.  It utilized the obfuscation of political ideas to create intraparty 
unity.  The Democratic convention at Baltimore confirmed that the Democrats would play this 
most dangerous game.  Their strategy led northerners like James Tallmadge—the congressman 
whose amendment to the Missouri bill almost thirty years earlier inflamed sectional tensions—to 
assert that “Cass, had danced around the circle--& settled down, under a pledge to Slavery and 
Southern interests.”85  Conversely, southerners like Calhoun insisted that Cass’s stance “made 
concessions, which surrender everything, as far as territories are concerned; and in which the 
South cannot acquiesce without endangering her safety.”86 
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Southern Democrats desperately wanted to interpret the Cass doctrine as an affirmation 
of the long-held belief that a territory could permit or prohibit slavery when admitted to the 
Union.  “My own notion is that a Territorial Legislature while legislating as such and for the 
Territory and for territorial purposes has no right to pass a law prohibiting slavery,” a North 
Carolina politician wrote to Howell Cobb.  “Because if we adopt that doctrine we at once 
practically exclude the slaveholder forever.”87 Therein lay the problem for slaveholders, as 
Dobbin illustrated; if southerners had any chance at expanding slavery into the Mexican Cession 
under the American flag, they had to prevent the settlers already there from passing legislation 
once the region became American soil.  The Cass doctrine would not give southerners enough 
time to emigrate west before the antislavery settlers passed positive laws prohibiting slavery. 
The Mexican ban on slavery presented proslavery leaders with a quandary they had never 
before faced.  All of America’s major territorial acquisitions in the past included places where 
slavery existed and where slaveholders could emigrate without fearing for the legal status of their 
slaves.  Local control over slavery seemed less threatening to southerners when slaveholders 
lived in the territory.  But allowing for the possibility that antislavery Mexicans could determine 
the status of slavery in the Mexican Cession seemed patently unfair, if not unconstitutional, to 
many southerners.  Southerners would evaluate Cass and the Democrats—as well as the 
Whigs—on their ability to protect southern institutions and rights, a test that made the 
interpretation of territorial self-government all the more significant.  Absent a concrete definition 
of the Cass doctrine, southern Democrats could only resort to what northern and southern party 
members agreed upon—the “principle that Congress shall not legislate for new territories.”88  
Despite the fact that the Whigs had dodged the slavery question in their own convention and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 James C. Dobbin to Howell Cobb, June 15, 1848, in Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb, 108. 
88 Mobile Journal, quoted in Milledgeville Federal Union, June 13, 1848. 
 209	  
through the nomination of Taylor, party regulars pummeled the Democrats on the Cass doctrine.  
Particularly in the South, Whigs unceasingly exposed the inconsistency of the Democratic stand 
on slavery in the territories.  Virginia Whigs likened the Cass doctrine to a statement “that a 
territory is sovereign.”89  Other Whigs accused the Democrats of evading the real questions 
concerning the expansion of slavery.  According to them, Cass and the Democrats had crafted a 
platform that deferred the hard decisions concerning the status of slavery in the Mexican Cession 
to a later date.90 
In an effort to shore up southern support for Cass, Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois, a rising 
star in Democratic politics, embarked on an early summer tour of the South to rally the party 
faithful and to gauge southern support for Cass.  From Mississippi, he wrote the candidate a 
summary of his meetings with southern party leaders.  North Carolina, Douglas affirmed, would 
vote for Cass “unless Taylor should be nominated by the Whigs.”  South Carolina, as expected, 
seemed unlikely to go for the Democrats.  The news from Georgia and Alabama, however, 
seemed generally positive.  Alabama’s Democrats had repudiated the ultra politics of Yancey 
and fallen behind the nominee.  In Mississippi, “the Democrats are in the best of spirits & the 
Whigs give up the contest.”91  Douglas made no mention of Florida and Louisiana, two states 
where the Cass seemed in trouble.  In a rousing speech in New Orleans in early June, Douglas 
warned his fellow Democrats that Taylor’s election by no means guaranteed the protection of 
slavery.  The Whig candidate’s silence on issues surrounding slavery expansion and the Wilmot 
Proviso posed too much of a risk for southern voters.  Cass had made his stand clear, Douglas 
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implied.92  Douglas’s southern tour provided Cass with much needed information concerning 
how southerners had received his nomination and the principles of the Nicholson letter.  Yet 
Douglas ended his missive with the following cryptic warning: “Write no more letters.  The 
South are satisfied with your views on the slavery question, as well as others.”93  Perhaps 
Douglas meant Cass to read his words at face value, but perhaps too he meant to discourage the 
candidate from making any additional pronouncements that would further complicate the already 
difficult situation surrounding the interpretation of the Nicholson letter.   
During the summer of 1848 the issue of race and territorial self-government resurfaced, 
as a significant number of southerners raised objections to allowing the Mexican population to 
determine the status of slavery.  Interestingly, a northerner—James Buchanan—had first voiced 
concern over the nature of the Mexican-born settlers in the cession when he proposed extension 
of the Missouri Compromise line.  The discussion of how to settle the slavery issue in the 
Mexican Cession gained greater urgency with ratification of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 
May 1848 as partisans asked who should have the right to determine whether the institution 
would pass into the cession or stall in Texas.  “Shall the few ignorant Mexicans now living in the 
country have the power of excluding the Southern people from settling amongst them with such 
property, as they choose to carry with them,” a Columbus, Georgia, correspondent asked John C. 
Calhoun.94   
The argument of those individuals who questioned the Cass doctrine based on the ability 
of the Mexican population to prohibit slavery in the territorial phase assumed two forms.95  The 
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more benign, and less common, reasoning suggested that Congress should defer granting New 
Mexico and California an elected territorial legislature, allowing time for the people’s 
democratic instincts to “ripen.”96  Forty years before, of course, southerners had vehemently 
objected to the suggestions of northerners that the people of the Louisiana Purchase—including 
the foreign population—could not legislate for themselves.  But the settlers of the Louisiana 
territory posed no threat to the institution of slavery.  The native inhabitants of the Mexican 
Cession did not desire the extension of slavery into New Mexico and California. 
In its more common form, the debate assumed a more derogatory tone against the native 
population and its ability to participate in territorial governance.  One of Calhoun’s associates 
flatly stated, “Congress has no authority to give the right of voting in conquered territory to 
Indians, negroes, or mixed breeds, in making constitutions or laws to Govern.”97  In a blatant 
attempt to use the issue of race to repel voters from Cass and the Democrats, a Virginia Whig 
editor wrote that the Nicholson letter meant that the Mexican residents “can prohibit slavery and 
will do so, and in fact having as much authority to act as the people of the States, they may even 
prohibit the introduction of white people within their domain.”98  Allowing the residents of the 
Mexican Cession to assume sovereignty similar to that possessed by the states, the writer argued, 
would jeopardize the sovereignty of white Americans.  “Is this what Southern Democrats mean?  
Is it their object to establish a Black republic in our South Western border! [sic]  And is it for that 
reason, they are so enthusiastic for Cass?”99 
Southern Democrats responded to their critics by trying to assert that the Cass doctrine 
did not grant the power to legislate on slavery in the earliest stages of territorial existence.  A 
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Georgia Democrat sought to assuage his fellow southerners that the doctrine of “territorial 
sovereignty” did not mean that the “mixed races of New Mexico and California” had the power 
to prohibit slavery.100  Those who construed the Cass doctrine as a grant of sovereignty to the 
Mexican settlers failed to note the claim in the Nicholson letter that power would only be 
exercised “under the general principles of the constitution.”  Indeed, the Richmond Enquirer 
maintained, “the Nicholson letter was written to discuss the power of Congress to exclude 
Slavery in the Territories, and to show that Congress possessed no such power; it does not 
directly touch upon the powers of a Territorial Legislature over slavery.”101  
While southern and northern Democrats alike continued to finesse the meaning of Cass’s 
territorial sovereignty doctrine, a competing alternative to the Wilmot Proviso emerged in the 
Senate.  In the closing weeks of the first session of the Thirtieth Congress, the Whig Senator 
John M. Clayton of Delaware moved to form a select committee to settle the issues surrounding 
the problems surrounding Oregon and the Mexican Cession.  With Jesse Bright of Indiana, 
Daniel S. Dickinson, and Calhoun, the Clayton committee drafted a plan to establish territorial 
governments for Oregon, New Mexico, and California.  Under the Clayton Compromise, the 
prohibition of slavery enacted by Oregon’s provisional government would stand until the 
territorial legislature passed its own law either permitting or prohibiting the institution.  In 
essence, the Clayton Compromise established the principle of territorial sovereignty in 
Oregon.102  For New Mexico and California, however, the committee resolved on a much 
different course of action.  The bill prohibited the territorial legislatures from passing any law 
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permitting or prohibiting slavery.  Any slave brought into either territory would have the express 
right to sue for freedom in the territorial courts, with the ultimate right of appeal to the Supreme 
Court.  In other words, the Clayton Compromise left to the federal judiciary the decision of 
whether slavery could exist in the Mexican Cession.103  “Constitutionalization of the struggle 
over slavery in the territories had at last been pursued to its logical conclusion,” a historian of the 
period has argued.104 
The Clayton Compromise and the Cass doctrine of territorial sovereignty had much in 
common—a point that some contemporaries recognized.  By vesting final authority over the 
question of slavery in the Mexican Cession to the Supreme Court, Clayton’s bill meshed with 
Cass’s principle that territorial sovereignty had to follow the principles of the constitution.  A 
Virginian expressed his opinion that the Nicholson letter was “identical” with the Clayton 
Compromise.105  Georgia Whig and U.S. Senator John M. Berrien believed that the bill upheld 
the traditional southern interpretation of territorial sovereignty, thereby protecting southern 
rights.106  Indeed, most southerners who lent support to the Clayton bill echoed Berrien’s claim 
that by denying territorial legislatures the right to legislate on slavery, it upheld southern equity 
in the territories.107   
Though certainly not identical in form, the two plans for adjusting the slavery question 
certainly bore similarities.  First and most apparent, the Clayton bill established the principle of 
territorial sovereignty in Oregon.  Like Cass and the Democrats, the compromise equivocated on 
the issue in New Mexico and California.  By barring the territorial legislatures from enacting 
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laws permitting or prohibiting slavery, the Clayton bill silenced the cries of individuals who 
objected to the Mexican population exercising legislative power over the issue.  By deferring the 
decision of the legality of slavery to the courts, the plan essentially upheld Cass’s statement that 
any action on the slavery question had to conform to the Constitution.  Under the Clayton 
Compromise, the Supreme Court would almost certainly rule on the constitutional issues 
surrounding slavery in the territories. 
Northerners trembled at the thought that the Supreme Court, with its proslavery majority, 
would rule on the slavery question.  A New York editor called the plan “a perfect specimen of 
arrant political cowardice.”108  Antislavery northerners posited that the compromise opened the 
door for slavery by allowing slaveholders to enter and remain in the cession with their property 
until the courts ruled on the issue.  For that matter, few antislavery partisans seemed to trust that 
the courts would rule on their side.109  People from both sections saw a more ominous flaw in the 
Clayton Compromise, however.  Clayton’s plan assumed that either northerners or southerners 
would acquiesce in the decision of the Supreme Court as final and binding.  Given the 
superheated atmosphere surrounding the slavery issue, partisans in both sections questioned 
whether people on the losing side of the issue would accept the court’s decision.110   
The most decisive opposition to the Clayton Compromise, however, came from southern 
Whigs, especially a group of eight congressmen led by the diminutive Alexander Stephens of 
Georgia.  Whigs from the South raised objections to the Clayton bill on several grounds.  A 
Virginia Whig editor argued that the Supreme Court had already ruled that slavery could not 
exist in a free territory until it became a state, a position most clearly articulated by Henry 
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Clay.111  Beside the fact that the Clayton Compromise wrongly assumed that slavery could pass 
into the Mexican Cession without congressional legislation, it still places southerners at a 
disadvantage, according to a Tennessee Whig.  The bill unfairly forced southerners to engage in 
litigation to secure the right to carry slaves into the territory.  “This seems very much like 
legislating the South out of her rights,” the correspondent insisted.112  Stephens and his associates 
in the House of Representatives likewise contended that slavery in the Mexican Cession could 
exist only by congressional authority.113  David Outlaw, a Whig congressman from North 
Carolina, rejected the Clayton bill as a blow against southern rights.  “My impressions were 
against it,” he confided to his wife, “because I regard it as no compromise at all but a surrender 
of the whole territory to the North.”114   
All speculation on the Clayton bill, however, proved academic.  The legislation met with 
a fate similar to that of the effort to extend the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific Ocean.  
The Senate passed the bill by a vote of 33-22, but the House of Representatives killed the bill 
when Stephens introduced a motion to table the legislation.  Most observers believed that the 
compromise would fail for want of support among northern representatives.  But Stephens, 
Outlaw, and six other southern Whigs combined to oppose the bill.  The Clayton Compromise 
died by a vote of 112-97.  Had Stephens and his seven southern Whig colleagues voted yea, the 
Clayton Compromise might well have passed by the slimmest margin, but he took the occasion 
to defend his own peculiar understanding of the constitutional status of slavery in the 
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territories.115  Slavery, the Georgian insisted, could legally exist in a federal territory only by 
congressional fiat.  Stephens, too, feared that the Clayton bill jeopardized Taylor’s own stance on 
the slavery issue because some Democrats had endorsed the plan.116  So Stephens and seven 
other southern Whigs combined with all of the northern Whigs and over half of the northern 
Democrats to kill Clayton’s bill.117  The bitter debate over the Clayton Compromise showed yet 
again how the politics of slavery could blur, if not obliterate, party lines over the issue of the 
expansion of slavery. 
With the Clayton Compromise unceremoniously buried by the House of Representatives, 
both parties reverted to their established plans for dealing with slavery in the Mexican Cession.  
Democrats had to burnish their candidate’s reputation and his plan for territorial self-
government, especially among skeptical southerners.  Stephen Douglas’s warning that Taylor 
could defeat the southern Democrats appeared increasingly prescient, and other Democrats took 
notice.  “I hope the South will see that their interests require them to stand fast for our 
Candidate,” a northern Democrat wrote to a colleague.  “If he is defeated by their fault it seems 
to me there will not soon if ever be another national candidate.”118  The Whigs assaulted Cass 
and territorial sovereignty with renewed vigor, forcing southern Democrats to further bend the 
meaning of their candidate’s message.  A Virginia Whig journal accused Cass and his associates 
of using “bungling illustrations” to explain the meaning of the Nicholson letter.119  Democratic 
opponents struck back with complicated logic, arguing that the Whigs themselves had 
misconstrued Cass’s words when he wrote that “in the mean time,” presumably the point 
between territorial formation and admission to statehood, that the people of the territories should 
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manage their “internal concerns.”120  The Whigs failed to recall that the people themselves had 
no voice in selecting their territorial officers in the first grade of government, the Richmond 
Enquirer replied.  Furthermore, the Cass doctrine only meant to give territorial legislatures the 
power to regulate slavery, not to abolish it.   
Southern Democrats settled on two critical points in interpreting the meaning of territorial 
sovereignty.  First, they insisted that the power to establish or prohibit slavery existed only when 
a territory drafted its constitution and sought admission to the Union as a sovereign state.  
Second, Democrats concluded that territorial legislatures could only pass laws regulating slavery.  
Cass proposed to limit congressional authority to the creation of territorial governments and to 
allow territorial legislatures to pass laws regulating slavery as they saw fit, but the “power to 
regulate the institution of slavery, implies the existence of such an institution to be regulated, and 
is wholly distinct from, and by no means includes, the power to prohibit it.”121 
From Democrats in the South, Cass faced a confusing array of signals about his chances 
to carry the region.  His standing among southern Democrats reflected the uncertainty 
surrounding his position on the all-important slavery question.  Cass received a letter from a 
Jackson, Mississippi, correspondent urging him to support President Polk’s Oregon message, 
which advocated extension of the Missouri Compromise, if he had any hope of carrying the state.  
One Virginian, however, advised him to oppose the message in order to sway the state’s voters.  
An exasperated Cass sought clarification from Mississippi Senator Henry S. Foote, but found 
little hope of finding the true pulse of southern opinion.122  A Virginia representative expressed 
more favorable sentiments, assuring Cass that the South would give “generous support” to his 
campaign.  “All reflecting men, whose party bias does not overcome their devotion to their 
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country and the Union,” John Y. Mason wrote, “must see, and do see, that the association of the 
Democratic party, is now the only hope of the Union.”123 
The fire-eater Robert Barnwell Rhett, however, better captured the division in southern 
opinion on Cass.  Rhett dismissed “territorial sovereignty” as proposed by Cass and the 
Democrats.   The South Carolinian stated in a speech, “I feared, and I think I had reason to fear, 
that the Southern Democrats might be divided as to the rights of the South, by a portion of them 
supporting this doctrine.”124  While Cass loyalists in the South gamely declared, “neither in the 
Nicholson letter nor any where else, that we have seen, has [he] declared himself in favor of 
Territorial Sovereignty,” they simply could not shape public opinion in their favor.125  The 
attacks of southern Whigs, ultra states’ rights advocates, and, to a certain degree, the language of 
the Nicholson letter itself, proved crippling to the southern Democrats’ bid to prove their 
candidate would best protect the institution of slavery and southern interests in the west.  The 
statements of Democratic speechmakers that Cass had taken the “true Southern ground” on the 
slavery question failed to impress a sufficient number of southern voters.126  Alexander Stephens 
best characterized southern sentiment on the Cass candidacy.  “Shall it be said that the South can 
not trust their peculiar interest in the hands of a cotton and sugar planter of Louisiana, but they 
must look for a man in Detroit, who has not a feeling in common with them?”127 
In the end, Cass could not overcome the odds against him in the South.  His opponents 
had raised too many questions about his sincerity in protecting southern rights.  They had 
skillfully attacked the Nicholson letter and its doctrine of territorial sovereignty as unsound 
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policy for the South.  Territorial sovereignty, designed to placate northerners and southerners 
alike, had ended up proving a liability—a doctrine that inflamed antislavery and proslavery 
partisans while failing to rally a sufficient number of moderates on the slavery question.  Taylor 
won the national popular vote by 4.8 percent, while in the South he won by only 2.8 percent.128  
In the electoral vote, Cass carried seven southern states, while Taylor carried eight.  The Whigs 
proved strongest in the southeastern states, while Cass carried Texas, Missouri, Arkansas, 
Mississippi, and Alabama. Taylor did not succeed at peeling large numbers of southern 
Democrats from their traditional party alliances, but many Democratic stalwarts in the South 
stayed home on Election Day.129  Indeed, a significant number of Democrats stayed home on 
Election Day, pointing to the unpopularity of Cass.  Taylor, on the other hand, invigorated the 
southern Whig base especially.  Taylor gained more actual votes than had Henry Clay in 1844 in 
every southern state save Maryland.130  For a complex set of reasons, Cass and territorial 
sovereignty did not prevail in the politics of slavery. 
In the month before the election, two Democrats—a man from Cleveland and another 
from Louisiana—met aboard a steamboat traveling west from Buffalo.  On deck, the Cleveland 
man enthusiastically endorsed Cass as the right choice for president, ensuring his audience that 
the candidate opposed the extension of slavery and favored the Wilmot Proviso.  Puzzled at the 
Ohioan’s speech, the Louisianan replied, “We are both Cass men, sir, but I see you are 
advocating his election on wrong grounds.”  On the contrary, the man insisted, Cass’s Nicholson 
letter repudiated the Wilmot Proviso and protected southern interests in the territories.  With that, 
the discussion ceased.131  Cass and the Democrats played a dangerous game in 1848 and lost.  
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They tried to court voters in different sections of the Union by trying to obscure the implications 
and lend a double meaning to their own platform—the doctrine of territorial sovereignty.  To a 
certain degree, they deferred the decision on whether slavery would exist in the Mexican Cession 
to some future date, when the nation, or more likely, the Supreme Court, would have to decide 
the constitutional issues surrounding slavery in the territories.  True, the Whigs had scarcely 
done better, but Taylor’s silence on the slavery question actually helped his candidacy. 
Southern Democrats bitterly received news of their candidate’s defeat.  “Strange as it 
may seem,” a Georgia editor wrote, “although the victorious chief is a Southern man, yet the 
South is the vanquished party.”132  The southern endorsement of Taylor would prove “a suicidal 
policy.”133  Taylor would finally have to break his silence on the slavery question, which would 
prove whether southerners had rightly placed their trust in one of their own.  While Cass 
emerged defeated from the election of 1848, no one knew whether his doctrine of territorial 
sovereignty would reemerge as an alternative to the Wilmot Proviso or whether the election had 
killed it, too. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




SLAVERY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE MEXICAN CESSION:  
THE CRISIS OF 1849 AND THE COMPROMISE OF 1850 
 
 
 Lewis Cass and the Democrats took considerable time licking the wounds they received 
at the hands of the triumphant Whig Party in November 1848.  On the surface, the electorate had 
repudiated the doctrine of territorial sovereignty and the efforts of Democrats to prove 
themselves safe on the slavery question.  Zachary Taylor, a Louisiana slaveholder and hero of 
the Mexican War, received sufficient support from the Whigs to overcome indignant antislavery 
opposition and ascend to the presidency.  He won election not by standing on an ambiguous 
platform, but by endorsing no platform at all.  Whig pundits accused Cass and the Democrats of 
crafting an indecisive and evasive campaign message regarding the Wilmot Proviso and slavery 
in the territories, but Taylor’s Whigs revealed nothing about their ideas, leaving many wondering 
if Taylor had a plan at all. 
 While citizens puzzled over the president-elect’s potential course, the seemingly 
inexorable debate over slavery in the Mexican Cession continued to trouble the national councils.  
With possession of the cession secured and people both within the territory and in the states 
clamoring for the extension of American law and institutions over the Mexican lands, leaders 
perceived the gravity of the situation in the West and the need to settle the slavery issue.  Under 
Mexican law, however, slavery did not exist anywhere in the cession except the institution of 
peonage, which little resembled the institution that existed in the American South.1  In the 
Mexican system, peons technically contracted themselves to their master for a meager wage.  In 
practice, however, the institution effectively bound peons and their issue into a labor relation 
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similar to that of slavery.    Antislavery and proslavery partisans argued over whether the 
Mexican law prohibiting slavery prevailed under American rule, as antislavery politicians 
posited, or if slavery followed the flag, as proslavery leaders like John C. Calhoun insisted. 
 The slavery debate that had raged during the election year continued into the lame duck 
second session of the Thirtieth Congress.  In the antebellum era, Congress met in a short winter 
session, which in an election year meant that Congress met in between the election and seating of 
its successor body.  The situation became even stranger in a presidential election year, when the 
president remained in office for almost four months after the election of his successor.  
Accordingly, in December 1849 President James K. Polk sent his final message to Congress, 
chiding the legislators for failing to provide territorial governments for California and New 
Mexico and encouraging them to act promptly lest conditions deteriorate in the West.  Polk 
lamented that the slavery issue had delayed the erection of territorial governments.  Indeed, the 
president argued, “no duty imposed on Congress by the Constitution requires that they should 
legislate on the subject, while their power to do so is not only seriously questioned, but denied by 
many of the soundest expounders of that instrument.”2  Polk maintained that Congress should not 
intervene in the slavery issue, leaving the matter to the territories themselves when they drafted 
state constitutions.  Instead, they had insisted on debating the matter in Congress while leaving 
the territories of the Mexican Cession unsettled and without government.  Congress had to act, 
Polk insisted, most preferably by organizing territories out of the vast cession and leaving the 
matter of slavery alone.  
 California quickly emerged as the jewel of the Mexican Cession—a vast, fertile territory 
of immense natural resources and strategic importance to the newly continental nation.  In his 
message to Congress, Polk had recognized the incalculable value of California to the nation.  
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Almost two years earlier, settlers had found gold at Johann Sutter’s mill along the banks of the 
American River, provoking an astonishing influx of prospectors who moved west to find 
wealth.3  New Mexico, on the other hand, seemed far less impressive—a territory dominated by 
cattle grazing and the ages-old Spanish seigneurial system of agriculture, a situation by no means 
suited for plantation agriculture.4   
Slavery could never flourish in the Mexican Cession, a Virginia minister wrote, because 
of the land, the climate, and the inhabitants who would almost surely prohibit slavery by their 
territorial laws and constitution.5  An army officer visiting New Mexico in 1846 had observed 
that the “profits of labor are too inadequate for the existence of negro slavery.”6  In California, 
some believed that the gold rush would work against the expansion of slavery.  Not only did the 
influx of white laborers to the gold mines seemingly militate against the use of slave labor, but 
the hostility of the native Mexicans as well as the whites emigrating to the region placed 
slaveholders at a disadvantage.  Emigrants from the free states almost assuredly would tip the 
balance in favor of a free California, long before Congress would act on the subject.7  Though 
slaves might well prove excellent mine laborers, Georgia politician Wilson Lumpkin stated, 
slaveholders would not “under existing circumstances run the risque of loosing [sic] the slaves.”8  
Unless Congress could provide some sort of protection for slave property in the Mexican 
Cession, significant southern emigration seemed unlikely.  What slaveholder would want to 
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move west, many observers asked, especially since the land seemed unfit for plantation 
agriculture. 
Southerners demanded equal rights in the national domain regardless of whether slavery 
would or would not thrive there.  For antislavery followers who believed that slavery could never 
exist profitably in the region, the question of the expansion of slavery to the Mexican Cession 
seemed an abstract notion dreamed up by ultra southerners seeking to augment their power in the 
nation.  Their increasing hatred of the institution, however, led them to make a stand against its 
expansion.  Conversely for southerners, the question of the profitable existence of slavery in the 
cession itself seemed abstract.  They sought to secure their rights in the face of what they deemed 
an onslaught against their peculiar institution and their section.  Moderate Democrats like Polk, 
James Buchanan, and Lewis Cass had sought to avert a battle over the issue by brokering a 
compromise or a suitable arrangement by which northerners and southerners alike could save 
face and protect their interests.  With the electoral defeat of the Democrats in 1848 and the 
apparent repudiation of territorial sovereignty, the nation looked to the Congress and the 
president-elect for the next step.  Congress, however, would have the first chance to act. 
The cries from individuals on both sides of the issue did not dissipate with the election of 
Taylor.  Proslavery politicians continued to accuse northerners of attempting to deprive the 
South, in the words of Texas Democrat Louis T. Wigfall, of “the common conquest and 
purchase” of the Mexican Cession.9  Southerners could not predict the course that Taylor would 
take with regard to the slavery issue, however, a point that betrayed the fact that some questioned 
the proslavery credentials of Louisiana’s favorite son.  “Unless they can show a united and bold 
front,” a northern observer predicted, “it is generally thought Gen. Taylor will go against 
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them.”10  Southerners like Andrew Jackson Donelson, the nephew of Old Hickory, could only 
express hope that Taylor would adopt a compromise proposal similar to the Clayton 
Compromise or endorse the Cass doctrine by allowing the territories themselves to settle the 
matter for themselves.11 
Many political spectators, however, predicted that while Taylor would not openly 
endorse the Wilmot Proviso, neither would he veto it.  Even some southern Whigs had begun to 
question their leader’s resolve on the slavery issue.12  Nevertheless, southerners remained badly 
divided over the slavery issue.  Calhoun’s efforts to create a southern caucus in Congress and 
issue an address to the southern people to promulgate his opinions on settling the slavery issue 
had foundered amid the familiar divide between southern moderates and ultras.13  Vice President 
George M. Dallas observed the proceedings of the southern caucus, noting that Calhoun seemed 
unable to convince many of his colleagues of adopting an ultra southern stance that even hinted 
at the prospect of disunion over the slavery issue.14 
Calhoun’s effort to rally the South failed while Congress took a moderate course, 
renewing deliberations over establishing territorial governments in California and New Mexico.  
At the beginning of the congressional session, Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois introduced 
a bill that organized the entire Mexican Cession into one giant state of California, thereby 
bypassing the territorial stage.15  Though he had served in Congress for only four years—two 
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terms in the House of Representatives before the Illinois state legislature elected him senator—
Douglas had earned a reputation as an ardent supporter of westward expansion.  He also had 
come to endorse the doctrine of territorial self-government.  In the current session of Congress, 
the Illinoisan had considered taking a more orthodox approach, providing separate bills creating 
the territories of California and New Mexico.  Douglas became convinced, however, that any 
territorial bill would fail because of the prevailing atmosphere in Congress.   In order to organize 
the cession, he concluded, Congress had to grant immediate statehood and let the people of the 
Mexican Cession decide for themselves the status of slavery within their constitution.  The 
senator almost certainly knew that he proposed a state of unwieldy size; therefore, his bill 
provided that in the future, Congress could create additional states out of the land that lay east of 
present-day California.16   
Douglas’s ingenious plan addressed the political realities of the day while fulfilling his 
ultimate goal of extending American law and institutions over the Mexican Cession.  Most 
significantly, the Douglas bill provided for self-government but rendered moot the discussion of 
when a territory could exercise its sovereignty over the slavery issue.  Practically everyone 
agreed that a state possessed the right to determine the status of slavery in its constitution.  The 
Douglas plan preserved the best part of the Cass doctrine by removing the issue of slavery from 
congressional deliberation, while it jettisoned the vexing question of when a territory gained the 
right to legislate on slavery. 
Though Douglas’s bill might have appealed to those looking for a way to organize the 
cession without renewing the contentious debate over slavery, southern senators soon raised 
objections.  Douglas knew that his bill faced an uphill battle in the Senate, and almost 
insurmountable opposition in the House of Representatives.  The Illinois senator hoped to 
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commit the bill to his own Committee on Territories, where it would receive a favorable reading.  
Georgia Senator John M. Berrien outfoxed his northern colleague by using a parliamentary 
maneuver to derail the legislation.  He reminded Douglas that the Judiciary Committee, which he 
chaired and which he knew would resist the bill, traditionally received statehood bills.  Berrien 
won his point, and within four weeks the Judiciary Committee had issued an unfavorable report 
on the Douglas bill.  The legislation, according to the committee, proposed to create a state out of 
a vast territory sparsely inhabited by people unfamiliar with American institutions and “unfitted” 
to assume the burden of self-government.17  Given the present circumstances, statehood for 
California seemed a poor idea. 
Douglas could only stand by as a combination of northern and southern radicals 
dismantled his effort to organize the Mexican Cession and remove the slavery issue from 
congressional deliberation.  Simply put, he stood between two sides that did not especially desire 
to close the debate on slavery in the territories.  Northerners remained committed to extending 
the Wilmot Proviso—or at least its spirit—over the western territories.  The radical southerners, 
on the other hand, advanced a new argument in their efforts to protect what they perceived as 
southern rights in the territories.  Whereas in the past (most notably in the Louisiana Purchase) 
southerners had ridiculed northerners who insisted on a period of “territorial pupilage,” where 
the foreign residents of a territory could become Americanized, they now insisted that the native 
Mexicans could not govern themselves.  Beneath this explanation of why Congress should delay 
California statehood, however, southerners protested that they had not been given sufficient time 
to emigrate west themselves and influence the governance of the cession. 
Certain political leaders observed that ultras on both sides of the slavery issue had 
maneuvered against Douglas’s bill in an effort to gain advantage on the slavery question.  Vice 
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President Dallas lambasted the southern members of the Senate Judiciary Committee.  The 
committee’s argument that the “people of New Mexico & California are too barbarous,” he 
confided to his diary, “seem to me mere spurious pretexts, devised by an acute and ingenious 
mind in order to keep those territories open to Slavery.”18  Indeed, Dallas sensed the true purpose 
behind the opposition to the Douglas bill.  In a conference with President Polk, Calhoun had 
frankly admitted that southerners opposed California statehood because slaveholders had been 
denied the opportunity to emigrate to the region with their slaves.  He conceded, too, that 
California would certainly enter as a free state, which rankled southerners who viewed the entire 
statehood movement as a northern plot to prevent the expansion of slavery.  The president 
reminded Calhoun that the people themselves possessed the right to determine the status of 
slavery, but such reasoning would not suffice for the South Carolinian, who believed that the 
equal rights of slaveholders in the territories merited federal protection.19 
Douglas would have to compromise on the terms of his bill if California statehood would 
have any chance of passing through Congress in early 1849.  He lacked southern support both in 
Congress and in the court of public opinion.  “No man can be blind to the fact,” a Georgia editor 
wrote, “if called on to form a State Constitution now, the people of California will exclude 
slavery.  In doing this, they will also fix the fate of New Mexico.”20  Though Calhoun had failed 
to rally sufficient support for his Southern Address, a significant number of southerners agreed 
with his contention that the Douglas plan excluded southern slaveholders from having a stake in 
the future of the Mexican Cession.  The Polk administration saw great benefit in admitting 
California as a state by bypassing the territorial stage, but the president and his advisers 
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considered the size of the state as proposed by Douglas as prohibitively large.  Better to secure 
statehood for California alone, the cabinet concluded, and defer deliberations on New Mexico for 
a later date.  Of course, separating New Mexico from California forsook one of the benefits of 
the original Douglas plan—by organizing the entire cession as one state, the bill had the potential 
to neutralize the debate over slavery in the territories. Nevertheless, Polk prevailed on a reluctant 
Douglas to amend his bill.21   
The revised legislation provided for the immediate admission of California and the 
delayed admission of New Mexico, almost certainly a nod to the fact that California would enter 
as a free state.  By delaying statehood for New Mexico, however, southerners could theoretically 
gain a foothold in the territory.  For a fleeting moment, passage of the amended bill seemed 
possible.22  Supporters lauded the effort of Douglas to extend self-government to the Mexican 
Cession.  “We go for the principle of non-intervention,” the Washington Union declared, “We 
cannot obtain it in the territorial form.  We must, then, seek it in the form of States—leaving the 
people themselves to frame their own constitution, and to seek admission into the Union as 
States.”23  The Union’s editor characterized precisely the motives behind the Douglas bill.  The 
Illinois senator recognized that the Cass doctrine of territorial sovereignty had failed to unite the 
Democratic Party because of the vexing issue of when a territory could exercise sovereignty.  
Indeed, while Cass had initially suggested in the Nicholson letter that territorial legislatures 
could pass laws permitting or prohibiting slavery, the Democrats faced a firestorm of opposition 
from southern party regulars who argued that “squatter sovereignty” would allow the native 
Mexicans to prohibit slavery in California and New Mexico before Americans could emigrate 
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west.  By bypassing the territorial phase and admitting California and New Mexico as states, 
Congress could obviate the difficulty over when a territory could legislate on slavery while 
preserving the right of the people to settle the matter when drafting a constitution.  
Though southerners had rejected the superheated rhetoric of Calhoun’s Southern Address 
and veiled threats of disunion, they nonetheless felt threatened by northern encroachment on 
slavery and westward expansion.  In this atmosphere of fear over antislavery attempts to deny 
southerners equal rights in the territories, they renewed their opposition to the Douglas bill.  
“The bill assumes that it is a mere point of honor for which the South is contending, and not for 
an actual bona-fide participation in the territory,” an associate wrote to Georgia congressman 
Howell Cobb.  “Be that as it may, the question is will even the point of honor or equality be 
saved by a practical surrender of the whole territory to the North.”24  The Douglas bill, to the 
minds of southerners, did not settle the territorial issue in an equitable manner.  Furthermore, it 
sanctioned the vote of native Mexicans in deciding whether California and New Mexico would 
become free or slave states, a point that southerners would not abide.   
Territorial self-government received a new name at the latest juncture of the debate over 
slavery in the territories as politicians began to refer to the doctrine as non-intervention.  
Traditionally, non-intervention had meant simply that Congress would not involve itself in 
matters concerning slavery in the territories.  The concept of territorial self-government, or 
territorial sovereignty, represented the corollary to non-intervention.  Conceivably Congress 
could decline to interfere with slavery in the territories, but not specify who could determine its 
status or when.  In other words, congressional non-intervention could allow for the practice of 
territorial sovereignty.  In the past, however, congressional non-intervention had always meant 
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territorial sovereignty in practice.25  Because in past history Congress had always paired non-
intervention with territorial sovereignty and perhaps, also, to avoid the debate over when or if a 
territory possessed sovereignty, people began referring to territorial sovereignty as non-
intervention in contemporary parlance. 
Even the revised Douglas bill for California statehood deftly avoided the contentious 
territorial phase, thereby providing a way to remove the slavery issue from Congress while 
organizing the cession.  Southern senators, however, continued to rebuff the amended legislation 
as injurious to the interests of their section.  A group of southern Whigs in the House of 
Representatives had closely followed the deliberations across the Capitol and latched onto the 
idea of immediate statehood as an ingenious way to solve the territorial crisis.  They especially 
wanted to settle the issue before Taylor took office.  Polk and Douglas sold their plan to southern 
Whigs as a way to defuse the explosive Wilmot Proviso and secure southern rights in name, even 
if not in practice.  Most everyone surmised that California would enter the Union as a free state 
regardless of any plan in Congress.  The Douglas plan, however, effectively killed the debate 
over the Wilmot Proviso.  If the Democrats and southern Whigs could unite behind the Douglas 
bill, moderation would prevail and Congress could hopefully dispense with the slavery issue.26 
With Douglas’s bill mired in contentious Senate negotiations, the proponents of 
immediate statehood looked to Virginia Whig congressman William Ballard Preston to introduce 
legislation in the lower house.  The Preston bill borrowed the language of Douglas’s original 
legislation by admitting the entire cession as a single state of California.  Speaking for the 
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moderate Whigs and Democrats, Preston entreated his colleagues to give careful consideration to 
his bill; legislation he argued would settle the long-standing crisis over slavery in the territories 
by letting the people of California draft their constitution and select their own institutions as they 
saw fit.  Preston mocked the notion that the people of California could not erect their own 
government and therefore needed a period of “territorial tutelage.”  Illustrating the stakes 
involved in delaying the organization of California, Preston thundered, “Tutelage!  You, in the 
great day and great hour of this question—are you to stop, like a mere pedagogue, to teach New 
Mexico and California the A B C of political liberty, while the destruction of an empire and a 
government might learn you the last lesson of its overthrow?”27   
Supporters of the Preston bill rallied for the principle of non-intervention.  Quoting the 
words of James Madison in the Missouri crisis, Democrat James McDowell of Virginia said, 
“The right of Congress to control the territories being given from the necessity of the case and in 
suspension of the great principle of self-government, ought not to be extended further nor 
continued longer than the occasion might fairly require.”28 McDowell endorsed the Preston bill 
as a sure way of ensuring southern rights while upholding the principle of non-intervention.   As 
for Preston himself, he represented the sentiments of those who had grown weary of the 
incessant turmoil over the Wilmot Proviso.  “I want repose,” Preston exclaimed, “and the bill 
now offered gives finality to the question.  I want the question ended.”29  
Though the moderates desired a speedy resolution of the territorial issue, northern Whigs 
and southern ultras would not let the matter rest.  Southern Democrats voiced opposition to the 
Preston bill as the Wilmot Proviso cloaked in the mantle of compromise.30  Some even 
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maintained that the continued agitation of the slavery question only benefited the Democratic 
Party in the South.31  Southern ultras repeated their claims that immediate statehood would allow 
Indians, blacks, and native Mexicans to deny Americans the right to carry their slaves into the 
cession.32  Preston’s most intractable opposition came from northern Whigs who insisted that 
Congress apply the Wilmot Proviso to the Mexican Cession.  Two last-minute amendments, one 
of which added the Proviso to the bill, derailed his efforts to avoid the issue.  With the intent of 
the bill destroyed, not one member of the House voted for passage.  The original bill never came 
up for a vote.  The lame duck Congress would pass no legislation for California or New Mexico 
statehood, leaving the issue for the next Congress and the new president.  The slavery issue 
would continue to threaten the stability of the Whig Party, just as it stood poised to claim the 
presidency for only the second time in the party’s brief existence.33 
The Whigs had failed in their efforts to settle the slavery issue before Zachary Taylor 
took the presidential oath of office.  The efforts of congressional moderates to solve the crisis 
had failed in spite of their efforts to broker a settlement in the last days of the session.  All eyes 
fixed on the new president for some clue, some direction as to how he would settle the Wilmot 
Proviso controversy.  Taylor’s speech gave them nothing; in his “exceptionally brief and 
bafflingly vague” inaugural address, the new president gave no indication of the course he would 
take on the slavery in the territories; indeed, he made no explicit mention of the issue.34  
Surveying the new administration, former president John Tyler wrote to his eldest son, “For the 
settlement of our territorial difficulties we must look to the territories themselves.  They must 
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organize governments for themselves as Congress will not do so for them.”35  Tyler, too, had no 
indication of what the new president might do with regard to the situation in California and New 
Mexico. 
Within the month, however, Taylor had settled on a plan for organizing the Mexican 
Cession.  Working closely with Kentucky Governor John J. Crittenden and other Whig 
associates, Taylor decided that the substance of the Preston bill provided the best means of 
allaying sectional tensions.  The administration, however, would circumvent Congress by taking 
action through the executive branch.  Crittenden urged the administration to send emissaries to 
California, New Mexico, and Deseret (present-day Utah) in order to urge the citizens in each 
territory to organize governments and draft constitutions.  The Taylor plan possessed great 
promise, as it organized the entire Mexican Cession into three states of large, but not 
unmanageable size, thus removing one of the complaints against both the Douglas and Preston 
bills.  Furthermore, with the entire cession organized, no American territory would remain where 
the status of slavery had not been previously determined.  The policy, too, upheld the twin 
principles of non-intervention and self-government as the best means of settling the slavery 
dispute.  The people in the three territories would determine the status of slavery for themselves, 
not distant members of Congress.36 
Taylor’s plan may have seemed an inventive proposal for organizing the Mexican 
Cession, but he either ignored or failed to recognize that his plan bore too many similarities to 
the aborted Douglas and Preston bills to gain the approbation of Congress and the public.  The 
president had anticipated difficulty with Congress and therefore bypassed the legislative branch 
by sending agents west to prod the residents of the cession to act on their own, but he 
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misunderstood the nature of southern public opinion against the mélange of American settlers—
squatters to the minds of southerners—and native Mexicans drafting constitutions and seeking 
admission to the Union before southerners themselves could enter the territories.  Opposition to 
the Taylor project would only grow and deepen over the spring and summer of 1849.37 
Taylor’s stance toward the Wilmot Proviso intensified southern opposition to his plan for 
admitting California and New Mexico to statehood, as a growing number of southern politicians 
recognized that the president would not veto the antislavery statement.  Taylor himself dismissed 
the possibility that the proviso would even reach his desk; his plan for immediate statehood 
would obviate the need for any such antislavery dictum.  His belief that Congress would never 
send him the proviso revealed his certainty that slavery would never take root in the Mexican 
Cession.  The president had kept quiet on his opinions regarding slavery in the cession through 
the first few months of his administration, but in the summer of 1849 he took a northern tour in 
which he revealed his opinions on slavery in the territories.  In a speech given at Mercer, 
Pennsylvania, in late August, Taylor declared, “The people of the North need have no 
apprehension of the further extension of slavery.”38  For southerners already skeptical of the 
president’s beliefs on the slavery question, the northern tour—and especially his antislavery 
pronouncement at Mercer—confirmed their worst suspicions.  “It explained the purpose of 
King’s mission to California and placed the man whom they had promised would never betray 
his fellow slaveholders squarely against slavery expansion.”39  For the interests of Whig party 
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unity as well as the bipartisan hopes for a calm, considered settlement to the slavery question, 
Taylor’s remarks proved disastrous.  For southern Democrats, Taylor’s actions confirmed the 
campaign rhetoric better than they could have dreamed.  If the southern states had rallied behind 
Lewis Cass, Tennessee Congressman Andrew Johnson stated, he would have won election and 
“then all would have been safe.”40 
Even before Taylor’s summer tour, proslavery and antislavery advocates had commenced 
making preparations for a battle over the slavery issue.  Calhoun’s unsuccessful southern rights 
movement, which culminated in the pronouncement of his Southern Address, may not have 
united the South behind a non-partisan proslavery banner, but southerners continued to look 
warily at northern movements on slavery in the territories.  A number of southern state 
legislatures and citizens’ organizations issued resolutions condemning the Wilmot Proviso and 
asserting southern rights in the newly acquired territories.41  They affirmed that the right to 
prohibit slavery belonged, in the words of the Missouri General Assembly, “exclusively to the 
people thereof, and can only be exercised by them in forming their Constitution for a State 
government, or in their sovereign capacity as independent States.”42  Of course, if Taylor’s plan 
for immediate statehood for California and New Mexico succeeded, the very beliefs of 
southerners who insisted that territories could exercise their sovereignty to prohibit slavery only 
when drafting a constitution would result in the creation of two new free states.  As Georgia 
Senator Herschel V. Johnson commented, the Taylor plan would prove nothing less than “a 
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circuitous mode of cheating the South out of her rights and gaining the object of the 
Provisoists.”43 
With the Whig difficulties arising from the president’s actions regarding the Wilmot 
Proviso, Democrats took the offensive on the slavery issue and renewed their call for non-
intervention and territorial sovereignty.  The Washington Union, the official Democratic 
newspaper, led the call in the press for replacing the Taylor plan with the sound Democratic 
doctrine of territorial sovereignty.  “We propose the ground of NON-INTERVENTION; by which we 
mean that Congress shall abstain from all legislation in relation to the subject of slavery in the 
new territories; leaving it to the people of the territories themselves to make the necessary 
provision for their eventual admission into the Union, and to regulate their internal concerns in 
their own way.”44  The latest pronouncements for territorial self-government marked a subtle 
retreat from the Cass doctrine, which most people agreed provided for territorial legislatures to 
determine the status of slavery.  In the latest discussions over slavery in the territories, however, 
the issue of when a territory had the right to “regulate their internal concerns” became murky.  
According to its supporters, non-intervention retained the promise to extricate Congress from 
jurisdiction over the dreaded slavery issue, while returning the nation to its first principles of 
popular sovereignty and consent of the governed.  In the case of the Mexican Cession, according 
to Thomas Ritchie of the Union, the doctrine left to the courts all matters concerning the 
prohibition of slavery in the territories—essentially the aim of the Clayton Compromise of 1848, 
which would have given the Supreme Court the ultimate authority to adjudicate the slavery issue. 
Democrats maintained that they had provided a safe way to dispose of the slavery 
question in 1848, but southerners had chosen one of their own rather than to entrust the safety of 
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slavery to an outsider.  Now the president, a southern slaveholder, had inexplicably abandoned 
their interests in the territories.  Southern Democratic politicians reminded their constituents that 
in the 1848 presidential contest “the Northern Democracy proved true to Southern interests,” but 
now northerners had become wary of extending a hand of friendship across the Mason-Dixon 
Line.45  Northern Democrats had endorsed the Cass doctrine at considerable danger to their own 
electoral prospects at home, only to see southerners rebuff their overtures.46  Nevertheless, 
Democrats hoped to renew the enthusiasm for non-intervention and territorial sovereignty, 
especially with the increasing dissatisfaction toward the Taylor administration among 
southerners.  In 1848, Democrats had unsuccessfully defined territorial sovereignty as a 
bisectional compromise designed to unify the party and neutralize the Wilmot Proviso, but the 
party failed to convince either southerners or antislavery northerners of the doctrine’s 
sufficiency.  In 1850, moderate northern Democrats such as Lewis Cass and Daniel Dickinson 
renewed the effort to establish territorial sovereignty as national policy.  This time, however, 
they worked especially hard at convincing southerners that electing one of their own versus 
voting for the safety of slavery by upholding non-intervention had cost them dearly.  Once again, 
the South became center stage in the debate over territorial sovereignty. 
Cass himself entered the political dialogue once again by defending the doctrine he had 
advanced in the Nicholson letter almost two years before.  The former Democratic presidential 
candidate, who had returned to the Senate in March 1849, accused his opponents of resorting to 
“inconsistency, amounting to dishonesty” in order to discredit his concept of territorial 
sovereignty.47  Those who maintained the constitutionality of the Wilmot Proviso, he argued, 
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must also believe that Congress possessed the power to “direct all the internal territorial 
legislation at its pleasure, without regard to the will of the people affected by it.”48  Drawing 
from classic Jacksonian principles, Cass denied both suppositions.  The Wilmot Proviso, 
according to Cass, was patently unconstitutional.  Furthermore, the idea that Congress could 
dictate local laws for territories or states denied the nation’s very heritage.  Americans had risen 
in revolution against the British because the mother country refused to let the colonies rule their 
own internal concerns.  Had the United States government created its own colonial system in the 
West that it could rule at its own will, Cass asked rhetorically.  “This dispute divided one 
empire,” he proclaimed.  “Let us take care that a similar assumption does not divide another.”49 
Cass’s defense of non-intervention and territorial sovereignty resonated with moderates 
on the slavery issue, even if the Michigan senator assiduously avoided the question of when the 
territories gained sovereignty.  By hearkening to the nation’s revolutionary heritage, Cass sought 
to give the Democratic Party’s doctrine added legitimacy.  Southern Democrats who rallied 
behind the Cass banner in 1848 lamented that their candidate had not taken the White House.  
They had missed their opportunity to unite with sympathetic northerners and secure the safety of 
slavery in the West.  In an aspersion directed at the president the editor opined, “The South. . . 
has been betrayed, and basely betrayed, and that too by her own sons.”50 
Yet in the face of the bellicose pronouncements of ultra proslavery and antislavery 
leaders, northern Democrats like Cass and Daniel S. Dickinson rallied once again in favor of 
territorial sovereignty.  Soon after Cass issued his letter to Thomas Ritchie defending the 
principles he outlined in the Nicholson letter, Dickinson moved to galvanize his New York 
supporters to make another attempt at instituting his favored doctrine.  Like Cass, Dickinson 
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appealed to the nation’s revolutionary heritage in a bid to win the support of recalcitrant 
northerners who threatened to give up compromise with the South.  Territorial sovereignty, 
Dickinson reminded his audience, upheld the right of self-government while rejecting the 
“tyrannical precedent of that living compound of scrofula and gold-lace, called George III.”51  
Dickinson, who had always taken a stronger position on the territorial sovereignty issue than had 
Cass, argued that the people of the territories possessed the same sovereignty as the residents of 
the states.  Surely American citizens did not lose their right of self-government merely by virtue 
of emigrating to the territories, Dickinson maintained.  The New York senator, however, 
offended southerners who believed that the North had conspired to prevent southerners from 
sharing in the common conquest of the Mexican Cession by concluding that the people of 
California had already decided against slavery, and that the people of the states must respect their 
decision as final and binding. 
Southerners derided the process by which California seemed poised to draft an 
antislavery constitution, but they had become resigned to the fact that they could do little about 
it. “We admit the right of a people in forming a State Constitution to establish or eschew 
slavery,” Herschel Johnson reasoned.  “Then, ought we to oppose and how?”52 Southerners 
agreed that they could not stand idly by as California became a free state, and New Mexico 
seemed ready to follow suit.  They did not concur on how to oppose the movement.  Some 
southerners, like Johnson, seemed puzzled at how to oppose a free state constitution for 
California when the South had always upheld the sanctity of self-government in the drafting of 
organic law.  Others viewed the situation more pragmatically.  “I feel a most solemn conviction 
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that the South must arouse from its negative position and assume that of the lion,” a Tennessean 
wrote to Calhoun, or California “will be cut off from us & the doom of our children sealed.”53  
More experienced politicos viewed the situation in less apocalyptic terms.  Mississippi Senator 
Henry S. Foote intimated that southerners could not hope to gain a foothold in California, but 
that they should insist on the admission of New Mexico only when a sufficient number of 
Americans had emigrated to the territory to apply for statehood.  In the meantime, Congress 
should prohibit the native New Mexicans from legislating on the subject of slavery.54 
Many southerners blamed the California situation on the machinations of the Taylor 
administration to foment a statehood movement among the native population and the few 
American squatters on the ground.  Consequently, they began to attack the process by which 
California seemed ready to apply for statehood, not the principle that a territory had the right to 
self-government in drafting a constitution.  Renewing an argument first suggested by Robert J. 
Walker and James Buchanan in 1847, a number of southerners attacked the notion that foreigners 
could decide the fate of slavery in the Mexican Cession.  In one of the more colorful 
pronouncements against the California free state movement, a proslavery commentator lamented 
the fact that the cession had become “the resort of Mexicans and South Americans of every hue 
and race, of Sandwich Islanders and even Chinese.”  Yet northerners sought to bar “the people of 
the fifteen Southern States and of that particular class to which Washington, Jefferson, Madison, 
Henry, Pinckney, Rutledge and Carroll belonged; that class from which the people of the North 
and South have elected a large majority of their Presidents.”55  To the writer, the North had 
abandoned years of sectional conciliation and compromise in a mad effort to purge the territories 
of slavery.  He even suggested that the Northwest Ordinance had its proslavery corollary—the 
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Southwest Ordinance, which had provided for an equitable distribution of the nation’s territories 
between the North and South.  But now the North sought to renege on generations of 
compromise.  The correspondent called the northern efforts to bar slavery in the territories an 
“incendiary plot” of the “surviving fragments of the fallen houses of Braintree and Kinderhook,” 
referring to the antislavery leaders John Quincy Adams and Martin Van Buren.56 
While most southerners did not resort to such superheated rhetoric, many did believe that 
native Mexicans had no right to determine the status of slavery in the cession.  After the residents 
of California elected delegates to draft a constitution in August 1849, southerners fumed at what 
they deemed a “mongrel convention.”57  Their criticism only intensified when, on September 10, 
the convention officially added a slavery prohibition clause to their draft constitution.  It seemed 
that the South had lost its battle against the antislavery advocates.  Critics lambasted the 
members of the convention as Mexicans unfit to draft organic law and accused the convention of 
admitting foreigners to its councils.58  The fact that the convention adopted the antislavery clause 
unanimously, according to the Richmond Enquirer, only deepened their suspicion of the 
convention’s work.59  Ultimately, the journal blamed the California situation on President 
Taylor.  “Such are the ‘glorious fruits’ which the South is to reap under the administration of a 
‘Southern President.’”60 
Once again the issue of slavery in the territories loomed over a newly elected Congress, 
as the nation’s representatives gathered in Washington, D.C., in December 1849.  With 
southerners attacking antislavery northerners for conspiring to bar the South from the cession 
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and the Taylor administration’s support for a free soil California, most of the solons knew that 
they faced a difficult session ahead, one that might well impact the stability of the Union.  The 
election of a speaker of the House of Representatives portended the conflict ahead, as for three 
weeks the lower chamber failed to elect a leader.  Without a speaker, the House sat paralyzed, 
unable to function.61  So far most southerners had rebuffed the efforts of radicals to foment 
disunion, but one could foresee the future.  The poisonous atmosphere in Washington, so vividly 
evinced by the battle for the speakership in the House, further troubled political observers.  But 
both sides stood ready to defend their beliefs on whether slavery could or would exist in 
California and New Mexico. 
As the congressional session began and with the dawn of a new year and decade, an array 
of individuals throughout the nation as well as state legislatures issued resolutions, gave 
speeches, and printed essays concerning the slavery issue.  Most failed to advance any new 
arguments or provide new insights into the vexing issues of the day; instead, they recapitulated 
the familiar points raised and debated incessantly since the introduction of the Wilmot Proviso.  
The Missouri General Assembly promptly forwarded resolutions decrying the agitation over 
slavery in the West and raised the familiar refrain that territories could legislate on slavery only 
when drafting a constitution.62  Observant southerners, however, had already noted that with 
respect to California and New Mexico, maintaining that territorial sovereignty existed only in a 
constitutional convention would not suffice.  Northern Democrats had hailed the California 
constitutional convention as a “triumphant confirmation” of the territorial sovereignty as defined 
by Cass.63  Southerners would have to attack the constitution making in California as illegitimate 
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in order to halt the process.  As Missouri Congressman James S. Green wrote to his constituents, 
they could stand by the “old and long cherished doctrine of the Democratic party”—non-
intervention, but they also must insist on the right of citizens from all the states to enjoy the 
benefits of the new territories.64  The precipitous move of the California statehood supporters 
threatened that right.  In spite of the cries of a number of southern leaders, many already believed 
in the inevitability of a free state of California. 
The president only confirmed their fears when he delivered special messages to Congress 
concerning his administration’s efforts to promote immediate statehood for California and New 
Mexico.  Taylor defended sending emissaries to both of the territories to encourage them to draft 
constitutions and seek immediate admission to the Union.  Congress had proven unable to settle 
the issue without violent debate and interminable delay, so the president took another approach 
that seemed to promise a way out of the quandary provoked by the Wilmot Proviso.  Taylor, 
however, denied that either he or his representatives had actively influenced the formation of 
statehood movements in the territories, a truthful claim with respect to California, but not in the 
case of New Mexico.65  More importantly, Taylor disputed the claims of those who characterized 
the citizens of the cession as a conquered population.  He noted that a significant number of 
American citizens had moved to the territories and had a right to draft a constitution as they saw 
fit.  In short, Taylor refuted the claims of those who denied the legitimacy of the California 
constitutional convention and their efforts to prohibit slavery. 
The president encouraged Congress to adopt his plan for settling the territorial issue, as it 
removed the issue from its purview and rightly placed it in the hands of the people of California 
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and New Mexico.  By virtue of its authority to “make all needful rules and regulations respecting 
the Territories of the United States,” he stated, Congress had time and again wrestled with the 
issue of whether to prohibit or permit slavery in newly acquired territories.66  He suggested that 
Congress should dispense with its authority and forego the contentious territorial phase for the 
cession.  While Taylor’s proposition seemed reasonable, he had perhaps unwittingly raised an 
even more contentious issue by arguing that Congress had the power to prohibit slavery in the 
territories.  Furthermore, his language suggested that he would not veto a congressional 
prohibition of slavery—essentially the Wilmot Proviso—if Congress passed such legislation.  In 
other words, Taylor believed the Wilmot Proviso constitutional but unnecessary, as the territories 
could establish or prohibit slavery once they became states.67   
 Southerners excoriated the president for his message and his administration’s actions 
with regard to the cession.  North Carolina Whig Representative Thomas Clingman broke ranks 
with his president over the plan for immediate statehood.  “The idea that conquered people 
should be permitted to give law to the conquerors,” he exclaimed, “is so preposterously absurd, 
that I do not intend to argue it.”68  A Texas Democrat likewise attacked the president’s actions, 
implying that if Cass had been elected president, he would have rallied to the southern cause.  
Southerners had erred in electing one of their own, or at least a man who they believed would 
stand for their interests.  The Democratic doctrine of non-intervention, he suggested, would have 
protected southern rights far better than the active intervention and machinations of the Taylor 
administration.69 
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Democrats across the nation had rallied to defend their party and its presidential 
candidate in the midst of Taylor’s controversial course on the slavery issue.  In a lengthy address 
to his colleagues, Senator Cass defended himself and reaffirmed his belief in the doctrine he had 
expressed in the Nicholson letter.  The Michigan legislature had placed Cass in a political 
quandary, as they had instructed him to vote for the Wilmot Proviso.  Cass, of course, completely 
opposed the proviso and insisted on his own formula for dealing with slavery in the territories.  
Though the Michigan senator probably wished to avoid the discussion over slavery, by late 
January he recognized the impossibility of maintaining silence.70  Cass repeated the theme that 
had become common among proponents of territorial sovereignty—that the United States fought 
a war of revolution against Great Britain for precisely the same principles at stake in the present 
debate over slavery in the territories.  He portrayed the battle over territorial sovereignty as 
nothing less than a fight for the “human rights” of citizens residing in the cession.71  “Are not the 
people of the territories competent to manage their own affairs,” Cass asked his colleagues.  “Are 
they not of us, and with us?—bone of our bone, and flesh of our flesh?”72   
Cass identified the essence of the principle of territorial sovereignty—that Americans 
who emigrated to the territories still possessed the basic political rights of their fellow citizens 
residing in the states.  National citizenship and the rights of an American citizen, Cass implied, 
did not cease or change because a resident of a territory did not necessarily possess citizenship 
within a particular state.  Of course, the issue of citizenship—itself a troubling matter of 
constitutional interpretation in antebellum America—remained unsettled, but Cass insisted that 
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Americans in the territories had the same natural right to self-government as those in the states.73  
How they could exercise those rights in an inchoate political community, a problem that had 
plagued the doctrine of territorial sovereignty since Cass wrote the Nicholson letter in 1847, 
remained undefined. 
Cass provided an exhaustive defense of territorial sovereignty, answering his many critics 
and attempting to revive the doctrine as the preferred solution to the crisis at hand.  He 
maintained the belief that the Constitution did not give Congress the power to pass laws 
concerning slavery in the territories, defending his position in spite of the precedents of the 
Northwest Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise, both of which avowed congressional 
authority over slavery in at least part of the national domain.  Cass disputed the authority of the 
Northwest Ordinance because it had become law under the Articles of Confederation.74  The 
Missouri Compromise, Cass argued, “was not a legislative precedent,” but a “political expedient, 
which adjusted a fearful controversy.”75 
Cass sought once again to build support for his favorite theory of territorial sovereignty, 
though he maintained a certain degree of ambiguity on when and how a territorial legislature 
could pass laws concerning slavery.  The senator, however, clearly implied that Congress should 
dispose of the issue and leave the question of the extension of slavery to the people of the 
territories themselves.  Cass feared for the safety of the Union, as forces on both sides of the 
slavery issue threatened to tear apart the nation. Portraying himself as the voice of moderation, 
the indefatigable senator from Michigan called on his colleagues to support the principle of 
territorial sovereignty.   
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The southern Democratic press generally praised the Cass speech and its firm statement 
against congressional intervention with slavery in the territories.  His implication that territorial 
legislatures possessed the right to legislate on the slavery question and his contention that the 
Californians had rightfully exercised their right to draft a free state constitution offended a few 
southern observers, but most of the southern press focused instead on his avowal of non-
intervention.76  Others praised the senator for standing firm for constitutional principles while his 
own state’s legislature had instructed him to vote for the Wilmot Proviso.  Southerners still had a 
stalwart friend in Lewis Cass, a Georgia paper opined.77  Some Democrats accused President 
Taylor of stealing the Cass doctrine for his own political purposes.  “It is a singular coincidence, 
that while Cass was making this fine speech in the Senate, Taylor, in his message, then being 
read in the House, was signifying his consent to the great doctrine of NON-INTERVENTION, 
opposed and misrepresented by his whig friends in the last Presidential canvass.”78  And yet it 
seemed that little of the rancorous debate over the doctrine itself had abated, as implied by the 
nearly complete southern silence on the part of Cass’s pronouncement that addressed territorial 
sovereignty.  The ability of the Cass doctrine to serve as a compromise remained doubtful. 
Amid the intensifying rancor over the slavery question, some leaders concluded that only 
a broad based, sectionally balanced compromise could preserve the Union. Since October 1849, 
the momentum for a southern rights convention to be held at Nashville the following June had 
increased, as six southern states had committed delegates to the meeting.79  Such ominous 
developments worried Henry Clay, the seventy-two year old senator from Kentucky who had 
shepherded compromises through Congress in 1820 and 1833.  Sensing the onset of a true crisis 
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of the Union, he took the lead in devising a way to avert the coming crisis of 1850.  Clay’s 
meeting on January 21 with Daniel Webster, in which he convinced the famed senator to aid him 
in drafting a compromise plan, and his subsequent introduction of a far reaching settlement of the 
difficulties between the North and South have become historical legend.80   Clay’s compromise 
plan, which he delivered to the Senate on January 29, proposed eight resolutions each designed 
to placate the North and the South on the troublesome questions concerning slavery and the 
westward expansion of the institution.  Two of the resolutions directly affected slavery in the 
territories.81  First, Clay proposed to admit California to the Union with her free state 
constitution.  Second, Clay proposed congressional non-intervention respecting slavery in the 
remainder of the Mexican Cession by establishing territorial governments without reference to 
the institution.  In doing so, however, he contended that slavery would most likely never exist in 
the region; therefore, he considered congressional intervention “inexpedient.”82  Furthermore, 
Clay clearly stated that he hoped that California and New Mexico would never admit slavery 
within their boundaries.  He would not oppose statehood, however, if either or both territories did 
permit slavery because “then it would be their own work, and not ours, and their posterity will 
have to reproach them, and not us for forming constitutions allowing the institution of slavery to 
exist among them.”83 
For almost the next eight months, Congress and the nation would debate the Clay 
compromise plan in a discourse that itself repeatedly threatened to derail any effort at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 The standard history of the Compromise of 1850 is Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict.  Michael F. Holt’s incisive 
narrative of the compromise effort, however, has largely superseded Hamilton’s book.  See The Rise and Fall of the 
American Whig Party, 459-597.  For a beautiful description of the lead up to Clay’s compromise plan and a succinct 
summary of the compromise package itself, see Potter, The Impending Crisis, 96-100. 
81 Clay’s third resolution dealt with the explosive issue of the boundary of Texas and New Mexico, which obliquely 
concerned slavery in the territories.  See Stegmaier, Texas, New Mexico, and the Compromise of 1850.  For the 
resolutions, see CG, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., 244-247. 
82 CG, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., 245. 
83 Ibid., 246. 
 250	  
conciliation.  More specifically, Americans debated the virtues and the complications of non-
intervention, as Clay had settled upon using the idea of self-government as the preferred means 
to defuse the Wilmot Proviso controversy.  Clay’s interpretation of territorial sovereignty proved 
vague and elusive, however, presumably because he believed that slavery would never exist in 
the region.  He provided no answers for how or when the territorial governments erected in New 
Mexico and Deseret would settle the slavery question.   
Much to the chagrin of the Great Pacificator, southerners pounced on the compromise 
plan as soon as Clay uttered the last words of his speech.  Two Mississippians—Henry S. Foote 
and Jefferson Davis—expressed their dissatisfaction with the Kentuckian’s plan.  Foote flatly 
rejected Clay’s reasoning that slavery did not exist by law in the Mexican Cession.  To his mind, 
“the treaty with the Mexican republic carried the Constitution, with all its guaranties, to all the 
territory obtained by treaty.”84  He also expressed resentment at Clay’s contention that slavery 
would probably never enter the cession.  Let time and the people of the states decide the 
question, Foote maintained.  After insisting that Clay yield the floor for a response to his political 
“set speech” on the compromise measures, Davis denied that the eight resolutions comprised any 
sort of compromise.  The Mississippi senator preferred extension of the Missouri Compromise 
line as the only way the South could hope to share equally in the settlement of the cession.  Davis 
demanded that Congress adopt extension, with a positive declaration that citizens had a right to 
possess slaves south of the line.85  
Southerners outside of Washington joined the chorus against the Clay proposal.  The 
compromise, according to a Georgia editor, “concedes all the Provisoists ask—that the territories 
are already free—all that the abolitionists contend for—that Mexican law in the territories, is 
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paramount to the constitution.”86  Clay’s second resolution, with its assertion that slavery would 
most likely never exist in the cession and with its implication that the Mexican laws prohibiting 
slavery remained in force, particularly offended southerners.  Some southerners fumed at Clay’s 
expression that congressional legislation was inexpedient; they deemed it unconstitutional.  “It is 
of no avail that the second resolution proposes to erect territorial governments, without saying 
any thing about slavery,” the Richmond Enquirer stated; “the right of Congress to regulate it is 
conceded, and it is declared by the same resolution not to exist in the land.”87   
Though the criticism aimed at Clay stemmed chiefly from his second resolution on 
slavery in the territories, some southerners also took issue with granting California admission 
with her free state constitution.  “A mere handful of men should never be allowed to appropriate 
to themselves a vast extent of territory,” a New Orleans Democrat argued.88  Southerners 
maintained that the “gold diggers in California are not bona fide inhabitants but mere 
adventurers” who had no lasting stake in the land.89  Perhaps more importantly, a number of 
southerners contended that the mixed race native population of California had no right to 
participate in drafting a state constitution.  “Her constitution,” a Georgian wrote, “was made by 
those who had no right to make it.”90 
Southern state governments responded to the compromise plan with equal disdain.  Just 
days after Clay delivered his compromise speech, the Georgia legislature passed resolutions of 
its own stating that Congress had no authority to prohibit slavery in the territories and that people 
of all the states had the right to emigrate to the territories with their slave property.91  In 
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Louisiana, Governor Isaac Johnson repeated sound Democratic doctrine, declaring that the 
“inhabitants of the territories have a clear and indisputable right to settle this question according 
to their own wishes, when ready for admission into the Union as a state.”92  Any congressional 
interference, he contended, would meet with solid resistance from the South. 
Clay had concluded his presentation of the compromise measures with an appeal for 
northern magnanimity, but many southerners believed his plan asked for far more concessions 
from their section than from the North.  Clay maintained that he asked northerners for “a more 
liberal and extensive concession than should be asked from the slave States” because the North 
held the preponderance of power in the Union.93  He entreated them to recognize that while they 
viewed slavery as an abstraction, southerners faced the palpable reality of the institution and the 
danger and discontent stirred by antislavery fanatics who sought an end to the peculiar 
institution.  To the minds of many men from his own section, however, Clay had surrendered 
southern constitutional rights to the North in return for little to nothing.  Throughout the 
remainder of the congressional session, both politicians in Washington and the people they 
represented would debate what measures would create a just compromise.  At the center of that 
discussion lay the issue of territorial sovereignty, which continued to provoke heated debate over 
its meaning and potential application.  Southerners certainly did not accept the version Clay had 
proposed in his second resolution. 
The debate over slavery in California and New Mexico centered on the power of 
Congress to legislate on the issue of slavery in the territories.  While it seemed to provide a way 
out of the controversy caused by the Wilmot Proviso, Clay’s compromise proposal failed to 
satisfy a number of southern senators because of its implication that Congress did possess the 
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right to legislate for the territories with regard to slavery. “Sir, it is no longer a mere question of 
party policy in the South,” said Whig Senator Willie P. Mangum of North Carolina, in response 
to Clay.  “An overwhelming proportion of our people believe that this Government has no power 
to touch the subject of slavery in either the States or in the Territories.”94 
Mangum correctly argued that southerners would rally first to the defense of slavery and 
second to party fealty, but he failed to recognize that southern opinion once again had divided 
along familiar lines.  Two factions—essentially those that had divided the South in the election 
year of 1848—reappeared: those who supported the Cass doctrine of territorial sovereignty and 
those who sided with Calhoun and demanded federal protection of slavery in the territories.  
Within these two broad distinctions lay numerous variants of how specifically to settle the issue 
of slavery extension, but essentially the moderates and the Calhounites once again battled over 
how to protect best the rights of the South.95 
Almost a month after Cass renewed the call for territorial sovereignty, Jefferson Davis 
rose in opposition to the plan, claiming that Cass had finally defined his doctrine and revealed it 
as essentially antislavery.  Indeed, on the day that Davis spoke against territorial sovereignty, 
Cass had made two statements that offended southerners.  First, he stated that slavery would 
never exist in the Mexican Cession.  Second, Cass reiterated that “the people of the Territories 
have just the same right to govern themselves as the people of the States have.”96  Cass qualified 
his second statement by insisting that by territories he meant organized communities, but he 
could not define precisely when that would happen.  In fact, he made the subtle implication that 
the courts might well have to adjudicate the issue.  Cass had surely offended Davis and other 
southerners who believed that the Californians had abused the right of territorial sovereignty in 
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drafting their constitution.  The Mississippi senator immediately chastised Cass for his 
statements on territorial sovereignty.  “His doctrine, which acknowledges sovereignty in any 
community which may by accident or design be planted on territory belonging to the States, I 
always rejected.”97  As Cass asserted his belief that the people of the territories had the right to 
legislate on the slavery question prior to drafting a constitution, more conservative southerners 
attempted to refute his claims.  Once again southerners debated the meaning and practice of 
territorial sovereignty. 
A North Carolina Whig congressman wryly explained the predicament that southern 
Democrats faced in 1850 concerning slavery in the territories.  They had demanded that 
Congress could not legislate on slavery for the territories, but that the people alone possessed the 
right when drafting a constitution.  When California presented a constitution prohibiting slavery, 
though, southern Democrats cried foul. “What is not a little remarkable upon this subject, too,” 
David Outlaw wrote to his wife, “is the fact that the Democracy, whose candidate Gen. Cass, 
avowed before and has since reiterated the same opinion, that the people of the territories alone 
have the power to legislate, are the loudest in their denunciations—against their own 
doctrines.”98  Outlaw had captured the dilemma facing southern Democrats.  California had 
followed the southern plan of territorial sovereignty, which excluded slaveholders from the 
future state.  Proslavery Democrats now could only object by disputing the right of native 
Mexicans to take part in constitution making and by arguing that an insufficient number of 
Americans lived in the territory. 
Southerners mocked the notion that the native Mexican population in the new American 
Southwest could have a hand in telling citizens of the states what property they could and could 
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not bring into the territories.  “[S]hall these conquered people be allowed to dictate such terms as 
will exclude one half of her conquerors from enjoying their acquired immunities within her 
limits,” a Georgia commentator wrote.99   Some southerners derided territorial sovereignty, as 
defined by northern Democrats, because they feared it would deny their section equal 
participation within the territories.  Others sought to seize control of the debate over territorial 
sovereignty’s meaning by asserting the South’s traditional interpretation of the doctrine.  Whig 
Senator John Bell of Tennessee, for example, introduced his own set of compromise resolutions 
that affirmed specifically that the people of a territory gained sovereignty when seeking 
admission to the Union.100  Bell’s plan considered California a lost cause, providing for its 
admission with the free state constitution presented to Congress.  But Bell sought to save New 
Mexico for the South by defining when the territories gained sovereignty. 
As the debate over Clay’s compromise measures continued through the spring of 1850, 
numerous southerners had settled on the belief that Congress would have to institute some form 
of non-intervention in order to solve the crisis.  “We know that whenever the settlement does 
take place, a New Orleans journalist wrote, “it must be done on the ground advocated first by 
General Cass.”101  Kentucky Governor John J. Crittenden, a Whig who supported the Taylor 
administration’s plan to settle the slavery issue, expressed his belief “that the slavery question 
must soon be settled, & that upon the basis of admitting Calafornia [sic] & establishing 
Territorial governments without the Wilmot Proviso.”  The nation had unwisely rejected 
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Taylor’s “pacific policy” to bypass the territorial phase, but any overall plan that reaffirmed 
congressional non-intervention seemed likely to gain the approval of Congress.102 
Most southerners, however, made clear that they would not stand for squatter 
sovereignty—or the rule of a small and inchoate number of squatters on the public domain.  The 
rule of law and order, as well as the spirit of equality demanded that all decisions on the slavery 
issue rest with an elected territorial assembly charged with drafting a constitution.  The allies of 
John C. Calhoun demanded that southern politicians repudiate squatter sovereignty.  “The 
doctrine of absolute sovereignty in the inhabitants of a territory,” Representative Daniel Wallace 
of South Carolina declared, “in every petty province of a mother country, is repugnant to all past 
history.”103  The Calhounites addressed a concern of most southerners that squatters and native 
Mexicans had seized control of the statehood process in California—and threatened the same in 
New Mexico.  But their language came perilously close to portraying the United States as a 
colonial power, which offended numerous advocates of non-intervention, including Lewis Cass.  
Cass himself had, after all, justified non-intervention and territorial sovereignty by invoking the 
memory of America’s revolution against Great Britain. 
The Clay compromise as well as President Taylor’s initial proposal to settle the slavery 
issue each contained the essence of territorial sovereignty, though observers could quibble about 
finer points of how to interpret and implement the doctrine.  Nevertheless, southerners remained 
divided over the compromise plan in Congress and the principle of territorial sovereignty.  
Expressing support for the Clay compromise, John Tyler wrote to an associate, “I do not see that 
anything better can be done.”  Like President Taylor’s plan, the Clay compromise left the slavery 
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matter “open to the selection of the people themselves in convention.”104  Under the 
circumstances, the South could not expect much better.  A Georgia editor expressed similar 
resigned support: “By the compromise we get territorial governments, and non-intervention on 
the slavery question for the Territories.  That is something.”105 
Not all southerners could muster even tepid support for the compromise emerging in 
Congress.  In the Senate, Jefferson Davis remained a stalwart opponent of Clay’s bill, especially 
because of its implication that the Mexican laws against slavery trumped the rights of American 
citizens, including slaveholders.  He declared himself willing “to leave the question to be decided 
according to the great cardinal principles of the Democratic party; that the people inhabiting a 
territory, when they come to form a State constitution for themselves, can do as they please.”106  
Davis could not support, however, either the implication that Mexican law prevailed in the 
cession or the idea that territorial legislatures could prohibit slavery.  Furthermore, the 
Mississippi senator flatly rejected Clay’s contention that slavery could never exist in the region.  
The people themselves could decide that question by emigrating there with or without slaves.  
But Congress, with its limited knowledge of the vast territory and its geographical conditions, 
had neither the knowledge nor the right to declare the Mexican Cession unfit for slavery. 
Though Davis attacked the compromise based on specific provisions that he deemed 
odious to southern interests and rights, other legislators questioned whether the package of 
resolutions even made up a compromise. Democratic Representative James Seddon of Virginia 
wrote to his constituents that the compromise demanded great concessions form the South and no 
expense to the North—“not even the poor boon of equal privilege and simple protection of our 
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property in the Territories of Utah and New Mexico, the least valuable of our new 
acquisitions.”107  Others predicted that the people of the territories, namely any southern 
slaveholders who might choose to settle in the West, would not stand for any infringement of 
their rights and would establish of prohibit slavery as they saw fit, regardless of any 
congressional dictate.108  Southern ultras felt that the compromise had hoodwinked the moderate 
leaders of their section and lulled them into a dangerous complacency.  Lamenting the 
“decadence of the Southern spirit” to resist the compromise measures, Senator Robert M. T. 
Hunter of Virginia decried the efforts of northerners to “dragoon the South into fastening this act 
of submission on herself and by her own vote.”109   
Amid the continued dissension over both the Clay compromise and the territorial 
sovereignty issue, which had spilled over into the summer, an exasperated Lewis Cass mounted 
another campaign to defend his favored doctrine.  Cass served on the Committee of Thirteen in 
the Senate that took Clay’s initial compromise plan and reworked it into a unified piece of 
legislation known as the “Omnibus” bill.110  Clay and his select committee believed that a single 
bill composed of the individual compromise resolutions would more easily gain passage and, 
moreover, force senators to accept a unitary compromise package rather than merely vote for 
their specific interests.  But the Omnibus bill had the opposite effect as it solidified opposition 
among northern and southern ultras, leaving moderates in despair of their efforts to secure a 
bisectional adjustment.111 
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Facing discord over the Omnibus bill as well as heightened criticism over the correct 
interpretation of territorial sovereignty, Cass clarified his position on the Senate floor one last 
time.  In a rare moment of self-deprecation for the Michigan senator, Cass stated that it seemed 
the Nicholson letter “is so dark that every man may read it his own way, or, in fact, no way at 
all.”112  Cass finally and emphatically stated that the Nicholson letter asserted the doctrine that 
territorial governments could legislate on the slavery issue.113  Over the course of 1850, he had 
come to define the doctrine in more emphatic and less ambiguous terms.  In the speech he 
delivered to the Senate in February, Cass affirmed his belief in the power of territorial 
legislatures to pass laws concerning slavery.  In the heat of the contentious debates in June, the 
senator left no doubt of his opinion on the interpretation of territorial sovereignty.  Yet he left 
open the possibility that the Supreme Court could rule on the issue.  The inhabitants of the 
territories “will always have a legislature which will reflect their wishes; and, if they desire 
slavery, they will have it, and if they do not, they will exclude it, unless prevented by the 
Constitution.”114  While Cass left open the possibility of a legal challenge to territorial 
sovereignty, he left no doubt that he believed it not only constitutional, but also the wisest policy 
to avert disunion.   
For three years politicians and political observers had debated the real meaning of the 
Nicholson letter.  In the Nicholson letter itself, Cass had strongly implied that territorial 
legislatures had the power to permit or prohibit.  When a veritable firestorm erupted over the 
issue, it seemed that Cass and other supporters of the doctrine prevaricated on its true meaning.  
Now that Cass had explicitly stated his true belief, his speech had little impact on the continuing 
debate in Congress.  The opponents of territorial sovereignty already knew its true meaning, 
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while supporters could either embrace his latest pronouncement or continue to ignore the 
implications of vesting power over slavery in territorial governments. 
As if the proponents of the Omnibus bill did not have enough problems to contend with, a 
new front emerged in the battle over the Mexican Cession.  In May 1850, the residents of New 
Mexico Territory had elected a constitutional convention that promptly drafted a document 
prohibiting the institution of slavery.115  Though few observers expected the New Mexico 
statehood movement to succeed, the actions taken by the territory’s antislavery faction received 
an indignant response from southerners and heightened concerns about the compromise bill in 
the Senate.  The movements in New Mexico seemed only to confirm that northerners sought to 
“convert the Territories into States, before the south has a chance to gain a foothold in them.”116 
Efforts to secure compromise faced far greater challenges than the tenuous statehood 
movement in New Mexico.  The summer of 1850 turned chaotic, as the Senate debate over the 
Omnibus bill grew increasingly acrimonious.  Then, on July 9, President Taylor died 
unexpectedly.  In the short term, the president’s death created instability and uncertainty as to the 
prospects of achieving compromise.  Thoughtful observers knew that Taylor had stubbornly 
opposed the Clay compromise, especially after the Kentucky senator had broken ranks with the 
administration over the preferred mode of sectional adjustment.  Intrigue swirled regarding the 
course that Vice President Millard Fillmore would take now that he assumed Taylor’s office.  
The new president took only two weeks to chart a new course, ultimately deciding to throw his 
administration’s support behind Clay’s Omnibus package.117   
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“Close quarters.  Neck and neck, and the omnibus under whip and spur, and on the 
outside track.  Looks bad—looks awful—looks mighty squally for the vehicle, the freight, and 
the passengers,” wrote a witty New York Herald correspondent.118  Even with President 
Fillmore’s support for the bill and his influence among key senators, the impetus for 
compromise—at least that proposed by Clay—seemed in peril.  In spite of the plaintive appeals 
for moderation and the seemingly endless speeches in favor of an adjustment, the Omnibus met 
its fate on July 31, when opponents of the compromise package in the Senate succeeded at 
killing the bill through a procedural maneuver.119  Physically and mentally broken, Henry Clay 
retreated to Newport, Rhode Island, while his supporters contemplated the next move.  A 
perceptive Tennessee representative recognized perhaps the only tactic left to save any of Clay’s 
efforts—to pass each proposition separately.120  Ironically, Clay himself had used a similar 
maneuver in 1820 to get the Missouri Compromise through an intransigent Congress. 
Stephen Douglas assumed control of the compromise movement, proposing to secure 
passage by breaking the ruined Omnibus bill into its constituent parts.  The Illinois senator knew 
that he could obtain passage of individual measures by utilizing sectional and partisan blocs in 
the Senate.  The plan stood a great chance of success, but it completely defeated Clay’s original 
purpose—to broker a bisectional compromise in which both northerners and southerners would 
have to give and take.  The Douglas maneuver ensured passage, but did so through parliamentary 
tactics and not through a sincere desire for compromise.121  Nevertheless, by September 16 
Douglas had gained passage of the separate bills through the Senate and the House, where 
Douglas himself had correctly predicted a bruising battle for passage.  The bills comprising the  
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Special Collections Library, Duke University. 
121 For Douglas’s efforts, see Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas, 294-303. 
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Compromise of 1850 arrived at President Fillmore’s desk the next day and received his 
signature.  The measures provided statehood for California, much to the chagrin of southerners, 
as well as congressional non-intervention and territorial sovereignty in New Mexico and Deseret.   
The Compromise of 1850 instituted territorial sovereignty in all of the Mexican Cession 
except California.  Interestingly, the debate over the territorial sovereignty provision took an 
unexpected turn in the House of Representatives, where Georgia Representative Robert Toombs 
made a last ditch effort to erase any doubt that the Mexican laws prohibiting slavery had ceased 
with American acquisition of the territory.  Toombs sought to nullify explicitly Mexican law and 
bar territorial legislatures from prohibiting slavery in one sweeping amendment.  Toombs’s 
maneuver did not succeed; indeed, the wording of the final bill seemingly granted territorial 
legislatures the right to prohibit slavery if they so desired.122  Territorial sovereignty had 
prevailed, and had become law with respect to the Mexican Cession.  The territories of New 
Mexico and Deseret possessed the right to permit or prohibit slavery as they saw fit. 
On the surface, the nation rejoiced in the settlement of the difficult problems concerning 
slavery in the Mexican Cession through a compromise effort that touched the existence of the 
institution both in the territories and in the states.  Territorial sovereignty had prevailed.  
Southerners feared that territorial sovereignty in practice meant the prohibition of slavery.  “The 
authors and inventors of the doctrine frankly and honestly avowed that its practical operation and 
result was identical with [the Wilmot] proviso,” an Alabama jurist wrote.  “It secured to the 
Northern States, by ‘masterly inactivity,’ all the fruits of the Mexican law; and correspondingly 
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this contention in The Impending Crisis, 117n45. 
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with this, excluded the South.”123  Jefferson Davis lamented the passage of the territorial 
sovereignty provision as a defeat for southern interests.  He had opposed the “odious doctrine” 
because he “never knew what it meant.”124  The Mississippian likewise abhorred the notion that 
squatters on the land could deny southern slaveholders the right to enter the territories with their 
property.125  Nevertheless, most all southerners acquiesced in the compromise plan and seemed 
to welcome an end to the crisis.  
Questions concerning the application of the compromise abounded, however, as 
observers pondered the finality of the compromise and the meaning of the measures concerning 
slavery in the territories.  When a group of Georgia citizens queried former Vice President 
George M. Dallas about the compromise measures and their impact on slavery in New Mexico, 
he predicted in his reply that the Supreme Court would eventually decide the issue of whether 
Mexican laws prohibiting slavery in the cession would prevail.126  In other words, the 
compromise could not dispose of all the issues concerning slavery in the territories.  Historians, 
too, have asked questions about the finality of the Compromise of 1850, especially whether the 
Thirty-First Congress crafted a settlement designed to apply to all territories present and 
future.127  From the vantage point of 1850, it seemed that Congress had settled all issues 
concerning slavery in the Mexican Cession or had deferred them to the judiciary.  It seems that 
few, if any, leaders had given much consideration to future territorial acquisitions or to the 
remaining unorganized territory of the Louisiana Purchase.  And in the case of the latter, the 
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Missouri Compromise prohibition of slavery north of 36° 30’ had unquestionably settled the 
issue.  The recrudescence of the issue of slavery in the territories less than four years later would 
place all established precedent in doubt. 
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CHAPTER 7 
“A RECURRENCE TO FIRST PRINCIPLES”: KANSAS-NEBRASKA AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AS NATIONAL POLICY 
 
 The Compromise of 1850 settled the question of slavery expansion in the vast Mexican 
Cession, and while southerners had chafed at the admission of California as a free state and the 
seemingly inevitable passage of New Mexico toward the same course, most acquiesced in the 
outcome.  The compromise that Stephen A. Douglas had shepherded through Congress scotched 
any impetus for disunion, even as ultra southerners tried in vain to exploit dissatisfaction with the 
law to organize a second southern convention to contemplate secession.  Moderates carried the 
day and the heirs of the Calhounite mantle missed their chance to unite the South and deliver the 
North an ultimatum on the slavery issue.1   
Still, key southern politicians continued to express consternation over the compromise 
measures and what the South had given away for the sake of national unity.  Mississippi’s 
Jefferson Davis embarked on a statewide speaking tour in an effort to galvanize southern 
opposition to the compromise, though he never specified how southerners should counter the 
new policy on slavery in the territories.  California had gained statehood, Davis insisted, with the 
aid of antislavery partisans.  More importantly, the admission of California to the Union 
illustrated the danger of squatter sovereignty, by which transient Americans combined with the 
native Mexicans, Indians, and other immigrants from foreign lands had seized control of the 
constitution-making process and drafted an antislavery document.  By enacting the compromise, 
Congress practically endorsed the actions of these “‘squatters’ upon the soil.”2  In his judgment, 
it had also endorsed the doctrine of non-intervention in its most odious form, allowing a motley 
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assortment of settlers to exercise self-government.  A year after denouncing California statehood 
and in the midst of the election season of 1852, Davis continued to assail territorial sovereignty 
as a doctrine that injured southern rights and interests. “The intangible, ever-changing doctrine of 
non-intervention,” he said, “receiving as many interpretations as there were varieties of sectional 
policy, demoralized the South, and bore down the best and bravest of our Northern friends.”3  
Defending territorial sovereignty against the charges of antislavery politicians, according to 
Davis, had forced northern Democrats who had endorsed equal southern participation in the 
territories to abandon their bisectional overtures in order to save face at home.  At the same time, 
southerners like Davis believed that the doctrine imperiled southern rights by allowing the first 
settlers on the ground to determine the status of slavery for all time.  Behind Davis’s attack on 
territorial sovereignty lay his belief that the South would have fared better with an extension of 
the Missouri Compromise line. 
Though southerners like Davis may have objected to the Compromise of 1850 and its 
endorsement of territorial sovereignty, many more overcame their initial resentment of the 
policy.  Unionist sentiment overwhelmed any effort by southern separatists to renew agitation 
over slavery in the Mexican Cession.  Desperate for peace on the slavery issue and for a 
resumption of party harmony, the Democrats in 1852 sought to resolve their differences.  Yet the 
party operatives advanced two old warhorses for the presidential nomination—Lewis Cass of 
Michigan and James Buchanan of Pennsylvania.  The young but politically experienced Stephen 
A. Douglas emerged as the third candidate.  All carried significant liabilities.  Cass’s position on 
territorial sovereignty lingered in the minds of southern Democrats.  More than any other 
northern Democrat, Cass refuted the southern interpretation of territorial sovereignty, which 
earned him the enmity of key southern politicians.  The Michigan senator exacerbated the 
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problem when he reiterated his stance on the Senate floor in March, affirming that the “first 
settlers” of a territory inevitably influenced the community’s “political and social system.”4  
Southerners like Jefferson Davis, to whom Cass directed his remarks, viewed this latest 
statement as further evidence that the author of the Nicholson letter endorsed squatter 
sovereignty. Antislavery northerners opposed Cass because they believed he had pandered to the 
South for votes.  New York businessman and Democrat Erastus Corning wrote to a friend that 
Cass stood no chance of carrying the Empire State in a presidential canvass for “reasons which 
you can well understand”—a veiled reference to the Michigan senator’s stand on slavery.5 
The proceedings of the Democratic Convention in Baltimore in June 1852 revealed the 
party’s fragile condition on the slavery question.  The party platform endorsed the Compromise 
of 1850 as a permanent solution to the question of slavery in the territories.  Desperate to end the 
internecine struggle over slavery, the platform committee proclaimed that Democrats would 
“resist all attempts at renewing, in congress or out of it, the agitation of the slavery question.”6  
For forty-nine ballots, Cass, Douglas, and Buchanan jockeyed for advantage, but none could gain 
the necessary two-thirds of the delegate votes.  In the end, the Democrats turned to a dark horse, 
Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire.  The Democracy united behind Pierce, a candidate backed by 
southerners who viewed the Mexican War veteran as a proper doughface and by northerners as 
an acceptable alternative to the trio of Cass, Douglas, and Buchanan. 
In the weeks before the Baltimore convention, Pierce had accepted the Compromise of 
1850 with enthusiasm.  “If the compromise measures are not to be substantially and firmly 
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maintained,” Pierce wrote in a public letter, “the plain rights secured by the constitution will be 
trampled in the dust.”7  Both North and South had to stand behind the compromises made in the 
turbulent summer of 1850 for the sake of the Union, not to mention for the future of the 
Democratic Party.  Six years earlier, he had endorsed the territorial sovereignty doctrine as a 
young state party operative.  Pierce trounced the Whig candidate Winfield Scott in the November 
election, carrying an overwhelming majority of the electoral vote.  For a fleeting moment it 
seemed that moderation had prevailed and the Compromise of 1850 might well have settled the 
slavery question.  But candidate Pierce’s hopes for party unity and national harmony would face 
serious constraints once he became President Pierce. 
Just as the new president took office in March 1853, a discussion had commenced over 
the organization of a vast territory in the center of the transcontinental nation—what became 
known as Nebraska.  The large unincorporated portion of the Louisiana Purchase, which spanned 
roughly from the northern boundary of present-day Oklahoma to the Canadian border and 
included land between the Missouri River and the Rocky Mountains, had escaped the attention of 
Washington for years, as many leaders viewed the domain as an Indian territory.  The desire to 
construct a transcontinental railroad along with the inexorable westward push of settlers on the 
frontier led people both in the West and in Washington to reconsider the future of the vast 
region.8 
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No one had taken more interest in the settlement of the vast territory than Stephen 
Douglas.  The Illinois senator had first introduced legislation to organize Nebraska Territory in 
1844 in a multipronged effort to organize territories in the remainder of the Louisiana Purchase 
and Oregon, as well as prepare for construction of a transcontinental railroad.  The construction 
of the railroad would bring a host of settlers eager to take residence along the line and engage in 
farming, many of whom would be eligible for free homesteads provided by the federal 
government.  The breathtaking scope of Douglas’s design, a master plan to settle the remainder 
of the west, bore more than a faint resemblance to Jefferson’s plan for an agrarian republic.  He 
would connect the Great Plains to the industrial East, with Chicago at its center, by laying iron 
rails through the center of the republic.  For ten years, the senator refused to give up hope on his 
plan, even in the face of formidable odds and considerable sectional rancor.9 
While Senator Douglas continued to seek support for organizing Nebraska in 
Washington, residents in western Missouri and Iowa began to push on their own for 
organization.  The Missourians, in particular, eagerly sought organization of the territory in order 
to exploit its natural resources and establish homesteads.  While the initiative remained quite 
popular in western Missouri, Senator David Rice Atchison raised objections to the organization 
of Nebraska on the grounds that the Missouri Compromise would prohibit slavery in the 
prospective territory.  Atchison, a rough and tumble frontier Democrat from Platte County, 
Missouri, raised objection to the Nebraska bill at the close of the second session of the Thirty-
Second Congress.  With “no prospect, no hope for a repeal of the Missouri compromise, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas, 391-395; Michael A. Morrison, Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse 
of Jacksonian Democracy and the Coming of the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 
142-143. 
 271	  
excluding slavery from that Territory,” the senator confessed that he could not vote for any bill 
organizing Nebraska.10   
Atchison condemned the Northwest Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise as twin 
“irremediable” errors that previous congresses had passed against the spirit, if not the letter, of 
the Constitution.11  Given the apparent inviolability of the Missouri Compromise it seemed that, 
to his mind, slaveholders would simply have to acquiesce in the prohibition.  But in the summer 
of 1853, Atchison clarified his position in a series of speeches given in his home territory, 
demanding that any bill organizing Nebraska embrace the doctrine of territorial sovereignty.  “I 
am willing that the people who may settle there, and who have the deepest interest in this 
question, shall decide it for themselves,” he declared.12  Missourians had long supported the 
principle of territorial sovereignty via memorials to Congress and numerous public meetings, 
especially during the contentious congressional session of 1849-1850.  Now Atchison demanded 
that Congress apply the same standard to Nebraska.  Almost certainly unconscious of the 
implications of his statement, the senator had raised the pivotal question of whether the 
Compromise of 1850, with its endorsement of territorial sovereignty, had superseded the 
Compromise of 1820. 
The Missourians wasted no time in making their sentiments known to Congress and the 
nation.  In a series of public meetings held in the heart of Atchison’s political power base, 
citizens’ committees endorsed “leaving questions of local policy to be settled by the citizens of 
the territory when they form a state government.”13  In other words, they endorsed the concept of 
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territorial sovereignty as defined by the South.  Furthermore, their motives in supporting the 
organization of Nebraska became clear.  First, western Missourians expected to supply a 
significant number of residents for the territory and therefore desired to carry slavery there.  
Second, many feared that a free Nebraska would prove hazardous to slaveholders in Missouri 
itself, as runaway slaves could cross the border to freedom.  The latter issue would gain 
significance as the debate over Nebraska proceeded.14 
Douglas closely observed the developments in western Missouri and surely maintained 
contact with Atchison as the proposal to organize Nebraska gained momentum.  Indeed, in 
December 1853, a citizens’ committee from St. Joseph, Missouri, had invited the Illinois senator 
to attend its proceedings the following month.15  During the latter months of 1853, Douglas had 
begun organizing his own thoughts on how to revive his plan for western settlement and the 
construction of a transcontinental railroad that would pass through Nebraska.  Douglas knew that 
he needed southern and western support to achieve his goals, but realized that the Missouri 
Compromise prohibition on slavery north of 36° 30’ represented a significant obstacle.   
Ever the astute politician, Douglas believed that the principles of the Compromise of 
1850, namely territorial sovereignty, could assuage southerners and westerners and ensure their 
support for organizing Nebraska Territory.  The senator, however, also recognized that violating 
the principles of the Missouri Compromise’s slavery ban almost certainly would infuriate 
antislavery northerners.  Douglas hoped to mollify all parties and interests by a sleight of hand; 
he would endorse territorial sovereignty in Nebraska and remain silent on the Missouri 
Compromise.  The senator staked his project on the belief that “all will be willing to sanction and 
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affirm the principle established by the Compromise measures of 1850,” and would ignore the 
Missouri Compromise.16 
The Thirty-Third Congress commenced its first session on December 5, 1853, with the 
Nebraska issue at the top of its agenda.  Senator Augustus Dodge of Iowa introduced legislation 
to organize Nebraska Territory, essentially the same bill that had failed in the previous session.  
But the Senate referred the legislation to Douglas’s Committee on Territories, and in the course 
of three weeks the chairman had reworked the Dodge bill to his liking.  Meanwhile, the press 
began feverishly speculating on the course the Douglas committee and Congress at large would 
take with regard to Nebraska.  A well-informed correspondent to the Richmond Enquirer 
captured perfectly the negotiations occurring behind the scenes.  Missouri’s two senators—David 
Atchison and the venerable Thomas Hart Benton—were in the midst of a battle over who would 
control the state’s politics.  Benton favored the immediate organization of Nebraska with the 
Missouri Compromise ban on slavery intact, while Atchison, the “faithful champion of the 
South,” according to the Enquirer’s correspondent, favored territorial sovereignty.  “Peopled by 
immigrants of from Missouri, and, by the fertility of its soil inviting the labor of the negro, 
Nebraska, if allowed the free exercise of its own discretion, will soon apply for admission into 
the Union as a slave state,” the writer predicted.17  By all indications the people of Missouri, 
especially along its western border, favored the Atchison plan. 
On the other side of the issue, northerners quickly perceived that some senators wanted to 
circumvent the thirty-four year old Missouri Compromise and potentially open Nebraska to 
slavery.  “While so much zeal is evinced in behalf of the South, there is some danger that the 
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rights of the North may be overlooked,” a New Jersey editor warned.  “It may be that the glories 
of the compromise of 1850 have so dimmed those of its Missouri namesake that it may be 
forgotten that by the latter agreement Nebraska may be nothing but free territory.”18  Northerners 
and southerners perceived the stakes of the coming debate over Nebraska just as clearly as their 
fellow citizens in Missouri.  The great question became clear: would territorial sovereignty 
supersede the Missouri Compromise ban on slavery in Nebraska? 
The Senate Committee of Territories released its much-anticipated report on Nebraska on 
January 4, 1854, which set the stage for the debate over territorial sovereignty.  The committee 
maintained that the Compromise of 1850 had indeed invalidated the Missouri Compromise, 
though the report specifically avoided explicit repeal.  Writing for the committee, Douglas 
argued that the compromise measures “were intended to have a far more comprehensive and 
enduring effect than the mere adjustment of the difficulties arising out of the recent acquisition 
of Mexican territory.”19  As the author of the Utah and New Mexico legislation, he argued that it 
established a new precedent for territorial organization. The Douglas report endorsed the Cass 
formula for territorial sovereignty by allowing the people, “by their appropriate representatives,” 
to legislate on “all questions pertaining to slavery in the territories.”20  Presumably the Missouri 
Compromise ban on slavery would remain in effect until the territorial legislature provided 
otherwise.   In sum, Douglas had reshaped the Dodge bill to incorporate the compromise 
principles without explicitly repealing the Missouri Compromise.  But would northerners and 
southerners accept the crafty proposal? 
Even before Douglas introduced his version of the Nebraska bill, political observers in 
the South had intimated that they would support the organization of Nebraska only under the 
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20 Ibid., 4. 
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terms of the Compromise of 1850.  The Enquirer accused the North of having repudiated the 
Missouri Compromise in 1850, only to claim its validity in respect to Nebraska in 1853.21  Of 
course, northerners intended precisely that.  The Missouri Compromise did not apply to the 
Mexican Cession; accordingly Congress had provided a different means of organizing Utah and 
New Mexico.  Passage of the Compromise of 1850, according to antislavery partisans, did not 
nullify the Missouri Compromise.  Northern Democrats and southerners, however, saw the 
matter quite differently.  The compromise measures had established the twin principles of 
congressional non-intervention and territorial sovereignty as the preferred policy of territorial 
organization.  Congress should defer to the wishes of the people on the slavery question.  
Supporters of the compromise principles saw the Douglas bill as a test of “how far gentlemen are 
willing practically to enforce their acquiescence” in non-intervention and territorial 
sovereignty.22  “Before this bill gets through Congress,” a Florida editor predicted, “the South 
will have an opportunity of seeing who among the members of both Houses construe the 
Compromise of 1850 as a settlement of the slavery difficulty.”23 
Why had the South come to embrace the principles of the Compromise of 1850, when a 
substantial number of southerners expressed skepticism four years earlier?  Put simply, 
conditions in 1854 differed greatly from those the South faced in 1850.  Then territorial 
sovereignty seemed destined to prevent slavery from entering the Mexican Cession.  California 
had drafted a free state constitution without congressional sanction, embodied the principle of 
territorial sovereignty—or squatter sovereignty, as southerners derisively labeled the doctrine.  
New Mexico seemed poised to follow suit with its own free state movement, supported by native 
Mexicans and a small number of Americans who had moved west to exploit the region’s natural 
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resources.  Southerners felt that they had lost the Mexican Cession because of territorial 
sovereignty.  But in Nebraska, southerners could gain a foothold for slavery only by 
implementing territorial sovereignty.  The Missouri Compromise prohibition on slavery stood on 
solid legal footing, unlike the Mexican prohibition on slavery in the cession.  Proslavery 
partisans recognized that territorial sovereignty could potentially circumvent the thirty-four year 
ban on slavery in the remainder of the Louisiana Purchase.  Though southerners seemed to 
embrace the fundamentals of the Nebraska report, they soon recognized that the plan had a 
significant flaw.  Douglas’s implication that the Compromise of 1850 had superseded the 
Missouri Compromise provided insufficient protection for southern interests.  Only by explicitly 
repealing the Compromise of 1820 could the South truly have a chance of extending the slave 
domain into Nebraska.  At this point, the impetus for repeal mixed with the familiar politics of 
slavery to create a concerted effort to repeal the Missouri Compromise. 
Days after the Senate Committee on Territories released its report on the Nebraska bill, 
the New York Herald, a northern Democratic newspaper with pro-southern proclivities, 
maintained that it contained an “artful dodge.”24   Few, if any, accepted Douglas’s effort to avoid 
contention over the Missouri Compromise.  The failure to repeal the slavery prohibition equaled 
a tacit endorsement of the Wilmot Proviso, the Herald argued.  Southerners could not have 
agreed more.  Indeed, they saw an effort among antislavery advocates to reopen the wounds that 
the Compromise of 1850 had purportedly closed.  “The compromise measures will soon again be 
in jeopardy,” a Louisiana writer opined.25  Southerners espoused the belief—sincere or not—that 
the compromise achieved four years earlier had settled the slavery question permanently and had, 
in spirit, supplanted the Missouri Compromise.  Facing northern opposition to the expansion of 
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25 New Orleans Louisiana Courier, January 18, 1854. 
 277	  
slavery, as well as pressure within the South to stand firm on the issue, southern politicians in 
Washington began to move for an explicit repeal of the Missouri Compromise’s ban on slavery. 
Most interestingly, the impetus for repeal came from southern Whigs who sought to 
prove themselves safer on slavery than their Democratic adversaries and to rejuvenate their 
moribund party.  Southern Whigs recognized that the Douglas bill left much to chance in its 
explicit refusal to repeal the slavery ban from 1820.  Additionally, they hoped to capitalize on 
southern skepticism of the Douglas formula for territorial sovereignty.  The Illinois senator had 
followed Lewis Cass’s definition of the doctrine by insisting that territorial legislatures could 
prohibit or permit slavery at their pleasure.  The bill of January 4, 1854, clearly expressed the 
Cass version of the doctrine.26  Even southern Democrats hoped to amend that portion of the bill.  
Southerners demanded that the “people of Nebraska shall have the privilege of admitting or 
excluding Slavery, when the form a State constitution,” a Georgia journalist declared.27  Many 
southerners continued to express their opposition to squatter sovereignty, whereby a select few 
individuals could take the reins of government and prevent slaveholders from sharing the 
territory, insisting that citizens could determine the future of slavery only when drafting a 
constitution.  
Two members of Congress took the lead in proposing the repeal of the Missouri 
Compromise’s slavery ban—a Whig senator from Kentucky and a Democratic representative 
from Alabama.  On January 16, Senator Archibald Dixon introduced an amendment that 
provided for the repeal of the ban on slavery.  Answering charges that he sought to embarrass the 
Democrats, Dixon declared, “I know no Whiggery, and I know no Democracy.  I am a pro-
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slavery man.  I am from a slaveholding State; I represent a slaveholding constituency; and I am 
here to maintain the rights of that people whenever they are presented before the Senate.”28  
Dixon and the Whigs hoped to resurrect their failing party by proving themselves safer on 
slavery than the Democrats, but their actions also bear witness that the preservation of slavery 
and southern rights came before party considerations.29   
In an unprecedented effort to prove himself and his party safe on slavery, Dixon went a 
step beyond repeal.  In what one historian has rightly called “one of the most extreme proslavery 
pieces of legislation ever aired in Congress,” the Dixon amendment also stipulated that American 
citizens had the right “to take and hold slaves within any of the Territories of the United States or 
of the States to be formed therefrom.”30  Because the Dixon amendment guaranteed federal 
protection of slavery in the territories as well as new states, it could not conceivably gain the 
support of the Senate.  It destroyed the principle of territorial sovereignty by specifically 
sanctioning congressional intervention for slavery in the territories, but the Kentucky senator’s 
move to repeal the Missouri Compromise’s ban on slavery had the support of southerners from 
both parties.  Recognizing that he would have to incorporate repeal into the Nebraska bill, 
Douglas consulted with his Whig colleague and received permission to take charge of the 
movement for repeal.31 
Even before Dixon introduced his amendment to the Senate, an Alabama representative 
anticipated the impetus for repeal and acted in the House of Representatives.  At the request of 
Douglas, the freshman Democrat Philip Phillips introduced his own amendment to repeal the 
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Missouri Compromise’s ban on slavery.32 Unlike the Dixon effort, in which the Kentucky Whig 
sought to jettison self-government in the territories, Phillips built his proposal on territorial 
sovereignty.  Written just days after Douglas introduced the Nebraska bill, the amendment 
stipulated that “the people of the Territory through their Territorial legislature may legislate upon 
the subject of slavery in any manner they may think proper not inconsistent to the Constitution of 
the United States, and all laws inconsistent with this authority or right shall, from and after the 
passage of this act, become inoperative void and of no force and effect.”33   
In sum, the Phillips amendment had two aims.  First, it unequivocally endorsed the 
Cass/Douglas version of territorial sovereignty.  Phillips, a Deep South congressman, had 
sanctioned the right of territorial legislatures to legislate on slavery.  Furthermore, the 
amendment had received the approbation of key southern members of the Senate, Missouri’s 
David Atchison, Robert M.T. Hunter and James Mason of Virginia, and Andrew P. Butler of 
South Carolina, all friends of Douglas, all powerful advocates of southern rights, and all 
individuals who would play a pivotal role in selling the Douglas bill to President Pierce and his 
administration.34  Undeniably, southerners continued to maintain different beliefs about the 
territorial sovereignty doctrine, but Phillips had taken a significant step toward placating all 
southern interests.  To his endorsement of territorial sovereignty, Phillips added the important 
caveat that any act of a territorial legislature could not conflict with the Constitution, thereby 
creating an opening for the judiciary to decide ultimately the meaning of territorial sovereignty 
and the fate of slavery in the territories.  Second, the amendment voided the Missouri 
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Compromise’s ban on slavery, but in more equivocal language than Dixon would use in his 
amendment just days later. 
The movement for repeal became a sine qua non for southern support; without voiding 
the restriction on slavery in Nebraska, Douglas could not muster sufficient votes to pass his bill.  
Phillips and Douglas had attempted to assuage southerners with some success, yet the oblique 
wording surrounding the repeal of the slavery restriction troubled others.  Dixon’s language 
regarding the Missouri Compromise proved far more acceptable to the South.  After the 
Kentucky senator presented his amendment, Douglas knew that he would have to endorse the 
explicit repeal of the Missouri Compromise restriction on slavery.  Meanwhile, the southerners 
in Congress surely knew that they had seized the initiative on the Nebraska bill and the future of 
slavery.   
Northern Democrats seemed willing to broker a deal with the southern wing of their party 
in order to pass the Nebraska bill and remove the slavery question from the political discourse.  
Certain party stalwarts called on Lewis Cass to endorse repeal of the slavery ban.  The aging 
Michigan senator, however, sent mixed signals about his stance on the Nebraska bill and the 
Dixon amendment.  Certain newspapers reported that Cass would “not only vote for the repeal of 
the Missouri compromise as far as it interferes with the compromise of 1850,” but that he would 
also declare the slavery ban unconstitutional.35  On the contrary, Cass vigorously denied the New 
York Herald’s report, for in private, he advised President Pierce to oppose the repeal effort for 
fear that it would irreparably fracture the party.36  Cass may well have deplored the idea of 
repeal, but he also bore some personal animosity toward Douglas, who in the opinion of the elder 
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senator had unfairly and unceremoniously appropriated the territorial sovereignty doctrine for 
himself.  Accordingly, the elder senator kept silent for some time, refusing to lend either his 
name or his support to the Nebraska bill. 
While the nation debated the merits of repealing the Missouri Compromise ban on 
slavery, Douglas worked feverishly behind the scenes to craft a revised bill and secure the 
necessary southern support.  Southern public opinion left no doubt of the course that the Illinois 
senator would have to take.  Passage of the Compromise of 1850 had remodeled the nation’s 
territorial system, according to the Richmond Enquirer.  “Does [the Compromise of 1850] render 
null and void the Missouri Compromise of 1820, which, if left in operation, will prohibit slavery 
in Nebraska and commit a gross outrage upon the South,” its editor asked.  “We do not entertain 
a doubt on the subject.”37  In order to protect the rights of all citizens—slaveholders included—
Congress needed to remove itself from the slavery debate and “throw its decision upon the courts 
and the people who may occupy the Territory, when it shall be sufficiently populated to be 
admitted as a State into the Union.”38  Indeed, a number of southerners demanded explicit repeal 
because without it, they feared that the judiciary might strike down slavery in Nebraska based on 
the Compromise of 1820.39 
After consulting with Archibald Dixon as well as his southern Democratic colleagues, 
Douglas prepared a revised Nebraska bill that included repeal of the Missouri Compromise.  The 
senator, however, faced opposition from the president, who had concurred with Lewis Cass’s 
assessment of repeal and had pledged to oppose the effort. Pierce did not hold to that position for 
long; while Cass sincerely condemned repeal in any form, the president merely desired to avoid 
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addressing the issue directly.  Convinced by his attorney general that the slavery restriction in the 
Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional, Pierce sought to leave the decision to the judiciary.  
The cabinet prepared an amendment to the Nebraska bill stipulating that “the rights of persons 
and property shall be subject only to the restrictions and limitations imposed by the Constitution 
of the United States and the acts giving governments, to be adjusted by a decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States.”40  In its ultimate outcome, the ponderous amendment bore 
resemblance to the unsuccessful Clayton Compromise of 1848, which would have left the status 
of slavery in the Mexican Cession in the hands of the Supreme Court.  The president may well 
have known, too, that certain southerners would support a measure that would refer the issue to 
the southern-dominated Supreme Court.  Douglas would have acquiesced in the amendment, but 
Atchison and his southern colleagues rejected the effort.  They demanded direct repeal. 
With one day left before he intended to deliver his revised bill to the Senate, Douglas 
faced the seemingly impossible task of convincing Pierce and the cabinet to accept a more direct 
form of repeal.  At the behest of key southern senators, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis 
arranged an extraordinary Sunday meeting that has become legendary in the history of the effort 
to organize Nebraska.  The pious president normally refused to conduct business on Sundays, but 
Davis convinced him of the necessity to discuss the legislation.41 That afternoon, Douglas, 
Davis, and a number of southern legislators met with Pierce at the White House.  The president 
must have faced one of the most surreal experiences of his young presidency as the most 
influential southern Democrats in Congress, and the most influential northern Democratic 
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senator, confronted the titular head of their party with an ultimatum for repeal.42  Pierce 
capitulated.  But because the president “had a way of changing his mind when later advice was 
given,” Douglas insisted that Pierce place his assent in writing.43  The next day, Douglas 
presented the revised bill to the Senate.  And amazingly, at the same time Pierce declared that he 
considered support of the new bill a test of party faith.  In sum, he staked the success of his 
presidency on the Douglas bill. 
Douglas doubly surprised his colleagues when he took the Senate floor on Monday, 
January 23.  The senator’s revised bill contained two provisions that fundamentally altered the 
legislation.  First, the bill delivered on his promise to his southern colleagues by declaring the 
eighth section of the Missouri Compromise “inoperative.”44  He had inserted the amendment 
drafted at the White House the previous day, much to the surprise of those who had not taken 
part in the negotiations.  Second, the senator stunned his colleagues by dividing Nebraska into 
two territories—Kansas to the south and Nebraska to the north.  Douglas claimed that agents 
from the Nebraska territory, and especially from Iowa, had petitioned for division of the vast 
land.45  Though no explicit proof has ever surfaced, the record suggests that Douglas and the 
people from the West advocated division of the territory as a corollary to the repeal of the 
Missouri Compromise.  “The object of this construction of the compromise of 1850, and the 
introduction of two territories instead of one,” the New York Herald noted, “is understood to be 
one territory for the North and the other for the South.”46  Kansas would lie west of Missouri, 
and would likely become a slave state.  With its proximity to the free state of Iowa, Nebraska 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 The best account of this meeting is in Nichols, Franklin Pierce, 321-324.  See also Johannsen, Stephen A. 
Douglas, 414-415. 
43 Nichols, Franklin Pierce, 323. 
44 CG, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess., 221-222. 
45 See Malin, The Nebraska Question, 309-310. 
46 New York Herald, January 24, 1854. 
 284	  
would almost certainly become a free state as well.  Regardless of geography, the bill declared 
that “all questions pertaining to slavery in the new Territories, and in the new States to be formed 
therefore, are to be left to the decision of the people residing therein, through their appropriate 
representatives.”47  Douglas had succeeded at protecting the principle of territorial sovereignty. 
One week later, the Little Giant rose in the Senate to explain his Kansas-Nebraska bill to 
his constituents and to the nation.  But he also sought to defend the bill against a strident attack 
from northern antislavery advocates.  A group of six senators led by Salmon P. Chase of Ohio 
had issued an “Appeal of the Independent Democrats in Congress to the People of the United 
States,” accusing Douglas of serving a “Slave Power” conspiracy that sought to extend its 
domain.48   The label affixed to the address gave sufficient cause for alarm, as some feared for 
the effect of the Kansas-Nebraska bill on the Democratic Party.  Chase and his associates 
condemned the repeal of the Missouri Compromise ban on slavery and called on Democrats to 
resist Douglas and the Pierce administration.49  Their effort led Douglas to respond with a 
vituperative attack against the appeal and the opponents of his bill.  On the “holy Sabbath, while 
other Senators were engaged in attending divine worship, these Abolition confederates were 
assembled in secret conclave, worship plotting by what means they should deceive the people of 
the United States, and prostrate the character of brother Senators.”50  Of course, Douglas omitted 
that he and his associates had conducted business on the same Sabbath day, when they called on 
President Pierce at the White House. 
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The senator spoke with incredulity as he described the efforts of those who opposed 
applying territorial sovereignty to Kansas and Nebraska.  The Compromise of 1850, he 
maintained, had superseded the Missouri Compromise. Northern antislavery Democrats had no 
one to blame but themselves for the eclipse of the Missouri Compromise.  “The first time that the 
principles of the Missouri compromise were ever abandoned, the first time they were ever 
rejected by Congress, was by the defeat” of Douglas’s own provision to extend the Missouri 
Compromise line to the Pacific Ocean.  By whom was that defeat effected,” Douglas asked.  “By 
northern votes, with Free-Soil proclivities.”51 
The magnanimity of Democrats from both North and South had led politicians to propose 
extending the compromise line, Douglas suggested.  Now he aimed to restore the “great principle 
of self-government” by affirming the right of the people in the territories to decide whether or 
not they desired slavery.52  Furthermore, he insisted on the right of sovereignty during the 
territorial phase, of course with the ubiquitous proviso that their actions conform to the 
Constitution.  Congress simply could not, nor should it, attempt to establish the domestic 
institutions of the territories.  Douglas used his own state as an example of how congressional 
interdiction of slavery had failed.  Congress failed to prohibit slavery in Illinois Territory in spite 
of the Northwest Ordinance “because the people there regarded it as an invasion of their 
rights.”53  Finally, Douglas maintained, with the Kansas-Nebraska bill the nation would return to 
its democratic principles of self-government and popular sovereignty.  The senator had 
inaugurated the debate over Kansas-Nebraska in a bold fashion; afterward, he would face the 
task of preventing northerners—especially the Chase faction—from delaying deliberations over 
the bill. 
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Southerners generally hailed the Douglas effort as a vindication of their section’s rights.  
The senator had demolished the artificial line preventing them from equal participation in the 
territories, thereby correcting the mistake that their predecessors had made some thirty-four years 
before.  Southern commentators portrayed the actions and words of the abolitionist vanguard as 
hypocritical.  “The natural religion of Abolitionism is all laid aside, and the South is appealed to 
in the name of the binding obligation of the Missouri Compromise—an act of Congress,” a South 
Carolinian remarked.  “It is a prodigious fall from the clouds, for such high-reaching spirits as 
the Free-soilers.”54   
Douglas’s southern colleagues hailed the establishment of self-government, “the 
redeeming feature of the Compromise bill of 1850,” as the resurrection of sound Democratic 
doctrine and the guarantor of southern rights.55  Georgia Senator Robert Toombs best explained 
the southern position, maintaining that the North had long ago made the Missouri Compromise a 
dead letter.  “They have adhered to its prohibitory provisions, but uniformly and nearly 
unanimously trampled its principles under foot so far as the South was to be benefited by it.”56  
Conversely, Toombs praised Douglas for recognizing the Compromise of 1850 as a “compact” 
recognized by North and South.  The Kansas-Nebraska bill wisely affirmed it as national policy 
for present and future. 57  Howell Cobb of Georgia lauded the bill as a “doctrine worthy of the 
democratic party.”58  Recognizing that in times past the South had divided over territorial 
sovereignty, Douglas responded, “our southern friends have only to stand firm & leave us of the 
North to fight the great Battle. . . . The great principle of self government is at stake & surely the 
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people of this country are never going to decide that the principle upon which our whole 
republican system rests is vicious & wrong.”59  Douglas appreciated the plaudits of his southern 
colleagues, but recognized that he needed more from their section. 
 At first glance it seemed that southerners had gained mightily from allying with Douglas 
to repeal the Missouri Compromise and establish territorial sovereignty as national policy.  But 
some observers viewed the situation warily.  “I perceive a new storm is to break out in Congress 
and the country by the organization of the Nebraska Territory,” former president John Tyler 
wrote.  “As customary, I presume it is to end, as has heretofore been the case, in the despoilment 
of the South.”60  Tyler feared that the abolitionists would move strongly against the Douglas 
bill’s proponents.  Indeed, his sentiment reflected a growing fear in what southerners perceived 
as a movement by abolitionist fanatics against southern rights.  “Let the power of meddling with 
the domestic institutions of the States and Territories be taken away from Congress, and fanatics 
will cease to send men to Congress for the sole purpose of mooting this dangerous question,” a 
southern correspondent cried.61 
 Not only did proslavery advocates accuse their northern opponents of rank hypocrisy, but 
they also charged them with ignoring the Constitution.  The argument that the North opposed 
extending the principles of the Compromise of 1850 became a staple of the southern response to 
the antislavery forces.  But proslavery supporters advanced a more potent supposition.  The tenth 
amendment to the Constitution vested in the people the power of determining whether slavery 
would exist in the territories.  They lauded the Kansas-Nebraska bill because it made “a clean 
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sweep of all sectional compacts, dictated by trading aspirants for the Presidency,” and left the 
issue of slavery in the territories “directly in the sovereignty of the people.”62 
 Southerners and their allies had begun to craft a nuanced argument that supported the 
Kansas-Nebraska bill based on the Anglo-American heritage of popular sovereignty.  Political 
theorists had long used the term to describe the will of the people to form and direct their own 
political affairs and institutions.63  During the Kansas-Nebraska debate, supporters of the bill 
appropriated the term—and the rich history behind it—to bolster their claim that the legislation 
would return the nation to first principles.  Accordingly, writers hearkened back to classical 
political theorists such as Edmund Burke, John Locke, and others to legitimate the doctrine of 
non-intervention and territorial sovereignty, which increasingly became known as popular 
sovereignty.  “We have an opportunity now of restoring the constitution to its original vigor, and 
of vindicating the great principle of self-government,” a New Orleans Democrat wrote, “and we 
will do both by passage of the Nebraska act.”64  According to its southern supporters, the 
doctrine of popular sovereignty with respect to slavery in the territories had the promise to end 
the bitter sectional quarrel because it respected states’ rights and local control over domestic 
affairs.  It respected the Constitution.  And in the spirit of Jacksonian democracy, it respected the 
vox populi. 
 A substantial number of southerners rallied to support the Douglas bill, with its repeal of 
the long-hated Missouri Compromise ban on slavery and the affirmation of local control over the 
issue of slavery.  While some in the South undoubtedly questioned whether it sanctioned squatter 
sovereignty, the legislation gained significant support below the Mason-Dixon Line.  “We cannot 
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imagine what objection any reasonable man at the South can raise against Judge Douglas’s 
doctrine,” a Georgia editor declared.65  Other journals followed suit in declaring the Kansas-
Nebraska bill as safe for the South, because it left the territories open to equal participation for 
northerners and southerners.  “To adopt the Douglas bill only leaves the question where it should 
be—in the hands of the actual settlers, and equally within the control of the North and South.”66  
In sum, the Kansas-Nebraska bill garnered support from the South for several reasons.  First, the 
South’s political leaders had succeeded in forcing Douglas to include an explicit repeal of the 
1820 ban on slavery; second, the legislation affirmed the principle of popular sovereignty.  The 
two actually worked in tandem.  Without popular sovereignty in Kansas and Nebraska, 
southerners could have no hope of extending slavery into the region.  Of course, without repeal 
of the 36° 30’ line not even popular sovereignty could prevail.  Southerners could—and did—
remain divided on the interpretation of popular sovereignty even though Douglas had sent strong 
signals that he believed that territorial legislatures could settle the issue.  Nevertheless, many 
believed they had reaffirmed southern rights and southern power with considerable success.67 
 Though Kansas-Nebraska received substantial support in the South, contrarians raised 
concerns about the bill and its meaning.68  Former Alabama Senator Jeremiah Clemens emerged 
as an opponent of the bill, predicting that with its passage, a “floodgate will be opened, and a 
torrent turned loose upon the country which will sweep away in its devastating course every 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Milledgeville Federal Union, February 14, 1854. 
66 Dover Delaware State Reporter, February 24, 1854.  See also ibid., February 14, 1854; New Orleans Louisiana 
Courier, February 17, 1854. 
67 My interpretation of southern Democratic support of popular sovereignty and Kansas-Nebraska builds on the 
work of Cooper, The South and the Politics of Slavery, 346-349. 
68 For southern opposition to Kansas-Nebraska, see Avery O. Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 1848-
1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1953), 192-205.  Craven, however, exaggerates opposition in 
the South to the Douglas bill. 
 290	  
vestige of the compromise of 1850.”69  He declared himself “fully against the doctrines of Gen. 
Cass’s Nicholson letter,” because it sanctioned squatter sovereignty.  Now Douglas, who had 
become the chief proponent of popular sovereignty, wanted to repeal the slavery prohibition in 
the Missouri Compromise and replace it with squatter sovereignty.  Clemens predicted that the 
courts would have to determine the constitutional interpretation of popular sovereignty.  John 
Minor Botts, a former Whig congressman from Virginia, excoriated Douglas and his 
“mischievous and pernicious” effort to repeal of the slavery ban.70  He predicted that the bill 
would merely reopen the corrosive slavery question and destroy the benefits of the Missouri 
Compromise, which had provided relative peace for thirty-four years. 
 In the Senate, Sam Houston of Texas emerged as one of the most vocal critics of the 
Kansas-Nebraska bill.  Standing against the Pierce administration and much of the Democratic 
Party, the colorful senator dismissed the legislation as folly.  Like other opponents of the bill, 
Houston predicted that it would “convulse the country from Maine to the Rio Grande.”71  Not 
only did he believe the bill would reopen the debate over slavery in a most dangerous form, and 
for a mere abstraction, but he also concluded Douglas’s misinterpreted the true meaning of 
popular sovereignty.  Houston would not “apply the principle to the Territories in their 
unorganized and chrysalis condition.”72   
 Yet the southern supporters of Kansas-Nebraska greatly outnumbered the bill’s 
opponents.  Under normal circumstances, one would surmise that the Whigs would have stood in 
opposition to the Democratic measure.  But the politics of slavery had again blurred party lines.  
After all, a Whig—Archibald Dixon of Kentucky—had first proposed the repeal of the Missouri 
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Compromise’s prohibition of slavery.73  Not all southern Whigs warmly endorsed the Kansas-
Nebraska bill, but they recognized that a majority of the South saw the bill as a bold defense of 
slavery and southern rights.  Even at the risk of further diluting party lines, they had to support 
the bill in order to maintain credibility in the South. 
 Even as southerners gave solid support to the Kansas-Nebraska bill, significant questions 
lingered about the interpretation of popular sovereignty.  Though some happily ignored the issue, 
others could not overlook any implication that popular sovereignty equaled squatter sovereignty.  
Several factors provoked a response from wary southerners.  After maintaining a long but 
studied silence on the Douglas bill, Lewis Cass delivered an address to the Senate regarding the 
measure in late February.74  The aging Michigan senator confessed that he did not support the 
movement for repeal, instead hoping that Douglas and his allies would remain silent on the 
Missouri Compromise.  He endorsed popular sovereignty, though his language seemed equivocal 
at times.  With advancing age and infirm health, the senator had gained a reputation for labored 
oratory, which only became worse when he tried to convince both sections that popular 
sovereignty would serve their interests.  Cass declared that the citizens of the territories “are their 
own masters, under the Constitution, as much as the people of a State, and are the property of no 
man.”75  Of course, he added the phrase “under the Constitution” to signal that in the future, the 
courts might well have to decide the true meaning of popular sovereignty.  In sum, the senator 
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called for a return to the “true principles” of the Constitution as outlined in his Nicholson letter 
some six years earlier.76   
Cass’s tone concerning the South, however, did much to offend slaveholders.  In terms 
perhaps clearer than ever before, the senator affirmed that he never meant for his doctrine to 
sanction the introduction of slavery in the territories.  Likewise, he never fathomed that slavery 
would enter either Kansas or Nebraska, just as it would never enter the Mexican Cession.  Cass 
merely intended the principle of popular sovereignty to affirm the principle of equality in the 
territories.  For southern senators and anyone else who read the Cass speech, his words seemed 
to ring hollow.  Southerners who doubted popular sovereignty only had their mistrust of the 
venerable politician confirmed.77  Indeed, the southern press interpreted his remarks to mean that 
slavery could enter the territories only “by positive enactment of the territorial legislature.”78   
They considered such a position anathema, and a “question belonging properly to the Supreme 
Court of the United States, and not to Congress.”79  Even supporters of popular sovereignty 
lamented the senator’s speech.  “Gen. Cass’ gingerly speech was a source of profound regret to 
me,” a correspondent wrote to Stephen Douglas.  “He spoke as if annoyed & frightened at the 
resurrection of his own offspring.”80  For the sake of the Democratic Party, many politicians and 
spokesmen pleaded for unity.  Southern Democrats rallied behind the bill and its author, pleading 
with their fellow citizens for unity on its passage.  “As usual with the unfortunate and fated 
South we have split into any number of factions upon this Bill,” a Georgia Democrat lamented.81  
Other observers predicted disaster if the South failed to unite behind the Kansas-Nebraska bill.  
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Without unity on the issue, “the South is certain to lose by a division among her 
representatives.”82 
Notwithstanding criticism leveled from the North or the South, two facts became evident 
even in the early stages of the debate.  First, Douglas had unquestionably eclipsed the Michigan 
senator as the leading advocate of popular sovereignty.  Second, he had done so with the support 
of numerous southern Democrats, and increasingly with the approval of southern Whigs.  Many 
southerners saw the Kansas-Nebraska bill as perhaps the best deal they could obtain under 
present circumstances.  Popular sovereignty in California and New Mexico had failed the South; 
the former had become a free state, while the latter seemed destined to follow suit.  Kansas 
presented an altogether different scenario.  The citizens of Missouri, many of whom held slaves, 
had long shown interest in settling in the territory to their west.  Furthermore, the division of the 
Nebraska territory into two separate entities—Kansas and Nebraska—suggested that 
slaveholders might enter Kansas, while Nebraska would almost certainly become a free state.  
Given these circumstances, popular sovereignty in Kansas might actually work to the benefit of 
southerners. 
Ultra states’ rights southerners had voiced concerns about the Douglas bill and applying 
popular sovereignty to Kansas.  Instead, they adhered to the common property doctrine first 
advanced in the late 1840s by John C. Calhoun while others seemed to ignore the implications of 
the Kansas-Nebraska bill and popular sovereignty.83  Robert Toombs of Georgia defined popular 
sovereignty in the traditional southern way, arguing that the power to prohibit slavery came only 
when a territory became a state.  “Every citizen of each State carries with him into the Territories 
this equal right of enjoyment of the common domain,” Toombs declared, but the “inchoate 
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society of the Territories” could do nothing more than protect the rights of property—the people 
residing therein could not legislate against a particular type of property until they assumed 
statehood.84 Virginia Senator Robert M.T. Hunter proposed to leave the matter alone, since 
proponents of the bill differed on its interpretation.  Like many other politicians, Hunter believed 
the courts could and would ultimately decide the proper interpretation of popular sovereignty.  
“There is a difference of opinion amongst the friends of this measure, as to the extent of the 
limits which the Constitution imposes upon the Territorial Legislatures,” Hunter said.  The 
senator invoked the Clayton compromise in saying, “I am willing to leave this point, upon which 
the friends of the bill are at difference, to the decision of the courts.”85 
Moderates chose to ignore the long-standing debate over when territories could exercise 
popular sovereignty, even though the truth became clearer over the course of the congressional 
debate.  Nevertheless, Democrats chose to believe that the courts could and probably would 
decide the issue in the future.  Antislavery northerners, however, had prepared an ingenious plan 
to discredit the doctrine by defining it in terms that the South could not accept.  The amendments 
contemplated by the antislavery forces would, in the words of a Texas correspondent, “test the 
sincerity of southerners, now, as to the non-intervention of Congress with respect to slavery in 
the territories.”86  Salmon P. Chase of Ohio, the leader of northern opposition to the bill, 
proposed an amendment specifically granting territorial legislatures the right to prohibit slavery, 
an effort that one southern journal termed “insidious and mischievous.”87  Chase and his 
associates clearly wanted to taint popular sovereignty with an antislavery interpretation in an 
effort to strip the bill of southern support.   
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Two southern senators—Andrew Pierce Butler of South Carolina and Albert Gallatin 
Brown of Mississippi—took the Ohioan’s bait and decried the notion that territorial legislatures 
could determine the status of slavery.  Lewis Cass reminded them that the “the power of the 
people of the Territories to legislate upon their internal concerns, during the period of these 
temporary governments, is most clearly given in this bill, if the Constitution permits it.”88  He 
left open the possibility that popular sovereignty would have its day in court, where the judiciary 
would decide its constitutional meaning.  While Butler vigorously disagreed with Cass’s 
interpretation of popular sovereignty, he pronounced himself, alongside Hunter of Virginia, 
“perfectly willing to leave it under the Constitution, to be decided by the law tribunals of the 
country.”89  Critics of popular sovereignty had long accused its proponents of shrouding its true 
meaning in order to maintain bisectional support.  But given statements from Cass and Douglas, 
among others, it seems more plausible that the supporters of popular sovereignty defined the 
doctrine clearly, but always subjected their interpretation to the ultimate decision of the 
judiciary—a point on which both the North and South could agree.  When legislators used the 
phrase subject to the Constitution, they meant subject to the Supreme Court. 
Another critical issue directly related to the implementation of popular sovereignty 
surfaced in the Senate debate.  Previous legislation organizing territories had given territorial 
governors, as well as Congress, the right of veto over local legislation.90  Both provisions 
threatened the free exercise of popular sovereignty since the president appointed territorial 
governors and Congress could nullify the laws passed by a territorial legislature.  Douglas moved 
to amend the bill by giving territorial legislatures the right to override a governor’s veto and strip 
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Congress of its right to review and nullify legislation.91  The unprecedented move would cement 
the status of popular sovereignty in the territories and indisputably remove Congress from any 
deliberations over the future of slavery in the West—precisely the aim of the senator from 
Illinois. 
Over the previous two months, the debate in the Senate had addressed at great length 
numerous points concerning the meaning and implementation of popular sovereignty in Kansas 
and Nebraska, but Douglas worked assiduously to preserve the cornerstone of his legislation, 
keep the bill on track, and prevent any effort to delay its passage.  By the end of February, the 
senator signaled that he would move to close debate on the bill and bring the measure to a vote, 
culminating a months-long process of spirited debate and intense backroom negotiations.  
Beginning on March 2 and spilling over into the next day, the senators engaged in final 
deliberations before the vote.  Leaders from both the North and the South delivered their final 
arguments over the merits of the Douglas bill.  Southern senators repeated the now-familiar 
refrain that the North had long ago abandoned the principles of the Missouri Compromise when 
they deemed it expedient, only in the present to characterize it as a sacred compact.  “Will any 
one dare to rise here to-day and say that the principle of the bill is not the American principle—
the principle upon which our whole system of government is based—the right of the people to 
govern themselves,” exclaimed Whig senator William C. Dawson of Georgia.92  Why, he asked, 
should senators object to the very idea of self-government that their Revolutionary forebears had 
embraced?  Other senators echoed his claims, while members of the northern antislavery caucus 
repeated their dismay over the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. 
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At eleven-thirty on March 3, over ten hours after the Senate had convened, Douglas rose 
to give his final defense of the bill.  Throughout the long day, the Illinois senator had listened to 
criticism from his northern colleagues and bided his time waiting to respond.  With his patience 
worn thin, Douglas gave a three-hour long speech that for sheer vitriol rivaled the address in 
which he introduced the Kansas-Nebraska bill.  After addressing a few ancillary criticisms, the 
senator turned his focus to the “great principle involved in the bill”—popular sovereignty.93  
Senators from the North had accused Douglas of reigniting the slavery debate by repealing the 
Missouri Compromise’s ban on slavery and substituting popular sovereignty.  He flatly rejected 
their allegation; indeed, “from 1820 to 1850 the abolition of congressional interference with 
slavery in the Territories and new States had so far prevailed as to keep up an incessant agitation 
in Congress, and throughout the country, whenever any new Territory was to be acquired or 
organized.”94  The Kansas-Nebraska bill aimed to calm the fury over slavery in the territories by 
placing it in the hands of the people concerned, not fanatics in the North and South. 
Douglas asserted that he had viewed the Compromise of 1850, which he played a pivotal 
role in passing through Congress, as a “general principle of universal application” for addressing 
the slavery issue.95  The Kansas-Nebraska bill, he argued, followed the principles passed into law 
in 1850 and sanctioned by both parties in their campaign platforms in 1852.  Betraying 
exasperation with the northern members of his party, the Illinoisan defended himself against 
charges that he did the bidding of the Slave Power.  Douglas engaged in a curt dialogue with 
Whig William Seward of New York over the Missouri Compromise and its status as a compact 
between the sections.  He excoriated Massachusetts Free Soil Senator Charles Sumner and 
Salmon Chase—both of whom had ceaselessly attacked the bill and upheld the Missouri  
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Compromise.  To them, Douglas replied, “The Missouri compromise was interference; the 
compromise of 1850 was non-interference, leaving the people to exercise their rights under the 
Constitution.”96  He predicted that passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill would forever destroy 
“all sectional parties and sectional agitations,” effectively silencing men like Seward, Chase, and 
Sumner as well as the proslavery fanatics of the South.97  Moderation in the nation would prevail 
if popular sovereignty prevailed in Congress.  On that note, Douglas concluded his remarks early 
in the morning of March 4. 
The debate continued for several more hours as Sam Houston of Texas made one final 
plea for maintaining the Missouri Compromise.  At five-o’clock in the morning, after seventeen 
hours of continuous debate, the Senate passed the Kansas-Nebraska bill by a vote of 37-14.98  
Southern Democrats and Whigs united to support the bill; only Houston and John Bell of 
Tennessee voted nay.  Fourteen northern Democrats voted for the bill, while four voted nay.  The 
Democrats had held together, though not without some struggle.  As for the Whig Party, 
however, the vote revealed a fatal division between its northern and southern wings.  Nine 
southern Whigs voted for Douglas’s bill, while six northern Whigs voted against it.  Three 
Whigs from the North had left the Senate floor.  In the Senate, however, the bill would have 
passed without any southern Whig support.99  Douglas had succeeded brilliantly in shepherding 
the Kansas-Nebraska bill through the Senate.  The governor of North Carolina wrote the senator, 
expressing the “proud satisfaction” of North Carolinians and southerners in general with his 
“statesmanlike and patriotic” efforts to affirm the principle of popular sovereignty.100  A Virginia  
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editor called the bill the “greatest triumph that the South and the Constitution has ever had.”101  
Southerners congratulated themselves on the fact that they had united  “with a unanimity 
unprecedented in the annals of legislation, to approve a principle in ’54 about the propriety of 
which she was divided in ’50.”102 
The Little Giant had convinced enough of his colleagues that congressional non-
intervention and popular sovereignty would prove safe for their respective interests.  Removing 
the slavery issue from Congress would quiet the increasingly bellicose political discourse; 
allowing the people in the territories themselves to determine their own course with regard to 
slavery would uphold the American tradition self-government.  But the adroit politician also 
knew that the biggest battle would come in the House of Representatives, where recalcitrant 
northern Democrats might well buck the administration and oppose the legislation.  Regardless 
of the potential outcome, Douglas knew that he would not achieve a landslide victory in the 
lower house.  Supporters urged Douglas and the friends of the bill to keep the issue in front of 
the public.  “Popular Sovereignty will win, if it is thoroughly & properly discussed & 
understood,” a Kansas-Nebraska supporter wrote to Douglas.103  Indeed, the public discussion of 
popular sovereignty did not abate. 
The leading voices for popular sovereignty stressed the common sense nature of the 
doctrine—self-government should apply to slavery in the territories as much as it did to any 
other American institution.  “Ultimately, the social institutions of all Territories seeking and 
obtaining admission into this Union on equal terms must be moulded and fashioned by the 
people thereof when they possess a sufficient population to entitle them to take rank as states,” 
the New York Herald declared.  It became axiomatic among the supporters of popular 
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sovereignty that the doctrine embodied the essence of American politics and the nature of people 
as political actors.  Settlers in the territories would naturally take responsibility for determining 
their own ways of life and domestic institutions.  Conversely, they would resent any effort from a 
distant federal government to direct them otherwise.  Characterized in these terms, popular 
sovereignty seemed eminently wise. 
Southern advocates linked popular sovereignty with the states’-rights doctrine that their 
section had embraced for years.  Emboldened by the movement to repeal the Missouri 
Compromise ban on slavery, southerners lashed out at those who believed that men in 
Washington could determine whether slaves would pass into the territories.  The federal 
government had no power “to prevent a Southern man from carrying his slaves to any Northern 
latitude he might select,” a New Orleans editor stated, “provided the local authority of State or 
Territory permitted him to locate his habitation within their limits.”  No person who had a 
“correct understanding of State rights” and the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution could 
declare otherwise.104 
One of the most impassioned defenses of popular sovereignty came from a Georgia 
Democrat writing under the pseudonym of Cato.  Recognizing that northerners sought to exploit 
divisions in the South over the doctrine, Cato entreated his fellow southerners to stand firm for 
the right of the people to determine the status of slavery in the territories for themselves.  
Antislavery newspapers in the North noted strains of southern dissent toward squatter 
sovereignty.105  Though a significant contingent of southern leaders rejected the notion of 
squatter sovereignty—that the first settlers on the ground could forever determine whether to 
permit or prohibit slavery—Cato expressed little concern of such an eventuality.  He wrote, “in 
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future territory acquired by this government, under the great principle of non-intervention and 
the sovereign right of the people to make their own laws, wherever slavery will be found 
advantageous there it will go.”106   
Likewise, he warned the people of the South that if they rejected popular sovereignty, 
they would “place slavery at the mercy of a growing number of representatives of the free 
States,” which would be “the most critical and dangerous position it could possibly occupy.”107  
Cato astutely recognized the diminishing power of the South in the halls of Congress, especially 
the House of Representatives.  In a letter to Douglas, New York Governor Horatio Seymour had 
expressed concern that antislavery Democrats sought “to abolitionize the rank & file of the 
party.”  Furthermore, the governor predicted that “Southern men will yet realize that they 
committed an error in remaining passive spectators of a ruthless crusade against” northern 
moderate Democrats.108  Cato seemed to believe the claims of northern Democrats like Seymour 
and tried to impress on southerners that they could not abandon their northern brethren.  He 
argued that the South would fare far better by placing the future of slavery in the hands of local 
communities that would act in their own best interests, rather than in Congress, where an ever-
growing phalanx of antislavery politicians sought to end the institution. 
Like Douglas, careful political observers in the South knew that the Kansas-Nebraska bill 
faced stiff opposition in the House of Representatives.  Southern Democrats rallied the party 
faithful by appealing to the virtues of popular sovereignty while seeking to extinguish claims that 
the bill would foist squatter sovereignty on the South.  “Some profess to support the Nebraska 
bill because the doctrine of Squatter Sovereignty is embodied in it, others support it because the 
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doctrine is not admitted in the bill,” a Georgia editor observed.109  Democratic regulars in the 
South, however, did not see the difference of opinion as an obstacle.  They believed, in the words 
of Cato, that if “any doubt arises upon the constitutionality of a territorial law the tribunal of 
judgment is not Congress but the Supreme Court.”110  On this point both northern and southern 
Democrats could agree.  “The extreme pro slavery, as well as the anti-slavery men, will still 
desire to fight out the battle on the compromise and slave extension issues,” a New York 
Democrat wrote, “but the moderate men of both parties will resolve to leave over those points to 
be discussed and settled on their own legitimate ground”—namely the territorial legislatures and, 
on appeal, the Supreme Court.111 
While the nation debated the merits and meaning of popular sovereignty, the House of 
Representatives labored over the Kansas-Nebraska bill.112  A close Douglas associate, fellow 
Illinoisan William A. Richardson, had introduced the bill on March 21, but a recalcitrant New 
York Democrat used a parliamentary maneuver to bury the legislation under a mountain of other 
bills before the House.  The Kansas-Nebraska supporters fought valiantly, but the amendment of 
Francis B. Cutting to commit the bill to the full House, where it would rank below forty-nine 
other bills, succeeded on a close vote.113  The Cutting amendment showed the managers of the 
Kansas-Nebraska bill that they faced an almost impossible battle to bring the bill to the floor, let 
alone secure passage.  Fortunately for Douglas, who maintained an almost constant presence in 
the House chamber while the representatives considered his bill, his associates proved equal to 
the task.  The senator as well as representatives from the Pierce administration placed intense 
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pressure on House Democrats to clear quickly other legislation so that they could debate the 
Kansas-Nebraska bill.114   
By early May, Richardson had brought the bill before the House for debate, though it 
seemed that the opposition might kill it yet through a myriad of objections to the way in which 
supporters had introduced the legislation.  Finally, Alexander Stephens of Georgia broke the 
parliamentary logjam.  The Georgia Whig had emerged as an ardent supporter of the legislation, 
considering it the best possible deal the South could obtain.  “I feel a deep interest in the success 
of the measure as a Southern man,” he wrote to an associate.115  Stephens believed that while 
slavery might never gain hold in either Nebraska or Kansas, the nation could gain more territory 
in the future—perhaps in Cuba or elsewhere in the Caribbean.  Establishing popular sovereignty 
as the principle by which the nation would judge where slavery would or would not pass could 
greatly benefit the South in the future.116  Given his support of popular sovereignty, Stephens 
worked assiduously to ensure that the Kansas-Nebraska bill received a floor vote.  On May 22, 
the House passed the Kansas-Nebraska bill by a vote of 113-100.  Southern Democrats provided 
nearly unanimous support, but without help from southern Whigs the bill could very well have 
failed.  Thirteen southern Whigs provided “the critical margin of victory,” while seven voted 
against the bill.117   The House vote confirmed the splitting of the Whig Party evinced by the 
Senate vote almost three months earlier.  For the Democrats, however, the House vote revealed 
sharper differences between the northern and southern wings of the party.  The northern 
Democracy divided evenly—forty-four representatives voted yea and forty-four voted nay.  
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Democrats in New England and the northern states of the Old Northwest provided significant 
opposition to Kansas-Nebraska.118  On May 30, President Pierce signed into law the bill that he 
had reluctantly thrown his administration’s support behind and had made a test of party faith. 
Supporters hailed the vote with a jubilant response.  “The contest in the House was close 
and hot but we whipped the opposition out and carried the measure by 13 majority,” Stephens 
exclaimed.  “Nobody says anything now against it but the abolitionists. Let them howl on—“’Tis 
their vocation.”119  John Tyler hailed the outcome as a vindication of the nation’s Revolutionary 
heritage of self-government and affirmed that the South would back the outcome, stating, “they 
desire a rule of universal application to all the Territories, which will prevent the busy 
intermeddling of Congress, and allow it some moments free from eternal agitation to look to the 
great interests of the country.”120  Stalwart supporters of the Kansas-Nebraska bill announced a 
“recurrence to first principles” and “the triumph of a great principle over temporizing 
expedients—of the constitution over sectional fanaticism, and of popular sovereignty over the 
usurpations of Congress.”121 
Many southerners found much to support in the Kansas-Nebraska Act.  First, by securing 
the repeal of the Missouri Compromise’s ban on slavery, it had the potential to open free 
territory to slaveholders.  It also removed a restriction that had irked southerners for thirty-four 
years.  To no small number of proslavery and states’-rights advocates, the Kansas-Nebraska Act 
restored the nation to constitutional principles.  Indeed, one New York Whig remarked acidly 
that southerners supported the bill in spite of squatter sovereignty “because it repeals the 
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Missouri Compromise.”122  Southerners certainly embraced repeal, but many found other merits 
in the legislation.  Second, it removed Congress from the business of determining where slavery 
could or could not exist and placed the decision in the hands of the people involved.  It, too, set a 
useful principle for the future: Congress could no longer meddle with slavery in the territories.  
Regardless of whether slavery would ever flourish in Kansas and Nebraska, the South had gained 
mightily by removing the issue from the hands of an increasingly antislavery Congress. 
Yet not all southerners could muster such delight over the triumph of popular 
sovereignty.  Many questioned whether the South would ever benefit from the principles of the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act.  In reality, some feared a northern backlash.  “This act may give more 
quiet to the South but it will be the protest for the formation of a new party at the North,” a friend 
confided to Georgia Governor Herschel V. Johnson.  “Now is the time to unite the South with 
the great west, our only safety depends on that union.”123  Other southerners advised vigilance 
against the abolitionists, who roundly criticized the bill as a violation of a sacred compact—the 
Missouri Compromise.  “Our Southern friends must be up and stirring,” future Caribbean 
filibuster William Walker wrote to David Atchison.  Virginia, Tennessee and Kentucky ought to 
send her hardy sons out to claim their rights and maintain them too.”124 
Though a few southern politicians feared a northern backlash or meddling from 
abolitionists, others maintained the claim that the Kansas-Nebraska Act legalized squatter 
sovereignty, which would bar the South from the territories just as effectively as the Wilmot 
Proviso.  Certain southern Whigs charged their Democratic rivals with embracing the notion that 
mere squatters could prohibit slavery.  “[The Democrats] tell us, they contend for the principle, 
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that Congress has no right to legislate on the subject of slavery,” remarked an Arkansas Whig, 
“appearing to forget that the admission of this principle necessarily admits the right of the 
squatter to legislate the people of the south out of any territory we now possess, or may hereafter 
acquire.”125  The very principle embodied in the Kansas-Nebraska Act, opponents argued, had in 
1850 lost California to the South. 
Irrespective of concerns that the Kansas-Nebraska Act would injure the South, a 
substantial majority of southern citizens believed that they had won a signal victory, at least on 
principle and quite possibly in practice.  While hardly anyone expected Nebraska to become a 
slave state, Kansas presented an altogether different possibility.  If populated by Missourians and 
other slaveholders from the region, the territory might well sustain a slave culture similar to that 
of its eastern neighbor.  Even if Kansas became a free state, the South had won a symbolic 
victory.  Kansas-Nebraska vindicated their principles of states’ rights and local control of 
domestic issues and institutions.126   
Stephen Douglas had succeeded at affirming popular sovereignty with respect to slavery 
in the territories as the law of the land.  The ebullient senator celebrated his victory by 
proclaiming the triumph of “self-government, state rights, & constitutional liberty” as embodied 
in the act.127  More importantly for the ardent expansionist, passage of the act now paved the way 
for the settlement of a vast portion of the nation’s territorial domain.  He could now concentrate 
on issues like homestead policy and a transcontinental railroad, which would encourage 
economic development and bind the West to the rest of the Union.128  Unfortunately for 
Douglas’s hopes and aspirations, the Kansas-Nebraska Act did not quiet the debate over slavery 
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in the territories.  In fact, it seemed to have inaugurated a race between North and South over 
which section would gain control of the two territories.  In other words, the settlement of Kansas 
and Nebraska became equated with the battle for sectional supremacy.  A correspondent who had 
traveled to Kansas saw the coming migration as a chess game between the sections.  “The 
territories of Kansas and Nebraska being free from constitutional clogs and thrown open to the 
competition of North and South,” he wrote, “no one who understands the philosophy of Yankee 
enterprise can doubt the result for a moment.”129  Some southerners admitted that the 
“Abolitionists will compass sea and land heaven & hill to prevent the establishment of slavery” 
in Kansas.130 
The first indication that the Kansas-Nebraska Act had achieved anything but its goal of 
promoting sectional harmony and an end to the struggle over slavery in Congress came with the 
November 1854 elections for Congress.  Northern Democrats suffered a horrendous electoral 
defeat in the midterm elections, while southern voters rewarded their Democratic legislators by 
returning them to Congress.  In the North, the Democrats lost sixty-six congressional seats, while 
the southern Democrats lost only four.131  In sum, voters decimated the northern Democracy 
while the southern wing of the party remained strong, a fact that did not bode well for the future 
of a bisectional Democratic Party.  The Whigs, on the other hand, disintegrated.  In several key 
southern states, Whig politicians fell to their Democratic rivals.  By the end of the election 
season, the party had virtually “bled to death.”132  Outrage over the repeal of the Missouri 
Compromise line gave rise to an “Anti-Nebraska” movement that rallied antislavery northerners 
against doughfaces and southerners.  Moreover, the indignation over Kansas-Nebraska lent a 
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greater sense of urgency to the race for Kansas and Nebraska.  Northerners and southerners 
would compete for control of the territories.  Though Nebraska remained securely a free 
territory, Kansas Territory became a battleground over the future of slavery and the meaning of 
popular sovereignty in ways no one could have predicted.  Popular sovereignty—the elegantly 
simple affirmation of the people’s right to govern their own domestic affairs—would face its 
ultimate test on the plains of Kansas.
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CHAPTER 8 
THE SOUTHERN CRITIQUE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN KANSAS 
  
 The footrace between antislavery and proslavery forces to gain control of Kansas had 
commenced even before President Franklin Pierce signed into law the Kansas-Nebraska Act, but 
it gained vigor and urgency once popular sovereignty became national policy.  The federal 
government had officially created the territories of Nebraska and Kansas; the former would 
almost certainly become a free state while southerners hoped they could add the latter to the 
ranks of the slave states.  Indeed, southerners had embraced popular sovereignty in 1854 because 
it made possible the impossible by permitting slavery in a territory where the Missouri 
Compromise had restricted it.  The South had long supported its version of the popular 
sovereignty doctrine, by declaring that a territory could decide the future of slavery within its 
bounds when drafting a constitution and applying for statehood.  When the settlers of California 
and New Mexico moved swiftly to prohibit slavery, however, southerners cried foul.  
Southerners attacked the notion that a cadre of antislavery emigrants could prohibit slavery 
before citizens of the South could move west, a maneuver they derisively called squatter 
sovereignty.  They lambasted the pronouncements of key northern Democrats, especially Lewis 
Cass, who endorsed the actions of the western settlers as a perfect embodiment of the right to 
self-government.  For the South, the Kansas-Nebraska Act seemed to make amends for the past, 
voiding the Missouri Compromise’s restriction on slavery and calling for popular sovereignty.  
Now southerners believed they had to take advantage of the opportunity. 
 Southerners embraced popular sovereignty in Kansas for several critical reasons.  First, 
southern politicians trusted Stephen Douglas.  The Illinois senator had made himself the leading 
proponent of popular sovereignty, taking the title from Cass, whom southerners viewed as 
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unreliable on the slavery question.  Second, a number of slaveholders lived within close 
proximity to Kansas and seemed certain to settle the new territory.  The Missourians had 
remained stalwart defenders of slavery and popular sovereignty throughout the Kansas-Nebraska 
debate.  Southerners believed that slavery had a legitimate chance to exist in Kansas Territory.1 
 The substitution of popular sovereignty for the thirty-four year restriction on slavery in 
the territory masked the significant challenges presented by the new policy.  Popular sovereignty 
created a contest for the future of slavery in Kansas and Nebraska; one side would win and the 
other would lose.  This fact alone raised a host of questions.  A high-stakes contest over slavery 
in Kansas opened the possibility of fraud and chicanery from people on both sides of the issue.  
Southerners had accused the North of swindling slaveholders in California and New Mexico.  
Would northerners and southerners follow the rules of popular sovereignty?  Perhaps more 
importantly, what were the rules?  A significant number of southerners continued to insist that 
settlers could prohibit slavery only when drafting a state constitution; before that time, they 
could not interfere with the institution.  Northerners interpreted popular sovereignty to mean that 
territorial legislatures could ban slavery whenever they pleased.  More than any other proponent 
of popular sovereignty, Stephen Douglas left the question open by giving credence to both 
interpretations.  Of course, many people in the North and South believed that the Supreme Court 
would probably decide which interpretation would prevail.  Finally, given the highly charged 
atmosphere surrounding the slavery debate, one could legitimately question if the losing side 
would abide by the will of the majority.  Would, or more importantly, could, popular sovereignty 
work? 
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 In 1854 and 1855, many southerners believed that popular sovereignty would achieve the 
desired result of adding a slave state to the Union.  Southern state legislatures hailed the doctrine 
as a bold avowal of the Compromise of 1850.  The Georgia Legislature embraced popular 
sovereignty in the territories, asserting that “the question whether slavery shall or shall not form 
a part of their domestic institutions is for them alone to determine for themselves.”2  The 
legislature in Arkansas concurred, approving the Kansas-Nebraska Act as a repeal of the “mis-
named ‘compromise’ of eighteen hundred and twenty” and the victory of popular sovereignty 
and congressional non-interference with slavery in the territories.3  Howell Cobb of Georgia 
praised the bill because it “affirmed the great principle of popular sovereignty” and “pledged 
Congress to the admission of Nebraska and Kansas, with or without slavery, as the people of 
those territories might declare for or against slavery, in the organization of their State 
Constitutions.”4  Cobb encapsulated the southern view of popular sovereignty and the best hopes 
of his section that Kansas would become a slave state, while Nebraska would apply for statehood 
with a free state constitution.  The democratic and moderate principle of popular sovereignty 
would restore sectional harmony and maintain the balance between free and slave states. 
 Popular sovereignty worked almost exactly as planned in Nebraska Territory.  Historians 
have usually ignored Nebraska’s path to statehood, instead focusing on its wayward southern 
neighbor.  Only recently have scholars investigated how popular sovereignty operated in the 
northern territory.5  In the 1850s practically nobody expected slavery to exist in Nebraska 
Territory.  The settlers themselves did not want the institution, and slaveholders had no desire to 
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emigrate to the territory.  During the congressional debate over the Kansas-Nebraska Act, a 
Nebraskan sent a memorial to Congress endorsing popular sovereignty based on constitutional 
principles.  The writer, however, made clear that “the philanthropist need not be alarmed, as I 
believe there has never been, nor do I suppose there ever will be, a single slave residing in the 
Territory of which I am writing.”6  Because nobody believed that slavery would ever exist in 
Nebraska, few resorted to extraordinary actions, chicanery, or other dubious measures to affect 
the outcome.  In Nebraska, popular sovereignty operated successfully as the will of the people to 
become a free state prevailed.  No competition between proslavery and antislavery forces 
emerged in the territory.  Consensus within Nebraska on the slavery issue emerged in the 
territory’s earliest days and never waned, making self-government appear sensible and 
unproblematic.  Conditions in Kansas could not have differed more. 
 Supporters on both sides on the slavery issue in Kansas quickly mobilized to influence 
the outcome of the race to make the territory a free state or a slave state.  Candidates committed 
to a “Southern Rights” platform carried the election for a delegate to Congress in the fall of 
1854.  Four months later, Missourians flooded the territory and elected a proslavery territorial 
legislature.7  Antislavery supporters rejected the results of the fraudulent election; the proslavery 
votes cast in March 1855 exceeded the eligible voters by over two times.  According to 
northerners, proslavery supporters intended to abuse the doctrine of popular sovereignty to make 
Kansas a slave state.  Without doubt, the Missourians fully intended to use their power to sway 
the territorial government in favor of a proslavery policy. 
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 Popular sovereignty in the territories seemed a perfect idea in theory, but in practice 
settlers found numerous problems that they would have to address in order to create a 
government.  Ignoring the certain election frauds perpetrated by proslavery forces in Kansas, the 
nation’s patchwork system of electoral law confounded efforts to create a uniform system in a 
territory peopled by emigrants from across the nation.  Residency requirements varied from state 
to state, and jurisdictions administered the election process differently.8  Ensuring a fair, 
uniform, and equitable election would have proven challenging even in an atmosphere free of 
electoral fraud.  In Kansas, however, proslavery Missourians made a farce of honest elections by 
brazenly crossing the border to vote in territorial elections.  Antislavery Kansans who 
complained of fraud and intimidation resolved to counteract the efforts of the proslavery faction. 
 In 1854, southerners believed that they had control of Kansas Territory and that they 
would make it a slave state.  The first territorial census revealed that nearly two-thirds of the 
residents hailed from Missouri and other southern states, with the remaining third coming from 
the North.9  The numbers, however, obscured other facts that would come to concern 
southerners.  In spite of the overwhelming majority of southerners residing in the territory, the 
slave population remained meager.  Two factors contributed to the lack of slaves in the territory.  
Poorer farmers who did not own chattel slaves moved to Kansas to seek cheap land and 
economic sufficiency.  More importantly, the Missourians who resided on the border between 
their state and Kansas felt reluctant to move west with their slaves until they had secured the 
future of slavery in the territory.  Southerners residing on the border appealed to their fellow 
citizens to move west in order to make Kansas a slave state.  “As to the security of negro 
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property,” a Lexington, Missouri, correspondent wrote, “that will depend on the aid we get from 
Southern States.”10  The writer asserted that if only “500 to 1000 at most pro-slavery men, who 
would move to Kansas with their slaves,” their presence “would settle the matter beyond 
question.”11  Slaveholders, however, wanted assurances that the territorial government would 
take a favorable stance toward slavery.  Their reticence to emigrate led to a self-fulfilling 
prophecy of doom for slavery in Kansas.  Slaveholders wanted security for their property and 
their future before they would move west, something they could not achieve through the popular 
sovereignty formula unless they took a chance and settled in Kansas.  Only one other option 
remained: to influence the creation of the territorial government by crossing the border to vote.  
Missourians did precisely that. 
 Mobilization of the antislavery movement further complicated the already unstable 
situation in Kansas.  After passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, antislavery proponents in New 
England determined to send settlers west to secure the territory against slavery.  Organizations 
such as the New England Emigrant Aid Company, backed by powerful northeasterners, 
mobilized in the spring and summer of 1854.  In spite of a miniscule number of emigrants during 
the first year of the enterprise, their very presence galvanized free soil supporters and inflamed 
the South.12  “We should not allow the Abolitionists to Colonise [sic] Kansas by emigrant 
societies without making the effort to counteract it by throwing in a Southern population,” 
Jefferson Davis wrote.13 
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By the summer of 1855, southerners recognized that the Kansas issue had become far 
more complicated that they had anticipated.  Familiar divisions reemerged in the South, as ultra 
proslavery advocated called for a sectional political party to resist any northern encroachment on 
southern rights in the territories.  Facing a reelection bid as governor of Georgia, Herschel V. 
Johnson implored his Democratic friends to stay true to their party and to popular sovereignty.  
He reminded Georgia Democrats that many of their northern brethren had worked diligently to 
pass the Kansas-Nebraska Act.  “Did they not aid the South in repealing the Missouri restriction, 
under which she had writhed for thirty years, as degrading to her equality and violative of the 
constitution,” he asked?14  Johnson urged southerners to wait and see what happened in Kansas, 
leaving open the possibility that the South could resort to stronger action should Congress refuse 
to admit Kansas should it submit a proslavery constitution.15 
Southerners stood by popular sovereignty even as its application in Kansas Territory 
became increasingly troubled.  They understood that the principle gave their section the best 
possible chance at securing Kansas as a slave state.  A Mississippi correspondent lauded Stephen 
Douglas for protecting the rights of southerners in the territories through popular sovereignty and 
expressed hope that both northerners and southerners would “let the Territories settle their own 
affairs without the intervention of Congress.”16  Although many southerners stood by popular 
sovereignty, they also made clear that the South would not allow the free soil elements entering 
Kansas to seize control of the territorial government solely for the purposes of prohibiting 
slavery.  Just as southerners had viewed emigrants to California and New Mexico as squatters on 
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the land and not bona fide citizens, so too they rejected those who settled in Kansas under the 
auspices of emigrant aid societies.  At a rally in Milledgeville, Georgia, Democrats made clear 
their interpretation of popular sovereignty.  The people of Kansas “have the right, when the 
number of their population justifies it, to form a republican State constitution, with or without 
slavery, as they may determine,” the committee stated.17  If Congress refused to admit Kansas 
with a proslavery constitution, there would exist “just cause for the disruption of all ties that bind 
the State of Georgia to the Union.”18 
As the antislavery movement in Kansas continued to take shape, southerners more 
carefully—and more forcefully—asserted their interpretation of popular sovereignty.  The 
presence of New England free soil emigrants challenged proslavery settlers in Kansas as well as 
southerners in the states who sought to protect slaveholders’ interests in the new territory, yet the 
South continued to face the conundrum of how to settle Kansas to its advantage.  Few disagreed 
that slaveholders needed to emigrate to the territory if the institution of slavery stood any chance 
of survival, if for no other reason than to maintain a proslavery majority in the territorial 
legislature.  If northerners gained control of the territorial government, they would surely seek to 
prohibit slavery as soon as possible.  Southerners denied their right to enact such a prohibition, 
but maintaining control of the Kansas territorial government removed any doubt for the future.   
Southern politicians accused their northern opponents of trying to change the substance 
of the popular sovereignty doctrine by affirming the power of territorial legislatures to prohibit 
slavery.  “The true doctrine was incorporated in the Utah bill of 1850,” a Richmond editor 
argued, “declaring the right of the people of the territories in organizing a State government 
preparatory to admission into the Union, and not before, to decide the question of slavery or no 
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slavery for themselves.”19  Alternatively, Lewis Cass and many northerners now endorsed the 
idea of squatter sovereignty, which affirmed the right of territorial legislatures to exclude 
slavery.  The editor argued that Douglas upheld the former, while Lewis Cass and many 
northerners affirmed the latter.  Squatter sovereignty, according to the editor, “means no more 
nor less than the power of congress through its creatures, the territorial legislatures, to legislate 
upon the subject of slavery—which is held an absurdity among all State Rights politicians.”20  As 
conditions in Kansas deteriorated in late 1855 and early 1856, southerners felt they had to defend 
their interpretation of popular sovereignty to maintain slavery within the territory.  They 
increasingly recognized that whichever interpretation of the doctrine prevailed would determine 
the future of slavery in Kansas. 
The presidential election of 1856, in many ways, served as a referendum on Kansas-
Nebraska and popular sovereignty.  It soon became clear that the turmoil in Kansas issue would 
adversely affect the Democratic Party.  Enactment of the Kansas-Nebraska Act had caused 
considerable disruption in the political system, leading antislavery Democrats and Whigs united 
under a new political banner called the Republican Party.  Republicans completely rejected 
popular sovereignty as a formula for disaster.  “Popular sovereignty had not provided a common 
ground but a battle ground.”21  The newly formed party criticized the self-government in the 
territories as an insidious means of avoiding discussion of the slavery question.  To the 
Republicans’ minds, the doctrine of Stephen Douglas ignored the moral dilemma of extending 
slavery and upheld the absurd claim that Congress had no power to legislate for the territories.22  
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Southerners viewed with great alarm the development of a sectional antislavery party, 
expressing resentment and fundamentally rejecting the attacks on southern morality.  The 
South’s leaders struck back with force during the election year.  “We believe our institutions to 
be as moral, rightful and expedient as those of the North,” a Virginian wrote.  “But we are no 
propagandists, and we do not set ourselves up, like Massachusetts, as a model and as a pattern 
for other people.”23  The writer portrayed the South as eminently tolerant and democratic; 
indeed, he implied, northerners intended to impose their will on other free Americans, rather than 
staying true to the quintessentially American principle of popular sovereignty.  According to 
many southerners, the North sought to violate the terms of state equality and equal rights for all 
free Americans.  The Kansas-Nebraska Act and popular sovereignty, southerners argued, 
returned the nation to its heritage of self-government, whereas the abolitionists sought to 
slaveholding Americans to give up their peculiar institution.  In a touch of biting criticism, the 
Richmond Enquirer stated, “Were the Federal Government to enact a law preventing 
Massachusetts from sending Sharp’s rifles to Kansas, all would admit the iniquity of the law.  
Yet the exclusion of Southern slaves is alike in principle, and far more iniquitous in practice.”24 
Southern moderates and their northern allies sought to quiet the increasingly bellicose 
debate by pointing to popular sovereignty as the best means of compromise on the slavery 
question.  While the doctrine steered a moderate path between the ultra opinions in the North and 
the South, according to moderate Democrats, it represented not a compromise but a fundamental 
axiom of American political institutions—the right of the people to govern themselves.  In early 
1856, Douglas worked closely with southern Democrats to boost northern support for popular 
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sovereignty.  He encouraged southerners to give speeches in and send correspondence to the 
North in an effort to unite the Democracy.25  Several notable southern political leaders responded 
by extolling the virtues of popular sovereignty as a moderate, pragmatic solution to the slavery 
issue.  “In the Kansas bill it was provided that this vexed question of slavery should be left—
where the blood of the Revolution put it,” Howell Cobb cried before a New Hampshire audience, 
“where the constitution leaves it; where the great principle of self-government leaves it—to be 
decided by the people of Kansas, subject only to the constitution of the United States.”26  Cobb 
argued firmly that neither the people of his native Georgia nor any other state had the right to tell 
the settlers of Kansas whether to prohibit or permit slavery.  Southern Democrats who believed 
that the ascendancy of a sectional antislavery party threatened the power and security of their 
section fell back on popular sovereignty as a way to defend their interests within the political 
system. 
Southerners rallied to defend states’ rights and popular sovereignty as a bulwark of their 
liberty.27  At the same time, their words drew a line that politicians could not cross.  Antislavery 
leaders had increasingly attacked the South and slavery for perpetuating an immoral institution.  
They had expanded their arguments beyond the familiar bounds of constitutional interpretation in 
order to chastise slaveholders on moral terms.  Southerners would not tolerate attacks upon their 
morality.  “Whenever the South takes the distinct ground that her institutions are righteous, 
honorable and expedient, as those of the North, she will find her defence easy,” the editor of the 
Richmond Enquirer wrote.  “Until she does this, until she asserts her equality in morality, as well 
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as in right, she invites, nay, she justifies, the attacks of abolition.”28  Southern politicians sought 
to impress on their northern friends that popular sovereignty presented the best way to navigate 
safely the issue of slavery in Kansas.  In a letter to the Tammany Society of New York, Governor 
Herschel Johnson of Georgia, another southern Democratic moderate, implored northerners to 
withdraw their criticism of popular sovereignty.  “[W]hy should the Abolitionists and Free-
Soilers rail against the Kansas-Nebraska act?—They had repudiated the Missouri Compromise in 
1850, why insist upon it now,” he asked?  “Its repeal does not, ipso facto extend the area of 
slaveholding territory.  Its only effect is, to open the territory to emigrants from every State in the 
Union, upon terms of equality.”29   
Southern Democrats tried to convince their northern brethren of the virtues of popular 
sovereignty and the benefits of a united party in the months preceding their national convention.  
Politicians in both sections recognized that the Kansas-Nebraska Act had wounded the 
Democracy, fracturing the party along sectional lines.  When the party of popular sovereignty 
met in Cincinnati for its national convention in June 1856, its leaders and delegates almost 
certainly anticipated a protracted fight over the presidential nomination as well as the platform.  
The convention marked the first time that a national party held its meeting in the West, a certain 
nod to the growth of the nation and the political power of the western states.30  Based on the 
press coverage of popular sovereignty, one might have expected a battle over how the platform 
would address the doctrine.  The delegates, however, unanimously endorsed the plank supporting 
popular sovereignty and the Kansas-Nebraska Act.31  The language of the platform suggested 
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that the resolutions committee had defined popular sovereignty.  It upheld congressional non-
interference with slavery, while proclaiming that the people of any territory, “acting through the 
legally and fairly expressed will of a majority of actual residents, and whenever the number of 
their inhabitants justifies it; to form a Constitution, with or without domestic slavery, and be 
admitted into the Union upon terms of perfect equality with the other states.”32  The popular 
sovereignty plank artfully addressed the issues surrounding the doctrine’s operation in Kansas by 
obliquely addressing the recent election frauds.  Perhaps more importantly, it suggested that 
territories exercised their true popular sovereignty when writing a constitution—and not before.  
In sum, the platform carefully balanced sectional concerns in order to present a united front on 
popular sovereignty and slavery in the territories.   
The delegates quickly and harmoniously approved the platform, but the contest over who 
would receive the presidential nomination proved more contentious.  Northerners would take 
their stand against Kansas-Nebraska by striking at the Pierce administration, while southerners 
would uphold his and Douglas’s efforts to transplant popular sovereignty in the territory.  
Southerners made clear their preference for Pierce, with Douglas as their second choice should 
the incumbent fail to gain sufficient votes.33  The president clearly lacked the support for a 
second term from the northern wing of his own party, which voiced opposition to his handling of 
events in Kansas.  In the afternoon of the fourth day of the convention, the delegates began the 
laborious process of nominating candidates and taking ballots.  James Buchanan of Pennsylvania 
emerged as the frontrunner, with Pierce and Douglas considerably behind in the vote.  After 
fourteen ballots, the delegates adjourned for an evening of closed-door politicking.  The northern 
delegates had no intention of supporting Pierce’s nomination for a second term.  A number of 
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southern delegates remained true to the president, though others voted for Douglas.  The next 
morning revealed that a deadlock had emerged between Buchanan and Douglas.  After intense 
debate and a handwritten plea from Douglas for party unity, enough delegates shifted their votes 
to push Buchanan over the top.  During the final vote, several southern delegations expressed 
their hearty support for Douglas and his efforts to provide for popular sovereignty in Kansas, 
making clear that they expected the Democracy to stand firm for the doctrine.34 
The greatest praise for Douglas and popular sovereignty came from William E. Preston of 
Kentucky, who gave an impromptu speech supporting the Illinoisan and his doctrine.  Preston 
lauded the efforts of northerners like Douglas, who had worked to repeal the Missouri 
Compromise’s ban on slavery, “which for thirty years, had produced festering discontent at the 
North and the South.”35  When Buchanan accepted the nomination ten days later, he endorsed the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act and popular sovereignty.  The nominee had not always looked with favor 
on the doctrine; for years, he advocated extending the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific 
Ocean.  Now, however, with the nomination of his party secured and the expressed support of 
the delegates for popular sovereignty, Buchanan could only offer praise for the doctrine derived 
“from the original and pure fountain of legitimate political power.”36   
Two other political parties—both new and both composed of dissidents from the 
Democratic and the defunct Whig parties—sealed their nominations for the coming election 
season.  Just ten days after the Democratic Convention adjourned, the nascent Republican Party 
opened its convention in Philadelphia with delegates present from only four slave states.  Their 
platform not only denied the right of territorial legislatures to regulate slavery, but affirmed the 
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“right and imperative duty of Congress” to prohibit the institution in the territories.37  The 
Democrats, according to the delegates’ work, had upset a solemn compact between the 
sections—the Missouri Compromise—that Congress should never have disturbed.  Finally, the 
platform decried the violence in Kansas and posited that it would end only with the admission of 
the territory as a free state.  John C. Fremont won the nomination of the Republicans, a party that 
committed itself to rejecting the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the doctrine of popular sovereignty.38   
The third party that nominated a presidential candidate in 1856, the American, or Know-
Nothing Party, also addressed the popular sovereignty issue.  In the South, many former Whigs 
joined the Know-Nothing ranks after the disintegration of the former organization.  In the past, 
southern Whigs had advanced negative, but thoughtful, critiques of popular sovereignty, even 
though some among their ranks supported the doctrine.  In 1856, the southern Know-Nothings 
used the familiar politics of slavery by resurrecting the old Whig charge that popular sovereignty 
equaled squatter sovereignty. Know-Nothings in the South reminded the electorate that squatters 
in California had “assembled without law or authority, in a mob—called a Convention and 
formed a Constitution prohibiting slave owners forever from the whole Territory of California.  
This was Squatter Sovereignty in its worst form.”39  The Democrats, according to southern 
Know-Nothings, had caused the disaster in Kansas by repealing the Missouri Compromise and 
substituting popular sovereignty, which gained nothing for the South.  Indeed, the doctrine 
deceived many southerners into believing that North and South could unite based on self-
government.  Popular sovereignty, according to the Know-Nothings, bore different meanings in 
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the two sections.  Better to secure part of the West for slaveholding interests via the Missouri 
Compromise line than to lose everything by popular sovereignty, they argued.  More alarming 
for the South, the Missouri Compromise repeal had united antislavery citizens and fostered the 
creation of the Republican Party, a sectional organization fundamentally opposed to the South 
and her interests.40  In spite of their objections to the Democratic platform, southern Know-
Nothings flocked to the party when their own fledgling organization collapsed amid its own 
sectional disputes.  They realized that the South faced a common enemy—the Republican Party. 
Though the Know-Nothings achieved little in using the squatter sovereignty issue to 
advance their own party, they did raise significant questions for southerners to confront.  The 
efforts of northerners to move to Kansas with the express purpose of securing the territory 
against slavery led a few in the South to believe that squatter sovereignty could prevail.  
Supporters of the doctrine, however, rallied to the defense of self-government in Kansas.  “The 
people who bona fide settle the territories North and South, by their fairly expressed will, are to 
determine the character of their institutions,” a Georgian wrote.  “This is popular—or as our 
American friends see fit to call it—‘squatter sovereignty.’”41  Alexander Stephens, who had 
provided critical support for passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act and who became a Democrat 
after the collapse of the Whig Party, made clear to his fellow southerners that popular 
sovereignty did not permit squatter rule.  He firmly endorsed the traditional southern view that 
“when admitted as a State the said territory or any portion of the same shall be received into the 
union with or without slavery as their Constitution may prescribe at the time of their 
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admission.”42  Stephens denied the allegations of Know-Nothings and other opponents of 
popular sovereignty that the doctrine allowed squatter rule.  “Neither the Kansas, nor the Utah 
bill, nor the New Mexico bill, recognized any such doctrine,” he insisted.  “For all the powers 
exercised by the Territorial Legislatures of all these territories emanated from Congress—they 
exercised them by permission and by grant from Congress and not by sovereign right.”43  
Stephens advanced three vital points that composed the southern view of popular sovereignty.  
First, Congress could not grant to a territory a power that it did not possess itself.  Second, 
neither Congress nor a territorial legislature could exclude American citizens from “equal 
enjoyment of the public domain as long as it remains a territory.”44  Finally, territories became 
imbued with sovereignty only when they stood ready to draft a constitution and enter the Union.  
To Stephens’s mind, no southerner could reject this interpretation of popular sovereignty. 
Democratic leaders canvassed the nation to secure support for Buchanan in the coming 
election and to encourage the party faithful to stand behind popular sovereignty.  Douglas 
maintained a grueling speaking schedule in his home state.  The senator knew that the strife over 
Kansas had divided the Democrats in his home state of Illinois and elsewhere.  Anti-Nebraska 
Democrats had united with the new Republican Party in opposition to popular sovereignty.  
Douglas sought to rally the electorate and counteract the inroads made against the Democratic by 
party dissidents and the Republicans.45  By the end of September, he felt confident enough to 
inform Buchanan that Illinois would vote Democratic.46  In New York, Daniel Dickinson once 
again took to the hustings to support the Democrats and—most importantly to him—popular 
sovereignty.  The former senator lambasted the abolitionists for their efforts to stir discontent and 
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for not supporting the principles of self-government.  “They admit that man is capable of self-
government in New York and Massachusetts,” Dickinson said mockingly, “but if he gets out into 
Kansas they would put a kind of political baby-jumper about him, to protect him from himself 
and learn him to walk, before they would trust him to make the attempt.”47  Dickinson, however, 
held the northern position that slavery would never exist in Kansas because of the soil and 
climate.  Therefore, popular sovereignty would almost certainly make Kansas a free state.  
The efforts of key Democratic leaders paid off, as their party won the presidency and 
both houses of Congress.  The Democrats won every southern state except Maryland.  
Nevertheless, the vote revealed significant problems for the Democrats, as Buchanan received a 
plurality, not a majority of the popular vote.  In the North, Democrats had carried only five free 
states.  The presence of three parties diluted the voter base; an alarming sign for southerners 
given that one of the parties had no interest in courting the southern electorate.  Furthermore, the 
Republicans had made significant inroads in the North, carrying eleven states for Fremont.  In 
fact, if Pennsylvania and either Illinois or Indiana had voted Republican, Fremont would have 
become president.48  The Democrats’ troubles did not end with the election, because Buchanan 
now had to devise a plan to govern the nation and resolve the contentious Kansas issue. 
Though Buchanan endorsed popular sovereignty during the election, he had equivocated 
on how it would operate.  In some instances, he supported the southern view of the doctrine; in 
others, he suggested that territorial legislatures could settle the matter.49 In a speech given at 
Wheatland, Buchanan’s Pennsylvania home, the president-elect declared his support for “the 
doctrine which is the very root of all our institutions.”  Popular sovereignty recognized the right 
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of “a majority of the people of a Territory, when about to enter the Union as a State, to decide 
for themselves whether domestic slavery shall or shall not exist among them.”50  Buchanan 
extolled the idea of popular sovereignty as the democratic way of settling the slavery issue, but 
he offered no clue as to how he believed it should operate.  Supporters of popular sovereignty, as 
well as Buchanan, added the key phrase “subject only to the Constitution” or “under the 
principles of the Constitution” to any description of popular sovereignty.  In the aftermath of the 
1856 election, the New York Herald asked, “’Subject only to the constitution!’  What does that 
mean?  How far does the constitution allow the people of a Territory to go in their legislation 
upon slavery?”51   
Democrats could not agree upon a single answer to the most significant question 
regarding popular sovereignty.  Lewis Cass and Daniel Dickinson had stated that territorial 
legislatures could enact legislation with regard to slavery whenever they pleased.  Southern 
Democrats denied that interpretation, asserting that territories could act on slavery when drafting 
a constitution.  Anyone who read the 1856 Democratic Party platform had to conclude that the 
party supported the latter interpretation. Douglas seemed intent on avoiding the issue as best as 
he could.  Though Democrats had differing interpretations of popular sovereignty, a problem that 
intensified as events in Kansas spiraled out of control, most party regulars assumed that Supreme 
Court would ultimately decide what definition would prevail.  The true meaning of the phrase 
“subject only to the Constitution” lay in the assumption that the judiciary would have to interpret 
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the meaning of popular sovereignty.  The Herald stated defiantly that Buchanan’s first duty 
would be to “give us his official interpretation of squatter sovereignty.”52 
The new president would not have the chance to define popular sovereignty for the 
nation, in what he surely considered a welcome relief from a task that no moderate politician 
wanted to touch.  For some time, Congress and presidents alike had attempted to defer the 
question to the judiciary.  The Kansas-Nebraska Act itself declared several times that territorial 
citizens could legislate on slavery “subject only to the Constitution of the United States.”53  In 
other places, it mimicked the language of the Clayton Compromise, which left “all cases 
involving title to slaves and ‘questions of personal freedom’” to the “adjudication of local 
tribunals, with the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.”54  In December 
1856, the Supreme Court heard for the second time a case that most political observers believed 
would settle the interpretation over popular sovereignty.  The case involved a Missouri slave 
named Dred Scott, who had sued his current owner, John F.A. Sanford, for freedom based on the 
fact that his previous owner had kept him in the state of Illinois and Wisconsin Territory even 
though both jurisdictions prohibited slavery.  Scott and his attorneys posited that his residence in 
Illinois and Wisconsin had made him free.  The case made its way slowly through the judicial 
system, finally arriving on appeal at the Supreme Court in February 1856. 
The justices of the Supreme Court faced two questions regarding Scott’s case, one of 
which had direct bearing on slavery in the territories.  First, the court would have to decide if 
Scott, a slave, had the right to sue in court.  The issue centered on whether a slave held 
citizenship.  If Scott was a citizen of the state of Missouri, he clearly possessed the right to sue 
his owner in court, but if he did not possess citizenship he had no legal standing to sue.  Second, 
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the justices would determine whether Scott’s residence in Illinois and Wisconsin Territory 
invalidated his master’s ownership.  To address this issue the justices had to determine whether a 
territory—in this case, Wisconsin—had the right to pass laws prohibiting slavery.  Over the 
course of the Jacksonian era, the Supreme Court had developed a jurisprudence of self-rule that 
would lead the justices to address the meaning of popular sovereignty regarding slavery in the 
territories.55 
For months political observers pondered how the Supreme Court would rule in the Dred 
Scott case.  Nearly all believed that the southern-dominated court would rule against Scott’s bid 
for freedom.  Whether the Court would end there or proceed to consider the legality of 
Wisconsin’s ban on slavery—and thereby the Missouri Compromise’s ban on slavery north of 
36° 30’—remained uncertain.  That Congress had invalidated the Missouri Compromise line in 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act only complicated matters further.  For a time, it seemed that the 
justices would confine their ruling to a determination on Scott’s case for freedom.  By February 
1857, however, the Court decided to rule on the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise.  
The Court almost certainly wanted to settle the question of slavery in the territories and a 
majority of the justices wanted to issue an “emphatically pro-southern decision.”56 
Perhaps no one hoped more for a judicial determination on popular sovereignty than 
James Buchanan.  The president-elect, who desperately wanted to end the slavery dispute, saw in 
Dred Scott v. Sandford a perfect opportunity to dispose of the issue with the inauguration of his 
administration.  Buchanan crossed the line of propriety, however, by communicating directly 
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with several justices on the Supreme Court regarding the case and the emerging decision of 
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney.  The president knew on his inauguration day the substance of the 
decision that Taney, the man who would administer the oath of office, would imminently deliver.  
The two men even engaged in a brief conference during the ceremonies, which would lead to 
speculation that they had colluded on the decision.  Buchanan’s speech fueled those suspicions.  
The new president began his address with platitudes about the American system of government 
and the cherished principle of self-government.  The election had “excited to the highest degree” 
the passions of the electorate, but “when the people proclaimed their will, the tempest at once 
subsided, and all was calm.”57   
Buchanan then made the logical leap from the vindication of self-government in the 
presidential canvass to popular sovereignty in the territories.  “What a happy conception, then, 
was it for Congress to apply this simple rule—that the will of the majority shall govern—to the 
settlement of the question of domestic slavery in the Territories,” he exclaimed.58  Buchanan 
acknowledged that a “difference of opinion” existed regarding when a territory could exercise 
popular sovereignty, but dismissed it as “a matter of but little practical importance.”59  He could 
dismiss the problem because he knew of the Supreme Court’s impending decision.  It “is a 
judicial question, which legitimately belongs to the Supreme Court of the United States, before 
whom it is now pending, and will, it is understood, be speedily and finally settled.”60  Subtly but 
unmistakably, Buchanan had revealed that the court would make a pronouncement on the 
constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise and the meaning of popular sovereignty.  He did 
not, however, reveal which way the court would rule, though he almost certainly knew from his 
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correspondence with Justices John Catron and David Grier that the court would declare the 
Compromise of 1820 unconstitutional.61  Buchanan declared somewhat disingenuously that he 
would “cheerfully submit” to the court’s decision, “whatever this may be.”62   
Two days later, Chief Justice Taney delivered the decision of the Supreme Court in Dred 
Scott v. Sandford.  The eighty-year old jurist, his voice barely audible, read the opinion of the 
Court in its chambers in the Capitol.63  On the first question the justices faced, the Taney opinion 
declared that a “free negro of the African race, whose ancestors were brought to this country and 
sold as slaves, is not a ‘citizen’ within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States.”64  
Therefore, Scott had no right to bring suit in a federal court.  Most startling, the opinion affirmed 
that neither a slave nor a free black could ever hold American citizenship, regardless of 
emancipation.  Taney further complicated matters by addressing the issue of state versus national 
citizenship, thereby converting the issue of whether Scott alleged citizenship in Missouri to his 
standing as a citizen of the United States.  In other words, he nationalized the issue of Scott’s 
citizenship.  The chief justice then declared that blacks could not hold state citizenship either.  
Taney had to do so for his opinion to have any meaning, because under the diversity of 
citizenship clause in the Constitution if one state granted citizenship to a slave another had to 
recognize it.  In sum, Dred Scott held neither state nor national citizenship and therefore had no 
standing to sue in court. 
At first glance, the citizenship issue seems to have little to no bearing on the 
interpretation of popular sovereignty, but to Taney’s mind the latter built on the former.65  
Indeed, the Supreme Court could have ended its ruling with invalidation of Scott’s original suit 
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and declined to address the issue of slavery in the territories.  Taney fully intended, however, to 
rule on popular sovereignty and the Missouri Compromise restriction.  He began the second part 
of the decision with a summation of the nation’s territorial history.  Under the Articles of 
Confederation, the national government accepted certain cessions of land from the states on 
behalf of the confederacy and pledged to act as their common agent in administering the national 
domain.  The territories, therefore, belonged to the states as common property.  In reasoning 
closely akin to the theories of John C. Calhoun, Taney asserted that the Constitution of 1787 
largely maintained the relation of the federal government to the territories.  The new government, 
too, acted as a common agent for the states, holding the territories for the equal enjoyment of the 
citizens.66   
The chief justice anticipated criticism from those who believed that Article Four, Section 
Three of the Constitution—the “needful rules and regulations” clause—gave Congress the 
express power to legislate for the territories on all matters, including slavery.  Taney took the 
narrow interpretation of the clause long held by southerners that it referred only to the 
administration and disposition of federal property. The clause certainly did not grant to Congress 
the “despotic and unlimited power over persons and property” in the territories as some 
implied.67  Citing an 1842 Supreme Court case involving the Territory of Florida, Taney 
affirmed that the federal government did possess the power to enable creation of territorial 
governments.  He sanctioned the traditional practice of assigning territorial grades, or stages of 
government, based on the population of a territory and its ability to govern itself.  “In some cases 
a Government, consisting of persons appointed by the Federal Government, would best subserve 
the interests of the Territory, when the inhabitants were few and scattered, and new to one 
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another,” Taney explained.  “In other instances, it would be more advisable to commit the 
powers of self-government to the people who had settled in the Territory, as being the most 
competent to determine what was best for their own interests.”68   
The government’s role as a common agent for the states, however, limited its jurisdiction 
as well as that of any territorial government it created.  The Fifth Amendment, Taney argued, 
guaranteed the right of property to an American citizen regardless of where he resided.  
Accordingly, an act of Congress “which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or 
property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of 
the United States, and who had committed no offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified 
with the name of due process of law.”69  Because Congress could not confer a power that it did 
not itself possess, a territorial legislature could not prevent a citizen from the enjoyment of his 
property within a territory.  Taney therefore concluded that the Missouri Compromise restriction 
was unconstitutional and therefore void. 
Not only had the Supreme Court declared the Missouri Compromise restriction 
unconstitutional, but it had also defined popular sovereignty.  If taken at its word, the Scott 
decision dealt a fatal blow to the Cass/Douglas definition of the doctrine and upheld the southern 
interpretation.70  Moreover, it substantiated the Calhoun common-property doctrine regarding 
slavery in the territories.  With the Taney opinion, the Supreme Court defined popular 
sovereignty as the right of the people in a territory to determine the status of slavery when they 
drafted a constitution and asked for admission to the Union—and not a moment before.  
Territorial legislatures could presumably pass laws to regulate slavery, such as slave codes, but 
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they could not prohibit slavery or restrict the right of a person to hold slaves as property within 
any territory. 
For the first time in the nation’s history, the Supreme Court had invalidated a major piece 
of federal legislation.  “The decision just made in the Dred Scott case, an obscure African, by the 
Supreme Court of the United States,” a Maryland editor wrote, “is probably the most important 
that ever emanated from that highest tribunal of our country.”71  Scott’s name had become 
inextricably linked with the slavery issue; his case had given the Supreme Court the opportunity 
to define popular sovereignty. More important to the moment, the Court had delivered “a final 
adjudication” on the slavery issue, “one which is in accordance with the great principle of 
popular sovereignty in regard to slavery in the Territories.”72  The Charleston Mercury hailed the 
decision as a vindication of southern rights.  The court’s opinion, the editor argued, “is equally 
fatal to Congressional Intervention and Squatter Sovereignty, and opens before the South a clean 
and unobstructed field for the propagation of its institutions.”73  Abolitionists had threatened to 
negate the spirit of the Kansas-Nebraska Act by imposing squatter sovereignty, the Mercury 
argued, but the Supreme Court had ruled for states’ rights and strict construction of the 
Constitution, thereby restoring the true meaning of popular sovereignty.  Southerners believed 
the Taney court had vindicated their rights in the territories and had relieved their section from 
the “moral stigma” of slavery restriction.74  To the minds of southerners, the court had upheld 
their equality in the Union. 
Northern and southern Democrats initially united in approval of the decision and its 
meaning for the issue of slavery in the territories.  The high court had given Democratic 
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politicians what they had long hoped for, a decision on the meaning of popular sovereignty.  The 
Taney opinion absolved Congress of the duty to define the doctrine, thereby allowing the 
legislative branch to maintain the policy of non-intervention with the vexing slavery issue.  
Many Democrats saw the opinion as a mighty blow against the young Republican Party.  A 
Maryland journal acknowledged the “indiscreet and suicidal ravings among some of those who 
know no law except that of their own violent self-will and passions,” but concluded that even the 
Republicans would have to abide by the Court’s definition of popular sovereignty.75  Other 
observers held hope that the case marked the end of the slavery dispute and the Republican Party 
itself.  The Supreme Court’s decision, a Georgia editor declared, “crushes the life out of that 
miserable political organization.”76  Indeed, the virulent response of the Republicans to the 
decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford “had the effect of uniting the Democracy behind the Court.”77  
Democrats in the North and South could come together against their common enemy and declare 
that popular sovereignty—the democratic and Democratic doctrine—had prevailed. 
In upholding the long-held views of the South on popular sovereignty and slavery in the 
territories, the Taney court had rejected Stephen Douglas’s position on the doctrine.  The Little 
Giant held his tongue on the matter, choosing to study the issue carefully and let others—
especially the Republicans—make intemperate remarks before he would issue his own 
pronouncement on the decision and its implications for popular sovereignty.  The doctrine’s 
other great supporter, Lewis Cass, had to respond cautiously given his position as Secretary of 
State in the Buchanan administration.  Prior to the inauguration, he had contended to Buchanan 
that territorial legislatures could pass laws concerning slavery, though he also hoped that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Baltimore Sun, March 9, 1857 (italics in the original). 
76 Augusta Constitutionalist, March 15, 1857. 
77 Morrison, Slavery and the American West, 189. 
 337	  
Supreme Court would settle the matter.78  Consequently, when the Court handed down the Dred 
Scott decision, Cass could offer little objection to its endorsement of the southern position.  Of 
course, Douglas had long ago succeeded the elderly and infirm Cass as the chief proponent of 
popular sovereignty.  Most observers waited for Douglas to address the decision. 
Douglas broke his silence in June with a major address delivered in Springfield, Illinois, 
on the strife in Kansas, the ongoing problems with the Mormons in Utah, and most importantly, 
the Dred Scott decision.79  The senator warmly endorsed the Court’s invalidation of the Missouri 
Compromise, but he strained to express his opinion on the decision’s meaning for popular 
sovereignty.  Ever the master of circumlocution, Douglas argued lamely that he could find no 
contradiction between his and the Supreme Court’s definition of popular sovereignty.  In his 
attempt to resolve the differing interpretations, Douglas resorted to an idea that others had 
expressed during the debates over slavery in the Old Northwest and in Missouri, but one for 
which he later would become famous.  He argued that the right of a person to hold slaves in a 
territory “necessarily remains a barren and a worthless right, unless sustained, protected and 
enforced by appropriate police regulations and local legislation.”  Any regulations depended 
“entirely upon the will and wishes of the people of the territory as they can only be prescribed by 
the local legislatures.  Hence the great principle of popular sovereignty and self-government is 
sustained and firmly established by the authority of this decision.”80 
In one respect, Douglas spoke of a different issue than what the Supreme Court 
addressed.  Nothing in the Dred Scott decision suggested that a territorial legislature could not 
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pass laws regulating slavery; it simply declared that they could not prohibit the institution.  More 
importantly, Douglas raised a critical point by noting that the people in any territory—but 
especially Kansas—could easily find ways to implement a de facto prohibition of slavery and 
thereby circumvent the spirit of the Dred Scott decision.  Southerners did not like the 
implications of Douglas’s statement, though some had already arrived at the same conclusion.  
Just four months before the Supreme Court ruled in Dred Scott v. Sandford, South Carolina 
Representative James L. Orr declared that slavery could not exist where “local legislation and 
local police regulations” did not protect the sanctity of slave property.81 
With popular sovereignty defined by the Supreme Court and Buchanan’s resolve to 
regain control of Kansas, politicians faced the task of putting theory into practice.  Southerners 
welcomed the pronouncements of Buchanan and the Supreme Court, but feared that they had 
secured a hollow victory.82  Betraying a belief that the South would lose Kansas to the 
abolitionists, Louisiana Senator Judah P. Benjamin implored the Buchanan administration to 
consider the expansionist impulse of the South as well as the North.  “Let your policy be directed 
to affording to the South legitimate expansion,” he wrote to Cass, “and she will forget all about 
Kansas, as unworthy of a struggle, whilst her individual energies can be bent on her development 
in regions where our future is plainly marked out for us.”83  Not all southerners looked to 
expansion in the Caribbean as a panacea for the nation’s sectional disputes, but an increasing 
number believed that Kansas would become a free state regardless of what anyone said.  The 
Republicans seemed intent on halting the spread of slavery at any cost and had gained a perhaps 
decisive foothold in Kansas.  Others made clear that the South could ill afford to let down its 
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guard, even with the resounding victory of the Dred Scott decision.  Jefferson Davis reiterated 
his denunciations of the “dangerous innovation” of squatter sovereignty.84  Though Davis and 
most southerners hoped that the Supreme Court had sounded the death knell for squatter 
sovereignty, they looked west to Kansas with a wary eye.  
Events in Kansas reached a fever pitch in the summer of 1857, as deliberation over a 
proslavery constitution intensified and ad the Buchanan administration sent a new territorial 
governor to impose order.  Robert J. Walker, a prominent Democratic politician, reluctantly 
agreed to take charge in Kansas and steer the chaotic territory toward statehood.  To the 
president and his cabinet, Walker seemed a perfect fit; as “a Northerner by birth, a Southerner by 
adoption, and a Union man by conviction,” the diminutive but resolute man possessed the 
necessary credentials to unite people of disparate opinions and quiet the discontent in Kansas.85  
Walker firmly endorsed popular sovereignty, but he also believed that Kansas would never 
accommodate slavery.  In 1856, he had made the controversial assertion that Kansas would 
become a free state because of its climate and soil as well as the mass of northern immigration 
that brought laborers to the new territory.  Kansans would not need slaves for labor when they 
could hire European immigrants and northern day laborers, Walker posited.   
Largely because of his opinions on slavery in Kansas, southerners coolly received news 
of Walker’s appointment.  Some southerners insisted that Walker depart from the practice of his 
“treacherous” predecessors, maintaining “nothing short of a genuine and strict neutrality” on the 
slavery issue.86  Others implored the South to give Walker a chance to oversee a fair and neutral 
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application of popular sovereignty in the territory.87  Almost immediately, however, the governor 
ingratiated himself with the free state partisans in Kansas.  In his inaugural address, Walker 
repeated his claim that Kansas lay beyond an “isothermal” line that would prevent slavery from 
developing in the region.88 Walker also addressed the recent action of the territorial legislature to 
organize a constitutional convention.  Popular sovereignty would fail in Kansas, the new 
governor insisted, “unless the Convention submit the constitution to a vote of all the actual 
resident settlers of Kanzas [sic], and the election be fairly and justly conducted, the constitution 
will be and ought to be rejected by Congress.”89  Northern newspapers and antislavery editors in 
the territory alike received Walker’s words as an affirmation that Kansas would become a free 
state.90   
Radical southerners almost immediately broke with Walker over his inaugural remarks, 
arguing that the new governor had no intention of ensuring the fair and impartial expression of 
the people’s will.  Laurence Keitt of South Carolina called Walker’s demand that voters ratify 
the constitution “unprecedented, and intended only to restore [Kansas] to black republicanism.”91  
A Louisiana newspaper accused Buchanan on breaking his promise to southerners to protect 
their rights; instead the administration had “irredeemably sold” the South to curry northern 
favor.92  Moderate southerners rejected the fulminations of their fire-eating brethren.  In the past, 
constitutional conventions may not have submitted their work to the voters for ratification, but 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act had set a new precedent.  “The distinct ground of this Act is—and a 
more important ground was never taken—that the people of a territory have a right to say in their 
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constitution what shall be the character of their domestic institutions,” a Georgia correspondent 
wrote.  “How can they say this?  In no other way so effectually as by a direct vote of 
themselves.”93 
Walker faced a barrage of criticism from southern ultras, but once again the South 
divided over the administration’s plan for overseeing the constitutional convention that would 
convene in the territorial capital of Lecompton.  Key Democrats, most especially Stephen 
Douglas and Lewis Cass—the chief proponents of popular sovereignty, feared for the governor’s 
position.  Douglas praised Walker’s call for popular ratification of a constitution, citing that his 
position “commanded the approbation of the whole country, with the exception of a small party 
at the South.”94  Southern radicals intended to make the new governor a “scape goat” for their 
dissatisfaction with the Buchanan administration, Douglas wrote.95  He encouraged Walker to 
stand firm on his course and to ensure that the actual residents of Kansas voted on election day.  
Not only did the governor need to make sure that Missourians did not cross the border and vote 
fraudulently, but he also needed to convince the free state Kansans not to boycott the election as 
they had done in past canvasses.   
Cass and Douglas both knew that the future of popular sovereignty as a successful means 
of settling the slavery question hinged on the outcome of the Lecompton constitutional 
convention and the subsequent vote on the document it drafted.  Cass also endorsed Walker’s 
actions, encouraging a plebiscite on the constitution when drafted.  Like Douglas, he believed 
that Walker had to ensure a vote free of fraud in order to achieve stability in Kansas.96  At the 
same time, Cass communicated with key southern allies in an effort to galvanize support for the 
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administration and for popular sovereignty in Kansas.  Robert Toombs of Georgia praised Cass 
for the instructions he had initially sent to Walker, directing the governor to ensure a fair vote on 
any prospective constitution.  Toombs stated his belief that most southerners had no issue with 
submitting the constitution to a popular vote.  “This course though not necessary to the validity 
of the act unless required by lawfull [sic] authority,” he wrote to Cass, “yet, is more conformable 
to the more recent practice, & under the peculiar circumstances of Kansas I should consider the 
most prudent & proper policy.”97  Walker, however, had committed an error that southerners 
could not ignore.  “He has usurped the authority to decide what people, what voters shall have 
the right to vote on this constitution.”98  Toombs insisted that the territorial legislature—elected 
by the people themselves—possessed the right to determine who could or could not vote in the 
election.  As a federal appointee, Walker’s course was “in direct contravention of the doctrine of 
non-interference.”  Popular sovereignty could not prevail with the governor’s interference. “Shall 
he fix the qualifications of voters in Kansas,” Toombs asked, “or shall the people in Kansas be 
free to form their institutions according to their own will?”99 
Toombs had raised an important point by using the popular sovereignty doctrine as a 
weapon against its chief supporters.  A popular vote on the prospective Kansas constitution 
would circumvent the ruling in Dred Scott v. Sandford by allowing a version of squatter 
sovereignty to prevail.  Ultra southerners like Toombs undoubtedly realized that the popular vote 
in Kansas would reject a proslavery constitution, but if the constitutional convention and the 
territorial legislature ratified the document, slavery would almost certainly prevail.  The 
opponents of squatter sovereignty had once focused on the right of territorial legislatures to 
prohibit slavery; now they expanded their criticism to the process by which a territory ratified its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




constitution.  The fight over Kansas increasingly became a struggle over the implementation of 
popular sovereignty as defined by the Supreme Court.  The Dred Scott decision had not ended 
the popular sovereignty debate; it merely shifted the focus from territorial legislatures to 
constitutional conventions. 
Lewis Cass anguished over how to address Toombs’s concerns.  The Buchanan 
administration scarcely needed another prominent critic of its policy toward Kansas, but 
desperately wanted southern allies.  Democratic state conventions in three southern states had 
already passed no-confidence resolutions against Walker, a development that the New York 
Herald called a declaration of “open war” between the southern ultra Democrats and the 
administration.100  Cass conferred with Secretary of the Treasury Howell Cobb, who advised him 
to reply that “we do not approve of any dictation to the people of Kansas about the qualification 
of voters & that Walker himself in his communications disclaims such purpose.”101  Jefferson 
Davis praised Cass for his services to the southern states in dealing with the Walker imbroglio, 
even as he warned him that Congress would have to approve of the Kansas constitution, a subtle 
implication that southerners in the House and Senate would not approve a constitution drafted by 
means they considered fraudulent.102  The president, on vacation in Bedford Springs, 
Pennsylvania, instructed his secretary of state to remain cautious in answering Walker’s critics.  
“The game is now plain,” the president wrote.  “The assaults on Walker were intended to reach 
the administration.”103 
Some southerners had indeed grown impatient with the Buchanan administration’s 
handling of the affairs in Kansas.  Once again, they argued that the northern wing of the 
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Democratic Party had reneged on past promises made to the South.  Popular sovereignty in 
Kansas seemed on the brink of becoming a repeat of what happened in California seven years 
earlier, when a group of antislavery squatters—to the minds of southerners—had taken control of 
the territorial government, drafted an antislavery constitution, and stealthily gained admission to 
the Union as a free state.104  Southerners in the states as well as in Kansas called for restrictions 
on voting rights in the territory to ensure that only bona fide settlers had a voice in the formation 
of a constitution.  Toombs repeated his claims that Walker’s actions in Kansas amounted to 
“executive interference with the popular will in Kansas,” a direct attack on President Buchanan’s 
policy.105  Not all southerners openly criticized Buchanan and the popular sovereignty policy.  
According to a South Carolinian residing in Kansas, the southern settlers supported popular 
ratification of the Lecompton constitution, but “with a restriction, requiring at least, six months 
residence in the Territory so as to cut out all those who are denominated here as the ‘carpet sack 
gentry’ from the North, who have doubtless been imported by the aid societies.”106 
During the contentious summer of 1857, the Buchanan administration stood firm on 
popular sovereignty and Governor Walker.   Events in Kansas, however, continued to 
deteriorate.  The free state coalition, actually a shadow government headquartered some twenty 
miles west of Lecompton in Topeka, resolved to do everything in its power to disrupt the work of 
the Lecompton convention.  They had refused to take part in the June election of delegates to the 
constitutional convention, but in the fall had participated in the election of a new territorial 
legislature and won control of the body.  Incensed at the results of the election, the proslavery 
Lecompton constitutional convention finished work on a proslavery constitution in November.  
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At first the delegates had resolved to submit their work directly to Congress and ignore Governor 
Walker’s instructions to seek popular ratification, but they relented at the behest of moderates 
who forged a compromise plan.  The Lecompton convention would submit the seventh article of 
the charter—which addressed the slavery issue—to voters for ratification.  Voters could choose a 
constitution with slavery or without slavery, the convention contended.  Actually, Kansans had 
no such choice.  If they approved the slavery article, Kansas would become a slave state 
complete with a slave code akin to that of Missouri and Kentucky.  Rejection of the article would 
prohibit the future importation of slaves, but would not affect the status of slaves currently 
residing in the territory.  One way or the other, slavery would remain in Kansas.   
The Lecompton constitution presented northern Democrats with an anguishing dilemma.  
If they rejected the convention’s version of ratification, the South would erupt in opposition to 
federal interference in the affairs of Kansas.  If they accepted popular sovereignty Lecompton 
style, they would face the wrath of voters at home.  Either way they would cause an irreparable 
breach between the northern and southern wings of their party.  In his first annual message to 
Congress, the president declared that the Lecompton convention had “fairly and explicitly 
referred to the people whether they will have a constitution ‘with or without slavery,’” therefore 
complying with the principle of popular sovereignty.107  “Looking back, knowing the ultimate 
consequences of Buchanan’s policy decision,” one historian has remarked, “it stands as one of 
the most tragic miscalculations any President has ever made.”108 
Some consequences of Buchanan’s endorsement of the Lecompton convention became 
immediately apparent.  Douglas leapt to his feet after the Senate clerk had finished reading the 
president’s message, announcing his opposition to the administration’s course regarding 
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Lecompton.  The following day, the Illinois senator delivered a speech on the Senate floor, 
rebuking Buchanan for his startling endorsement of the Lecompton convention.109  The man 
whom some had predicted would become the “great pacificator between the policy of the 
administration and the uncompromising attitude of hostility assumed by Governor Walker” had 
broken with his president.110  The proslavery convention threatened to make a mockery of 
popular sovereignty, Douglas argued, by submitting only a part of the constitution to the people 
for ratification.  If “the President be right in saying that, by the Nebraska bill, the slavery 
question must be submitted to the people, it follows inevitably that every other clause of the 
constitution must also be submitted to the people.”111   
Douglas saved his most vituperative criticism for the manner in which the convention 
delegates had framed the question of whether slavery would or would not exist in Kansas.  To 
Douglas and many northerners, the convention gave Kansans no choice at all; regardless of the 
outcome of the vote slavery would remain.  “Is that the mode in which I am called upon to carry 
out the principle of self-government and popular sovereignty in the Territories—to force a 
constitution on the people against their will,” Douglas asked?112  The indignant senator had 
broken with the president in bold fashion, completely discrediting Buchanan’s motives and 
actions with respect to the Lecompton fiasco.  Douglas took the matter personally, as the 
administration had trifled with his popular sovereignty doctrine.  “I have spent too much strength 
and breath, and health, too,” Douglas declared before his fellow senators, “to establish this great 
principle in the popular heart, now to see it frittered away.”113  
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The Little Giant’s break with Buchanan “plunged the party into confusion and 
consternation,” as leaders sought to calculate their next step.114  Douglas particularly lamented 
the inevitable loss of his southern allies, but he believed that Buchanan’s policy left him no other 
choice but to oppose the work of the Lecompton convention and risk the break with the South.  
Southern Democrats suggested that Douglas discredited his own doctrine by attempting to dictate 
to Kansans how they should ratify their own constitution.   “It is with regret,” a Baltimore editor 
wrote, “that we find this distinguished man now, at this moment, when he should be firm in 
support of his own measure, deliberately arraying himself against it, and virtually declaring that 
the Kansas-Nebraska act is a failure.”115  “That Senator Douglas is in and with the Northern 
party,” the Charleston Mercury maintained, “is no longer questioned.”116 John Tyler declared his 
disgust with Douglas’s break with the president, arguing like many other southerners that the 
Illinois senator had basically invalidated his own doctrine.  “Douglas, I see, has taken ground 
against the Lecompton Convention, and yet nothing is plainer than that, by his own admission, 
the convention was the creation of the popular will, as far as the voting class could make it so, 
and that is the only standard to which we can refer.”117 
Voters in Kansas did receive the chance to vote on the entire Lecompton constitution, but 
only after some complicated maneuvering by Acting Governor Frederick Stanton.  Walker had 
left Kansas for Washington, never to return, to plead his opposition to the Lecompton 
convention.   Stanton let the initial election continue, but scheduled a second referendum in 
which residents would vote on the whole constitution and not just Article VII.  On December 21, 
1857, voters ratified the Lecompton constitution with the seventh article by a vote of 6,226-
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569.118  The free state supporters boycotted the December election that they considered 
fraudulent.  Southerners hailed news of the vote while the northern Democrats bided their time 
until the next canvass, when Kansans would vote on the entire document.  On January 4, they 
voted en masse against ratification of the Lecompton constitution by the overwhelming vote of 
10,226-162.119  This time, the proslavery faction boycotted the election.  Which vote—and which 
version of popular sovereignty—would prevail? 
The Buchanan administration proceeded with referring the constitution to Congress for 
ratification, disregarding the January 4 free state vote.  The entire affair had caused irreparable 
damage to his reputation and to the stability of the Democratic Party.  The South, however, 
feared defeat at the hands of the anti-Lecompton Democrats.  The Buchanan administration’s 
allies desperately tried to convince southerners that the party remained the last bulwark of 
security for their section, but many in the South could not forgive Douglas’s opposition to the 
Lecompton convention.  To their minds, Douglas had committed himself to squatter sovereignty, 
just as Lewis Cass had during the debate over the Compromise of 1850.  Almost eight years 
later, Douglas had finally shown his true colors.  Southerners could no longer trust the Little 
Giant as a defender of their rights.  Douglas and the northern Democracy had betrayed the South 
and her interests by interpreting popular sovereignty as an antislavery principle that would bar 
slaveholders from the plains of Kansas.   
Democrats on both sides of the Kansas issue remained firm in their positions following 
the votes in Kansas.  Douglas maintained his position, arguing that the January 4 vote has 
established conclusively that “the Lecompton Constitution is not the act of the people of Kansas, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Potter, The Impending Crisis, 318; Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas, 156-161. 
119 Potter, The Impending Crisis, 318.  Of the 162 voters for Lecompton, 138 voted for the document with slavery 
and 24 for it without. 
 349	  
and that it does not embody the popular will of that Territory.”120  Southerners, too, vociferously 
defended the work of the Lecompton convention. Congress thrust itself into one of the most 
heated deliberations in its history over admitting Kansas to statehood with the Lecompton 
constitution.  In the lower house in particular, anti-Lecompton Democrats rebelled against the 
president, threatening to block the admission of Kansas.  Southerners witnessed the proceedings 
with indignation.  Governor Joseph E. Brown of Georgia declared, “If Kansas is rejected by a 
direct vote I can see no other course for Georgia to take but to stand by her rights, upon her 
platform, and act, or confess to the world that she has backed down from her solemn pledges.”121 
With Congress deadlocked, the Democratic Party nearly destroyed, and threats of 
disunion surfacing, an Indiana Democrat developed an ingenious, if outrageous, means of 
circumventing the crisis caused by the Lecompton constitution.  A bill presented by 
Representative William H. English would submit the Lecompton constitution to another popular 
vote because of a change in the land grant provided to the territory.  Under the English plan, 
voters would have the choice to gain statehood with slavery if they agreed to a vastly reduced 
federal land grant.  If they opposed the change, Kansas would have to wait until it had a 
population of ninety-three thousand—the minimum population to gain a representative in 
Congress—to reapply for statehood.  The land grant subterfuge allowed Kansans to take another 
vote on the constitution, this time sanctioned by the federal government.  Most politicians 
recognized that the Kansans would reject the constitution and delay admission.122  Though 
radical southerners opposed the English bill, most moderates acquiesced in the fact that the 
Lecompton constitution would inevitably fail.   
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The English bill, which passed Congress on April 30, 1858, allowed the South to save 
face in some small way.  Voters would not technically reject the constitution because of slavery, 
but because of the land grant.  On August 2, Kansans went to the polls yet again and 
resoundingly defeated the Lecompton constitution.  Kansas would not become a state until 
January 29, 1861, and then it would join the Union under an antislavery constitution.123  
Southerners lamely portrayed the English bill as a technical victory for the South. In the months 
after the Lecompton vote, Jefferson Davis made several speeches in Maine and in his home state 
of Mississippi lauding the English bill as a vindication of southern rights.  Technically, according 
to Davis, Congress had admitted Kansas as a slave state.  The Kansans themselves had rejected 
its offer of admission because of the terms stipulated for the circumscribed land grant.  To 
Davis’s mind, the English bill preserved the power of the Democratic Party by protecting equal 
rights for the South.124  The Mississippi senator’s optimism did not obscure the incredibly weak 
bargain Congress had struck, but politicians saw no better way to extricate themselves from the 
Kansas imbroglio.  
The Lecompton fiasco destroyed any hope that popular sovereignty could settle the 
question of slavery in the territories.  Northerners and southerners could not agree on how to 
implement the doctrine even after the Supreme Court had defined it in the Dred Scott case.  Far 
from determining when a territory could legislate on slavery, the focus of the debate merely 
shifted after Chief Justice Taney pronounced his infamous opinion of the court.  Northerners and 
southerners thereafter fought over when and how a constitutional convention could draft and 
ratify a prospective state’s organic law.  Southerners maintained that the territorial legislature of 
Kansas had elected a constitutional convention that possessed the sole right of determining the 
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process of ratification; thereby hoping to avoid a plebiscite on the slavery issue in which they 
suspected slaveholding interests would lose.  Northerners demanded just such a vote because 
they believed the free state interests would prevail.  Popular sovereignty—the doctrine designed 
to vest power over domestic institutions in the hands of the people themselves—proved unable to 
prevent meddling from outsiders.  The final blow came with the English bill, which ended any 
pretense of congressional non-intervention with slavery in the territories.  Congress directly 
involved itself in the affairs of Kansas Territory by ordering the resubmission of the Lecompton 
constitution to the voters.   
Stephen Douglas would not admit the defeat of popular sovereignty.  The Little Giant, 
who had invested so much in the ideal of self-government, would continue to defend it as the 
only way to ensure the safety of the Union.  Desperately clinging to his favored principle, he 
would continue to promote a “strict adherence to the doctrine of popular sovereignty and non 
intervention by Congress with slavery in the territories as well as in the states” long after Kansas 
and made a mockery of the former and Congress and flagrantly violated the latter.125  The 
southerners who had once vigorously supported the Illinois senator now had virtually abandoned 
him, as they now viewed popular sovereignty as an antislavery doctrine. 
Two significant issues confirmed that southerners could no longer trust popular 
sovereignty as sound policy for addressing slavery and territorial expansion.  In the winter of 
1860-1861, Congress once again found itself forming governments for western territories, even 
as the secession of southern states shattered the Union.  During the fateful session of Congress, 
legislators voted to create three new territories in the West—Colorado, Dakota, and Nevada.126  
The enabling bills for each territory contained no reference to slavery, a development that 
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Stephen Douglas saw as an oblique endorsement of popular sovereignty.127  Dakota Territory 
presented an interesting case, as it was the last unorganized region within the Louisiana 
Purchase.  Before 1857, the Missouri Compromise would have prohibited slavery within the 
territory, but the Dred Scott decision’s invalidation of the compromise line left discussion of that 
legal technicality superfluous.  Of course, it did not matter, because slavery would never exist in 
Dakota. 
In an interesting turn of events, the Republican Party had taken to the doctrine with an 
enthusiasm that troubled Douglas and the Democrats.  Republicans, like southerners, recognized 
that popular sovereignty had become an effective tool to prevent the spread of slavery.  They 
believed that popular sovereignty had prevented slavery from taking root in Kansas.  In 1859, 
some Republicans called for an extreme version of popular sovereignty that would have allowed 
territorial residents to elect their own governor and judges, presumably to prevent the proslavery 
Buchanan administration from appointing officials sympathetic to slavery.  By 1860, however, 
Republicans dropped their insistence on an explicit prohibition of slavery in the bills creating the 
Colorado, Dakota, and Nevada territories.   
Republicans in Congress had worked diligently to remove any shadow of a doubt that 
slavery would never exist in the new territories.  The bills had initially contained language 
affirming the popular sovereignty principle, much akin to the clause in the Kansas-Nebraska Act.  
Key senators had removed the clause, however, in order to gain passage of the separate bills.  
Senator Benjamin Wade, an influential Ohio Republican, revealed the reason: Republican 
factions within both the House and Senate could not agree on the meaning of popular 
sovereignty.  Accordingly, negotiators from both chambers agreed to remove the offending 
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clause and remain silent on the slavery issue within the three bills.128  Popular sovereignty—the 
doctrine that so many politicians had believed could solve the vexing slavery issue in so many 
critical moments over the past seventy-five years—still lacked a definition because northerners 
and southerners still sought to interpret it to their advantage.   
Douglas tried valiantly to save some remnant of his cherished doctrine, but key 
Republicans as well as Douglas opponents stripped the bills of any overt reference to his version 
of popular sovereignty.  In a carefully designed blow against the Supreme Court, the Senate 
amended the bills to deny the right of appeal to the Supreme Court on property issues.  They sent 
a clear message that Congress would not allow the Taney Court to exercise its power of judicial 
review to permit slavery in Colorado, Dakota, or Nevada.129  Again Douglas offered resistance to 
the amendment, calling out the Republicans for their effort to circumscribe the authority of the 
southern-dominated Supreme Court and enhance the power of Republican President-Elect 
Abraham Lincoln.  Republicans could play the political game to their advantage now, Douglas 
averred, “but suppose, four years from now, there should be a southern President; then are we to 
be called upon to change the law again, to give a right of appeal from the territorial judges to the 
Supreme Court of the United States?  Are we to change the law and the territorial system 
according as the politics of the President may be changed?”130   
Douglas suffered a final blow to his conception of popular sovereignty in the territorial 
bills of 1860-1861, but in a way, the bills contained the idea of popular sovereignty in its purest 
form.  None of the three bills addressed the slavery issue with regard to the powers of territorial 
legislatures or the judiciary.  Slavery received no mention in the legislation, presumably leaving 
the matter to the people.  Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court had a charge to implement or 
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interpret popular sovereignty.  Most important to the South, nobody believed that slavery would 
exist for a day within Colorado, Dakota, or Nevada.  The territorial debate in the secession 
winter of 1860 and 1861 provided still more confirmation that popular sovereignty would not 
provide southerners with what they demanded—more slave states.   
Even before Congress considered organizing territories in the West, the frantic discussion 
over the meaning of popular sovereignty had convinced southerners that the doctrine offered 
neither solace nor security for their peculiar institution.  Between the rejection of the Lecompton 
constitution and the secession winter, numerous politicians weighed in on the meaning of 
popular sovereignty in the territories.  The arguments that emerged proved that self-government 
in the territories could not extinguish the slavery debate.  Northerners would not accept popular 
sovereignty as defined by the Taney Court and the South, while southerners had come to believe 
that the doctrine would never yield an inch of territory for their section.  
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EPILOGUE 
THE DEMISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 
 
Numerous efforts to resurrect popular sovereignty surfaced after passage of the English 
Bill and the subsequent rejection of the Lecompton Constitution, especially in the secession 
winter of 1860 and 1861 when politicians grasped at anything that might save the Union.  
Popular sovereignty, however, could not function if the North and South could not agree on its 
interpretation.  In the two-year period between the rejection of Lecompton Constitution and the 
coming of the Civil War, three substantive arguments emerged over the interpretation of popular 
sovereignty.  Separately, they show how different people in different sections wanted to cast 
popular sovereignty in order to achieve their desired ends.  Together, they illustrate that despite 
over seventy-five years of debate over popular sovereignty and slavery in the territories, the 
establishment of the doctrine as national policy in 1854, and finally the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, the North and South still held to differing interpretations of 
territorial self-government on which they would not compromise.  
In September 1859, Stephen Douglas drafted a lengthy article for Harper’s Magazine in 
which he defined popular sovereignty.  His treatise, by far the most elaborate description of the 
doctrine ever produced, placed popular sovereignty in historical context in order to refute the 
Dred Scott decision and the arguments of southern ultras.1  The Supreme Court had effectively 
gutted Douglas’s formula for popular sovereignty by endorsing the southern interpretation of the 
doctrine.  The Illinois senator resolved to challenge the Court’s decision and justify his 
conception of popular sovereignty.   
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In addition to the Dred Scott decision, another political factor motivated Douglas to write 
a defense of his conception of popular sovereignty.  After the failure of the Lecompton 
Constitution, the Republican Party had taken to the doctrine with an enthusiasm that troubled 
Douglas and the Democrats.  Republicans, like southerners, recognized that popular sovereignty 
had become an effective tool to prevent the spread of slavery.  They believed that popular 
sovereignty had prevented slavery from taking root in Kansas.  In 1859, some Republicans called 
for an extreme version of popular sovereignty that would have allowed territorial residents to 
elect their own governor and judges, presumably to prevent the proslavery Buchanan 
administration from appointing officials sympathetic to slavery.  Douglas recognized that if he 
had any hope of resurrecting popular sovereignty from the ashes of the Kansas debacle, he had to 
neutralize the new Republican threat.2 
Douglas had a reputation as a brilliant speaker and master debater, but “The Dividing 
Line between Local and Federal Authority” lacked his characteristic verve and logic.  In forty 
pages of labored prose, the Little Giant presented the case for his version of popular sovereignty.  
After stating its different interpretations for his readers, Douglas launched into a history lesson 
designed to show that his doctrine upheld the central tenet of the nation’s Revolutionary 
fathers—the right of the people to govern themselves.  America’s forebears had fought for 
independence to gain “Local Self-Government” in order to “make their own local laws, form 
their own domestic institutions, and manage their own internal affairs in their own way.”3  The 
founders recognized that a “diversity of interests” regarding slavery existed and that only 
through compromise could the thirteen states join in a Union.4  Popular sovereignty, Douglas 
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implied, had facilitated the creation of the Union itself by leaving the matter of slavery to local 
communities. 
For far too long, Douglas argued, the federal government had ignored the wisdom of its 
fathers by meddling in the local affairs of the territories.  The Compromise of 1850 and the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act had restored the nation to its constitutional moorings, but the Dred Scott 
decision—or at least the interpretation others gave to it—threatened all that Douglas and the 
Democrats had gained.  He lamely attempted to assert that the decision did not affect popular 
sovereignty in the territories, a contention easily dismissed by his critics.  The Supreme Court 
had unquestionably challenged Douglas’s contention that territorial legislatures could pass laws 
prohibiting slavery.  On some occasions, most notably the Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858, the 
Illinoisan had fallen back on an idea that became known as the Freeport Doctrine, arguing that 
slavery could not exist where the people did not provide laws and aid for its protection.  Other 
politicians had articulated the idea long before Douglas, but his statement of the principle gained 
immediate attention and prompt disdain from the South.  In the Harper’s article, however, 
Douglas moved away from the Freeport Doctrine and tried to portray the Dred Scott decision as 
sympathetic toward his version of popular sovereignty.5 
The Douglas essay failed to persuade any of the senator’s opponents to embrace his 
version of popular sovereignty.  Indeed, other politicians clamored for the chance to respond to 
Douglas’s argument.  The southern press rose in opposition to the Illinois senator’s defense of 
squatter sovereignty—as they saw it.  The doctrine as described in the Harper’s article “is as 
false in theory as it would be dangerous in practice should it ever be established as the policy of 
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this government,” the Nashville Union declared.6  The Richmond Enquirer labeled it an 
“incendiary document” designed to pacify antislavery northerners.7  Southerners now viewed the 
Douglas doctrine as an antislavery tool that would deprive the South of “all her rights in the 
territories.”8 
Just as southern Democrats excoriated Douglas’s words, so too did the Republicans, who 
accused the senator of ignoring the will of the North, not to mention the moral crime inherent in 
perpetuating slavery.  Horace Greeley, the editor of the New York Tribune, asserted that most 
Americans wanted to halt the spread of slavery into the territories.9  He lambasted popular 
sovereignty as “a politician’s dodge” designed to prevent sectional discord through a false sense 
of compromise.10  “The Sovereignty you defer to, is that of a political necessity, not that of the 
people of the Territories,” Greeley charged.11  The editor took issue with Douglas’s 
interpretation of history, noting that the senator had twisted the meaning of words in cavalier 
fashion.  For example, Douglas used Thomas Jefferson’s proposed Ordinance of 1784 to prove 
that the founding generation instituted popular sovereignty in the territories—or “new states,” as 
Jefferson called them.  Douglas did not admit, Greeley correctly argued, that Jefferson’s 
ordinance would have abolished slavery in any of the territories after 1800.  Douglas completely 
ignored Jefferson’s proposal for gradual abolition in any states created out of the national 
domain.  Likewise, Greeley claimed, Douglas completely ignored the Northwest Ordinance’s 
precedent for federal legislation over slavery in the territories.  In the Ordinance of 1784 and the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, Greeley concluded, history gave “two explicit affirmations by the 
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Revolutionary Fathers, of the right and duty of Congressional Inhibition of slavery in the 
Territories.”12   
The third statement on the popular sovereignty controversy came from the pen of 
Jeremiah S. Black, President James Buchanan’s attorney general.13  Though he hailed from 
Pennsylvania, Black held the views of his chief executive on the slavery issue.  The attorney 
general’s rebuttal to Douglas outlined the position that most southerners held after the failure of 
the Lecompton Constitution.  Black, too, questioned Douglas’s interpretation of history, but for 
far different reasons than Horace Greeley.  The nation’s history provided no precedent for the 
power of territorial legislatures to prohibit slavery, as Douglas asserted, or for congressional 
intervention, as Greeley argued.  Black, however, largely avoided giving a history lesson and 
focused instead on the legal aspects of the popular sovereignty question.  “The Constitution 
certainly does not establish slavery in the Territories, nor anywhere else,” he maintained.  “But 
the Constitution regards as sacred and inviolable all the rights which a citizen may legally 
acquire in a State.”14   In other words, the attorney general supported the decision in Dred Scott 
v. Sandford, which upheld the right of an American citizen to hold slaves in any federal territory.  
The Constitution was impartial on slavery in the territories, requiring both slaves and freedmen 
“to remain in statu quo until the status already impressed upon them by the law of their previous 
domicil [sic] shall be changed by some local competent authority,” namely a constitutional 
convention.15 
Black completely endorsed the Dred Scott decision as the authoritative interpretation of 
popular sovereignty.  The Republicans, whom the attorney general called a “little band of ribald 
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13 [Jeremiah S. Black], Observations on Senator Douglas’s Views of Popular Sovereignty, as Expressed in Harper’s 
Magazine, for September 1859, 2nd ed. (Washington: Thomas McGill, 1859). 
14 Ibid., 4 (italics in the original). 
15 Ibid., 5. 
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infidels,” refused to abide by the decision.16  Douglas, too, seemed insistent on rejecting the 
definition supplied by the Supreme Court in favor of his view that territorial legislatures could 
prohibit slavery.  Black articulated the position southerners had held for years—only a 
constitutional convention could determine the future of slavery within a territory preparing for 
admission to the Union.  He accused Douglas of ignoring his own doctrine with respect to the 
Lecompton Constitution.  Douglas himself had rejected the vote of a plebiscite on the slavery 
provision in the constitution because the Lecompton convention did not allow poplar ratification 
of the entire document.  After the failure of Lecompton, Douglas insisted that the territorial 
legislature could determine the status of slavery without submission of the question to the 
people.  “Popular sovereignty in the last Congress meant the freedom of the people from all the 
restraints of law and order; now it means a government which shall rule them with a rod of iron,” 
Black wrote.  “It swings like a pendulum from one side clear over to the other.”17 
In pointing out the inconsistencies of Douglas’s argument, Black advanced the southern 
definition of popular sovereignty as upheld by the Supreme Court.  The Constitution protected 
the sanctity of personal property—including slavery—in the national domain.  Southerners had 
felt vindicated after the Dred Scott decision, but the unrelenting assault on slavery by the North, 
especially the Republicans, led them to realize that popular sovereignty would never sufficiently 
secure the South’s peculiar institution.  Douglas’s rejection of the Lecompton Constitution and 
his subsequent defection from the Democratic fold convinced many southerners that popular 
sovereignty was an antislavery doctrine.  Squatter sovereignty had triumphed over the true 
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doctrine of popular sovereignty, according to the South.  “Squatter Sovereignty,” a New Orleans 
editor declared in 1860, “looks to permanent exclusion by hostile Territorial legislation.”18 
The failure of the North to accept the Dred Scott decision and acquiesce in the southern 
definition of popular sovereignty left the South with but one alternative: to demand federal 
protection for slavery in the territories.  Some ultra southerners had endorsed federal protection 
in the past, but most southerners repudiated the idea, instead standing by their conception of 
popular sovereignty.  On January 18, 1860, Albert Gallatin Brown, a Democratic senator from 
Mississippi, delivered a series of resolutions calling for federal protection of slavery in the 
territories.  Most notably, Brown demanded a federal slave code that would guarantee the 
sanctity of slave property in any territory.19  Two weeks later, Senator Jefferson Davis introduced 
a less bellicose set of resolutions that once again affirmed the constitutional right to hold slaves 
in the territories.  Mississippi’s other senator did not call for a federal slave code or for active 
federal intervention against antislavery forces in the territories.20  Instead, his resolutions 
demanded that the Senate use its power to “resist all efforts to discriminate” against 
slaveholders’ rights in the territories.21  Regardless of the debate over a federal slave code, 
southerners clearly expressed their belief that popular sovereignty no longer offered them 
protection for slavery. 
In spite of several efforts to resurrect popular sovereignty in order to save the Union from 
destruction, neither Douglas nor any other politician could restore trust in the doctrine.  Popular 
sovereignty—the doctrine that at one time had held significant promise as a way to solve the 
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vexing issue of slavery in the territories—had failed because no one could agree on what it 
meant.  Northerners and southerners held different interpretations of the doctrine that suited their 
respective political goals and opinions.  Republicans and Douglas Democrats used the doctrine 
as an antislavery weapon, while the South saw it as a way to permit the spread of slavery into the 
territories.  Both goals meant that people defined popular sovereignty in different ways at 
different times, leading to often complex interpretations of a doctrine that seemed so simple—the 
right of the people to govern themselves.  Ultimately, northerners and southerners in the states 
could not trust the people in the territories to do as they wished.   
For seventy-five years, American politicians had held to some form of popular 
sovereignty doctrine as a way to determine the future of slavery in the territories.  For many 
years, the idea worked in concert with compromises that prohibited slavery north of a geographic 
line and allowed for popular sovereignty to the south.  The Southwest Ordinance left settlers 
south of the Ohio River free to determine the status of slavery, while the Missouri Compromise 
extended the precedent to the Louisiana Purchase.  In these instances, popular sovereignty had 
facilitated the expansion of slavery through the South.  By the 1840s, however, the North had 
hardened its stance against slavery, just as southerners became increasingly defensive of their 
peculiar institution.  In the late 1840s and 1850s, politicians tried to use popular sovereignty 
again as the best possible compromise to maintain sectional harmony. At the same time, leaders 
muddled its meaning by refusing to specify when the residents of a territory could exercise self-
government.  In the absence of a dividing line—and later in the repeal of the Missouri line 
itself—politicians looked to the Supreme Court to define how popular sovereignty would work.  
When the decision came in 1857, many in the North repudiated it.  In 1860, when the opponents 
of popular sovereignty and slavery gained the presidency, southerners repudiated the Union.  
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Ultimately popular sovereignty failed because it could not provide the North or the South with 
the certain result each section desired.  Popular sovereignty failed, too, for the very reason that 
politicians had enacted it—it removed them from the decision-making process and placed the 
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